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Abstract 
This study focuses on the particular course taken by the theory of sexual 
difference (il pensiero della differenza sessuale) in Italy. It examines Italian 
feminism as a current which has received hitherto little international attention. 
The first part of the thesis situates Italian feminism in relation to the more 
familiar French and Anglo-American contexts in order to consider its 
distinctiveness. The main body of the study then considers the historical and 
political emergence of contemporary Italian feminism, the elaboration of a 
social-symbolic practice called "entrustment" ("affidamento"), beginning in 
1983, and the hegemony achieved by the theory of sexual difference amongst the 
majority of feminist groups. Here, I develop the central argument of the thesis: it 
is the elaboration of entrustment which has first occasioned contemporary Italian 
feminism, as a whole, to engage with a theory of sexual difference adapted to the 
highly politicised Italian context. The last section of the thesis critically evaluates 
entrustment and the symbolic order of the Mother created by it, and considers the 
debates surrounding such a social-symbolic practice. Adriana Cavarero provides 
an original point of view on contemporary Italian feminism since she is both a 
fierce critic of entrustment and one of the leading exponents of ilpensiero. The 
final chapter thus utilises Cavarero's theory in order to postulate that entrustment 
is best considered as part of a plural but common Italian strategy of "practising" 
relationships between women. Sexual difference now becomes the political 
practice of restructuring the order of representation so that feminine sexual 
difference can be included. 
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Introduction: Framing "Italian Feminism" 
In 1990, Teresa de Lauretis deplored: "Italian feminism is not well-known 
in North America. With very few, very recent exceptions, its critical texts are not 
translated, discussed or cited by American and other Anglophone feminists. "' 
Fifteen years on, and despite a few more translations, articles and sporadic 
references in Anglophone publications, this is still the case. Most French 
feminists have been equally oblivious of the work carried out by their Italian 
neighbours. 2 Rather, it is with so-called "minor" feminist currents (Spanish, 
German and Dutch) that a dialogue has been established. 3 It is to be hoped that 
the tide will start to turn, thanks to the attention that Adriana Cavarero's thought 
is currently enjoying in the United States, in Britain and in Australia. It is 
perhaps through her work that Anglophone feminists are likely to become 
progressively more familiar with Italian feminism. Nevertheless, Adriana 
Cavarero occupies a position which is both pivotal and original within Italian 
feminism, as the last chapter of this thesis will argue. 
This lack of attention remains surprising since Italian feminism has 
generally openly received and drawn on both the Anglophone and the 
Continental traditions of feminist thought. Could this show an inner tendency, in 
feminist theory, for "cultural imperialism"'? 4 It is on the issue of imperialism that 
Christine Delphy attacks certain Anglophone feminists who claim to study 
1 Teresa de Lauretis, "The Practice of Sexual Difference and Feminist Thought in Italy: An 
Introductory Essay", introduction to The Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual 
Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1990), p. 1. 
2 Although some important members of the philosophical community of Diotima in Verona 
regularly published in French, the French feminist landscape remains largely unaffected by its 
Italian neighbour. A notable exception here is Luce Irigaray who has been in constant dialogue 
during the 1980s. Luce Irigaray is rightly seen as a major influence on contemporary Italian 
feminism, as Chapter 11 of this thesis will argue. However, in Chapter 111,1 will point out that this 
relationship has often been presented as a one-way exchange and little attention has been given to 
the importance of contemporary Italian feminism for the development of Irigaray's thought. 
3 Many of the Italian feminists who feature in this thesis regularly publish in Spanish and in 
German. In addition, the Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, which is central to my analysis 
of Italian feminism, is in constant dialogue with the Argentinian group "Women of the Plaza del 
mayoll. in Germany, the Italian conceptual isation of sexual difference has been widely debated. 
For an overview, see Britta Kroker, Sexuelle Differenz: Einftihrung in ein Feministiches Theorem 
(Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgeselischaft, 1994). 
4 Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp, Italian Feminist Thought: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 
P. 1. 
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French feminism. Delphy argues that the French feminism discussed by many 
Anglophone feminists has nothing to do with the reality of feminism in France. 5 
In allegedly creating French feminism, these Anglophone theorists have imposed 
their version of events (a version which has served their own theoretical 
purposes) and have silenced many voices. For Delphy, this is where the 
imperialism in question lies. I am not interested in supporting or disclaiming 
these assertions at this point. I will come back to them in the chapter which deals 
with the French context (Chapter 11). For the time being, what is of benefit is to 
relate this problem of imperialism to my own perspective on contemporary 
Italian feminism. 
The purpose of my study is to present this trend of feminism which has 
hitherto received little attention from the two giants of feminist theory, while 
avoiding the kind of imperialism that Delphy describes. Delphy remarks astutely 
that "The very attempt to attribute a specific content to a feminist movement 
shows that we are dealing with an outsider's view. So, even before we start 
looking at this content, we know that it cannot be a self-definition. ,6 My thesis 
is also the result of an outsider's view and I will here outline the particular type 
of Italian feminism I purport to analyse in the following chapters. 
Italian feminism, the social-symbolic practice of entrustment and the theory of 
sexual difference. 
This thesis is centred around a particular political practice elaborated by the 
Milan Women Bookstore Collective (La Libreria delle Donne di Milano) and 
first detailed, in 1983, in a pamphlet entitled "More Women Than Men" ("PiU' 
donne che uomini"). This practice is called "entrustment" ("affidamento"). A 
5 Christine Delphy, "The Invention of French Feminism: An Essential Move" in Yale French 
Studies 87 (1995): 190. 
6 ibid., p. 190. Delphy seems to ignore the fact that even self-defmitions are partial. At times, she 
herself seems to be guilty of the very Imperialism she criticises. In one particular instanceý 
Delphy acknowledges that one of the women writers whose position has been taken as 
representative of the whole of French feminism - namely, Luce Irigaray - is "very popular within 
important part of the women's movement in Italy" (p. 219). However, she minimises the 
relevance of this fact as "marginal". I would argue that Delphy surrenders to the temptation of 
universalising her own version of events (by disclaiming minor cuffents as marginal therefore not 
important to get a clear picture of feminism in France). In addition, this rejection of Ingaray as 
essentialist and a minor theorist in France is bound to give an image of the part of the women's 
movement in Italy as equally iffelevant and underdeveloped. 
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relationship of entrustment is sought by a woman, who is moved by a particular 
desire that she wishes to express in society but who is also blocked by a sense of 
unease, weakness, "estrangement" ("estraneitti "). She chooses an "inspirational 
woman" who becomes a guide, a mentor, a point of reference. The "inspirational 
woman"" helps define and express this desire. Such a relationship is 
controversially based on a difference in ability which separates the "inspirational 
woman"" (whom I call "affidataria" throughout this thesis) and the entirustee. 
Entrustment is both a symbolic and a social practice since it is based on the 
assumption that reality, although presented as neutral, is shaped by male desire 
and body. Entrustment thus responds to what is perceived as a need to sexualise 
social relations. It is also a social practice since it is designed to empower women 
to participate in social relations by creating a network of support through 
multiple relationships between entrustees and their "inspirational women". 
Relationships of entrustment are thus meant to allow women's participation in 
society on their own term by setting a new social contract between them. 
From this provisional description of entrustment, one can already grasp the 
influence of Luce Irigaray (examined in Chapter 11). Irigaray herself has toured 
Italy and has not only participated in feminist seminars but has also been a 
favoured guest speaker at many annual conferences of the Italian Communist 
Party (P. C. I. ). In order to place entrustment within its Italian context, I would 
nevertheless like to observe that the Italian adaptation of Irigaray's theory of 
sexual difference, from the 1980s onwards, has achieved a more or less complete 
theoretical hegemony. So much so that a majority of feminists and political 
activists have been grouped under the banner of il pensiero della differenza 
sessuale (sexual difference thought). That said, it is here important to make three 
additional points. Firstly, despite the theoretical hegemony achieved by the 
theory of sexual difference, there still exists, in Italy, some feminists who favour 
an egalitarian perspective. 7 Secondly and as this thesis will show, not all the 
exponents of il pensiero have embraced the social-symbolic practice of 
7 For example, this is the case of Stella Bianchi, Franca Chiaromonte, Elena Montecchi, Claudia 
Mancina, Laura Penacchl, Tana de Zulueta, Miriam Mafai, Marina Calloni. These women are all 
members of the association "Emily in Italia", which aims at providing more means and support 
for women who wish to enter politics as party activists, candidates and MPs. For an account of 
egalitarian feminism in Italy, see Chiara Valentini, Le donne fanno paura. La veritii sulla vita 
delle italiane (Milan: 11 Saggiatore, 1997). For an account of the activities and goals of "Emily in 
Italia", see Stella Bianchi (ed. ), Emily: come eleggerepitý donne (Reset, 1998). 
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entrustment. For example, this is the case for Adriana Cavarero. We will return 
to her contribution to il pensiero and to her critique of entrustment, in Chapters 
IV, V and Vi. 
The third point I would like to make clear at this early stage is that 
entrustment, while widely known and discussed, is a product of a few feminist 
groups. As Chapters III will show, Italian feminism, from its emergence at the 
end of the 1960s as a movement, is characterised by the diversity of its 
contributors and of the themes chosen, as well as by its diffusion across social 
groups and geographical areas. 81 concentrate on a few of these feminist 
collectives. The Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, both as "inventor" of 
entrustment and exponent of il pensiero, occupies an important place in the 
history of contemporary Italian feminism and in my thesis. The philosophical 
community of Diotima in Verona and the Cultural Centre Virginia Woolf Group 
B are two other prominent groups. 9 Their members have either been directly 
implicated in the creation and promotion of entrustment, or have at least started 
from a common philosophical premise and have theorised the relationships 
between women in similar ways. Following the developments initiated by Luisa 
Muraro, these feminists have concentrated their research on the relationships 
between women as a way of establishing a Symbolic Order of the Mother. 
Chapter IV will compare this Symbolic Order of the Mother and the new social 
contract between women that the social-symbolic practice of entrustment has 
attempted to create. 
I suggest that at least three factors explain the temptation to confound 
Italian feminism with theoretical production of the Milan Bookstore and of 
Diotima. 10 Firstly, it can be explained by the wide diffusion of the theory of 
sexual difference in Italy during these two decades. Chapter III of this thesis will 
map the context (from the late 1960s) in which a move towards sexual difference 
is noticeable. This particular cultural background itself determines the good 
reception of Irigaray and the central place that her thought occupies in 
8 See Bono and Kemp, OP. cit., pp. 4,7. 
9 Although their presence in this thesis is not as conspicuous, I could have mentioned the 
philosophers of the co-operative Transizione, or those of the Centro Donna of 
Naples. 
10 Rosi Braidotti has, in the past, expressed her annoyance at the fact that, when discussed outside 
Italy, Italian feminism has often been reduced to that of the Milan Bookstore and the Diotima. 
See Linda M. Zerilli, "Refiguring Rights Through the Political Practice of Sexual Difference", 
Differences: A Journal ofFeminist Cultural Studies 15: 2 (2004): 85 n. 1. 
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subsequent years. Secondly, It can be argued that the Milan Bookstore and 
Diotima have attracted the greatest attention due to the presence, at their heart, of 
three important theorists: Lia Cigarini (a lawyer and long-standing member of 
the Bookstore), Luisa Muraro (a philosopher both active within the Bookstore 
and within Diotima), and Adriana Cavarero (who, with Muraro, co-founded 
Diotima before taking her distance in the early 1990s). Thirdly, although feminist 
collectives in Italy are generally of a separatist nature, an effort is made, in the 
1980s to export ilpensiero della differenza sessuale outside the singular context 
of the feminist group. In particular, the Communist Party attempts to inscribe 
entrustment in its Women's Charter ("La Carta delle Donne"), discussed in 
Chapter IV, and appoints Adriana Cavarero as a member of its executive 
committee at a crucial stage in the history of the Party. " As a result, both the 
social-symbolic practice of entrustment and il pensiero della differenza sessuale 
become widely known outside feminist circles and its exponents become 
notorious. 12 
The Milan Bookstore and Diotima are thus vital to an understanding of 
contemporary feminism in Italy. However, I do not confine my thesis to their 
arguments alone. The central claim of my study is that there are two factors 
which give contemporary feminism in Italy its specific character. A first source 
of originality lies in the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. Entrustment is 
what has given the theory of sexual difference its distinctly "Italian" 
characteristic precisely because it has helped polarise feminist debates in Italy. 
II From "Partito Communista Italiano ", it becomes the P. D. S, or "Partito Democrato della 
Sinistra" (Democratic Party of the Left). 
12 During an interview that I held at Warwick University in May 2004,1 asked Adriana Cavarero 
about this particular period in Italian feminism and about her appointment within the executive 
committee of the P. C. I/P. D. S. She had this to say: "By the mid-1980s, the philosophical 
community of Diotima had become very famous in Italy. In my own way, I had become 
notorious too. When we used to hold conferences in universities or in women's centres, 
audiences of 500 women used to gather. We had become a phenomenon which was both socially 
and politically conspicuous. I have always been from the Left, but my interest in Left-wing 
politics and in the Italian Communist Party had not involved, up to then, much militancy. It was 
the P. C. I. which contacted me in Rome, mainly for instrumental reasons. As I had become 
famous amongst women and as the question of sexual difference had become an important issue 
within the party, the P. C. I. probably thought that I could become a central figure in what was then 
called the Central Committee. While I was in the Central Committee, the passage from the P. C. I. 
to the P. D. S. occurred. Unlike some other feminists, I was very much in favour of this passage 
and actively worked towards it. I felt that the P. C. I. had become a party rigidly structured around 
a Soviet model. I was subsequently disappointed by the P. D. S. because nothing changed at all. I 
hence distanced myself from the Party's hierarchy because I felt (and still do) that such 
hierarchical politics does not achieve anything. " 
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Whether argued for or disputed, the social-symbolic practice of entrustment has 
never been ignored and has occupied centre stage, not only theoretically but also 
politically. It is these contentious and heated debates which take my analysis 
outside the sole groupings of the Milan Bookstore and of the philosophical 
community of Diotima in Verona. Secondly, I argue that entrustment has directly 
contributed to the subsequent hegemony achieved by il pensiero amongst a 
majority of feminist groups. Although not all sexual difference theorists embrace 
entrustment, they all work towards the restructuring of the symbolic order so that 
feminine sexual difference can be accommodated. 
Unfolding the specificity of contemporary Italian feminism. 
In the opening three chapters of my thesis, I return to the problems of 
framing Italian feminism and of relating it to more familiar contexts. "What are 
the common historical and conceptual characteristics that allow one to relate 
Italian feminism to other feminist strands, while marking it out as distinctive? " is 
here the chief question. Together, these three chapters aim to convey a sense of 
Italian feminism emerging in its specificity from an earlier and more general 
historical origin. Thus, I begin with the broad context of important debates which 
have accompanied the development of Anglophone feminism. In particular, I use 
the prominent debate between equality and difference, that has marked the 
vicissitudes of the history of Anglophone feminism and which has recently been 
contested. I identify key contentions in relation to sex, gender, essentialism and 
anti -essentialism to sustain but also to undennine the chasm that has often 
been 
constructed between Anglo-Saxon and continental feminism. The critical 
arguments of Juliet Mitchell, Nancy Chodorow, Adrienne Rich, Diana Fuss, 
Judith Butler and Christine Battersby are established as points of reference for a 
subsequent comparative discussion of entrustment and of i1pensiero. 
In Chapter 11,1 examine the ways in which such debates between equality 
and difference, essentialism and anti-essentialism have been inflected or refined 
by certain French feminists. Simone de Beauvoir, Jacques Lacan, the 
"Psychanalyse & Politique " group and, of course Luce Irigaray, are identified as 
important to the development of Italian feminism. The aim of the chapter is to 
see how the French context specifically engaged with these issues of equality and 
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difference, and to detennine which aspects of Irigaray's work filtered through to 
i1pensiero and entrustment. 
Chapter III concentrates on the way in which Italian feminists have both 
used and adapted the Anglo-Saxon and the French perspectives to the Italian 
case. I argue that there are grounds for conceiving of the history of Italian 
feminism, from its early forinulations to the establishment of entrustment, as a 
passage from egalitarianism to gynocentrism. However, I also show that il 
pensiero and entrustment have to be seen as "home-grown" theories. In 
endeavouring to retrace a history of feminism in Italy, I hence prefer to 
investigate the shift from an analysis of the relationship between the sexes to a 
conceptualisation of the relationships amongst women. I argue that relating such 
an evolution helps to identify the key moments which have led to the creation of 
entrustment and to the hegemony of il pensiero. This evolution also shows the 
importance that the practice of relationships between women has held within 
Italian feminism since the earliest feminist groups. My intention, in these three 
opening chapters, is to add the Italian perspective to the Anglo-Saxon and the 
French ones, without reifying any particular "strand" of feminism. 
The remaining chapters deal more directly with i1pensiero della differenza 
sessuale and with the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. Chapter IV is 
entirely and exclusively dedicated to the specificity of entrustment. I argue that, 
while the mark of Luce Irigaray is both evident and acknowledged, the Italian 
specificity of the theory of sexual difference lies in the political practice of the 
relationships between women, which has defined Italian feminism from the 
1970s and continues to do so. In addition, an explanation of the aims and 
mechanisms behind entrustment enables my argument to consider critically why 
entrustment is both specific and original to Italian feminism. In this chapter, I 
also attempt a comparison of the social contract between women that entrustment 
seeks to create and of the Symbolic Order of the Mother as theorised by members 
of Diotima. 
Chapter V addresses the criticisms and the limitations of entrustment. In 
particular, I concentrate on the concept of power, as articulated through the 
social-symbolic practice of entrustment. I return to what the previous chapter has 
identified as entrustment's main source of both originality and contention- 
namely, that it is a relationship structured by the disparity which exists between 
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two women. I also examine the nature of the female subject that the practice of 
entrustment calls forth and consider it in the light of different accusations of 
essentialism. It is in this chapter that the different voices of contemporary Italian 
feminism are heard, since other feminists from within il pensiero support my 
own critique. 
Finally, Chapter VI deals with the most important of these voices, that of 
Adriana Cavarero. My focus is on the complexity of the relationship which links 
Cavarero's thought to i1pensiero della differenza sessuale. I trace an evolution in 
her work from an Irigarayian to an Arendtian influence. My aim is to illustrate 
how, like entrustment theorists, Cavarero inherits from Irigaray the critique of 
the existing "hom(m)osexual" symbolic and answers the call to "invent" 
feminine sexual difference. This is what situates Cavarero, Diotima and 
entrustment theorists under the common banner of il pensiero della differenza 
sessuale. However, I argue that Cavarero's thought occupies a specific position 
within il pensiero on two particular counts. Firstly, she adapts the Arendtian 
categories of natality, uniqueness as well as action to feminist purposes. 
Secondly, these themes prevail over the Irigarayian concept of female mediation 
(central to entrustment and to Diotima). She thus replaces a politics of difference 
by one of uniqueness. In this way, expressing sexual difference is no longer the 
starting point of a feminist political strategy but its inevitable effect. 
All in all, the chapters of this thesis add the Italian voice to contemporary 
feminist theoretical debates. Focussing on the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment helps to account for the specificity of contemporary feminism in 
Italy. Indeed, this social-symbolic practice has only been elaborated within the 
Italian context and, although it is not unanimously embraced, has contributed to 
the hegemony that i1pensiero della differenza sessuale has achieved over the last 
twenty years. This thesis therefore postulates that entrustment is best considered 
as part of a plural but common Italian strategy of "practising" relationships 
between women in a bid to restructure the order of representation so that the 
latter can include feminine sexual difference. As such, the Italian voice, if heard, 
can contribute to current feminist debates on the problematisation of the feminine 
and feminist subject position. 
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Chapter I 
"Surfing the Waves": Equality and Sexual Difference in the 
Anglophone Context 
Introduction: Italian feminism in an international context. 
The aim of the opening three chapters of this thesis is to situate Italian 
feminism within a historical and international context. At the outset, purporting 
to study "contemporary Italian feminism" already sets up a spatio-temporal 
frame to my analysis. In the coming chapters, I will show why, in Italy, one can 
consider post-1983 feminism "contemporary". Firstly, 1983 marks the opening 
of polarising debates surrounding the invention of the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment. Entrustment also directly contributes to the second contemporary 
characteristic of Italian feminism - namely, the subsequent hegemony achieved 
by the theory of sexual difference (ilpensiero della differenza sessuale). 
The geographical limits that the adjective "Italian" suggests are more 
difficult to pin down. Is feminist theory to be considered "Italian" when it is 
conducted within the geo-political frontiers which delineate the nation-state of 
Italy? Adopting such a preposterous logic would force us to consider, for 
example, Luce Irigaray's Democracy Begins Between Two, 1 written in Italy, as a 
work typical of Italian feminism. Are we, then, to label feminist theory "Italian" 
when it is produced by Italian-born philosophers? This is what Nancy K. Miller 
seems to suggest indirectly when she calls, at the end of the 1980s, for a more 
international outlook on feminist debates, one which would not only include 
Anglo-Americans, French but "also Italians, for instance. 992 In referring to 
"Italians". Nancy K. Miller has Teresa de Lauretis and Rosi Braidotti in mind. 
Although both are Italian-born thinkers who have maintained a critical 
relationship with entrustment theorists and with the exponents of il pensiero 
1 Luce Irigaray, La democrazia comincia a due (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1994), translated 
into 
English by Kirsteen Anderson as Democracy Begins Between Two (London: 
Athlone Press, 
2000). 
2 Nancy K. Miller, Subject to Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 18. 
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della differenza sessualel' they have both lived and worked outside Italy for 
some time, and I would guard myself from thinking them representative of 
contemporary Italian feminism. 
Sexual equality or sexual difference? 
This first chapter identifies the common historical and theoretical features 
which Anglophone and Italian feminisms share and prepares the discussion of 
the specificity that allows one to mark the theoretical productions of feminists 
from Italy as "Italian". In particular, I here retrace the development of 
Anglophone feminism. The central debate on which I concentrate opposes 
advocates of equality to supporters of difference. Equality and difference are 
essentially contested concepts, the precise meanings of which have 
, 
never been 
univocal but have shifted according to the different historical and political 
positioning of various feminists. Within feminism and political theory in general, 
equality and difference act as units of an inseparable couple. There is a wide 
recognition that women are both equal and different to men, and rare attempts 
have been made to favour equality or difference independently and 
unequivocally. Feminism's concern has been the articulation of the relationship 
between the two concepts (Carole Pateman calls it "Wollstonecraft's dilemma', 4). 
What are the different definitions of equality and difference? What are the 
fluctuations in the relationship between these two concepts? These will be two 
recurrent questions in this chapter. 
My purpose is not to offer a monolithic and comprehensive narrative of the 
history of Anglophone feminism. The equality vs. difference debate is much 
rehearsed and I do not wish to repeat it as such. Rather, my objective is to select 
the key aspects and thinkers who will subsequently aid me to confirm as well as 
undermine the distance separating Anglo-Saxon from Continental feminism, and 
31 will have many occasions to use and mention their perspective on entrustment and on il 
pensiero della difterenza sessuale in the coming chapters. Here, I will only give two provisional 
examples of de Lauretis and Braidotti's critical connection with Italian feminism: Teresa 
de 
Lauretis, "The Essence of the Triangle or, Taking the Risk of Essentialism Seriously: Feminist 
Theory in Italy, the U. S., and Britain", Differences I (Summer 1989): 3-37, and Rosi Braidotti, 
-Commento alla relazione di Adriana Cavarero" in Cristina Marcuzzo. and Anna Rossi Dona 
(eds. ), La ricerca delle donne. Studifemministi in Italia (Turin: Rosenberg & Sellier, 1987). 
4 Carole Pateman, quoted in J. Squires, Gender in Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1999), p. 12 1. 
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to establish the originality of the Italian position. In addition, the equality vs. 
difference debate is a good starting point because it is so theoretically charged as 
to contain other concepts which will reappear in my analysis of entrustment and 
of il pensiero della differenza sessuale. The opposition between equality and 
difference also calls forth debates between sex and gender, and between 
essentialism and anti-essentialism. At different times, these additional debates 
have dominated and determined the hierarchy between a strategy of equality and 
one of difference. 
Preliminary definitions. 
Because of the connection between equality/difference, sex/gender, and 
essentialism. /anti-essentialism, I feel it would be useful, at this early stage, to give 
a few preliminary definitions. The debates characteristic of the so-called "second 
wave"" of feminism have been fought on the distinction between "sex" (as 
biologically and naturally deten-nined sexual difference) and "gender"' (as 
culturally constructed difference). Although traceable to the central claim of The 
Second Sex (1949), where Simone de Beauvoir asserts that one is not born but 
rather becomes a woman, we will see how egalitarian theorists of the first wave 
already use this distinction implicitly. 
Similarly, the debate between essentialism and anti-essentialism is a frame 
which is specific to the late 1980s and to the 1990s. However, one can notice the 
endorsement or refusal of the two terms in many earlier feminist arguments. 
Briefly, "essentialism" designates, in the words of Diana Fuss, "a belief in the 
real or true essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the 
5 'whatness' of the given reality". This conception of essence as "what it is to be", 
6 
as the timeless elements which persist across change, goes back to Aristotle. In 
feminist theory, essentialism thus refers to a given set of characteristics without 
which a woman would not be a woman. 
5 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1989), p. xi. 
' Christine Battersby, The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of 
Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 25 and Ch. 2 as a whole. In the last part of the 
chapter, we will see that Christine Battersby argues that it is the Aristotelian conception of 
essence which has dominated the essentialist/anti-essentialist debate in the Anglo-American 
countries. 
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However, the problem is that essentialism is "a loose tongue'57 and as such, 
is used in conjunction with other close terms such as biologism, naturalism, 
universalism which also connote necessity and fixity. To succinctly follow the 
distinctions delineated by Elizabeth Grosz, biologism and naturalism are 
Particular forms of essentialism. While the former designates the biological 
capacities forming the bedrock of essence, the latter postulates a fixed nature for 
women (one which is not always given in biological forms). Finally, 
universalism (whether articulated in terms of biology, nature or culture) refers to 
the tendency of assigning common characteristics to women across historical, 
8 cultural and social contexts. In the course of this chapter, I will come back to 
refine and develop these definitions. 
"Surfing the waves ". 
This chapter thus consists of three parts. The opening two sections deal 
with how the first two waves of feminism articulate the relationship between 
equality and difference. In a first instance, I confront liberal and Marxist theorists 
who, although ideologically opposed, have tipped the balance in favour of 
equality. I pay particular attention to Juliet Mitchell because she tries to bridge 
feminism, Marxism and psychoanalysis, three fields which have also played a 
major part in the development of Italian feminism. Secondly, I concentrate on the 
shift of priority operated by difference theorists focusing, in particular, upon the 
views on mothering adopted by Nancy Chodorow and Adrienne Rich. 
Chodorow's perspective is of notable interest since she exemplifies another way 
in which feminism and psychoanalysis have been related in the Anglophone 
context. Although Chodorow deals with psychoanalysis and mothering, the 
political implications of her thought for women are different from those 
envisaged by entrustment theorists. I also examine Adrienne Rich's treatment of 
motherhood and of the relationships between women to argue that she is, 
7 Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak with Ellen Rooney, "In a Word. Interview" in Naomi Schor and 
Elisabeth Weed (eds. ), The Essential Difference (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), p. 159. 
8 Elizabeth Grosz, "Sexual Difference and the Problem of Essent a sm" n Schor and Weed, Te h 
Essential Difference, op. cit., pp. 84-86. 
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alongside Irigaray, the other great inspiration behind the development of 
entrustment and of ilpensiero. 
The third section of this chapter brings us to the present and deals with the 
way "third-wave" theorists have attempted to go beyond the equality/difference, 
sex/gender, essentialism/anti-essentialism dichotomies. In a first instance, this 
has created space for the consideration of other differences such as sexuality and 
race to feature in feminist politics. In addition, the progressive questioning of any 
stable identity, that the increasing influence of poststructuralism and 
postmodernism over feminism has encouraged, has presented feminism with an 
ontological and a political challenge to which I will return. 9 Therefore, the 
closing part of this chapter looks at some solutions offered to overcome this 
problem. Amongst them, I focus on the importance of strategic essentialism and 
begin to ask whether entrustment could be considered as a practical application 
of this politics. I also follow up Judith Butler's proposal for a feminist genealogy 
of the category of "woman", in order to contrast it with Italian feminists' use of 
the term "genealogy". Finally, I consider the work of Christine Battersby since 
her proposal of a new feminist metaphysics recalls many aspects of Adriana 
Cavarero's politics of uniqueness (discussed in the closing chapter of this thesis). 
Section 1. The E$! alitarian perspective: 
From a chronological point of view, equality is the chief preoccupation of 
first-wave feminism (183 0- 1920). 1 have typically divided egalitarian feminists 
into two groups. The first group uses the framework of liberalism to argue for 
sexual equality via the acquisition of rights. Here, equality is first given a legal 
and political definition until the emergence of the second wave (around the later 
9 Although I here lump together poststructuralism and postmodemism, I am aware that these two 
currents of thought, while sharing obvious affinities, are not exactly the same. 
As Christine 
Battersby rightly points out, poststructuralism "involves a thesis about language 'after' 
structuralism", while postmodernisin "involves a variety of theses about modernity and 
temporality" (Battersby, The Phenomenal Woman, op. cit., p. 13). For a comparative 
discussion of 
these two theoretical currents, see Madan Sarup, An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism 
and postmodernism (London: Harvester, 
1988). For an exposition of the implication of each term 
for feminist theory, see Diana Coole, Women in Political Theory (London and New York: 
Wheatsheaf Harvester, 1993), Ch. 10. In the coming chapters, I will argue that poststructuralism 
has had a much greater influence upon Italian feminism than postmodemism. 
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1960s), when equality is considered broadly in sexual terms. The second group 
of egalitarians, of a socialist/Marxist conviction, first targets the more structural 
(economic) reasons for inequality. Beyond the writings of Marx and Engels, 
mentioned in this part, one could consider the more "dormant" period of the 
feminist movement (c. 1920-1960) as an attempt to settle the "Woman Question" 
and to reconcile feminism and Marxism. This attempt is furthered when 
feminism re-emerges as a movement at the end of the 1960s. It is then that Juliet 
Mitchell endeavours to "rehabilitate" psychoanalysis and to combine it with 
Marxism for feminist ends. Let us now turn to these two groups of egalitarians in 
more detail. 
1. The fiberal approach to the debate between equality and difference. 
Liberalism holds much potential for improving the condition of women in 
society. Its emphasis on the fundamental natural freedom and equality of all 
individuals, reflected and upheld by legal rights, together with its definition of 
politics as a public sphere where the differences which exist between citizens 
become irrelevant to an equal and free political debate, are first considered as 
positive force for women. At the time of its emergence as a major political 
ideology, liberalism thus offers a first opportunity to claim the freedom, equality 
and rights which are badly lacking for women. The task of the first feminists is 
thus to hold liberalism accountable to its universal ideals, and to use the latter to 
request sexual equality in front of the law. 
In order to do that, early liberal egalitarians have to go against a whole 
tradition of political thinkers who explain women's social subjection by the 
biological or natural differences between the sexes. The essentialist strategy that 
these political philosophers use is centred around the distinction between nature 
and culture. While such misogynist arguments make a sharp distinction between 
the "male" (the animal ruled by passions and often located in a state of nature) 
and the "masculine" (the sophisticated, rational, free, political agent), they 
collapse the "female" and the "feminine" together in nature. Thus, women are 
described as lacking the capacity to transcend their body and reach the rational, 
detached and objective standpoint that political activity is considered to require. 
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They are often associated to Nature, the irrational, the passions, that is to all the 
things which liberal philosophy rejects as unfit and dangerous for public fife. ' 0 
Early liberal feminists historicise these descriptions of women, contending 
that they do not portray women's nature but the characteristics of contemporary 
women who have been denied rights and opportunities. They thus recuperate the 
distinction between nature and culture in order to apply it to women. In addition, 
many note that such descriptions are not objective but prescriptive since they set 
guidelines for an acceptable feminine behaviour. " Nature vs. culture, 
prescription vs. description and historicist arguments still form the basis of 
second wave attacks on "Patriarchal religion, popular attitude and to some 
degree, science as well [which assume the] psycho-social distinctions to rest 
upon, the biological differences between the sexes, so that where culture is 
acknowledged as shaping behaviour, it is said to do more than co-operate with 
nature. ") 12 
The differentiation between that which is naturally produced and that 
which is culturally induced becomes particularly important to second-wave 
radical egalitarians, who reformulate it as the sex vs. gender opposition. 
Although already implied in writers such as Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart 
MilI5 13 feminism owes the extremely influential distinction between biological 
sex and cultural gender to Kate Millett who, in Sexual Politics, recuperates it 
from Robert J. Stoller. 14 Once the sex vs. gender dichotomy is formally made and 
10 For example, such descriptions are to be found in Denis Diderot's essay on women where he 
argues that the uterus is the cause of all of women's excesses. Jean-Jacques Rousseau also 
typically collapses together the biological characteristics of the female sex with the feminine 
character when he declares that "the male is only male now and then, a female is always a 
female. " See Denis Diderot, "Sur les femmes" in Oeuvres (Paris: Editions de la P161ade, 
Gallimard, 1951), p. 954, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile ou De VEducation (Paris: Garnier- 
Flammarion, 1966), p. 477. However, it should be pointed out that, in the same essay, Diderot 
does acknowledge that natural and positive laws have been combined to keep women in their 
inferior state. 
11 See, for example, Mary Wollstonecraft's critique of Rousseau's Emile in A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman (1792). 
12 Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (London: Abacus, 1971), p. 27. In The Feminine Mystique, Betty 
Friedan uses the historicist argument against Freud's theories on female sexuality. In Sexual 
Politics, Kate Millett furthers this attack using the prescription vs. description argument. See 
Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (London: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 93, and Kate Millett, 
ibid., p. 183. 
13 See, for example, John Stuart Mill, "On the Subjection of Women", in Alan Ryan (ed. ), Mill 
(New York and London: Norton, 1997), p. 149. 
14 Millet, op-cit. pp. 29-31. Stoller is at the origin of other distinctions which will be very 
influential for feminist theory. For example, in the passage that Millett quotes, Stoller stresses the 
distinction and the contingent correspondence between male/female and masculine/feminine 
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used to claim political as well as socio-economic equality for women, the 
contiguity and intermingling of the two terms, emphasised in Stoller, is 
nevertheless lost. While the early liberal egalitarians mentioned above are keen 
to downplay some aspects of sexual difference in order for women to qualify as 
bearers of natural rights, we shall shortly see that they both retain some notion of 
sex. Once the distinction between sex and gender is explicitly formulated, 
gender, to use Tina Chanter's expression, is "deified" and becomes immune to 
any serious questioning. ' 5 Correlatively, difference, essentialism, biologism and 
naturalism become closely connected and depreciated as irremediably 
determining the social fate of women. 
This evolution of the sex vs. gender dichotomy has, to a certain extent, 
influenced the negative reception of Luce Irigaray's writings in the Anglophone 
context. 16 This has not been the case in Italy, where Irigaray has been received 
favourably right from the early translation of Speculum in 1975.17 In Chapter 111, 
we will see how this can be explained by the specific historical development of 
feminism in Italy, where the debate between sex and gender has never been so 
pivotal, or polarised as in the Anglophone context. ' 8 
(p. 30). In Gender Trouble, Butler indeed favours the subversive potential that unusual 
combinations between these terms can have on politics. As we shall see, she also questions the 
adequacy with which the sex/gender distinction has been used within feminist theory. See Judith 
Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion ofIdentity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 
P. 1 1. 
15 Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros: Irigaray's Re-Writing of the Philosophers (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 40. Tina Chanter also points out that Stoller acknowledges his debt to Freud 
but that, in her intent to criticise Freud, Millett (like other liberal feminists) omits the 
psychoanalytic lineage of the distinction between sex and gender. According to Chanter, it is 
precisely "The abstraction of the distinction from psychoanalysis [which] has generated a 
discourse in which attempts to retain a sense of [the sex vs. gender] complexity have been 
outlawed" (ibid., p. 41). 
16 This prejudiced reception of Irigaray is now widely recognised. See, for example, Tina 
Chanter, Ethics of Eros, op. cit., Introduction and Ch. 1, Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking, ChA, 
or Naomi Schor, "This Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray", 
Differences I (Summer 1981): 38-59. 
17 Luisa Muraro translated Irigaray's Speculum a year after its original publication in French but 
10 before its English translation. 
18 The lesser importance of the sex-gender dichotomy in Italy can be partly explained 
linguistically. As Kirsteen Anderson points out at the outset of her translation of Irigaray's La 
democrazia comincia a due, the Italian language "does not distinguish between 'male' and 
6 masculine' or 'female' and 'feminine', both meanings are covered by 'maschile' or 'femminile "' 
(in Luce Irigaray, Democracy Begins Between Two, op. cit., p. vii). The same applies to the 
French language, where 'fiýminin " is used "for all the varieties of sexual difference that relate to 
4woman... (Battersby, The Phenomenal Woman, op. cit., p. 19). 
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The requirements of equality and the ghost of essentialism. 
The liberal perspective can be used to illustrate the artificiality of the sharp 
opposition between equality and difference. Once women's differences from men 
are both downplayed and described as socially constructed, it is felt that women 
can truly be "considered in the grand light of human creatures"19 and can thus be 
included in the universals upon which liberal rights are erected. Liberal feminists 
can then request sexual equality. For Wollstonecraft and Mill, sexual equality is 
to be achieved by extending rights to women and by emphasising equal 
opportunities. But, as later feminists will find out, translating equal opportunities 
politically (in maternity leave for instance) often erodes the rigid barriers 
between equality and difference. Equal opportunities require setting up special 
measures because, generally, women can have children. 20 
In addition, a certain degree of essentialism pervades liberal egalitarianism. 
Despite its rejection of the biologist or naturalistic justifications of women's 
subjection, there are at least four ways in which essentialism haunts the liberal 
argument for equality. Firstly, early egalitarians such as Wollstonecraft and Mill 
are often limited by the liberal perspective they endorse. For example, 
Wollstonecraft or Mill never truly challenge the sexual division of labour or the 
separation of public from private. Wollstonecraft demands more rights and 
autonomy for women so as to make of them better wives and mothers since "the 
care of children in their infancy is one of the grand duties annexed to the 
female 
sex by nature". 21 Similarly, Mill's view of the family, to which 
he thinks the 
majority of women belong, is also embedded in a bourgeois sentimentalism - 
it 
22 
is the seed of virtue, where progressive values are taught . In that way, the 
essentialist assumptions that both Wollstonecraft and Mill criticise are 
displaced 
onto the family. One could therefore argue that, instead of 
being ignored, sexual 
19 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (Toronto: Dover 
Publications, 
1996), p. 7. 
20 In Italy, where the feminist movement arose as a result of the massive 
demonstrations for the 
legalisation of abortion and of divorce, the simultaneous fight for equality and 
difference is 
recognised and actively practised until the 
beginning of the 1980s. For a history of the two laws 
on abortion and divorce, see 
Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought: A 
Reader (oxford: Blackwell, 199 1), Ch. 11. 
21 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, op. cit., p. 156 
22 john Stuart Mill, "On the Subjection of Women", op. cit., p. 168. 
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difference is in fact protected, confined to the private realm (where liberal rights 
do not reach) and thus de-politicised. 
Socialist feminists will challenge this view of the family and the liberal 
separation of the private from the public. A similar critique is also put forward by 
second-wave liberal feminists who target sex roles. For Millett, sex roles are 
"allotted to the female [and tend] to arrest her at the level of biological 
experience"23 and, when supplemented by force (rape, brutality and ridicule), 
engineer women's consent to their own oppression. This is how Millett extends 
the notion of politics, beyond the fight for rights, to encompass "power- 
structured relationships, arrangements whereby one group of person is controlled 
by another. ý24 
Secondly, Wollstonecraft or Mills' defence of women's rights as a "means 
to general well-being rather than absolute ends intrinsic to every individual . )25 
does not only open the possibility of defending the reduction of women's rights 
on the same utilitarian basis. It also paradoxically undermines the fact that 
women, as an integral part of the human race, are constitutively entitled to 
natural rights. We seem to have thus returned to this Aristotelian premise - 
although women are "human" (and have the minimal characteristics which 
constitute the essence of "human"), they do not instantiate that essence in its 
most perfect form. 
26 
Thirdly, essentialism also makes its way back into the liberal argument for 
equality via universalism. The type of equality demanded by Wollstonecraft and 
Mill seems to benefit only one section of the female population, namely middle- 
class women . 
27 The problem of universalism is not fully resolved in the second- 
wave. Indeed, in their exhortation for women to work, both Friedan and Millett 
ignore the specific case of those women who already have to work. Millett's 
universalist tendencies are also apparent in the concept of "patriarchy", which 
23 Millett, Sexual Politics, op. cit., p. 26. Millett reserves a section of Sexual Politics to John 
Stuart Mill (pp. 89-108) whom she sometimes praises, not least for his description of the home, in 
existing marital arrangements, where women are treated as slaves and are often subjected, 
without resources, to sexual violence (p. 99). 
24 ibid., p. 21. We will see how the feminist movement in Italy, also arises from a rejection of a 
narrow definition of politics. 
25 Diana Coole, Women in Political Theory, op. cit., p. 115. 
26 Battersby, The Phenomenal Woman, op. cit., p. 26. 
27 wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, op. cit., p. 7. 
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she introduces in the language of feminism. For her, patriarchy crosses the 
barriers of different epochs, cultures, and classes. 28 
Fourthly, liberal egalitarians of the first two waves of feminism still rely on 
a particular conception of human nature. Human beings are essentially rational 
and perfectible. Even for those second-wave feminists who focus on the 
psychological engineering of consent, sex roles can be voluntarily fought by a 
revolution in consciousness, that is, an intentional refusal of the housewife 
image, of marriage and motherhood as ends in themselves . 
29A girl would then 
learn to compete, "not as a woman, but as a human being". 30 In addition, liberal 
egalitarians either cherish an ideal of the whole, where the two sexes 
complement one another (Wollstonecraft, Mill), or one where humans are 
androgynous (Friedan, Millett). However, androgyny is far from being "genuine" 
here since it is not a question of annulling sexual difference by blending the 
characteristics that are usually associated to both sexes. Rather, it is a question of 
being able to ignore female sexual difference by taking the male as model. 
Androgyny is irremediably androcentric. This critique certainly also applies to 
some aspects of the Vindication, where Wollstonecraft openly wishes women to 
become more masculine. 31 In general, liberal egalitarians have been criticised for 
pursuing a strategy of assimilation into a social and political system which 
effectively takes man as its nonn. Apart from the fact that rights and equal 
opportunities have to be asked to the oppressors, they also imply individualist, 
autonomous and competitive actors. Arguably then, "equality" comes to mean 
"sameness" since conceptions of humanity and of society are modelled on a 
masculine criteria and approach to social life. In the following chapters, we will 
see how Irigaray and ilpensiero theorists have certainly inherited this definition 
of "equality" as "sameness". For them, equality not only means "sameness" but 
also "equalisation" of women as the "other" of man. 
32 For the moment, let us 
examine the socialist argument for equality. 
28 Millett, Sexual Politics, op. cit., p. 25. This critique is also often directed at Irigaray (see Tina 
Chanter, Ethics ofEros, op. cit., p. 5). 
29 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, p. 297. 
30 ibid., p. 318. 
31 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, op. cit., p. 9. 
32 For a questioning of the over-used equation between equality and sameness/equalisation in 
feminist theory, see Joan W. Scott, "Deconstructing Equal, ty-Versus-D, fference: Or, the Uses of 
poststructuralist Theory for Feminism", in Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox-Keller (eds. ), 
Conflicts in Feminism (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), p. 142. 
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2. Socialist egalitarians: between class and V_ender: 
One of the major contributions that Marxism makes to the analysis of the 
situation of women in society is to point to inequality as a structural problem. To 
a certain extent, this challenges the universalist grounds of the liberal fight for 
equality since Marxism recognises class as an index of variation in women's 
experience. Marxism is nonetheless faced with the problem of striking a difficult 
balance between equality and difference. This means that, although stressed in 
various ways, the two concepts subsist side by side. The way out of this dilemma 
is to relinquish the category of gender to that of class. 
Marxism and "the Woman Question ": the materialist approach to equality. 
The historical and materialist approach to the concept of equality holds 
some great promises for women. The materialist analysis of history as a series of 
"stages", each characterised by a particular mode of production and a specific 
class conflict, conveys that inequality is not natural and therefore not immutable. 
Marxists seek to demonstrate, as Engels does in The Origin of the Family, 
Private Property and the State (1884), that the economic foundation of gender 
inequality can be traced to the appearance of private property. 
Accordingly, it is the advent of the capitalist mode of production which 
inaugurates the difference between working and middle-class women. While 
both classes of women suffer inequality as a result of the capitalist system, the 
type of inequality they have to endure is different. Large-scale industry drives 
working-class women to join the mass of the male workforce. They hence suffer 
as exploited labourers. With the advent of capitalism, it is middle-class women 
who, because of their sex, have to endure confinement in the home, a life of 
slavery, producing heirs to the patriarch's fortune. The bourgeois 
family, 
depicted favourably by John Stuart Mill, is for Marx and Marxists a system of 
monogamous marriage, "supplemented by adultery and prostitution", 
33 one 
where women are "owned" in common. Essentialism is 
here coupled with 
biologism and fatalism and displaced onto the bourgeois family. 
33 Friedrich Engels, "The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State" in Robert Tucker 
(ed. ), The Marx-Engels Reader (New York and London: Norton, 1978), p. 745. 
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Although women from different classes face different types of inequalities 
(of sex or of class), Marx and Engels nominate a common solution to achieve 
universal equality - the overthrow of capitalism. Here, the Marxist critique of 
rights amounts to a refusal of liberal equality as assimilation to an existing 
system. However, Marxist equality also requires a fon-n of assimilation since 
womeWs sexual difference becomes irrelevant when joining the proletariat. 
Although ideological enemies, both liberals and Marxists envisage an 
androcentric future, where the presence of the female gender could be ignored. 
Marxism, feminism and psychoanalysis. 
Marx's weak analysis of gender within Capitalist society creates major 
obstacles to a "happy marriage', 34 between feminism and Marxism. Most notably, 
Marx's materialist account of history and his conception of production does 
exclude women from being the agents of history until they join the working class 
and become workers themselves. Their oppression is somehow necessary for 
history to progress. Secondly, Marx uses a narrow conception of production 
which excludes all activities traditionally assigned to women. Although basic to 
. ). ) 35 human survival, these activities "fall outside of a capitalist 'economy' . 
Therefore, one could argue that the historical/materialist approach avoids the 
issue of essentialism precisely because it relegates essentialism outside 
production. Essentialism once again subsists within the home where child- 
bearing, child-rearing, housework and the care of the sick are activities that 
remain unanalysed. 
Such a shortcoming from an otherwise promising theory has forced some 
second-wave radicals to unify sex and class by recuperating the concept of 
36 
production and extending it to include reproductive activities and housework . 
34 This expression obviously recalls Heidi Hartmann's famous essay "The Unhappy Marriage of 
Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union" in Lydia Sargent (ed. ), Women and 
Revolution (Boston: South End Press, 1985). 
35 Linda Nicholson, "Feminism and Marx" in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds. ), 
Feminism as Critique: Essays on the Politics of Gender in Late-Capitalist Societies (Cambridge: 
polity press, 1987), p. 18. 
36 See, for example, Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic ofSex: The Casefor Feminist Revolution 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1970), Mary O'Brien, "Reproducing Man", in Lorenne M. G. Clark 
and Lynda Lange (eds. ), The Sexism of Social and Political Theory (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1979), or Mich&le Barrett, Women's Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist 
Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980). On the feminist debate on housework which animated 
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However, very often these same feminists still uphold solutions to women's 
oppression that tie in with the ideal of an androcentric future where sexual 
difference would disappear. 37 
A second obstacle to an unproblematic reception of Marxism within 
feminism is the correspondence, in Marx and Engels' writings in particular, of 
women's oppression with capitalism and the capitalist family. Following Marxist 
theorists such as Grarnsci, Lukacs, and Althusser, feminists of the Left criticise 
the Marxist conception of equality as economically reductionist. For them, 
capitalism and patriarchy, exploitation and oppression do not necessarily co- 
exist, and an analysis of the ideological superstructure of patriarchy is badly 
needed. It is here that new tools of cultural and ideological analysis, such as 
38 consciousness-raising practices and psychoanalytic theory are employed . 
Consciousness-rai sing derives from a Maoist practice of "speaking 
bitterness", current amongst Chinese peasants. 39 Within feminism, it is practised 
in small groups of women who concentrate on their experience and feelings, and 
on bringing to consciousness the unconscious aspects of oppression. In terms of 
the debate between sex and gender, women see, by means of consciousness- 
raising, the process through which they become women culturally. 40 Once 
articulated within a small revolutionary group, what was formerly personal 
becomes political (hence the famous slogan of second-wave feminism). Another 
important contribution that the practice of consciousness-raising makes to the 
debate between equality and difference is its expression of a fundamental 
commonality between women despite their various personal, social, racial, sexual 
situations. This commonality is culturally expressed as "the fact of being a 
the 1980s, see Ellen Mallos (ed. ), The Politics of Housework (London: Allison and Busby 
Limited, 1980). For these debates in an Italian context, see Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp, Italian 
Feminist Thought, op. cit., Ch. 12. 
37 This is definitely the case of Shulamith Firestone who wishes to free women from the pain of 
(and oppression implied in) biological reproduction through artificial means, contraception, the 
abolition of the biological family and greater socialisation of childcare. See Firestone, The 
Dialectic ofSex, op. cit., p. 239-240. 
38 Although I here treat the feminist use of consciousness-rai sing and psychoanalysis side by side, 
I do not wish to suggest that the former is a type of group therapy. Juliet Mitchell herself refutes 
such a suggestion, while acknowledging some obvious similarities between consciousness -raising 
and psychoanalytic therapy [Woman's Estate (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 61]. In Chapter 
III, we will see how the future entrustment theorists nourish a much closer link between 
46autocoscienza " and psychoanalytic practice. 
39 Juliet Mitchell, Woman's Estate, op. cit., p. 62. 
40 Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary Feminist Thought (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1983), p. 36. 
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woman and of being treated as and considered a woman by others". 41 
Nevertheless, many later feminists see consciousness-rai sing as a universalist 
practice since "what white, heterosexual, middle-classl and educated women feel 
in their personal experience does not necessarily correspond to 'a condition 
shared by all women'. ),. 42 Consciousness-rai sing practices pave the way for the 
subsequent gynocentric perspective on the debate between equality and 
difference. We will see how the importation of such a feminist practice also 
marks, in Italy, the opening of an important dialogue with Anglo-American 
feminism. 
Within the Anglo-American context, Juliet Mitchell is the first feminist to 
propose psychoanalysis as a tool for analysing "patriarchy". 43 Mitchell begins by 
rejecting what she views as the distorted interpretations of Freud (current in the 
U. S. A. in particular), arguing that they are "pre-Freudian". For her, these 
interpretations explain or criticise Freud from a standpoint external to the context 
of psychoanalysis itself Contrary to these distorted readings, psychoanalysis 
does not account for biological difference between the sexes but for psychic 
reality (reality as it is lived out by a subject who tries to insert himself, as 
gendered, into that culture) . 
44 Mitchell points out that some fon-n of essentialism 
lies behind such feminist social explanation of the sexual differentiation between 
the sexes. Since they refute both the unconscious and the importance of infantile 
sexuality, 45 the feminists in question immediately place the individual at the 
behest of reality principle, 46 thus implying some essential and unified self whose 
alienation is subsequent to its integration into society. 
For Mitchell, psychoanalysis contains the obvious advantage of accounting 
for the formation of a social and sexually differentiated subject within the family. 
In order to explain the relationship between patriarchal ideology and the 
unconscious formation of the subject who lives himself as gendered, Mitchell 
recuperates Lacan, at this point still virtually unknown by Anglo-American 
41 
ibid., p. 38- 
42 Fuss, Essentially Speaking, op. cit., p. 68. 
43 Mitchell already argues for a feminist use of psychoanalysis in Woman's Estate (Ch. 9), but her 
landmark study is, of course, Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974). 
44 Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A Radical Reassessment of Freudian Psychoanalysis 
(London: Penguin books, 2000), p. 304. 
45 ibid., p. 3 5 1. 
46 ibid., p. 355. 
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feminiStS. 47 In particular, it is Lacan's emphasis on the castration complex as 
embodied by the position/word of the father ("le nom1non du pere"), symbolised 
by the phallus, which Mitchell puts to use. Mitchell does not use Lacan in 
connection with structural linguistics. Rather, she reads him alongside Levi- 
Strauss' stress on exchange as the basis of society and Althusser's account of 
ideology as partly transmitted via the family (in its function as an Ideological 
State Apparatus [ISA]). 48 Mitchell's marriage of feminism, Marxism (via 
Althusser) and psychoanalysis thus lies in the description of kinship/family 
relations as relations of exchange. These relations transmit subjectivities which 
are unconsciously (as well as consciously) lived as "feminine" or "masculine" . 
49 
Mitchell thus rehabilitates psychoanalysis within feminism by arguing that the 
former shows that "it is [ ... ] not on account of their 'natural' procreative 
possibilities but on account of their cultural utilisation as exchange-objects 
(which involves an exploitation of their role as propagators) that women acquire 
their definition. , 50 
Mitchell's use of Lacan is significantly different from that made by Luce 
Irigaray, entrustment theorists, and il pensiero philosophers. Jane Gallop, 
amongst others, has criticised Psychoanalysis and Feminism for purging its use 
of Lacan of what Mitchell herself describes as "the whole framework and thrust 
of [his] theory: the importance of language". 51 Gallop claims that, as a result, 
Mitchell is guilty of the same offences that she identifies in Freud's detractors. 
Firstly, she frames and imprisons her discussion of Lacan and feminism within 
the context from which she writes, that is within a feminism which "reflect[s] the 
way American psychoanalysis ignores the ego-subverting significance of 
47 Jane Gallop, Feminism and Psychoanalysis: The Daughter's Seduction (London: Macmillan, 
1982), p. 5. 
48 The other influential feminist essay which discusses Freud in relation to Uvi-Strauss is of 
course Gayle Rubin's "The Traffic in Women: Notes Towards a Political Economy of Sex" in 
Rayna Reiter (ed. ), Toward an Anthropology of Women (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1975). However, Rubin's essay does not serve my purpose of placing Italian feminist within a 
historical and international perspective as well as Psychoanalysis and Feminism. Firstly, it is 
subsequent to Mitchell's book and secondly it does not introduce the Anglo-American context to 
Lacan. Rubin's essay could therefore serve as a point of contrast, whereas I can use 
Psychoanalysis and Feminism as a point of contrast and of comparison. I have therefore chosen 
to record its importance in a footnote rather than in the main body of my discussion. 
49 Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism, op. cit, p. xxx. 
50 ibid., p. 407. 
5) Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism, op. cit, p. 398. 
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language. , 52 In addition, by limiting the scope of her discussion, Mitchell herself 
falls back upon a biologist and reductionist use of Freud, where ý actual reality 
overshadows psychic reality. 53 This is particularly noticeable in the solution she 
proposes in last chapter of Psychoanalysis and Feminism. She argues that women 
should work towards a cultural revolution which would demonstrate "the social 
non-necessity, at this stage of [economic] development of the laws instituted by 
1,54 patriarchy' , those regulating the trade of women as objects of exchange. This 
solution is very much voluntarist (as if one could escape the hold of the 
unconscious by being a feminist) and the unconscious becomes a mere 
depository of culture. 55 One must also note Mitchell"s universalist use of the 
concept of patriarchy. 56 In Italy, it is this voluntarist politics and the limited 
emphasis upon desire and language, current in autocoscienza groups, that have 
been criticised by entrustment theorists. 
Conclusion. 
Despite claiming different ideological allegiances, the feminists dealt with 
in this first part all share basic assumptions and viewpoints. Whether given a 
legal, economic or sexual definition, it is equality which is pursued at the 
expense of difference. When equality is understood as the means for 
emancipation, it usually involves inclusion (in public life, in the fight against 
capitalism). In contrast, the second wave conceives equality in ten-ns of 
liberation, defined in negative terms (e. g. liberation from sex roles which 
exercise a psychological hold on women). Correlatively, difference is generally 
blamed for women's inequality such that its defence becomes either suspicious 
or undesirable. Biologism. (the existence of biological capacities which form the 
bedrock of women's essence) and naturalism (the fact that women have a fixed 
nature) are widely rejected for confounding women's condition with fatality. 
52 Gallop, Feminism and Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 8. 
53 ibid., p. 12. 
54 Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism, op. cit., p. 414. 
55 Gallop, Feminism and Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 12. 
56 Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism, op. cit., p. 409. 
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Nevertheless, difference is not completely eradicated. I have argued that 
early liberals protect it by displacing it onto the bourgeois family. By excluding 
difference from their analysis of production, Marx and Engels also confine it to 
the private realm of domestic labour, child-bearing and child-rearing. In both 
cases, essentialism thus subsists in the private sphere. Marxists feminists, for 
their part, seek to reintroduce difference by pointing to the specific exploitation 
that women endure and by distinguishing between capitalism and patriarchy. 
I have also stressed that essentialism is not eradicated with a simple 
rejection of sexual difference. When it is not displaced onto the family, it 
reappears where the conditions of oppression are considered to be the same and 
to be experienced in an identical fashion by all women across classes and 
cultures (universalism). It is also present in the humanist vision of a future that 
all egalitarians share -a future where individuals can express, free from the 
burden of gender categorisation, an essentially rational nature. 
As the following chapters will show, similar weaknesses are to be found in 
the argument put forwards by those Italian feminists who argue for equality. For 
the time being, let us turn our attention to the other pole of the dichotomy set up 
between equality and difference in order to see which definitions of equality, 
difference, sex, gender and essentialism can be retrieved. 
Section 11. Arguing for difference: the gynocentric perspective. 
Due to a dramatic reversal of emphasis to which the practice of 
consciousness-raising has started to point, a split occurs within feminism around 
the middle of the 1970s. Some feminists now argue that, if re-assessed, women's 
differences may contain the seeds of liberation, and the key to the betterment of 
society as a whole. The reassessment of women's differences by gynocentric 
feminists is achieved mainly by a renewed analysis of mothering and 
motherhood. Gynocentric feminism in the Anglo-American context is thus very 
important to delineate both the commonality and originality of the development 
of Italian feminism towards entrustment and i1pensiero della 
differenza sessuale. 
In this second part of the chapter, I will focus on Nancy Chodorow, Adrienne 
Rich and their respective views on mothering, motherhood and the mother- 
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daughter relationship. I will deal with the re-articulation of the relationships 
between equality and difference, sex and gender, essentialism and 
constructionism, as well as with the renewed understanding of essentialism and 
its cognates. In addition, this part will further demonstrate that, far from being 
overruled by the shift from egalitarianism to gynocentrism, the theoretical 
framework which opposes equality to difference and sex to gender is re-affirmed. 
Equally, the theoretical and political problems associated with these dichotomies 
are not transcended. 
1. Nancy Chodorow and the reproduction of mothering. 
Thanks to an analysis of Nancy Chodorow's work on the reproduction of 
mothering, I will presently pursue and refine my account of the relationship 
between psychoanalysis and feminism. Chodorow's work points to another 
school of psychoanalysis used by feminism, namely, object-relations theory. 
Briefly, object-relations theory rests on the premise that the "child's social 
relational experience from earliest infancy is determining for psychological 
growth and personality formation". 57 A healthy development thus depends, most 
importantly, on the infantile relationship with the mother. At the start of his life, 
the child comes to know himself by a process of gratification or frustration of the 
demands he directs to the mother. If "good-enough", to use Winnicott's 
formulation,, the mother will adequately respond to the child's demands, and the 
child will develop into a "healthy" individual. 
In The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of 
Gender (1978), Chodorow examines the psychological reasons behind the socio- 
historical fact that it is women who mother. 58 Against essentialist and 
constructionist accounts, 
59 Chodorow claims that "[w]omen's mothering 
perpetuates itself through social-structurally 
induced psychological 
mechanisms"- 
60 It is the family which forms the knot between the natural, the 
57 Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the 
Sociology of 
Gender (Berkeley: California University Press, 1999), p. 47. 
58 ibid., p. 7. 
59 ibid., pp. 13,21,31. 
60 ibid., p. 21 I. 
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cultural and the psychological. Through the sexual division of labour, the family 
meets the requirements of society by creating personality structures that play the 
roles assigned to them. In turn, these personality structures contribute to the 
perpetuation of sex roles. 61 
As it will become clear in Chapter IV, Chodorow's theory shares common 
aspects with the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. First of all, Chodorow 
shifts the attention from the relationship with the father in the Oedipal situation, 
to the pre-Oedipal relationship with the mother. The mother becomes the central 
character in the child's psycho-social evolution, since the nature of her responses 
detennines the child's healthy development. 62 Secondly, she claims that mother- 
daughter and mother-son relationships are fundamentally different. For 
Chodorow, this accounts for the differently gendered personality structures, 
which psychologically determine little girls to mother. Chodorow explains that, 
when entering into a relationship with her child, the mother is aware of her 
similarity (with the daughter) or her difference (with her son), and of the social 
evaluation of gender differences. 63 The infant also gradually becomes 
appreciative of the mother's responses and of the weight society places on gender 
differences. Thus, the girl identifies with her mother and transforms the need to 
be nurtured into a need to care for others. This is how Chodorow accounts for 
women"s alleged capacity for relatedness and compassion as well as for their 
weaker sense of self and autonomy. In contrast, the boy becomes conscious of 
the power given to men, learns to be more independent from the mother but later 
fears relationships. According to Chodorow, two different personality structures 
(but one negative social attitude towards women) thus arise from the diverging 
types of relationships with the mother. 
61 ibid., p. 38- 
62 ibid., p. 57. 
63 A similar claim which bridges the physiological sex of the child with the mother's perception 
of her own difference is noticeable 
in the notion of the maternal continuum, as it is described in 
Luisa Muraro's Lordine simbolico della madre. This is only a similarity and not a 
correspondence since Muraro 
focuses on the symbolic role of the mother as the provider of the 
first language. We will return to this in Chapter IV. 
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Sexual indifference, essentialism and the absence of the symbolic. 
Chodorow's ideas have been deeply influential upon subsequent standpoint 
theories that seek to examine a specific way of apprehending experience. 64 
Despite its merits, The Reproduction of Mothering contains some problematic 
aspects. Let us first return to the debate between equality and difference. 
Although Chodorow explains the existence of different psychological structures, 
she is far from upholding them. According to her account, patriarchy does not 
allow the full development of our personalities as it represses one side in favour 
of another so that men and women can fit in the roles assigned to them. 
Chodorow endorses the social solution of shared parenting, thanks to which 
personalities could be re-balanced . 
65Difference is thus salutary and can be used 
to better society as a whole. It is not valued for its own sake but as a means to 
attain the kind of gender-blind society also envisaged by egalitarians. 
Secondly, Chodorow universalises the construction of a feminine identity. 
Her account obscures differences in both cultures, (under such terms as "the 
mother-daughter relationship")66 and in personal lives and character traits. One is 
left wondering whether there might not be an inherent psychical mechanism 
which detennines all mothers to behave in the same typical way. Chodorow 
could thus be accused of presenting a particular version of essentialism not 
hitherto encountered - namely "psychic essentialism". 
67 In addition, some 
inconsistencies arise from Chodorow's heterosexual bias. Indeed, if it is the 
mother-to-daughter relationship (that is, a woman-to-woman relationship) which 
64 For example, Carol Gilligan has used Chodorow extensively in order to distinguish between an 
ethics of justice (generally characteristic of men) and an ethics of care (more adapted to women). 
See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). For an assessment of the contribution to 
moral philosophy made by the Kohlberg - Gilligan debate, see Seyla Benbabib, "The Generalised 
and the Concrete Other: The Koblberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory" in Benhabib 
and Cornell (eds. ), Feminism as Critique, op. cit., pp. 77-95. In Italy, the "ethics of care" has not 
been influential for the development of feminist theory. 
65 Chodorow, The Reproduction ofMothering, op. cit., p. 211 
66 Stephen Frosh, The Politics ofPsychoanalysis: An Introduction to Freudian and Post-Freudian 
Theory (London: MacMillan, 1999), p. 213. As we shall see, this same critique can be extended to 
entrustment theorists. Amongst other feminists who have criticised the universalist assumptions 
of Chodorow's account of mothering, see Nancy Fraser and Linda J. Nicholson, "Social 
Criticism 
Without Philosophy", in L. J. Nicholson (ed. ), FeminismIPostmodernism (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1990). 
67 This expression "psychic essentialist" was coined by Lynne Segal in her discussion of Irigaray. 
See Segal, Is The Future Female? Troubled Thought Contemporary Feminism (London: Virago, 
1987), p. 132. 
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68 Is Primordial, then women may be drawn to lesbianism rather than motherhood. 
Furthermore, and as Elizabeth Spelman has argued, Chodorow reduces the cause 
of oppression to one single and universal factor - mothering - at the expense of 
other factors such as class and race. 69 Concentrating on sex as the bedrock of 
identity is, in this light, an essentialist move. 
Finally, some of Chodorow's assertions in The Reproduction of Mothering 
seem to deny the psychic primacy of the unconscious. She argues that the 
matemal attitude to femininity gives rise to a particular set of anxieties and 
emotions for individuals of both sexes. But Freudian psychoanalysis tends to 
argue the opposite - that it is (unconscious) anxieties and emotions which give 
rise to a particular set of attitudes. 70 This observation could be applied to object- 
relations theory in general. Object-relations theorists often see in Freudian 
psychoanalysis an exaggerated emphasis on innate drives detennining behaviour 
and individual development. 71 Despite this rejection of biological determinism, 
one could however argue that object-relations theory is still based on the 
essentialist assumption that the human subject has a basic impulse to form 
72 relationships . 
It is in fact here that the comparison between Chodorow's use of 
psychoanalysis and that made by entrustment theorists ends. The latter are 
influenced by Lacan's return to Freudian psychoanalysis and are thus likely to 
argue that The Reproduction of Mothering does not account for the unconscious 
symbolic structures that relegate women at the margins of language and which 
themselves require changing. Entrustment theorists have thus deplored the lack 
of an analysis of the symbolic dimension in the mother-daughter relationship, a 
relationship which needs to be symbolically rather than just socially reclaimed. 
73 
In ten-ns of the relationship between feminism and psychoanalysis as it 
68 Adrienne Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" in Signs 5.4 (Summer 
1980): 636. 
69 Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1988), p. 8 1. Chodorow has since revised her opinion on that matter - "I no longer 
think that one factor or one dynamic, can explain male dominance (even if I still have my own 
predilection for particular theoretical contenders)". 
Nancy Chodorow, Feminism and 
Psychoanalytic Theory (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 5. 
70 Frosh, The Politics ofPsychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 208. 
71 For example, see Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering, op. cit, p. 48. 
72 Frosh, The Politics ofPsychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 203. 
73 Anna Maria Plussi, "Era U dall'inizio", in Diotima, It cielo stellato dentro di noi (Milan: La 
Tartaruga, 1992), p. 24- 
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establishes itself in the 1970S. we can see that the barrier between Anglo- 
American and Continental feminism is rigidly demarcated. Neither Nancy 
Chodorow (who favours object-relations theory), nor Juliet Mitchell (who uses 
Lacan for an analysis of exchange) tackle the symbolic dimension of gender. 
2. Adrienne Rich and the "common world of women". 
Adrienne Rich is more evidently connected to the gynocentric perspective 
partly because of her link with lesbianism. In Chapter 111, we will see how 
lesbianism is a conspicuous presence in the history of Italian feminism. It acts as 
an undercurrent in some early separatist groups as well as in the social-symbolic 
practice of entrustment. But it also takes a more explicit form with the rise, in the 
1980s, of "lesbofemminismo" (discussed in Chapter V). 
What is particularly interesting for the present discussion is the distinction 
between "male-identifi cation" and "woman-identi fi cation" that Rich makes in an 
influential essay entitled "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" 
(1980). 74 A "male-identified" woman casts her social, political and intellectual 
allegiances with men by internalising and upholding their values. 75 In contrast, 
the woman who is woman-identified believes in the primacy of the relationship 
between women from which she derives a sense of self, legitimacy and strength. 
With this distinction, Rich unden-nines the understanding of equality as 
assimilation, suggesting instead outright separatiSM. 
76 We will find an echo of 
these notions of "male" and "female" identification and of this call for 
separatism, not only in Carla Lonzi's work, but also in entrustment and in il 
pensiero della differenza sessuale. 
77 
74 This distinction was first developed by Ti-Grace Atkinson, March Hoffman, Ellen Bedoz, 
Cynthia Funk, Rita Mae Brown, Lois Hart and "Barbara XX", all authors of "The Woman- 
Identified Woman", in A. Koedt, E. Levine, A. Rapone (eds. ), Radical Feminism (New York: 
Quadrangle, 1973). 
75 See Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality", op. cit., p. 645. 
76 Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born (London: Virago, 1979), p. 80, "Compulsory Heterosexuality", 
op. cit., p. 207. 
77 Many of the themes encountered in "Compulsory Heterosexuality" had already appeared in 
1974, in Carla Lonzi's La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale. Although not a lesbian theorist, 
Lonzi uses the more sexually charged "clitoral" and "vaginal woman" to designate what Rich 
calls, respectively, the "woman- 
identified" and the "male-identified woman". See Carla Lonzi, 
Sputiamo su Hegel, La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale e altri scritti (Milan: Grammalibri, 
1982). Carla Lonzi is also one of the first Italian feminists to call for social and cultural 
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In "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence", Adrienne Rich 
exhorts feminists theorists to consider lesbianism more seriously and to engage 
5 78 in an overdue critique of the "compulsory heterosexual orientation'. She argues 
that heterosexuality, like motherhood, has been imposed as a "political 
institution"79 because of men's fear of a primary connection between women. 
According to Rich, what men see as a threat to the supremacy of male power is 
women's capacity to function on their own. Compulsory heterosexuality thus 
breaks the primacy of these relationships between women and it is those which 
must be reclaimed and restored. 80 For Rich, what must be studied is a "common 
world of women"81 or a "lesbian continuum". She defines the "lesbian 
continuum"' as "a range - through each women's life and throughout history - of 
woman-identified experience". 82 Women must create a feminist history by 
looking at women in the past who have resisted male-power. 83 
An early criticism can be here made of Rich's feminist politics. In 
"Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence". Rich proposes to replace 
the term "lesbianism" by "lesbian existence" and "lesbian continuum" (which 
indicates forms of "primary intensity between and amongst women", whether or 
84 
not this intensity is expressed sexually). Arguing that, in the case of women, 
heterosexuality is more often imposed than chosen is certainly a radical move. 
However, by extending lesbian existence to all women (irrespective of their 
sexual orientation), Adrienne Rich runs the risk of ignoring the specificity of 
lesbian experience (where lesbianism is also lived sexually). It is therefore not 
surprising, given the influence of Rich's "lesbian continuum" in Italy, that 
"lesbofemministe" have attacked entrustment theorists for their vision of 
separatism. I discuss Lonzl's work more extensively in chapter 111. As for entrustment theorists, 
they recuperate male and female identification both in relation to language and to the access of 
the symbolic order (see Chapter IV). 
78 Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality", op. cit., p. 632. 
79 ibid., p. 637 
80 In the following chapter of this thesis, I argue that entrustment theorists also find a similar idea 
in Luce Irigaray's thought - namely, that the existing symbolic order prevents the establishment 
of relationships between women (especially those between mother and daughter). 
81 Rich, "Conditions for Work: The Common World of Women", in On Lies, Secrets and Silence: 
Selected Prose 1966-1978, (London: Virago, 1980). An extract of this essay appears in "More 
Women Than Men" (1983), the original document delineating the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment. 
82 Rich, -Compulsory Heterosexuality", op. cit., p. 648. 
83 As we shall see in Chapter IV, the same idea lies behind Italian feminists' wish to identify the 
41symbolic mothers" of their history, and to establish a "maternal continuum". 
84 Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality", op. cit., p. 648. 
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lesbianism as a mere symbolic practice (see Chapter V below). What is the 
theoretical shape of Rich's feminist politics and how does she draw on the 
experience of motherhood? 
The experience of motherhood and essentialism. 
The mother-daughter connection and the problems of relationship between 
women are two central themes in Rich's Qf Woman Oorn: Motherhood as 
Experience and Institution (1976). She argues that society ignores, or seeks to 
hide the fact that every single individual coming to the world has spent nine 
months inside a woman's body, and that most individuals have had their first 
emotions and experiences with a woman. This relationship is particularly intense 
when it involves a mother and a daughter, "two biologically alike bodies". 85 Like 
Chodorow in the U. S. A., Muraro and Cavarero in Italy, 86 Rich explains this 
effort to forget, compensate for or deny our connection to the mother as a fear of 
regression, on the part of men, to a state of "dependence on a woman for life 
itseýf ý. 87 She distinguishes between two aspects of motherhood -the experience 
("the potential relationship of any woman to her powers of reproduction and to 
children") and the institution ("which aims at ensuring that that potential - and 
all women - shall remain under male control"). 88 While sympathising with 
earlier feminist critiques, this distinction allows Rich to recuperate motherhood 
as part of a strategy for potential liberation. 89 It is indeed in the experience (and 
not in the institution) of motherhood that the origin of women's connection to 
one another and that the source of a specific relation to their physicality are to be 
found. 
85 "Probably, there is nothing in human nature more resonant with charges than the flow of 
energy between two biologically alike bodies, one which has lain in amniotic bliss inside the 
other, the other which has laboured to give birth to the other. " Rich, Of Woman Born, op cit., 
p. 225-226. 
86 For example, see Muraro, op. cit, and Adrianna Cavarero, In Spite ofPlato (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1995). 
87 Rich, of Woman Born, op. cit., p. 11. 
88 ibid, p. 13. 
89 ibid., p. 57. In In Spite of Plato, Adriana Cavarero makes a similar argument when discussing 
abortion and artificial insemination. This 
discussion is introduced by an interpretation of the myth 
of Demeter and Kore, a myth also used 
by Adrienne Rich. See Adriana Cavarero, op. cit, ch. 3 and 
Rich, of Woman Born, op. cit., pp. 238-240. I come back to this in Chapter VI. 
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In assessing Adrienne Rich's politics, we no longer have to search for some 
hidden essentialist assumption since essentialism is here openly embraced. 
"Female biology", which Rich defines as "the diffuse, intense sensuality, 
radiating from clitoris, breasts, uterus, vagina; the lunar cycles of menstruation; 
[the locus for] the gestation and fruition of life"190 gives women a particular way 
of apprehending experience as well as a specific relationship to their body, to one 
another and to nature (the "universe" is Rich's own word). It is this connection to 
our physicality which, Rich believes, has been usurped and misused to serve 
patriarchy. 91 Rich "implicitly asks us to distinguish between embodiment as 
,, 92 experience and embodiment as institutions. Rich therefore conceives of a 
feminist revolution as a rethinking of our physicality which would allow it to be 
applied in a much broader way than has been under patriarchy. Indeed, the 
"authentic". untarnished, experience of sexuality, and our proud relationship with 
out body (like that of motherhood) remains to be rediscovered under the layer of 
patriarchy. 
Adrienne Rich's essentialism tarnishes her feminist politics for a number of 
reasons. To begin with, Rich fails to consider, unlike Chodorow, the way the 
institution of motherhood has pervaded women's psyche to such an extent that 
the distinction between motherhood as institution and experience might not be 
easily recognised, and the former not simple to defeat. Rich trusts that this new 
embodied knowledge will suffice to free women's creativity. In an interesting 
leap which becomes evident in the closing section of the book, Rich no longer 
confines motherhood to the new human life that only a fertile woman can give. 
In an almost cosmic vision, she declares that creating new life can also mean 
creating "the visions, the thinking necessary to sustain, console and alter human 
existence -a new relationship to the universe. , 
93 There is here a clear 
correspondence between female physiology and a feminine psychology (a 
particular forin of creativity). 
In addition, once reclaimed from the patriarchal context, Rich tends to 
idealise the experience motherhood, the relationships between /amongst women 
90 ibid., p. 39- 
91 ibid., p. 55. 
92 Spelman, Inessential Woman, op. cit., p. 129. 
93 Rich, of Woman Born, op. cit., p. 285. 
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and the relationship to the mother that women need to strengthen. 94 We shall 
encounter a similar criticism in relation to entrustment and il pensiero later in 
this thesis. For Rich, the way to redeem the conflict-ridden mother-daughter 
relationship is simply to empower mothers into wanting their own freedom and 
that of their daughters. This is to be done through a woman-to-woman network 
(the lesbian continuum). 95 
Finally, whilst Rich does not explicitly refer to an intrinsic goodness in 
women, there are certain unclear assertions which verge on this naive contention. 
It is true that Rich remains ambiguous about the distinct forni and nature of 
women's "creative" qualities which the overthrowing of patriarchy would 
liberate. Nevertheless, she seems optimistic about the fact that, once re-valued, 
these feminine qualities would be used only to do good. I will reconsider these 
criticisms in the light of the social-symbolic practice of entrustment later in this 
study. 
Conclusion. 
The gynocentric perspective encompasses a variety of views which flirt, 
more or less explicitly, with essentialism. At one end of the spectrum stand those 
feminists who, like Chodorow, argue that women's specific characteristics result 
from their historical position. At the other extreme, are those feminists who 
openly embrace essentialism and contend that it is biology which gives them 
specific characteristics. For example, this is the case of Mary Daly, 
96 and, to a 
lesser extent, of Adrienne Rich. For the latter, women's physiology accounts for 
feminine creativity, for a specific way of forming relationships and for a 
distinctive way of apprehending reality, all of which are to be searched for under 
the layer of patriarchy. It is in writings such as Rich's that equality, assimilation 
and alienation become very closely associated, while 
difference now suggests 
liberation, separatism and sometimes superiority. 
94 This is the central contention of both "Compulsory 
Heterosexuality" and "The Common World 
of Women", which 
is reiterated in Of Woman Born on pp. 245,246,255. 
95 Rich, of Woman Born, op. cit., p. 245 -246. 
96 For example, see Mary Daly, GynlEcology: The 
Metaethics of Radical Feminism (London: 
Women's Press, 1978). 
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As this part of the chapter has suggested, gynocentric positions tend to 
fluctuate between these two extremes. Indeed, the pole of difference is re-valued 
for various ends. Whilst Chodorow still holds an ideal of an androgynous society, 
where personalities are re-balanced, Rich envisages one where women's creative 
relationship to their body could find full expression. Nevertheless, both feminists 
hold an idea of "women" as rational enough to be capable of bringing about 
change in a voluntarist manner. In addition, Chodorow's argument is not immune 
to all forms of essentialism despite her apparent constructionist account of 
mothering. As we have argued, these essentialist undertones lie in Chodorow's 
belief that the individual's basic impulse is to form relationships and in her 
heterosexual, white and middle-class bias. 
In later chapters, I will return to these issues when dealing with the themes 
that Chodorow and Rich share with entrustment theorists - namely, the 
importance of the mother and of the pre-Oedipal phase, the specificity of the 
mother-daughter relationship, woman-identified experience, the lesbian 
continuum, separatism and the understanding of equality as assimilation. We will 
then have the opportunity to consider whether these critiques re-appear despite 
entrustment's emphasis on language and on the symbolic, an emphasis which is 
absent from both Chodorow and Rich's accounts. 
Section 111. Challeniziniz equality and difference. 
Chronologically speaking, the mid-80's marks yet another departure for 
feminist theory, one which sees the debate between essentialism and anti- 
essentialism become the theoretical paradigm. There are two definite (but 
simultaneous) "dynamics" to this evolution. From the mid-1980s, a critique of 
universalism emphasises the differences amongst/between women and difference 
becomes pluralised. 97 The debate between equality and difference is replaced by 
97 In Chapter 111,1 argue that the history of Italian feminism should not be related in terms of 
"waves". Not only does this tend to give a picture of Italian feminism as lacking in relation to its 
Anglo-Saxon counterpart, but it also ignores the cultural specificity of the Italian context. I rather 
propose to retrace the theoretical debates which have led some feminists to choose entrustment as 
a social-symbolic practice by thinking of the history of Italian feminism in terms of a theoretical 
and practical move from an analysis of sexual relationships between men and women to a study 
of the relationships between/amongst women. 
44 
one between identity and difference. Whilst the equality vs. difference framework 
regarded relations between the sexes, the new paradigmatic opposition between 
identity and difference considers the relationships between women. The issue at 
stake is no longer to establish whether women are equal or differentfrom men. It 
is rather to determine what (constructed) similarities and divergences enable 
women or prevent them from forming an ontological and political group. When 
opposed to "identity", the meaning of the term "difference" therefore changes 
since it no longer uniquely refers to gender. 
The second defining dynamic follows the erosion of the barrier set up 
between Anglophone and Continental theory. Apart from the impact made by 
theorists such as Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, Anglo- 
Saxon feminism opens a dialogue with its French counterpart (and with, amongst 
98 
others, Luce Irigaray). As we shall see shortly, the influence of postmodemist 
and post-structuralist theories problematize the very category of "woman" at the 
basis of feminist theory and political activism, whilst the engagement with 
difference theorists such as Irigaray fuel the debate between essentialism and 
anti-essentialism. We will examine how this second dynamic also alters the 
meaning of "difference". "Difference" now implies a thesis about language and 
discourse as constructing rather than simply communicating reality. 99 
This final part of the chapter will first briefly spell out the problematisation 
of the category of "woman" in terms of these two dynamics. These two dynamics 
will also help to disclose the conundrum that the questioning of the category of 
"woman" presents to feminism - if no "woman" but only "women" exists, or 
indeed, if "woman"/"women" do not exist at all, how can one pursue afeminist 
politics? Subsequently, it will challenge any definition of the so-called "third 
98 One will note that, although Anglophone feminism engaged with some French feminists, there 
has been little contribution from elsewhere on the Continent. Hence Nancy K. Miller's call, 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, for a more international outlook on 
feminist theory. 
99 it would be useful to point out, at this early stage, that it is in this sense that Irigaray can 
be 
considered a "difference" theorist. Unlike the previous gynocentric 
feminists that we have 
encountered, Irigaray does not seek to re-value all the "so-called" 
feminine characteristics that 
patriarchal society allegedly depreciate. As Chapter II will explain 
in more detail, this strategy of 
reversal is illusory for Irigaray since it works within the same phallocentric symbolic system 
which creates its own categories. Instead, she 
believes that the challenge faced by feminists is the 
creation of sexual difference 
independently of the dualistic definitions of male/female, 
masculine/feminine. More will 
be said on this point in the remaining part of this chapter and in 
Chapter 11. 
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wave"' of feminism as the simple refusal of the category "woman"100 by 
focussing on three particular theorists (Diana Fuss, Judith Butler and Christine 
Battersby) who propose to confront the "conundrum" of feminism and who will 
aid my future discussion of contemporary Italian feminism. 
I. Challenpinlz sexual difference: 
Some theorists have defined the "third-wave" of feminism as comprising 
-all critical work that points to the homogenising or exclusive tendencies of 
earlier feminisms. "101 According to this definition, Elizabeth Spelman's 
Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (1988) is firmly 
anchored in the "third wave". -Inessential Woman is of particular interest for its 
exploration of what "essentialism" comes to mean at the end of the 1980s. In this 
work, essentialism is irremediably linked to universalism (two concepts which, 
as said in the introduction to this chapter, are not necessarily conflated). The 
main target of Spelman's book is the exclusionary potential held in the idea of 
"woman-ness" at the basis of feminism. Spelman shows that this idea harbours 
the point of view and focus of only one particular group of women (the 
privileged white, middle-class), making the life-experience of other women 
"inessential". 102 These privileged feminists have not only universalised but also 
essentialised their position since they have made gender the core of women's 
identity (hence "single-cause feminism" 103 ), and sexism the core of their 
oppression (thus defining "patriarchy" as the identical oppression of all women). 
In contrast, Spelman points out that identity is not made of separate components 
that one can study in isolation from one another. ' 04 In her view, there are many 
ways of constructing gender, including ones which consider race and class. 
Therefore, when feminists talk about "woman", warns Elizabeth Spelman, they 
should be aware of the theoretical and politico-cultural presuppositions that 
inform their conception of "woman". 
100 Contesting this definition of the "third-wave" also forms the rationale behind Stacy Gillis, 
Gillian Howie and Rebecca Munford (eds. ), Third Wave Feminism: A Critical Exploration 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p. L 
101 Heyes as quoted in Alison Stone, "On the Genealogy of Women: A Defence of Anti- 
Essentialism" in Gillis, Howie and Munford, Third Wave Feminism, op. cit., p. 85. 
102 Spelman, Inessential Woman, op. cit., p. ix. 
103 Chodorow, Feminism and Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 5. 
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Similar attacks on the exclusionist tendencies of feminist theory have thus 
pushed some to stress plurality (of voices and of social structures determining 
identity) and have practised a so-called "identity politiCS". 105 But many others 
(those using a postmodern or poststructuralist approach in particular) have 
stressed that "identity politics" is only a pluralised fonn of difference politics and 
as such, it still presents problems of criteria of judgement, closure and exclusion, 
only on a smaller scale. 106 
As Chapter III will consider, in Italy, a shift from an analysis of the 
relationships with men to a study of the relationships between/amongst women 
similarly occurs in the mid-70s. In fact, it is the recognition of differences 
between women and the critique of the sisterhood spirit of the first 
consciousness-rai sing groups which motivates the elaboration of entrustment (a 
practice based, as Chapter IV will explain, on the empowering disparity between 
two women). A limited attempt to practice "identity politics" has been made in 
the mid- I 980s with the advent of "lesbofemminismo". As we shall see in the case 
of entrustment, the differences between women are not conceptualised in relation 
to class, race or sexuality, but in relation to language/ the symbolic order. Indeed, 
it is their view of language/ the symbolic order as constructing (and not simply 
communicating) reality which informs their conception of "difference". 
Following the poststructuralist leanings of Irigaray, entrustment theorists and il 
pensiero philosophers base their feminist politics on the fact that language 
constructs all women as "the other" of man. This not only denies them an access 
to subjectivity but also equalises all women in the role of the other, despite the 
differences which separate them. The political task facing them is therefore to 
make difference appear in language. We will come back to this common 
standpoint that both Irigaray and il pensiero della differenza sessuale adopt 
in 
Chapters 11 and IV. For the moment, let us analyse how poststructuralism has 
filtered through the Anglophone context. 
104 ibid., p. 133. 
'05 "The term [identity politics] refers to the tendency to base one's politics on a sense of personal 
identity". See Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking, op. cit., p. 97. 
106 For example, see Scott, "Deconstructing Equal ity-Versus-Difference", op. cit., p. 
145, and 
Fuss, Essentially Speaking, op. cit., p. 20- 
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Difference and dichotomies. 
The second anti-essentialist dynamic of the "third wave" of feminism 
introduces a new conception of "difference", directly derived from Saussurian 
linguistics and from its subsequent use mainly by Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
Derridean deconstruction. As we shall see more extensively in the following 
chapter, the Saussurian analysis of language shows that the meaning of a 
particular term derives and rests on the rejection of its opposite. Hence, meaning 
does not result from the correspondence of a word with an external object but 
from an eternal play of differences, existing within language, between 
words/symbols or "signifiers". "Difference" is thus not antithetical to "equality" 
but constitutive of equality. It is constructed as a "constitutive outside" that aids 
the formation of the concept but appears to be outside it. ' 07 Poststructuralists thus 
target any theoretical system which exposes reality dichotomously. An implicit 
hierarchy inevitably structures binary oppositions such as male/female, 
gender/sex, culture/nature, subjectivity/objectivity - the first term is valued at the 
expense of the other, while also being defined in contrast to the other (therefore 
not allowing for true, non-relational difference). 
This poststructuralist approach has radical implications for feminist theory. 
Firstly, it is used to deconstruct binary oppositions that have been used to define 
4(woman" (for example nature/culture, passion/reason, body/mind) and to expose 
their political purpose. Secondly, it is now argued that politics does not provide a 
reflection of identities (as egalitarians, difference feminists, and identity theorists 
believe), but instead constructs them. Politics cannot be the reflection or 
expression of a pre-existing ontological identity since all identities are deemed to 
be relational, contextual, political and without any ontological foundation. 
Thirdly, this new approach is employed to contest the very debates which have 
defined feminist theory and have been the object of this chapter. Strategies of 
equality and difference are now viewed as invalid. While egalitarians theorise 
equality as assimilation to an existing model, the gynocentric 
feminists lack 
107The expression "constitutive outside" or "abjected outside" is Butler's. Butler explains that 
"the subject is constituted through the force of exclusion and abjection, one which produces a 
constitutive outside to the subject, and abjected outside, which 
is, after all, "inside" the subject as 
its own founding repudiation. " 
(Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter [New York: Routledge, 1993], 
p. 3). 
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radicalism. Although difference theorists challenge the dominating values in 
society by re-emphasising women's contribution (thus following a strategy of 
reversal), they equally fail to question the framework according to which these 
values are presented. If equality means inclusion into a male norm, difference 
equally signifies deviation from the same male norm. 108 Because neither 
egalitarian strategies nor tactics of difference challenge the dichotomous and 
constructed framework which structures reality, the male norm stays in place. 
Italian feminism approaches post-structuralism, not via Derrida, Lacan, or 
Foucault, but via Irigaray. 109 The latter's influence begins to be felt from the 
middle of the 70s. Rather than the destabilising effect that poststructuralism has 
on the dichotomies hitherto used in feminist theory, it is Irigaray's critique of the 
"monosexual" symbolic order and her exploration of the possibility of 
establishing a speaking position for women which are influential at this point. 
The precise contours of Irigaray's position and her influence upon Italian 
feminism will be explored in Chapters 11,111 and IV. 
2. Confrontina the "conundrum" of feminism. 
In the light of the dynamics outlined above, both feminist theory (which 
primarily deals with the subject position occupied by women) and feminist 
politics (which is the fight for women as a homogenous group) are thrown into 
an apparent crisis. If "woman" as an ontological category and "Women" as a 
homogenous political group do not exist, how can we theorise and practice 
"feminism"? 
Many feminists have confronted this conundrum and have refused to give 
in to what Spelman calls the "bleak outlook". " 0 In the 1990s, a renewed interest 
in affirming the "body's inescapability"111 and for thinking corporeality and 
embodiment while avoiding the pitfalls of fixity, exclusion and essentialism (as 
108 Coole, Women in Political Theory, op. cit., p. 204. 
109 Adriana Cavarero In Cavarero and Restaino, (eds. ), Le filosofie femministe (Turin: Paravia, 
1999), p. 13 2. 
110 Spelman, Inessential Woman, op. cit., p. 172 
111 This expression is Diane Elam's. See Diane Elam, Ms en Abyme: Feminism and 
Deconstruction (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), p. 174. For a discussion of the 
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well as well as the latter's cognates) becomes manifest. I have here chosen three 
prominent feminists who have confronted this crisis and who have tried to think 
of gender in a novel theoretical way. 112 Let us begin with Diana Fuss. 
Diana Fuss and "strategic essentialism " 
In recent years, some theorists have expressed their impatience at the ways 
in which "essentialism" has been used (either too loosely or as anathema) to 
preclude its rigorous intellectual examination. ' 13 Diana Fuss is one of those who 
have sought to recuperate and question this concept. In Essentially Speaking: 
Feminism, Nature and Difference (1989), Fuss claims that, in and of itself, 
essentialism is neither good, nor bad, because "essentialism" does not have an 
essence (a philosophically, historically and politically stable content). 114 Its 
usefulness or harmfulness depends on where and how it is employed, and on the 
political effects it yields. ' 15 Thus, Fuss deconstructs the debates that have 
opposed essentialists to anti-essentialists in an attempt to show that the two are 
interdependent. Indeed, constructionism does not do away with essentialism but 
instead displaces it onto the idea that social determination confers meaning to 
identity and to sexual difference. 116 For Fuss, social constructionism is nothing 
more than a form of "sociological essentialism" since "both posit an utterly 
passive subject subordinated to the shaping influence of either nature or culture 
and both disregard the unsettling effects of the psyche. " 117 
Since essentialism is for her ubiquitous and inescapable, Fuss calls for the 
"risk of essence" to be taken. Essentialism, Fuss contends, must be re-deployed 
through the strategy of historicisation. One must indeed differentiate between 
somatophobia provoked by the anti-essentialist perspective, see Vicky Kirby, "Corporeal Habits: 
Addressing Essentialism Differently" in 4vpatia 6.3 (Fall 1991): 4-24. 
112 As fascinating examples of this renewed interest, I would like to mention works which I 
unfortunately will not have the space to discuss here. See Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: 
Towards a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994) 
and Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994). 
113 Many of these impatient feminists can be found in Schor and Weed, The Essential Difference, 
op. Cit. 
114 The same claim is made by Schor in "This Essentialism Which Is Not One", op. cit., p. 40. 
115 Fuss, Essentially Speaking, op. cit., pp. xi-xii. 
116 1 think that, to a certain extent, Fuss is here guilty of "essential i sing" constructionism. As we 
shall see when dealing with Butler's Gender Trouble "constructionism" and/or "social 
determination" can be much more fluid and theoretically nuanced than it is suggested here. 
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"deploying/activating" essentialism (that which feminists must strive for) and 
"fall ing/l apsing" into essentialism (that which must be avoided). This distinction 
is made according to the subject's positioning - who is risking essentialism? How 
is essentialism used? Where are its effects concentrated? ' 18 Essence is culturally 
and historically contingent and its definition has to be constantly reformulated 
and re-framed. The social constructionists who "insist that essentialism is always 
and everywhere reactionary [ ... ] act as if essentialism has an essence". 11 9 
For some, "risking essentialism" is no risk at all since it is based on 
maintaining a safety net for those who are afraid to erode metaphysical 
certainty. 120 For others, strategic essentialists must still believe implicitly that 
there are some common areas of women's life which require political 
intervention. Or else, what would be the point of "a strategy of affirming 
fictitious commonalities amongst women" [ ... ] "in a world where women do not 
really have any common characteristics or experiences"'? 121 In Italy, entrustment 
theorists and theorists of sexual difference in general, have invoked essentialism 
on slightly different grounds. Points of commonality that women share are still 
deemed fictitious. As we shall see from chapter IV, it is indeed to put an end to 
the equalisation. of women in their gender that entrustment is created. However, it 
is partly because society (or rather the existing symbolic order) considers women 
as a "gender" and not as singular speaking and thinking subjects, that they will 
appeal to essentialism. 122 It is the common positioning of women at the margins 
of signification which brings women together to devise a social-symbolic 
practice. But this essentialism is a temporary strategy and not an end in itself 
since entrustment seeks to contest the common positioning of women at the 
margins of signification. 
117 Fuss, Essentially Speaking, op. cit., p. 6. 
118 ibid., p-20 
119 ibid., p. 21 [original emphasis] 
120 ibid, p. 19 
121 Stone, "On the Genealogy of Women", op. cit., p. 89. 
122 Ida Dominijanni, "11 desiderio di politica" in Lia Cigarmi, La politica del desiderio (Parma: 
Pratiche Editrice, 1995), p. 24. 
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Judith Butler and thefeminist genealogy of the category of woman. 
The second theorist I have chosen to exemplify those feminists who have 
creatively embraced the purported crisis of feminism is Judith Butler. Apart from 
reflecting her important contribution to feminist theory in recent years, this 
choice is informed by the Foucauldian aspect of her thought. In particular, I wish 
to focus here on the genealogical account of gender. I will later contrast her use 
of genealogy to that explicit in entrustment theory (Chapters IV and V). 
Butler's Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990), 
rejects another opposition which has accompanied the history of feminism - that 
between sex and gender. Like Fuss, Butler argues that both sex and gender are 
produced discursively, and are hence constructed culturally. She captures the 
relationship between sex and gender as follows: gender is "the discursive and 
cultural means by which 'sex nature' or 'natural sex' is produced and established 
as (prediscursive', prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture 
acts. " 123 She follows Foucault who, in the History of Sexuality, contends that the 
category of sex is itself constructed through a historically specific mode of 
sexuality. Butler indeed argues that sex and gender are constructed so as to fit the 
norms of a particular masculinist and heterosexual society which establishes a 
heterosexual continuity between sex, gender, sexual practice and desire., 24 The 
body thus becomes, for her, a "cultural situation"125 where the effects of 
discourse and power become manifest. 
Like Fuss, Butler embraces what we have called the "conundrum" of 
"third-wave" feminism, whereby it becomes paradoxical to call oneself a 
feminist since both the ontological category of "woman" and the homogenous 
political entity of "women" are illusions. But she faces this paradox in a different 
way and disregards "strategic essentialism" as an inadequate solution because 
"strategies always have meanings that exceed the purposes for which they are 
intended". 126 Instead of searching for some stable notion of gender on which to 
123 Butler, Gender Trouble, op. cit., p. 7. 
124 ibid., p. 17. 
125 Judith Butler, "Variations on Sex and Gender: Beauvoir, Wittig and Foucault" in Benhabib 
and Cornell, Feminism as Critique, op. cit., p. 
134. 
126 Butler, Gender Trouble, op. cit, p. 4. 
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base a feminist politics, she instead welcomes its erosion. ' 27 In doing so, she 
recuperates Foucault's reading of Nietzsche's notion of genealogy as that which 
is opposed to the search for "origins". For Foucault, such a search "is an attempt 
to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their 
carefully protected identities; because this search assumes the existence of 
immobile fonns that precede the external world of accident and succession. ", 28 
Butler's proposal is thus radically anti -essentialist or, in her own words, "anti- 
foundationalist". 129 Unlike the constructionists whom Diana Fuss targets for 
positing an utterly passive subject subordinated to the shaping influence of 
culture, Butler once again relies on a Foucauldian notion of a subject who is not 
uniquely constituted by norms in a passive way. Such a subject also assumes and 
reinterprets these same non-ns actively. 130 Butler therefore redefines 
"construction" as that material process which "not only takes place in time but is 
itself a temporal process [operating] through the reiteration of normS.,, 131 
Butler's project is therefore to map a "feminist genealogy of the category 
of women", which involves "trac[ing] the political operations that produce and 
conceal what qualifies as the juridical subject of feminism". 132 Women become 
connected to one another, not through a common essence derived from "sex", but 
through multiple chains of historical interpretations of the category "woman" 
which have been both passively assumed and actively taken up and re-signified 
in different ways. Thus women are not a unified political group but can 
nevertheless form a "coalition" in pursuit of a particular end. 133 Identity no 
longer has to be the basis of politics, and feminism not longer needs "women" or 
"gender" as a foundational category. Butler in fact embraces the "conundrum" of 
127 ibid., p. 5. 
128 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in Paul Rabinow (ed. ), The Foucault 
Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 78. In On the 
Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche points out that "anything in existence, having somehow come 
about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new 
purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs [... ] consists of overpowering, 
dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consists of re-interpretation, 
adjustment, in the process of which their former 'meaning' and 'purpose' must necessarily be 
obscured or completely obliterated" (see Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], p. 55). 
129 Butler, Gender Trouble, op. cit., p. 15. 
130 See "Variations on Sex and Gender", where Butler re-examines de Beauvoir's notion of the 
body as a "situation". See Butler, op. cit., esp. p. 133. 
13 1 Butler, Bodies That Matter, op. cit., p. 10. 
132 Butler, Gender Trouble, op. cit., p. 5. 
133 ibid., p. 15. 
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contemporary feminism because she sees in it an opportunity to do away with 
feminism's inherent exclusionary and normative structure. She thus writes that 
"An open identity will affirin identities that are alternately instituted and 
relinquished according to the purposes at hand, it will be an assemblage that 
permits multiple convergences and divergences without an obedience to a 
normative telos of definitional closure. " 134 
As we shall see in the next chapters, entrustment theorists and il pensiero 
della differenza sessuale also use the notion of genealogy. Unlike Butler, 
however, they do not borrow it from Nietzsche and Foucault, but from Luce 
Irigaray's analysis of the existing symbolic order. In this second sense, 
genealogy refers to relationships between women and those between mothers and 
daughters. It is intended as a symbolic "lineage" or "descent" which connects 
women both to their origin (the mother) and to one another. Nevertheless, in 
Chapter V, we will explore the possibility of thinking of entrustment in ways 
which might recall Butler's "coalition" of women. We will indeed ask to what 
extent a relationship of entrustment can be conceived as a coalition between two 
women (on the basis that they are positioned by the existing male symbolic order 
at the margins of language) in pursuit of a particular end (the social translation of 
a specific project/desire). 
Christine Battersby andjeminist metaphysics. 
Christine Battersby's work on feminist metaphysics offers an ideal 
conclusion to my account of the development of feminism in the Anglo-Saxon 
context. Battersby not only provides yet another example of recent theorists who 
have faced contemporary feminism's dilemma. She also occupies a somewhat 
anomalous position within the socio-historical context that I have sketched in this 
part of the chapter. I will therefore use her Phenomenal Woman: Feminist 
Metaphysics and the Patterns of Identity (1998) to briefly show the elements 
which constitute this anomaly and which mark a certain affinity with 
Italian 
feminism as it has been taken beyond entrustment and il pensiero by Adriana 
Cavarero. 
134 ibid., p. 16. 
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Like the other feminists discussed in this part of the chapter, Christine 
Battersby refutes essentialist positions which claim that an underlying and 
unchanging core in women's identity determines their specific way of knowing 
and experiencing the world around them. 135 In addition, like Fuss and Butler, 
Battersby recognises that both sex and gender are discursive constructions that 
are, as such, historically and culturally contingent. 136 Her position can 
nonetheless be considered unusual because she wishes to recuperate metaphysics 
in order to put it to feminist uses. In a similar way to both entrustment theorists 
and Adriana Cavarero, Battersby explores "models for conceptualising ontology 
that would allow us to retain a notion of sexual difference while also theorising 
differences amongst women. " 137 
Battersby contends that, in the anti-essentialist re ections of the categories j 
of "woman", "women") or "female". an Aristotelian notion of essence has been 
privileged over other existing alternatives. 138 She interrogates the history of 
western metaphysics in order to arrive at a notion of a "female" essence which 
"'involves registering the norms and regulative practices that at one particular 
time and in one type of culture act as sexual definers". 139 In a theoretically useful 
way, Battersby hence dissociates essentialism from biologism, naturalism, fixity 
and timelessness. 
The starting point for this search is women's common "positioning vis-a- 
vis the founding metaphysical categories of 'identity', 'self, substance' and 
4 , 140 personhood' . She 
identifies five features of the female position (themselves 
contingent and subject to change). These are "the conceptual link between the 
paradigm woman and the body that births", 141 the socialisation of women as 
primary carers, the impregnation of the self with otherness, the connection of 
women with the flesh/the body, and the experience of the female as the 
anomalous/monstrous. Throughout The Phenomenal Woman, Battersby contends 
that if we took woman as norm, that is, if these five features acted as starting 
135 Battersby, The Phenomenal Woman, op. cit., p. 6. 
136 ibid., p. 2 1. 
137 ibid., p. 13. 
138 ibid., p. 31. It is on the basis of this tendency to "[homogenise] the history of metaphysics in 
ways reminiscent of Heidegger" (p. 119) that Battersby criticises Irigaray's later works such as 
Sexes and Genealogies (1987), Le Temps de la Diffiýrence (1989), Je, Tu, Nous (1993). 
139 ibid., p. 32. 
140 ibid., p. 200- 
141 ibid., p. 7. 
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points, our conception of essence and of metaphysics would be transformed so as 
to register contingency, multiplicity and change rather than fatality, fixity and 
timelessness. 
Many of the characteristics of the self that this metaphysics of 
"immanenceibecoming"142 calls forth suggest affinities with entrustment and 
Cavarero's accounts of the self (discussed in the last three chapters of this study). 
Firstly, the category of natality is put at the centre of Battersby's feminist 
metaphysics. For both Cavarero and Battersby, natality implies embodiment but 
also a regard for the new. It hence opposes fixity with multiple potentialities. 
However, while Cavarero borrows and adapts natality from Hannah Arendt and 
lays more emphasis on the relationship between natality and action, Batterby 
rather relies on Kierkegaard's account of a self "which is birthed from a multiple 
play of possibilities". 143 
Secondly, in both Cavarero and Battersby, natality also implies 
relationality. Taking the female as norm involves, for the latter, taking into 
consideration a body which can be impregnated with otherness. Thus, the self 
both includes the other and depends on the other for its constitution. 144 Following 
Kierkegaard, Battersby argues that the self is "marked - 'scored' - into 
specificity by its relationship with 'otherness"'. 145 These relationships are 
multiple and changing. This contests any notion of "substance" and allows for 
differences between women, since these relationships contain a plurality of 
possibilities, and are differently experienced. 146 Furthermore, these multiple and 
evolving relationships do not foreclose any form of permanence. Indeed, patterns 
(of relationships, responses and habits) are established over time so that "stability 
can emerge in a world of 'events' and 'becoming"'. 147 In Chapters IV and V, we 
will return to these multiple patterned relationships which form the subject's 
142 ibid., p. II- 
143 ibid., p. 200. 
144 Battersby registers both dynamics of the self containing the other, and depending on the other. 
In chapter V, I will argue that, in entrustment, only one aspect of this dynamics is taken into 
consideration. Entrustment theorists indeed stress that the entrustee's emergence as subject 
depends on the relationship she has with her inspirational woman. However, they hardly focus on 
the position of the other that the "Inspirational woman" occupies. In Chapter V, I will contend 
that this lack of attention leaves entrustment vulnerable to abusive power relationships. 
145 ibid., p. 12. 
146 
ibid., p. 202. 
147 ibid., p. 12. 
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specificity to compare and contrast them to those established by the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment. 
Thirdly, the type of metaphysics that both Cavarero and Battersby propose 
is "fleshy" since it concerns itself fundamentally with the corporeal aspect of the 
subject. In Battersby's account, the body itself is scored by these "patterns of 
becoming". These are constituted by what Battersby calls "forcefields", which 
can be linguistic, cultural, historical or social norms, bodily activities or training, 
or ways one apprehends one's morphology. They are "patterns" because they are 
actively repeated, intersected, and evolving. In that sense, conceptions of "'Male' 
and 'female' can be viewed as different patterns of potentiality". 148 
Affinities can also here be detected between the political consequences of 
Battersby's metaphysics of becoming, Cavarero's politics of uniqueness, the 
social-symbolic practice of entrustment and ilpensiero della differenza sessuale. 
Battersby herself confesses, in the concluding pages of Phenomenal Woman, that 
the model of identity developed in her book challenges ideals of sisterhood, 
equality, self-determining freedoms, and hence are bound to attract much 
feminist criticism. 149 In Battersby's account of identity, power inequalities and 
dependency also occupy centre stage (as in entrustment, they are exemplified in 
the mother-child relationship). Battersby accepts Foucault's assertion that power 
is ubiquitous. But she also calls for "an adequate distinction between abusive and 
non-abusive relationships of power". 150 As we shall see in Chapter IV, this 
distinction has been attempted by entrustment theorists. In Chapter V, I will 
argue that, despite this attempt, power is insufficiently theorised and, as a result, 
its potential abuse undermines the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. 
Battersby (together with Cavarero) rejects entrustment precisely because it 
renders the abuse of power possible. Because of these common themes that she 
shares with il pensiero della differenza sessuale as a whole and because of her 
unequivocal dismissal of entrustment as a "hannful" practice, 151 1 will refer back 
to Christine Battersby's metaphysics of sexual difference during the course of 
this thesis. 
148 ibid., p. 204. 
149 ibid., p. 205. It is because of these same issues of power differentials and dependency that 
debates following the invention of entrustment have torn i1pensiero della differenza sessuale in 
half 
150 ibid., p. 209- 
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C2-nkSchlusion. 
From the mid-1980s then, the foundations of feminist theorist and activism 
have seriously been shaken. As this part of the chapter has shown, the theme of 
essentialism has been ubiquitous. The questioning of "woman" (both as an 
essentialist and as a social construct), as well as the undermining of the 
sex/gender, equality/difference, essentialism/constructionism dichotomies, have 
led feminism to an apparent impasse. However, far from abandoning the terms of 
the debates mentioned above, some feminists have sought to re-examine them. 
We have seen how, thanks to their strategic essentialism, genealogical account of 
gender and feminist metaphysics, Diana Fuss, Judith Butler and Christine 
Battersby have respectively sought to recuperate a notion of gender and 
embodiment which avoids the pitfalls of essentialism that previous feminists had 
identified. 
Due to the hegemonic influence of Irigaray's theory of sexual difference in 
Italy, entrustment and il pensiero della dififerenza sessuale have sought to 
conceptualise differences between women, while retaining a notion of sexual 
difference as ontological. We will therefore have to re-examine (mainly in 
Chapter V) the question of essentialism in an Italian context. Chapter VI will also 
demonstrate that Adriana Cavarero's "politics of uniqueness" attempts to move 
beyond the debates mentioned above. "How does Cavarero's politics of 
uniqueness still manage to remain a feminist politics? " will therefore be one of 
the closing questions of my thesis. 
Concluding remarks: Avoiding the "Grand Narrative of Feminism 
99152 
One risk involved in presenting a linear account of the history of feminism, 
in terms of its successive waves, is to give the crude impression of a smooth 
development (from egalitarianism to gynocentrism and to an enlightened 
abandonment of both perspectives). I hope that the discussion of the Anglophone 
151 ibid., p. 119. 
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context with which I have opened my thesis has made clear that all the 
"traditions" and perspectives outlined above co-exist to some extent and that all 
thinkers, at some level, are obliged to acknowledge a mutual relationship 
between equality and difference. It is in order to demonstrate such an assertion 
that I have examined the ways in which essentialism (in one fonn or another) 
makes its way back, insidiously, into most arguments. It is also with such an 
intent that I have outlined the manner in which, if considered chronologically, so- 
called "third-wave" feminists still conjure up some notion of sexual difference, 
embodiment, or metaphysics. In conclusion, one could say, together with Judith 
Squires, that "the equality/difference debate has certainly been shown to be more 
complex than originally presumed, but its hold appears as strong as ever. " 153 
Another danger that I have sought to avoid in this opening chapter is to set 
a rigid barrier between Anglophone and Continental feminism. My selection of 
particular feminists for the specific issues they deal with has been done with the 
intent of setting bridges between the two contexts, while preparing to argue that 
Italian feminism can still be thought of as "specific" (a contention that the rest of 
the thesis will defend). The following chapter will pursue this enterprise. Chapter 
11 deals with the development of the debates encountered in Chapter 1, but in the 
French context. If, as we have just seen, the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment has explicitly recognised the influence of Anglophone feminism, via 
an adaptation of Adrienne Rich's work, it has been even more indebted to a 
particular current of French feminism. Entrustment indeed inherits some aspects 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis, of the political work of the Parisian group "Psych & 
Po ", and of Luce Irigaray's philosophy of sexual difference. It is to these 
influences that we will now turn. 
152 Diana Coole, "Threads and Plaits or an Unfinished Project: Feminism(s) Through the C20th" 
in Michael Freeden (ed. ), Reassessing Political Ideologies: The Durability of Dissent (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 157. 
153 Squires, Gender in Political Theory, op. cit., p. 13 9. 
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Chapter 11 
Sexual Difference in a French Context 
Introduction: inventing "French feminism". 
In the scathing article mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, Christine Delphy 
claims that what English-speaking feminists call "French feminism" is an invention., 
Anglo-American commentators have taken "a certain overtly antifeminist political trend 
called 'Psych et Po' as the core of French feminism and have repeatedly promoted 
,, 2 Helene Cixous, Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray as the 'Holy Trinity'. Delphy also 
argues that, due to their alleged essentialist nature, the theses advanced by "French 
feminists" are altogether reactionary and detrimental to the very existence of feminism. 
According to her, there is an ideological motive at work behind this creation: 
[its Anglophone inventors] did not want to take responsibility 
for what they were saying and, in particular, for their attempt to 
rescue psychoanalysis from the discredit it had incurred both in 
feminism and throughout the social sciences. They pretended 
that another feminist movement thought it was great - the fact 
that it was all the other, admittedly strange, movement was 
interested in. 3 
For Delphy, Anglophone inventors of "French feminism" simultaneously criticise and 
promote essentialism by arguing that the essentialism allegedly found 
in "French 
4 
feminism" is no essentialism at all. Since this chapter of my thesis deals with what 
Delphy calls "French feminism", with psychoanalysis and with one of the women writers 
I Christine Delphy, "The Invention of French Feminism: An Essential Move" in Yale French Studies 
87 (1995): 193. 
2 ibid., p-191. 
3 ibid., p. 21 0. 
4 ibid., p. 212- 
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forming the "Trinity" (namely, Luce Irigaray), I feel compelled to open my discussion by 
confronting Delphy's uncompromising assertions. 
As I have argued in the introduction above, Delphy's article is to be praised for 
raising the issue of imperialism within feminist theory. It is to combat homogenising and 
imperialistic tendencies of dealing with so-called "Anglo-American", "French" or 
"Italian" feminism that my introduction has begun to situate the social-symbolic practice 
of entrustment and il pensiero della differenza sessuale within the broader context of 
contemporary Italian feminism. 51 would like to point out that this particular chapter does 
recognise the diversity of the women's liberation movement in France ("Mouvement de 
la Liberation des Femmes" or MLT). It deals with psychoanalysis, "Psych & Po " and 
Luce Irigaray, not because they exemplify French feminism, but because they are 
relevant to the Italian context (analysed in Chapter 111). 6 
This chapter also contests many of Delphy's assertions. In particular, I will here 
question the claim that Luce Irigaray offers a vision of sexual difference which is 
essentialist and problematic for a feminist PoliticS. 
7 I will also challenge Delphy's 
opinion that the work produced by male theorists, by those who see themselves as anti- 
feminists or indifferent to feminism cannot provide an impetus for feminist analysis. 8 
Indeed, I will here approach Lacan as a major theorist with whom Irigaray and the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment engage critically. 
Sexual difference in a French context. 
The aim of this chapter is thus three-fold. Firstly, I will open my discussion with a 
consideration of egalitarian arguments as they are exposed in France. Simone de 
Beauvoir's The Second Sex (1949) will here take centre stage. I will briefly examine 
Beauvoir's famous anti-essentialist argument that one becomes a woman and relate it to 
her existentialist understanding of freedom. This discussion of Beauvoir's existentialism, 
5 One could certainly point out, that Delphy is here guilty of the same mistake. She talks about an 
"Anglo-American compulsion to homogenise the French" (p. 214) as if this compulsion itself were 
experienced by all Anglo-American feminist theorists. 
6 Delphy herself acknowledges that "Although Irigaray's work is not used in Women's Studies in 
France, her theses are very popular with important parts of the women's movement in Italy" (p. 219). 
7 ibid., p. 194. 
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be it a limited one, will be useful in order to later show that, although opposed to 
egalitarian feminism, entrustment theorists sometimes propose a notion of freedom 
which bears existentialist traces. In addition, I will investigate Beauvoir's analysis of 
woman as Other since this aspect of The Second Sex acts as a reference for second-wave 
feminists such as higaray. 
The second and most important aim of this chapter will be to investigate the link 
between the social-symbolic practice of entrustment, that which makes Italian feminism 
specific, and the theory of sexual difference as developed in France by Luce Irigaray. Of 
all the thinkers influencing Irigaray, I will particularly concentrate on Lacan. 9 My 
reading of Irigaray will here establish the centrality of the critical engagement with 
Lacanian psychoanalysis for the feminist project of creating a feminine symbolic. In 
addition, it will show why Lacanian psychoanalysis is so important to understanding the 
way in which Italian feminists have read Irigaray. Lacanian psychoanalysis will also be a 
useful tool for my own critique of entrustment, which I will develop in Chapter V. 
The third and final aim of the chapter is to identify those aspects of Irigaray's work 
central to the elaboration of entrustment and to il pensiero della differenza sessuale. At 
this juncture, I will isolate three important themes that are shared - the critique of the 
existing symbolic order, the theme of the relationships between women, and the 
forgetting of the mother. In this last part of the chapter, I will evaluate critically these 
three themes, while trying to outline the similarities and differences between Irigaray's 
writings and the political work of "Psych & Po ". I will also identify the insights as well 
as the risks that inheriting a perspective from Lacan and Irigaray entail for Italian 
feminism. 
8 ibid., p. 219- 
9 Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros: Irigaray's Rewriting of the Philosophers (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1995) deals with Irigaray's philosophical influences. For Luce Irigaray's debt to 
psychoanalysis, see for example, Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1991) or Elizabeth Grosz, Lacan: A Feminist Introduction 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 168-18 8. 
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Section Beauvoir and the Second Sex. 
There are noticeable similarities between the emergence of feminism in 
France and in the Anglo-Saxon countries. As in the Anglophone context, the 
equality perspective is the first to be articulated. The Enlightenment's emphasis on 
universal reason and fundamental equality brings various political theorists to 
reject women's natural inferiority and to use liberal natural rights arguments in 
order to claim greater equality for women in society. 10 Like Mary Wollstonecraft, 
some demand reforms in women's education, ' 1 but very few insist on 
enfranchisement. 12 Like their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, most of these early liberal 
feminists also retain some notion of woman's specificity 13 and still defend 
women"s rights on a utilitarian basis. 14 A socialist tradition of egalitarian feminism 
also emerges in the Cl9th. 15 What might locate the French context closer to the 
Italian is the existence of a strong republican tradition which brands liberal 
individualist feminism as "foreign" and opts rather for a pro-family and nationalist 
discourse. 16 There has been, therefore, enough "homegrown" theories about 
women for Simone de Beauvoir to open The Second Sex with those words: 
10 For a few examples, see Claude-Hadrien Helv6tius, De 1'esprit (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1968), 
111,27, p. 161 or Condorcet, "Sur Fadmission des fernmes au droit de cit6" in A. Condorcet and M. F. 
Arago, Oeuvres de Condorcet, Vol. X (Paris: Firmin Didot Fr&es, 1987), esp. pp. 122-129. 
11 See for example Madame de Sta6l, On Germany in Vivian Folkenflik (ed. ), Major Writings of 
Germaine de StaEl (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 205. 
12 See the Article VI of Olympes de Gouges's "D6claration des droits de la femme et de ]a 
citoyenne" in Andr6-Jean Arnaud and Elizabeth Kingdom (eds. ), Women's Rights and The Rights of 
Man (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), p. 105. De Gouges is, by far, the most radical of 
the feminists mentioned here. Her demands include an equal share in writing the constitution (XVI), 
in drafting the law (VII), in public administration (XIV) and in industry (XIII), the open access to all 
functions (VI) and the right to property (XVII). 
13 For example, Condorcet believes that "women are superior where gentle and domestic virtues are 
concerned". See Condorcet, "Sur I'admission des femmes au droit de cit6", op. cit., p. 124. 
14 Like Wollestonecraft, Madame de Sta6l believes that education provides better wives and increase 
women's sense of morality. See, respectively de Sta6l, On Germany, op. cit., p. 205 and Letters on 
Rousseau, op. cit., p. 40. It should be stressed that de Staýil, unlike Wollstonecraft, is a great admirer 
of Rousseau's ideas on education. 
15 One of its representatives is Flora Tristan (1803-44). These early egalitarian currents are described 
in Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, ed. and trans. H. M. Parshley (London: Johnathan Cape, 
1972), pp. 121-157. 
16 Karen Offen, "Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach" in Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 14.1 (1988): 144. In the following chapter, we will come back to the 
republican feminist discourse which, in Italy, is of Mazzinian inspiration. 
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"Enough ink has been spilled in quarrelling over feminism, and perhaps we should 
say no more about it. ý517 
Given the status of The Second Sex as a classic and the wealth of feminist 
responses and debates that it still generates, I will not attempt to present here a 
comprehensive exegesis. Rather, I will approach The Second Sex with a view to 
situating the debate between equality and difference within a French context. My 
aim is also to assess Simone de Beauvoir's legacy for French feminism (and, 
indirectly,, for contemporary Italian feminism). This first part of the chapter 
therefore concentrates on two central axes of The Second Sex - the contentions that 
one becomes a woman and that woman is the Other of man. 
1. Constructionism and existentialism in The Second Sex: 
"One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman". 18 In the introduction to The 
Second Sex, Beauvoir acknowledges the differences between the sexes as 
phenomenological, but also points out that woman's functioning as a female is not 
enough to indicate what woman is. 19 If being female is natural, being a woman is 
the product of civilisation. Thus, The Second Sex is, first and foremost, an anti- 
essentialist work in its rejection of biologism. 20 This part will briefly examine 
Beauvoir's discussion of Freudian psychoanalysis and Engel's historical 
materialism in order to highlight two slightly different theoretical oppositions that 
this influential "slogan', 21 of The Second Sex contains - first, the essentalism vs. 
constructionism antagonism that we have already encountered in Chapter I and 
second, the tension between essentialism and existentialism. 
It is on this account that Beauvoir welcomes Freudian psychoanalysis and 
historical materialism. For the former, it is not "the body-object described by 
17 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, op. cit., p. 13. 
18 ibid., p. 273. 
19 ibid., p. 14. 
20 See in particular, the first chapter entitled "The data of biology". 
21 Chanter, Ethics ofEros, op. cit., p. 78. 
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biologists that actually exists, but the body as lived in by the subject. ). ). 22 For the 
latter, humanity is not simply left vulnerable to the dictates of nature but is actually 
characterised by its ability to transform or repossess it. 23 Thanks to a consideration 
of technological evolution, historical materialism does not confine women to their 
biological destiny. Instead, woman's nature is a direct consequence of the 
economical development of a given society. 24 
In addition to the opposition between essentialism (biological determinism) 
and constructionism, another conflict is also implicit in the assertion that one 
becomes a woman. In The Second Sex, "determinism" is indeed redefined according 
to the existentialist perspective Beauvoir openly adopts. It is hence in comparison 
to existentialist ethics that Freudian psychoanalysis and historical materialism are 
deemed "detenninist" since both theories shun the individual's potential to make 
choices. Apart from their masculine bias, 25 Freud's theories are forsaken for 
offering a deterministic explanation of human life on the basis of sexuality alone. 26 
Similarly, historical materialism is rejected because it sees technology as 
determining the different stages of human history, regardless of men's and 
women's individual responses to technological changes. This leads Engels, on 
whom Beauvoir concentrates, to make a number of essentialist assumptions -a 
spontaneous sexual division of labour, man's natural ties with private property, the 
weakness of the female body. 27 
in The Second Sex, essentialism is hence not so much contrasted to 
constructionism as opposed to existentialism. Let us pause on this "quest of 
being"28 of which sexuality and technology are but two aspects. Beauvoir theorises 
liberty in existentialist terms. It is fundamental to the subject, irremediably linked 
with action and constantly actualised through the practical translation of new 
22 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, op. cit., p. 65. 
23 ibid., p. 79. 
24 ibid., p. 79 
25 ibid., p. 67. As we shall see, this assertion is not far from Irigaray's claim that the imaginary of 
psychoanalysis is male. 
26 ibid., p. 69. Disputing Beauvoir's claims about Freudian psychoanalysis is beyond the scope of my 
argument. For a critique of Simone 
de Beauvoir's assertions, see Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and 
Feminism (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 205-218. 
27 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, op. cit., pp. 81,83. 
28 ibid., p. 72. 
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projects: "every subject plays its part as such specifically through exploits or 
projects that serve as a mode of transcendence: he achieves liberty only through a 
continual reaching out of other liberties" . 
29Although freedom is an ontological 
component of the human individual, its responsibility can be sometimes daunting 
and the individual can choose to refuse it. In this case, the subject's consciousness 
falls back into immanence. This is an ethical affront since the subject chooses to 
ignore the fundamental drive towards liberty that defines him as a human being 
(this is what Sartrean existentialists call "bad faith"). Refusing transcendence and 
opting for immanence is a choice that the free subject always has to confront. 
30 Liberty would indeed not be liberty if some kind of free-will were not involved . 
Inheriting Beauvoir's construction ism. 
As many commentators have argued, such a perspective borrowed from 
existential ethics is equivocal if applied to the situation of women in society. I shall 
come back to this point in the following section. For the moment, I would like to 
examine the way in which Beauvoir's constructionism is inherited by some second- 
wave feminists. One should point out here that the publication of The Second Sex in 
France at the end of the 1940s is initially met with indifference or hostility. " it is 
not until it is acclaimed in the U. S. A. that the French feminist scene opens up to 
The Second Sex in the 1960s. 32 It is then that Marxist feminists such as Christine 
Delphy and Monique Plaza recuperate the constructionist side of Beauvoir's 
argument. 33 For Beauvoir, economic independence, which is to be achieved through 
work, is highly desirable and likely to better women's condition but insufficient for 
emancipating women. Beauvoir perceives an additional need for moral, social and 
cultural evolution. In other words, change needs to affect men and women's 
29 ibid., p. 27. For a detailed study of the connection between The Second Sex and Sartrean 
existentialism, see Mich&le Le Doetiff, "Simone de Beauvoir and Existentialism-, Feminist Studies 6 
(Summer 1980): 277-289. 
30 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, op. cit., p. 20. 
31 see Margaret A. Simons, "Sexism and the Philosophical Canon: On Reading Beauvoir's Second 
Sex" in Journal of the History of Ideas 51.3 (July-September 1990): 487-504. 
32 Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance: A Study of Woman in Contemporary Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 168. 
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consciousness. In claiming Beauvoir's inheritance, materialist f 
34 
eminists gather 
around Delphy and the periodical Questions Fýministes to focus on Beauvoir's 
account of the complexity of women's oppression. They seek to establish a feminist 
science that could unmask the convoluted ideological workings of patriarchy. 35 
The theorists of Questions Nministes also use Beauvoir's constructionism as 
a key weapon in the bitter battle which opposes them to the "new" feminists of 
sexual difference, partly represented by Luce higaray. All stress on sexual 
difference is henceforth deemed essentialist, reactionary and anti-feminist because 
it supposedly re-invigorates the myth of the "eternal feminine" that Beauvoir so 
convincingly writes against. 36 We will come back to contest the kinds of criticism 
that Delphy and Plaza direct against Irigaray in the third part of the chapter. 
Several reasons have been advanced for the lack of interest or for the hostility 
that The Second Sex has occasioned amongst certain feminist circles in France. One 
could mention the fact that, prior to the 1970s when she restates her position, 37 
Beauvoir has always kept a sharp distance from feminism. 38 One could also record 
her constant declarations of allegiance to Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism and her 
persistent rejection of her own philosophical originality. 39 However, the factor on 
which I would like to focus particularly is that of an evolution in French intellectual 
life. The end of the 1960s witnesses the decreasing influence of existentialism on 
the one hand, and the rise, on the other, of poststructuralist theory that a variety of 
"new" difference feminists embrace. 40 
33 
ibid.. p. 169. 
34 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, op. cit., p. 681. 
35 Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance, op. cit., p. 245. See, for example Christine Delphy, Close to 
Home: A Materialist Analysis of Women's Oppression (London: Hutchinson, 1984) or Monique 
Plaza, "Phallomorphic Power and the Psychology of Woman", Ideology and Consciousness 4 
(1978): 4-36. 
36 Delphy, "The Invention of French Feminism", op. cit., p. 198. 
37 Chanter, Ethics ofEros, op. cit., p. 74. 
38 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, op. cit., p. 25. 
39 Margaret A. Simons, "Introduction" in Margaret A. Simons (ed. ), Feminist Reinterpretations of 
Simone de Beauvoir (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1995), 
pp. 8-1 0. The publication, in 1990, of Beauvoir's letters and notebook by Sylvie Le Bon-de Beauvoir 
has occasioned a re-assessment of Beauvoir's own individual contribution to existential philosophy, 
independent of Sartre's influence. 
40 Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance, op. cit., p. 168 and Claude Imbert, "Simone de Beauvoir and 
Her Generation", in Emily R. Grosholz (ed. ), 1he Legacy of Simone de Beauvoir (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p. 14. 
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It is within these circles that Beauvoir's existentialist approach is received 
with suspicion because of the masculinist conclusions it calls forth .41 The Second 
Sex rejects sex as immanence, difference as inferiority and traditional female 
identity as alienating. Many feminists indeed feel uncomfortable with Beauvoir's 
existentialist disdain for embodiment, nature and biology. 42 It is in female biology 
that women's inferiority is located so much so that Simone Beauvoir's assertion 
arguably verges on essentialism. In Beauvoir, it is the specificity of female biology 
which makes it even more difficult for women to achieve transcendence. I will 
return to this existentialist tendency to denigrate the body and the biological in 
Chapter VI, when dealing with Hannah Arendt's existential politics. 
For now, let me point out that one can detect in Beauvoir's exhortation to 
transcend one's bodily limitations the dream of overcoming the distinction between 
the sexes. 43 In Chapter 1, we have seen how this vision of an androgynous future is 
recurrent within Anglo-Saxon egalitarian feminists such as Millett or Firestone's 
(both of whom have dedicated their books to Beauvoir). I have also noted how this 
androgyny is irremediably androcentric. It is precisely on this point that Irigaray 
rejects Beauvoirean egalitarianism. While Beauvoir seeks difference to be 
expressed within equality, Irigaray seeks equality in difference. 44 In the third part of 
this chapter, we shall grasp the extent to which Irigaray's project of rethinking 
sexual difference sets her up against Simone de Beauvoir. For the moment, I will 
point out that entrustment theorists and il pensiero della differenza sessuale share 
Irigaray's rejection of a Beauvoirian type of egalitarianism, which they see equally 
as an attempted homologation to a male model. However, we shall find an echo of 
existentialism in the emphasis that entrustment and i1pensiero put on action as "the 
social translation of the human value of being a woman', 
45 and on their particular 
41 For one example amongst a variety of feminists who have attacked Beauvoir on this point, see 
Dorothy Kaufmann McCall, "Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, Jean-Paul Sartre" in Signs 5 
(Winter 1979): 209-223. 
42 See, for example, Moira Gatens, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspective on Difference and 
Equality (Indianapolis: Bloomington, 199 1), pp. 2,5 8,127. 
43 Chanter, Ethics ofEros, op. cit., p. 49. 
44 For example, see Irigaray's efforts to establish sexuate rights in Je, Tu, Nous, 
(Paris: Editions de 
Minuit, 1990), p. 12. 
45 The Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic 
practice (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 146. 
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understanding of freedom as the capacity to express sexual difference in words and 
actions. 
A schematic view of the French backdrop to the debate between equality and 
difference can thus be glimpsed by an analysis of the feminist responses to The 
Second Sex. However, the other aspect of Beauvoir's landmark study - that which 
accounts for the status of woman as Other - makes it possible for difference 
feminists such as Irigaray to be reconnected to Beauvoir. It is to this second 
dimension of The Second Sex that I shall now turn. 
2. The Second Sex and Otherness. 
The other axis of The Second Sex opens with these lines: 
"humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as 
relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being [ ... ] 
She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not 
with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as 
opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, the Absolute - she is 
the Other. , 
46 
In order to analyse this passage and its impact on difference feminism, I wish to 
return to the two greatest philosophical influences behind The Second Sex - namely, 
Sartrean existentialism and Hegel's master-slave dialectic. I will argue that, while 
both are central to The Second Sex, Beauvoir implicitly alters them in order to 
account for the specific nature of woman's oppression. 
The Second Sex argues that the category of otherness is fundamental to 
consciousness. Thus, to define oneself is to define oneself against the other. 
47 But 
this other sets up a reciprocal claim and the relationship between the subject and its 
46 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, Op. cit., p. 16. 
47 ibid., p. 17. 
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other is one of conflict. The problem with the account of oppression that Sartre 
offers in Being and Nothingness is that it is somehow incompatible with the stress 
on the fundamental freedom of the individual. There cannot be oppression as such 
since the individual is fundamentally free either to submit or to resist and re-asseirt 
his freedom by objectifying the other. 
Beauvoir certainly employs this existentialist stand on oppression to account 
for women's complicity to patriarchy, suggesting that they are partly (but only 
partly) responsible for the situation they are in. She repeatedly mentions the relative 
economical and metaphysical advantages of a situation where man provides both 
material protection and moral justification for woman's existence. 48 We have 
however already observed that this temptation to forgo one's liberty and to live as a 
thing is equally experienced by men. Why is it, then, that women almost 
unanimously, succumb to it? We shall come back to this question after a Hegelian 
detour. 
Hegel's master-slave dialectics is often regarded as the other great influence 
behind The Second Sex. 49 What is interesting for an account of the way it is 
employed by Beauvoir, is to point out that the key to the resolution of the conflict 
between master and slave lies with the latter. It is the slave who confronts death and 
chooses life even if this choice means servitude. It is thus the slave who, by 
choosing servitude, confirms the master's freedom. In addition, one could say that 
there is no evolution of consciousness for the master. It is the slave who develops 
his consciousness. By confronting death, the slave becomes conscious of the fact 
that, without life, freedom is but an abstract idea. The slave also achieves a certain 
level of creativity and independence through work - he transforms nature into 
products for human consumption and satisfies his desires (understood here as basic 
biological needs). The slave finds confirmation of his own consciousness in the 
products he makes, and independent of the master's reciprocal gaze. 50 
48 
ibid., p. 20- 
4917or example, see Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros, op. cit., p. 50, or Mich&le Le Doeuff, "Simone de 
Beauvoir and Existentialism", op. cit., p. 285. 
50 G. F. W. Hegel, Phenomenology OfSpirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), § 178-196. 
70 
Simone de Beauvoir's innovation lies in the application of Hegel's master- 
slave dialectic to the relationships between the sexes. However, Beauvoir herself 
acknowledges that only "certain passages" of the master-slave dialectic allow for 
the comparison. 51 For example, she admits that, in the conflict that opposes her to 
man, woman never risks her life. 52 Many commentators have also highlighted other 
limitations to this comparison. For example, Eva Gothlin argues that the conflict 
between man and woman is much less dynamic since, in Beauvoir's account, 
woman's consciousness never evolves. Thus, only the first phase of Hegel's 
master-slave dialectic (where, unlike the slave, "the master has proved himself as 
pure consciousness by not having set life up as supreme") is applicable to women. 53 
Woman as Other. 
Beauvoir's use of Sartre and Hegel thus enables her to ask two logical 
questions. We have said that, in relation to Sartre, Beauvoir asks - why is it that 
women almost unanimously succumb to the temptation to forgo one's liberty? And 
in relation to Hegel - if "the Absolute Lord"54 of the relationship between man and 
women is thus not Death, why do women, abandon their claim as subjects? These 
two additional questions show that The Second Sex implicitly recognises the 
insufficiency of Sartre and Hegel's theories for an account of the extent and 
specificity of woman's oppression. 
Whilst Beauvoir seems to have little sympathy. for those who passively 
become accomplices of patriarchy, she also mentions the "lack of resources" for 
55 
women to claim their status as Subjects. As some critics have noted, Beauvoir had 
already tried to present, in Ethics of Ambiguity (1946), a more forceful theory of 
51 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, op. cit., p. 90. 
52 ibid, p. 96. 
53 See Susan James, "Complicity and Slavery in The Second Sex" in Grosbolz (ed. ), Ae Legacy of 
Simone de Beauvoir, op. cit., p. 74. Tina Chanter also notices the lack of dynamism in the 
relationship between man and woman. She argues that, in The Second Sex, there is a tension 
between the Sartrean idea of freedom and the Hegelian master-slave dialectic. See Tina Chanter, 
Ethics ofEros, op. cit., pp. 55-79. 
54 Hegel, The Phenomenology ofSpirit, op. cit., § 194. 
55 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, op. cit., p. 20. 
71 
oppression than that found in Sartre's Being and Nothingness (1943 ). 56 She had 
asserted that oppression exists when one is prevented from accessing the 
instruments to realise the projects one has set oneself 57 In that case, the oppressor 
is unethical because he chooses to refuse to recognise the Other and prevents him 
from becoming a subject. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir furthers this assertion that 
one does not simply choose oppression but that, in oppression, one is rather 
preventedfrom choosing. Men thus act as this unethical and oppressive collectivity 
- they deny women self-determination because they find certain advantages in 
keeping women in a condition of Otherness. 58 Men's "bad faith" lies in denying 
women's dialectical progression by confounding description (of phenomenological 
sexual difference) with prescription (of the norms tagged onto phenomenological 
sexual difference). Beauvoir here appeals to Hegel to explain that "when an 
individual (or group of individuals) is kept in a situation of inferiority, the fact is 
that he is inferior. But the significance of the verb to be must be rightly understood 
here; it is in bad faith to give it a static value when it really has the dynamic 
Hegelian sense of 'to have become' ". 59 
Some critics claim that, rather than restricting herself to the first phase of the 
master-slave dialectic, Beauvoir in fact goes beyond Hegel in describing women as 
"Absolute Other" . 
60 Nancy Bauer shows that, while Hegel assumes that the subject 
will struggle to get recognition as a subject, Beauvoir develops the idea that the 
Other will struggle to get confirmation of his status as object. The Other will 
attempt "to seduce others into allowing [her] to alienate [herselfl in their gaze', 61. 
This is the reason why women are the oppressed group which manifests the most 
56 Alison Stone, "Simone de Beauvoir and Marxism" in Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford 
(eds. ), New Writing by Women in Philosophy, Special Issue of Women's Philosophy Review 
(Nottingham: University of Nottingham Press, 1996), p. 166. 
57 Simone de Beauvoir, Ethics ofAmbiguity (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), pp. 81-82. 
58 Amongst these, Beauvoir mentions the economic advantage of having more jobs reserved to them, 
and the psychological narcissistic advantage of having somebody with whom to compare oneself 
favourably. See Beauvoir, The Second Sex, op. cit., p. 23. 
59 ibid., p. 23. There are of course problems in describing men as a compact oppressive collectivity. 
We will also encounter them within Italian feminism, in particular in the thought of Carla Lonzi 
who, like Beauvoir, equalises the differences between men in expressions 
like "the male", 
"masculine attitude". 
60 James, "Complicity and Slavery in The Second Sex", op. cit., p. 75. 
61 Nancy Bauer as quoted in James, ibid., p. 74. 
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complicity. 62 Bauer's interpretation is particularly interesting if one is to assess the 
way in which Beauvoir's treatment of woman as Other has been inherited by 
subsequent generations of French feminists. As the rest of this chapter shows, 
women as "mirror" to men, defined in such a way as to confinn male subjectivity 
rather than self-identity, is a theme that one finds in Irigaray (and in i1pensiero). 
Conclusion: after Beauvoir and existentialism. 
Naomi Schor has argued that "Irigaray's work cannot be understood without 
situating it in relationship to Beauvoir' S, ). ). 63 Both Irigaray and Beauvoir are indeed 
concerned with rectifying the state of things which prevent women from accessing 
subjectivity, and both concentrate on this problem of the Other/other. They 
denounce the fact that, under patriarchy, "man represents both the positive and the 
neutral, as is indicated by the common use of man to designate human beings in 
,, 64 general; whereas woman represents only the negative. 
Nevertheless, Beauvoir and Irigaray's understanding of "Subject" and 
"Other" is radically different. This difference is the result of a clash of 
philosophical currents that we have already mentioned above. Beauvoir's 
"Subject", is the "strong", intentional, active subject of Sartrean existential 
humanism. The "Other" is the debased, immanent object who is contrived to 
renounce his aspirations to transcendence. Therefore, difference, women's status as 
Other, is here wholly negative. It is that which has to be fought in order for women 
to access subjectivity. The Other must be transformed into the other - men must 
recognise women as subjects. 65 It is thus the i'mechanisms of othering"66 that The 
Second Sex describes, and it is on this humanistic ground that materialist feminists 
such as Delphy argue against the position of Irigaray. Without anticipating on the 
62 Beauvoir, p. 677. 
63 Naorn) Schor, "This Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips With Irigaray" in 
Differences I (Summer 1989): 45. 
64 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, op. cit., p. 15. 
65 ibid., p. 686. 
66 Schor, "This Essentialism Which Is Not One", op. cit., p. 44. 
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third part of this chapter, I will point out here that the human subject analysed by 
Irigaray is poststructuralist rather than existentialist. It is not a subject who uses 
language as a means of communication, but a subject constructed in/by language. It 
is Irigaray's conceptualisation of the subject and other (as other of the same) that 
entrustment and il pensiero will inherit. We shall now examine, in the second part 
of the chapter, how Lacan presents this subject before concluding the chapter on 
Irigaray's complex relationship with the Lacanian theory of subjectivity. 
Section 11 . Jacques Lacan. 
The opening chapter of this thesis has considered the emerging dialogue 
between psychoanalysis and feminism in the 1970s. I have stressed that Juliet 
Mitchell and Nancy Chodorow's work illustrates the gap between the feminist 
reception of psychoanalysis in the Anglo-American and the Continental contexts. 
While Mitchell and Chodorow use different schools of psychoanalysis, neither 
consider the symbolic dimension of gender. The second part of this chapter 
describes the different feminist reception reserved to psychoanalysis in France. In 
particular, it points to a privileging of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacan forms the 
Societj Franqaise de Psychanalyse in the 1950s in reaction to the popularisation of 
psychoanalysis in the U. S. A (through ego psychology and depth-therapy), to the 
rise of object-relations theory in the U. K. and to the stifling presence of the Societe 
Psychanalytique de Paris in France. Lacan has played a central role in revitalising 
the national and international resonance of French psychoanalysis. This success of 
this enterprise must also be attributed to the work of many "dutiful daughters" . 
67 It 
is this national resonance for feminism that I will now describe. In the following 
part of this chapter, I will concentrate on Luce Irigaray, considering 
her as a 
"defiant" rather than dutiful daughter. 
68 In order to do so, it is necessary to spell out 
Lacan's analysis of language, sexual difference and subjectivity. 
67 Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance, op. cit., p. 2 1. 
68 Elisabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan, op. cit., p. 167. 
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Languafyi, 
- cpvillia difference and subjectivity: 
For Lacanian psychoanalysis, subjectivity is constituted across three different 
orders - the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. These are not to be conceived of 
as stages in the individual's development but as coexisting and interlocked psychic 
components. Lacan first outlines his critique of the strong humanist subject in the 
1930s. In "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the 1" (1936), Lacan 
accounts for the fundamental split and alienation of the subject who first acquires a 
sense of self in relation to a specular reflection in a mirror. In this paper, Lacan 
describes how this external and unified reflection challenges the infant's inner 
experience of chaos, lack of co-ordination and control. The "Mirror Stage" explains 
how the assumption of this "mirage"69 in which the infant "misrecognises" himself 
gives the ego an illusory and frail sense of mastery, characteristic of the order of the 
Imaginary. 
We will later come back to this metaphorical function of the mirror (as 
other/mother/analyst) when dealing with Irigaray and with the social-syrnbolic 
practice of entrustment. For the time being, let us point out that Lacan's account of 
the formation of the ego in "The Mirror Stage" works within universal categories. It 
is not until Lacan's elaboration of the order of the Symbolic, in the 1950s, that 
sexual differentiation comes to play a part. It is therefore Lacan's structuralist 
account of the subject in language, where the latter takes up a position with regard 
to the phallus, which has been most interesting and contentious for feminists. The 
point of contact between Lacan, Irigaray's theory of sexual difference in France and 
i1pensi . ero in Italy lies in the elaboration of the symbolic order. 
Lacan, psychoanalysis and linguistics. 
In "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis" 
(1953), Lacan stresses the importance of understanding the two central concepts of 
69 Juliet Mitchell in Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (eds. ), Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan 
and the Ecole Freudienne (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 5. 
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the unconscious and of sexuality in relation to the field of language. Lacan 
"returns" to Freud through the lens of Saussurian structural linguistics. Briefly, 
Ferdinand de Saussure breaks language down to its most elementary component, 
namely the sign. A sign is composed of two unified elements - the signifier (the 
sound-image) and the signified (the object-concept). Lacan takes up the distinction 
between signified and signifier but, unlike Saussure, insists on their separation 
, 
and 
hierarchical ordering. Lacan goes against the common understanding of language as 
the expression of concepts, ideas (signified) by means of words (signifiers). He 
inverts the relationship and submits language to the laws of the signifier. Indeed, 
following Roman Jakobson's so-called "diacritical thesis", Lacan argues that the 
identity of the signifier does not derive from a signified to which its sends back but 
from its difference with another signifier. The signifier thus never exists on its own 
but always in relation (or, more exactly, in opposition) to another signifier. Hence, 
meaning is not to be found in the signified but in the connections between pre- 
existing signifiers, in what Lacan calls "the signifying chain". 70 
1 would like to highlight two important points in relation to Lacan's 
conceptualisation of language. First, it confirms the lack of unity or substance of 
the subject, already exposed in "The Mirror Stage". The subject does not control 
language or produce meaning but is enslaved by the signifying chain, in which he 
functions as a mere signifier. 71 In conformity with Freud, Lacan argues that when 
the subject speaks, he produces a truth he himself does not know. 72 This truth is 
temporarily glimpsed in the sliding from one signifier to the other, that is in the 
gaps of the subject's own discourse. 73 Secondly, and most importantly for my 
account, Lacan's assertion that the signifier functions independently, implies that in 
70 Lacan, "Agency of the Letter In the Unconscious Or Reason Since Freud" in Alan Sheridan (ed. ), 
Ecfits: a Selection (London: Tavistock, 1977), pp. 146-155. 
71 Malcolm Bowie, Lacan (London: Fontana Press, 1991), p. 66. 
72 Lacan, "Agency of the Letter". op. cit., p. 155. 
73 See Lacan, ibid., p. 154. The functioning of language in terms of metaphor and metonymy, that 
Lacan models on Freud's description of the unconscious processes of condensation and 
displacement is outside the scope of my study. I here wish to confine myself to a concise discussion 
of Lacan's conceptual isation of language in relation to sexual difference. For a 
feminist allusion to 
the distinction between metaphor and metonymy, see Luce Irigaray, "La Wcanique des Fluides" in 
Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un (Pans: Minuit, 1977), p. 108 and Gallop, Reading Lacan 
(Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1985), ch. 5. 
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order to access language, the infant will have to take a position in this signifying 
chain which pre-exists him. This brings us back to the importance that sexual 
difference plays in the infant's entrance into the symbolic order (the order/law of 
language and signification). 74 
Language, desire and sexual differentiation. 
What breaks the identification of the infant with the (m)other in the Real (the 
order where the infant is completely dependent on his mother for the satisfaction of 
his biological needs) and what strengthens the imaginary self-mastery glimpsed in 
the mirror is the infant's entrance into the Symbolic order. In Lacan, the subject's 
accession to language parallels Freud's account of the vicissitudes of the Oedipus 
complex when the child becomes an autonomous social (and speaking) being. For 
both Freud and Lacan, this process is experienced differently by boys and girls. In 
Freud, this difference is determined by the castration complex, to which Lacan 
75 comes back . Lacan however substitutes the phallus as a signifier to the biological 
penis of Freud's account. Lacan's linguistic construction of Oedipal relation is 
centred around lack as ontological category, and around the phallus as the 
privileged signifier of that lack and of the desire to fill that lack. Therefore in 
Lacan's account of the formation of the subject in the Symbolic order, lack, desire 
and the phallus are inextricably linked. 
Lacan defines human desire in Hegelian terms as "the desire of the other". 76 
The infant progressively accesses the position of subject by means of 
74 The concept of the symbolic has evolved in Lacan's writing. In their account of this evolution, 
Huguette Glowinski, Zita M. Marks and Sara Murphy identify "The symbolic as chains of 
signifiers. " See Glowinski, Marks and Murphy (eds. ), A Compendium of Lacanian Terms (London: 
Free Association Books, 2001), pp. 198-203. 
75 Lacan, "The Meaning of the Phallus", in Mitchell and Rose, Feminine Sexuality, op. cit., p. 75. For 
Freud's evolving theory of female sexuality see Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality in On 
Sexuality (London: Penguin Freud Library, 1977, vol. 7); "The Dissection of the Psychical 
Personality", "On Femininity" in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (London: Freud 
Penguin Library, vol. 11,1964). 
76 Lacan, "Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis" in Ecrits: a Selection, op. 
cit., p. 58. Benvenuto and Kennedy rightly point out that, in French, "le dýsir de Vautre " carries two 
meanings which both play a role - "le d6sir de Vautre " can refer to the Other's desire or the desire 
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identifications. In the Real, the identification with the mother, who fulfils the 
child's every need, is complete. In the order of the Imaginary, the child tries to 
compensate for the mother's absence and for the delay in the fulfilment of his 
needs, by identifying with what the mother desires, that is the phallus. 77 Lacan 
defines his dependence on his mother's love as the desire for her desire. 
Conversely, the infant takes up the role Freud has assigned to him, that of providing 
the mother with the only possible substitute to the phallus. 
In the accession to the Symbolic, a further identification in relation to the 
desire of/for the other is made. In the first instance, which can be seen as the re- 
interpretation of Freud's castration complex, the father intervenes to break the 
imaginary dyad between the infant and the mother. The father is the law-giving 
father who forbids the desire of the mother (in both senses - as the desire for the 
mother, and as the desire to be what the mother desireS)78 . The access to the phallus 
is here forbidden because the phallus only belongs to the father (as embodiment of 
the law). It is only subsequently to this assumption of the castration complex as a 
law, which Lacan calls the Law-of-the-Father, that the child (if male) can identify 
with the law-giver. This is how Lacan describes the shift in the position of the little 
boy from being the phallus for the mother to having it. 
We can here restate the relationship between desire, lack and sexual 
difference. Desire is always a desire for what one lacks, and by definition, 
impossible to satisfy. In addition and most importantly for feminists, lack is always 
articulated around the phallus. Thus "the phallus is the privileged signifier,. 
79The 
mother desires the phallus. The child first desires to be the phallus for the mother 
and eventually acquires the phallus himself The phallus also becomes the signifier 
of sexual difference. Women take a position in the signifying chain as those who 
lack the phallus, while men are positioned in the same signifying chain as having 
the phallus. 
for the Other. See Bice Benvenuto and Roger Kennedy, The 
Works of Jacques Lacan: an 
Introduction (London: Free association Books, 1986), p. 13 1. 
77 Lacan, "The Meaning of the Phallus", op. cit., p. 83. 
78 ibid., p. 83. 
79 ibid., p. 82. 
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Language thus imposes order on confusion. It pre-exists and assigns meaning 
to the individual who is split and whose sexuality is, in Freudian terms, 
polymorphous. However, in order to be assigned meaning, that is, in order to 
assume the Name-of-the-Father, the individual has to abandon something (the 
mother, the original confusion, the polymorphous sexuality ... ). Language therefore 
always contains a remainder of desire repressed or expressed symptomatically 
within the gaps of discourse. 
Lacan'S phallocentrism. 
Clearly, privileging the phallus as signifier of desire and lack has different 
consequences for masculine and feminine subjects. It is true that both subjects face 
incompleteness in language since desire subsists as repressed. However, one could 
easily argue that because the phallus is the privileged signifier and because this 
privileged status seems to be confirmed by our present cultural norms, it is at least 
easier for the masculine subject to imagine that he is master. In other words, 
language confirms him as master. Lacan himself acknowledges the disadvantaged 
position of woman in her relationship to the phallic term, which he describes as a 
relationship of "masquerade". 80 
Before coming to Irigaray's critique of Lacan's "phallocracy", 81 1 would like 
to stress that Lacan's differentiation between the penis (as the biological organ) and 
the phallus (as a signifier) is often advanced in response to such attacks. 82 Against 
Lacan's allies, some commentators have claimed that this distinction, already 
unclear in Freud, is slippery in Lacan. 83 Diana Fuss sees a hidden essentialism in 
privileging the phallus as signifier since the phallus constantly conjures up images 
80 ibid., p. 84 
" Irigaray, "Cosi Fan Tutti", in This Sex "ich Is Not One (Ithaca and New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), pp. 86-106. 
82 Lacan, "The Meaning of the Phallus", op. cit., p. 79. For one example amongst many, see Ellie 
Ragland- Sul Ii van's defence of Lacan contra Irigaray in "Jacques Lacan: Feminism and the Problem 
of Gender Identity" in SubStance 36 (1982). This text is discussed in Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques 
Lacan, op. cit., p. 123. 
83 See David Macey's discussion in Lacan in Contexts (London and New York: Verso, 1988), 
pp-184-193- 
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of the penis. 84 Indeed, Lacan himself seems prone to slips of the tongue where he 
mentions a "real phallus"85 in reference to the penis. For her part, Gallop argues 
that, rather than a slip of the tongue, Lacan uses "the real phallus" ironically in 
order to show how this term has been misunderstood. She nonetheless remarks that 
'(. such subtleties of irony never leave the user uncontaminated. , 86 Furthermore, if 
one combines this with the sexism inherent in Lacan's many puns on words which 
systematically reduce femininity to the female genitals, 87 the claim of essentialism 
is strengthened. Although positing the phallus as distinct from the penis, Lacan is 
thus inclined to regressing to the biological. So much so that Macey claims that, in 
accordance with his own definition of metaphor, Lacan merely substitutes "the 
penis" for "the phallus. " Lacan just reformulates Freud's account of the castration 
complex in structural terms. 88 
As we shall see in Section III of this chapter, Irigaray also maintains the 
centrality of sexual difference and of the symbolic to subjectivity while contesting 
the phallocentrism of the Lacanian account. As Chapter IV will make clear, her 
attempt to contest the inherent pessimism of Lacanian theory, for which 
('symbolisation is destiny", 89 and her suggestion that an alternative to the phallic 
symbolic order is possible, are followed by the Italian theorists of sexual difference. 
I would like to postpone this discussion by examining what Lacan explicitly says 
about Woman and about her relation to the order of the Real. 
2. The Real and the feminine: 
From the Sixties, Lacan re-enforces his thesis about the fundamental split of 
the subject between the imaginary knowledge he has of himself and the truth visible 
in the cracks of his own discourse. This truth, to put it paradoxically, is that there is 
84 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), p. 8. 
85 Lacan, "The Meaning of the Phallus", op. cit., p. 79. 
86 Gallop, Reading Lacan, op. cit., p. 144. 
87 For an analysis of these puns, see Macey, Lacan in Contexts, op. cit., p. 
202 - 209. 
88 ibid, p. 188. Also see Irigaray, 
7his Sex Which Is Not One, op. cit., p. 62. 
89 Macey, Lacan in Contexts, op. cit., p. 88. 
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no "truth" of the subject. The domain of this truth, that which surfaces in full 
speech from the unconscious, and that which resists symbolisation is the order of 
the Real. It should be said from the outset that, although the meaning and 
importance of the concept of the Real evolve throughout Lacan's writings, it is in 
no way to be confounded with reality, or with the individual's perception of the 
phenomenological world. 
The Real can be associated to Freud's death-drive. 90 For Lacan, the subject, 
once spoken, is motivated by a desire to recapture its origin, its own nothingness at 
the margins of discourse. From the start, the subject is marked by death. The 
inanimate state towards which Freud's death-drive was supposed to strive is, for 
Lacan, the symbiosis with the mother in the Real. But this return to the Real is 
impossible (and dangerous). 91 It is within the structure of this impossibility that 
desire is formed. Desire could also be defined as the ceaseless demand for the lack 
of being to be filled. It is a demand for fullness. This demand is made to the Other 
(mother, psychoanalyst) in the belief that the Other will be able to fill it. But, as 
said above, through the intervention of the father in the mother-child dyad, the child 
realises that the mother is equally marked by a lack. The Other thus becomes the 
other, an object a, whose fullness is barred (0). We can now see the relationship 
between need, demand and desire - "when the child demands something of its 
mother, his needs are satisfied but there is always a trace of that original loss and 
whatever the mum gives, it won't fill the gap/division. "92 Desire is therefore the 
residue left when needs have been satisfied. It is also in relation to this lack that 
language is created. Language can thus be conceived as a "defect in the purity of 
non-being.,, 93 It signifies existence in so far as it bars non-existence, that is the 
Real. The Real is that which the individual comes up against when attempting to 
90 For a development of this connection between the Lacanian real and Freud's death drive, see 
Richard Bootbby, Death and Desire: Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan'S Return to Freud (New 
York: Routledge, 1991). 
91 This is the origin of another Lacanian objection to the social-symbolic of entrustment, which 
seeks to recuperate the symbolic potential contained in the pre-oedipal mother-daughter 
relationships. By seeking a "return" to the mother through a practice of the relationships between 
women, entrustment could be thought to imprison women in a pre-linguistic essence. We shall come 
back to evaluate the validity of this point in Chapter V. 
92 Jacqueline Rose in Feminine Sexuality, op. cit., p. 32. 
93 Lacan, "Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire", Ecrits: a Selection, op. cit., p. 317. 
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signify desire. The Real threatens signification and subjectivity, and as such, it is 
forbidden by the phallus as signifier. For Lacan, all human knowledge is hence 
built upon this repression of non-being. The phallus is the guarantor of knowledge 
and female genitals (which cannot be seen) remind of that threat to knowledge. The 
Real is ultimately the "dark side" of the subject, the domain of origin (death), of the 
mother. That is why the origin (in mother) must be overcome, something which 
Irigaray , entrustment and 11pensiero theorists seek to challenge. 
Lacan and the jouissance ofAe Woman. 
Crucially for my argument here, the Real is also the site where Lacan 
situates the feminine. That is why woman in language only exists as a part object 
(object a). Her existence is necessary in so far as she confirms the existence of 
human identity. However, Woman as such does not exist (The Woman). Sexual 
difference is inscribed in language only in relation to the phallus. It is precisely this 
definition of women subjected to the symbolic power of the phallus that Irigaray 
aims to challenge. 
It is with the idea that language exists to fill the void left by the subject's lack 
of being that Lacan approaches the topic of the specificity of woman's sexuality in 
his seminar "Encore" (1972-73). It is here that he differentiates between (phallic) 
pleasure andjouissance. Language and knowledge are pleasurable in the sense that 
they give the individual a feeling of cohesion and mastery. But, at the same time, 
the individual is unable to enjoy truth in language. In acceding language, the 
subject trades a superior kind of enjoyment which Lacan callsjouissance for phallic 
pleasure. Language harnesses jouissance because of the latter's connection with 
desire, truth and the Real. Jouissance is detected when something resists phallic 
enjoyment. 
When man identifies with the phallus in language, he binds himself to phallic 
enjoyment. Lacan hypothesises that woman's access to the symbolic as "not-all" 
(as 
lacking the phallus) points the fact that she might have access tojouissance. Lacan 
defines her enjoyment as something supplementary, which transcends phallic 
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enjoyment (thus the title "Encore" ). 94 This surplus cannot be integrated into 
language and is thus prohibited under the law of castration. Jouissance is something 
which woman can know by virtue of her place at the margins of the symbolic. But 
it is also something that she cannot express . 
95 A surprising assertion thus follows - 
Woman might be the one who is in contact with the real phallus because the phallus 
of language is a fraud. 
This analysis of women's sexuality is ambiguous for a feminist reading. On 
the one hand, it suggests that female sexuality could be considered as autonomous 
("beyond the phallus"96 ). On the other hand, and precisely because 'ýouissancel)" is 
beyond the phallus, it cannot be signified. Thus, women are unable to know or 
express their sexuality, independently of the phallus. Equally, Lacan's contention 
that Woman does not exist could be favourably welcomed as an anti-essentialist 
claim which Beauvoir herself could have uttered. However, by portraying women 
as this unsymbolisable "not-all", Lacan does not budge from the description of 
women's sexuality as the "dark continent" and still does not (intend to) answer 
Freud's question "What does a woman want? ". In Lacan, Woman is still 
mysterious, hysterical and her sexuality is still devouring, threatening to 
civilisation. Lacan could thus be read in essentialist tenns since 
essence in fact operates in Lacan as a leftover classical 
component which re-emerges in his theory of woman precisely 
because it is woman who escapes complete subjection to the 
Symbolic and its formative operations. In her inscription as not 
94 Lacan in Mitchell and Rose, Feminine Sexuality, op. cit., p. 144. 
95 ibid, p. 69. Lacan compares this experience ofjouissance with religious ecstasy and cites Bernini's 
statue of St Theresa (p. 71). St Theresa is a figure who reappears in both Irigaray's thought (see 
"Cosi Fan Tutti", in This Sex "ich Is Not One) and in the elaboration of il pensiero (see Diana 
Sartori, "Perch6 Teresa" in Diotima, Mettere al mondo il mondo: oggetto e oggettivitti alla luce 
della dififerenza sessuale [Milan: La Tartaruga, 1990]). Irigaray criticises Lacan for looking for an 
expression of female jouissance in a statue sculpted by a man. Diana Sartori seems to take up 
Irigaray's suggestion and examines what Theresa herself has to say. Theresa becomes an 
inspirational woman who has found a way of signifying sexual 
difference in a phallocentric world, 
and of putting words tojouissance, thus making 
feminine sexuality active. 
96 Lacan, "God and the Jouissance of T4e-Woman", in Mitchell and Rose, Feminine Sexuality, op. 
cit. p. 146. 
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all (as Truth, lack, Other, objet a, God) woman becomes for 
Lacan the very repository of essence. 97 
Conclusion: after Lacan. 
From the above discussion of Lacanian psychoanalysis, one can easily 
understand why one finds, within post-Beauvoirean French feminism, both "anti- 
Lacanians" and "Lacanians". The anti-Lacanian camp is occupied by theorists such 
as Delphy and Plaza who reject psychoanalysis (with its focus on embodiment, the 
unconscious and sexual difference) as inimical to feminism. The Lacanians 
embrace all three broad aspects of Lacanian theory: the critique of the humanistic 
subject, the centrality of sexual difference and of the symbolic to subjectivity, and 
the analysis of socio-political reality in terms of an analysis of language. They take 
up the questions linked to female sexuality that Lacan reopens but fails to answer - 
how does women's enjoyment go beyond the parameters of the phallus? How far 
our language has been unnecessarily confined to phallic parameters? Is there a 
need, in psychoanalytic theory, for the subversion of the Oedipus Complex? 98 And, 
if so, what would be left of psychoanalysis altogether? The following part will 
precisely deal with the answer provided by some Lacanian feminists. In particular, 
it will concentrate on Luce Irigaray and the controversial group "Psychanalyse & 
Politique " ("Psych & Po ") as the two acknowledged French influences behind the 
social-symbolic practice of entrustment. 
Section 111. Specular games: Luce Irigaray and the theory of sexual difference. 
1974 marks a decisive year in the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
feminism. Within that same year, Juliet Mitchell's Psychoanalysis and Feminism 
97 Fuss, Essentially Speaking, op. cit., p. 12. 
98 he Works of Jacques Lacan o Benvenuto and Kennedy, T, p. cit., p. 195. 
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and Luce Irigaray's Speculum of the Other Woman are published in England and in 
France respectively. Unlike Psychoanalysis and Feminism, the novelty presented 
by Speculum does not reside in the fact that it sets up a dialogue with Freudian 
theory, since psychoanalysis already forms the battleground on which materialist 
Beauvoireans oppose difference theorists such as Irigaray and "Psych & Po 
Within the history of the Mouvement de la Liberation des Femmes (MLF), the latter 
plays a central and controversial role. The picture of French feminism emerging 
from the social unrest of 1968 is similar to its Italian counterpart. It is 
heterogenous, not organised and only shares the strategy of separatism and the goal 
of liberation. 99 At the outset, "Psych & Po" distinguishes itself for its declared 
antagonism to the French women's movement, which it sees as re-asserting, rather 
than challenging, what it calls "phallocentrism". Under the leadership of the 
charismatic and authoritarian psychoanalyst Antoinette Fouque, "Psych & Po" 
eventually usurps the MLF and, through a legal case, transforms it into a registered 
trademark. MLF dýpose, as "Psych & Po " comes to be known, imposes a 
homogenised and hierarchical image on this very disorganised and eclectic feminist 
landscape. 100 
Against this historical background, the originality of Irigaray's Speculum, 
which occasions higaray to be thrown out of Lacan's Ecole Freudienne, lies in its 
more critical engagement with Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Certainly, 
Irigaray is not solely a (practising) psychoanalyst and her intellectual influences 
cannot be reduced to Freud and Lacan alone. 101 However, she defines her project as 
a "process of interpretative reading [which] has always been a psychoanalytic 
undertaking as well. That is why we need to pay attention to the way the 
99 Dorothy Kaufmann -McCall, "Politics of Difference: The Women's Movement in France from 
May 1968 to Mitterand" in Signs 9.2 (1983): 283. 
100 For an account of this painful episode of French feminism, see Kaufmann-McCall, "Politics of 
Difference", op. cit., pp. 282-293, or Claire Duchen, Feminism in France: From May 1968 to 
Mitterand (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), ch. 2. If we take into account the fact that, 
through its approach to feminist militancy, "Psych & Po" effectively tried to silence many 
diverging feminist groups, it is not surprising to find, in writers like Delphy, a strong wariness of 
any tendency to equate French 
feminist movement with psychoanalytic feminism. 
]01 Carolyn Burke calls Irigaray a "psychophilosophical writer". See Burke, "Irigaray Through the 
Looking Glass" in Feminist Studies 7.2 (1981): 289. 
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unconscious works in each philosophy and perhaps in philosophy in general". 102 
Irigaray adopts and adapts psychoanalysis for her theoretical purposes while 
treating it as a discursive symptom of the inability to think sexual difference. Like 
"Psych & Po", Ifigaray seeks the transformation of Lacan's "phallocentric order", 
to be achieved via a return and a symbolisation of this original "homosexual" pre- 
oedipal link with the mother. However, Irigaray is critical of the political practices 
(such as homosexuality and Lacanian analyses) promoted between the members of 
the Parisian group. Through an exegesis of Irigaray's work, this last part of the 
chapter will thus also compare and contrast the positions adopted by Irigaray and 
by "Psych & Po", as both are central to the theoretical debates and practical 
political experiments which led to the creation of the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment. In Chapter 111, we will indeed see the way in -which "Psych & Po " 
prompted the adoption in Italy of the "Practice of the relationship between women" 
("la pratica delle relazioni tra donne") and "Practice of the Unconscious" ("la 
pratica dell'inconscio"). We will also advance reasons for the eventual dismissal of 
the latter practice in favour of entrustment. Moreover, I will argue (in Chapters III 
and IV), that it is the Lacanian Irigaray which has been privileged by entrustment in 
particular and by i1pensiero della differenza sessuale in general. 
1. The scopic economy: 
Let us begin by focusing on Irigaray's critique of psychoanalysis as a 
discourse of knowledge. I shall approach Irigaray's argumentation by referring to 
the imagery of the mirror that she here uses in two distinctive ways. On the one 
hand, Irigaray contends that psychoanalysis is a discourse which mirrors a male 
imaginary. On the other, she focuses on the mirror which psychoanalysis itself uses 
in order to represent the body, and offers the speculum as an alternative. 
102 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, op. cit., p. 75. For a further analysis of this comparison 
and contrast between Irigaray's style and the format of a therapeutic analysis, see Gallop, Feminism 
and Psychoanalysis: the 
Daughter's Seduction (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 57,71-74. 
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Ifigaray contests the Freudian account of the little girl's psychosexual 
development because it is modelled on the little boy's and articulated around the 
penis. 1 03 She argues that Freud's masculinist bias is not disputed by Lacan. The 
latter indeed maintains the centrality of the castration complex and of the penis 
envy which are "further elaborated in [their] structural dimension. "' 04 The 
foundations of the psychoanalytic discourse are thus not rational but passional in 
that they are grounded in a male body. 
For Irigaray, the Freudian and Lacanian "phallic economy" is also a "scopic 
economy". 105 It assumes that that which can be seen exists (the penis/phallus), and 
discards that which cannot be seen as non-existent (female genitals). ' 06 Irigaray 
illustrates this point by returning to Lacan's mirror stage. But instead of 
concentrating on the image which is reflected in the mirror, higaray now draws 
attention to the mirror itself It is a flat mirror, 107 which only reflects the surface of 
the body. In Irigaray, the Lacanian mirror becomes, a metaphor for the 
c'Ho(m)mosexual imaginary"108 where the desire for the same (the male) dominates 
the rules of representation. ' 09 
To this image of the flat mirror, Irigaray opposes the new forin of the 
speculum, that curved mirror which enables to see beyond what is visible. 
110 The 
speculum reverberates the surface of the female body but also what lies inside it - 
namely, the major part of the female genitals. The speculum allows Irigaray to 
present a possible alternative to the psychoanalytical discussion of woman's 
pleasure and desire. 
"' Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, op. cit., pp. 36-39. 
104 ibid., p. 62. 
105 ibid p. 26. Instead of the "scopic economy", Irigaray employs, in Speculum, 
Derrida's expression 
of the "metaphysics of presence" (See Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the 
Other Woman, trans Gillian G. 
Gill [Ithaca and New York: Comell University Press, 1985], p. 83) 
106 see Lacan's assertion that "the female sexe has the character of an absence, a void, or a 
hole. " (as 
quoted in Macey, Lacan in Contexts, op. cit., p. 
208). Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, op. 
cit., p. 26. 
107 Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, op. cit., p. 129. 
108 A combination "homme" (man) and "homosexual". 
See Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, op. 
cit., p. 171. 
109 Irigaray, Speculum, op. cit., p. 26. 
I 10 irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, pp. 154-. 155, 
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One cannot ignore the etymological proximity of "speculum" and of 
f. 4 speculation", which both come from the same Latin root "specere" ("to look at"). 
To speculate is to conjecture. Irigaray thus conjectures that what is excluded in 
psychoanalysis (or, what psychoanalytic discourse does not "see") is the possibility 
of a feminine auto-eroticism which does not depend, as Lacan would have us 
believe, on the desire of the other. It is in "This Sex Which Is Not One" that 
Irigaray invokes the image of the two lips which constantly touch one another. 
Against the one organ of the phallus, she points out that woman is neither one (lip) 
nor two, but multiple, simultaneously active and passive. Her sexuality is also 
"plural" since her erogenous zones are spread out all over her body. In an implicit 
reference to Lacan's "'Encore", Irigaray explains that women desire "always 
something more and something else besides that one - sexual organ, for example - 
that you give them, attribute to them. ""' In "Cosi Fan Tutti", Irigaray accuses the 
existing imaginary (which language reflects) for making female jouissance 
impossible to symbolise. But Irigaray adds that this is so only because the logic of 
the same has repressed any type of sexual pleasure other than phallic pleasure. 
This discussion of the specificity of woman's pleasure has often been used to 
argue for Irigaray's biological essentialism. In contrast, I would stress that, rather 
than favouring clitoral over vaginal pleasure or arguing that "women [... ] have a 
distinctive psychology and desire given by the nature of their sexual organs", 112 
Irigaray uses female sexuality as an image of multiplicity to challenge the logic of 
the same. The image of the two lips conveys another logic whose existence is 
repressed by the dominance of a male imaginary. Therefore, Irigaray uses the 
metaphors of the mirror and of the speculum in order to contest the ahistoricism of 
psychoanalysis. ' 13 Psychoanalysis, like any other discourses of knowledge, reflects 
the prejudices of its time and is informed by a male imaginary centred around the 
phallus/penis. It is thus marked by the impossibility of thinking sexual difference. 
111 ibid., p. 29- 
112 This is how Janet Sayers interprets Irigaray's discussion of the two lips. See Janet Sayers, Sexual 
Contradictions: Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Feminism (London: Tavistock, 1986), p. 42. The 
superiority of clitoral over vaginal pleasure 
is explored by many feminists in the 1970s, including 
Carla Lonzi in Italy (see my Chapter 111). 
113 Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, pp. 98-99. 
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In addition, the term "speculation" also has a financial connotation which 
Irigaray, who repeatedly uses an economic lexical field, certainly takes into 
consideration. "To speculate" means to engage in the buying (or selling) of a 
commodity in the hope of considerable financial gain. Financial speculation 
involves an element of chance or risk. The risk of Irigaray's enterprise, is double. 
As mentioned, ffigaray risks the charges of biological essentialism, conservatism or 
anti-feminism. 114 In her opening woman's body up to theoretical speculation, 
Irigaray also risks conjuring images of penetration, rape, objectification, or 
voyeurism, already numerous in Lacan. 1 15 These risks are nonetheless worth taking 
since the gain involved in Irigaray's speculation is the prospect to think and 
symbolise the feminine (I will shortly come back to what this requires). Irigaray can 
only speculate on the content of this feminine. She does not prescribe it but allows 
for a possibility to think/speak it in all its plurality. The precise poetic style of her 
works concurs with this attempt to combat the logic of the One - one approach, one 
interpretation. By playing on the polysemy of language and subverting grammatical 
rules, Irigaray favours a plurality of styles and meanings. 116 
This is probably where one of the significant differences between Irigaray and 
"Ps ch & Po " lies. Like ffigaray, "Psych & Po " relies on psychoanalysis as the y 
only discourse on sexuality. 117 "Psych & Po " equally contests the extent to which 
feminine sexuality has been confined to phallic parameters and stresses female 
multiplicity. Unlike Irigaray, the members of "Psych & Po " devise an active 
homosexual sexual practice which is said help women resist this imposed 
phallocracy. Trying to define sexual difference starting from sexual practice is 
highly problematic, since it can lead to the replacement of one sexual nonn 
(heterosexuality) by another (homosexuality) which is deemed, in essentialist 
terms, more "authentic". Replacing phallocracy with lesbianism is a leap Irigaray 
114 For these last two charges, see Delpy, "The Invention of French Feminism", op. cit, p. 218 and 
Plaza, "Phallomorphic Power and the Psychology of Woman", op. cit., p. 9. 
115 see Macey, Lacan in Contexts, op. cit., pp. 178-184. On this point, it is interesting to note that, in 
medicine, a speculum is an instrument used to dilate the opening of a corporeal cavity (especially 
the vagina) for medical examination. 
116 Duchen, Feminism in France, op. cit., p. 88. As we shall see, this strategy of plurality is referred 
to as "parlerfemme - (speaking as a woman/ like a woman). 
117 Antoinette Fouque as quoted in Duchen, Feminism in France, op. cit., p. 83. 
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Implicitly refuses to make by indicating the possibility of a feminine sexuality and 
not devising one. We shall encounter the same problems in Chapter III with the 
differentiation Carla Lonzi makes between a clitoral and a vaginal woman. We will 
also see how many of the forerunners of the social-symbolic practice of entrustment 
resist this sexual dogmatism to opt, like Irigaray, for a promotion of symbolic 
homosexual links between women. 118 
Irigaray'S imaginary. 
The speculum that Irigaray proposes is thus a theoretical invitation to think 
our relation to our body in different terms and thus acknowledge, at least, the 
partiality of the male imaginary. In that way, Irigaray's understanding of the 
imaginary does not confine itself to the Lacanian notion of a phantasised 
relationship of mastery over one's body. Irigaray also thinks of the imaginary as 
something produced socially and historically. It reflects the (false) ideas a particular 
society has of itself. In that respect, it is akin to Althusser's definition of ideology 
as "the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence". ' 19 In Lacan, consciousness (that part of the ego which thinks about itself 
as a unified subject) is always "false" because it is based on a meconnaissance. 
Irigaray does not oppose this "false" masculinist consciousness to a "true" feminine 
one, 120 but to the possible existence of alternative visions of reality. 
In addition, Irigaray also understands the imaginary as a function of the 
conscious, imagining mind. On the one hand, she links this understanding of the 
118 In that respect, Irigaray, for whom homosexuality is primarily symbolic, is closer to Rich's 
notion of a "lesbian continuum". Entrustment and ilpensiero perceive this affinity 
between their two 
sources of inspiration. 
119 Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)" 
in Essays on Ideology (London: Verso, 1984), p. 36. I will of course point out that Lacan 
had a 
recognised influence on Althusser's conception of 
ideology. For an account of the similarities and 
differences between Lacan's concept of m6connaissance and Althusser's concept of 
"interpellation", see Caroline Williams, Contemporary French Philosophy: Modernity and the 
Persistence of the Subject (London: Athlone Press, 2001), pp. 68-70 and pp. 105-106. 
120 This corresponds to Duchen's reading of Irigaray (see Duchen, Feminism in 
France, op. cit., 
P. 101). 
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imaginary to mythical, artistic or literary products of imagination., 21 On the other, 
the imaginary also helps to designate an alternative which has to be imagined and 
created (as we shall later see, through the work of "specula(risa)tion"). This 
contrasts strongly with Lacan's pessimism about change and justifies the political 
reception of Irigaray's work in Italy. As the following chapters show, entrustment 
and il pensiero exponents have inherited this critique of the "hom(m)osexual" 
imaginary which informs both the discourses of knowledge and social reality. 
Italian feminists have also taken up Irigaray's polysemic imaginary. Let us now 
turn to a second use which Irigaray makes of the metaphor of the mirror - that of 
language as a mirror to men and not women. 
2. The symbolic mirror 
The comparison of language to the flat mirror which does not reflect 
women's identity is a leitmotiv of Irigaray's work, one on which she has elaborated 
ever since the publication of Speculum. It is also a theme which has been crucial in 
the development of the theory of sexual difference in Italy in its attempt to devise a 
feminine symbolic order. In addition to spelling out this theme, we will also discuss 
Irigaray's use of the image of the mirror in relation to the theme of the relationships 
between women, itself central to the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. 
Irigaray sides with Lacan and agrees that language is phallocentric, but she 
departs from him in questioning the extent to which language has been confined to 
phallic parameters. Echoing Derrida's critique, Irigaray decries language as 
satisfying the "economy of the logoS.,, 
122 In language, the phallus is taken as the 
central signifier, and, in the name of "metaphysical closure and coherence", 
123 
women are defined as different and excluded from language as subjects. But the 
original act of taking the phallus as the paradigm is forgotten, hidden under a false 
121 For a discussion of Irigaray's understanding of the imaginary in connection with Sartre, Merleau- 
Ponty and Bachelard, see Whitford, Luce Irigaray, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 
122 Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, op. cit., p. 72. See Derrida, "The Purveyor of Truth" in Yale 
French Studies 52 (1975): 331-414. 
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neutrality and universality. This is what Irigaray calls the (. 'sexualisation of 
discourse", or "sexual indifference". 124 One could restate this process in terms of 
the mirror imagery: the matter of which the mirror is made is women's (or, the 
mother's) body (in that men look at women's body and decide it is different from 
theirs because it is lacking) but women's (the mother's) body is not reflected in the 
mirror. In that sense, Irigaray recalls one aspect of Beauvoir's Second Sex that we 
have discussed above: women serve as mirror to men. 
For Irigaray, this false neutrality of language has several consequences for 
women. Firstly, it means that women cannot translate or represent their own 
relationship to their body and to the mother. They have no imaginary of their own. 
They thus experience themselves "only fragmentarily, in the little-structured 
margins of a dominant ideology, as waste, or excess, what is left of a mirror 
invested by the (masculine) 'subject' to reflect himself, to copy himself. , 125 The 
phallocentric symbolic reserves for women the position of the hysteric in language 
since women cannot assume their own discourse and constantly seek the approval 
of the other. 126 One could elaborate on this and contend that both hysterics and the 
psychoanalytic discourse which analyses them are constructions of the 
phallocentric symbolic. 127 
Secondly, the phallocentric symbolic also creates a problem which could be 
referred to as "the equalisation of women" and which could, once again, be 
formulated using the mirror image - in the existing symbolic, women mirror one 
another. Woman acquires value - that is, a position in language - only in relation to 
an outside, transcendental "Golden Standard" (the phallus as signifier of desire). 
Therefore women are all equal objects waiting to be given value by men in a 
123 Inigaray, Speculum, op. cit., p. 28. 
124 Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, op. cit., pp. 73,74. 
125 ibid., p. 30. 
126 Irigaray, Speculum, op. cit., pp. 68,72. On hysteria, see Whitford, Luce Irigaray, op. cit., p. 35. 
The analysis of hysteria has been central to the development of the theory of sexual difference in 
Italy, as Chapter III will show. In chapter IV, we will also see how Irigaray's description of hysteria 
has also been used by entrustment and il pensiero theorists to describe the position of the 
emancipated woman who constantly seeks the approval of men by assimilating to their models, 
discourses and language. 
127 David Macey has also remarked that psychoanalysis and hysteria are inseparable. See Macey, 
Lacan in Contexts, op. cit, p. 200. 
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relationship of symbolic exchange. They have no value of their own., 28 There is no 
exchange between women which is not mediated by men. Hence Irigaray's 
contention (itself very influential for Italian feminism) that in the existing symbolic, 
relationships between women do not exist, and that the differences between women 
cannot be represented. As the following chapters will show, this analysis, which 
conflates equality with equivalence, has been recuperated to attack theories of 
emancipation in Italy. 
The mother as totem. 
The third consequence of the "sexual indifference" of the symbolic order 
regards women's relationship to the mother. Luce Irigaray here contests the 
Freudian and Lacanian notion that subjectivity demands that the imaginary link 
with the (m)other be severed. In that way, the mother is exploited as an 
unacknowledged means to achieve identity. 129 In the preceding part, we have seen 
how, in Lacan's construction of the Imaginary, the mother functions as a mirror 
where the child may capture the image of an illusionary unity and coherence. 
IrIgaray historicises Freud's Oedipus complex and its Lacanian structural 
adaptation as theoretical translations of the course of development one has to follow 
in order to be a social actor in a patriarchal symbolic system. 130 She proposes the 
following alternative to Freud's interpretation of the Oedipus complex: the desire to 
kill the father becomes a desire to eliminate the one who has artificially severed the 
bond with the mother in order "to take over the power of creating any world. , 131 
This is reflected in terms of phylogeny. Irigaray indeed suggests the possibility of a 
matrilineal pre-historic civilisation, and Clytemnestra, Oreste and Electra here 
replace Oedipus as the guiding myths. 132 Patriarchal civilisation is thus 
128 See Irigaray, "Women on the Market", in This Sex Which Is Not One, op. cit., pp. 187-188. 
129Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous: Towards a Culture ofDifference (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 54. 
130 irigaray, nis Sex Which Is Not One, op. cit., p. 73. The same contention is to be found in Luisa 
Muraro's L'ordine simbolico della madre, analysed in Chapter IV. 
131 Luce Irigaray, Le corps-ei-corps avec la mýre (Montreal: Editions de la Pleme Lune, 1981), p. 25. 
132 ibid., pp. 15-19. 
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49 sacrificial""' since it is based on the unrecognised murder of the mother by the 
father who would have replaced the desire for the origin ("umbilical link ), 134) by 
that for the phallus. One could argue that, in Irigaray's writings, Lacan implicitly 
stands for this "father" who interprets the umbilical desire as a desire for the 
phallus. Such a substitution would place Irigaray closer to Lacan than originally 
anticipated since Irigaray also describes desire, in a way, as being "beyond the 
phallus". Unlike Lacan, Irigaray nonetheless seeks to symbolise this desire beyond 
the phallus, that isjouissance and the feminine. We shall come back to this point 
when discussing Ingaray's re-working of the Lacanian concept of desire below. 
For the moment, let us focus on'the alleged necessity to severe the link with 
the mother as the cause of the difficulty and even impossibility of a symbolised link 
between mother and daughter. 135 Unlike the little boy, who compensates for the loss 
of the mother by identifying with the phallus in language, Irigaray stresses that 
there is nothing with which women can offset this loss. That is the reason why the 
little girl enters the symbolic order as hole, lack, fault,, "castration". 136 In Irigaray's 
eyes, the lack of social differentiation between women (that is, the fact that women 
mirror one another) and the expectation that women eventually take their mother's 
place (women mirror their mother) thus explain the difficulty many women 
encounter in the relationship with their mother. 137 
It is clear that on the issues of symbolic order (which is inherently 
masculine), of phallocratic denial of relationships between women, and of the 
severed link with the mother,, Irigaray, "Psych & Po "', entrustment and il pensiero 
133 on the notion of the "sacrifical", see Irigaray's essay "Women, the Sacred and Money" in Sexes 
and Genealogies, op. cit., pp. 82-83. 
134 Irigaray, Le corps-ti-corps avec la mire, op. cit., p. 25. 
135 Irigaray points out that in Western culture, motherhood is glorified when it involves a male child 
not a female. She provides a psychoanalytical explanation - the valuation of motherhood 
is a social 
translation of male narcissism, since it helps re-assert the power of the phallus. Man "[values] 
woman in so far as he values himself - in her role as mother, correlative of 
his fatherhood, proof of 
his potency"(Iri garay, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, op. cit., p. 63). 
136 Irigaray, Speculum, op. cit., p. 83. In psychoanalysis, the person who suffers from melancholia 
designates does not accept, does not represent to him or herself the loss of the loved object. 
Language thus constructs women as both hysterics and melancholics (Speculum, op. cit., p. 68). 
137 Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, op'. cit., pp. 101-102. 
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theorists share common ground. All seek a "Revolution of the Symbolic. 9038 
However, "Psych & Po " and entrustment theorists go a step further than Irigaray or 
other exponents of il penslero in devising a precise political practice based on 
women's alterity. The social-symbolic practice of entrustment aims to symbolise 
the mother-daughter relationship via a network of social relationships between 
women (once again, let us stress that this does not necessarily involve lesbianism). 
In Italy, the sacrifice and exploitation of the mother have also proven to be very 
influential themes for il pensiero as a whole. Entrustment and il pensiero are 
viewed as combating the sexual indifference of social discourse via the recognition, 
that is the payment of a "symbolic debt", of the part played by the (Symbolic) 
Mother in the construction of subjectivity. I will come back to these themes in 
Chapters IV and V. It is in the latter chapter that I will question the capacity of 
entrustment not so much to recognise the work of the mother but to make the 
mother speak. There, I will also point to a divergence which seems to exist within il 
pensiero, namely between those who wish to pay a "symbolic debt" to the actual 
mother (Luisa Muraro) and those who insist on the existence of a mother who 
remains symbolic (Lia Cigarini). For the time being, let me turn to the more 
constructive side of Irigaray's work which has inspired entrustment theorists to 
construct "female genealogies". 
3. "Specul(aris)ation" 
We have seen how Irigaray uses the imagery of the miffor in different ways 
in order to show that both imaginary and symbolic orders bear the masculine mark. 
The third use that Irigaray makes of the mirror is that of exhorting women to 
engage in a work of "specul(aris)ation". 
139 On the one hand, women have to start 
from the language at hand and imagine other possibilities denied by the existing 
138 This is "Psych & Po "'s own expression (see Duchen, Feminism in France, op. cit., p. 85). See 
also No. 42-43 of desfemmes en mouvement 
hebdo (1981), "Psych & Po "'S own periodical, entirely 
dedicated to this issue of homosexuality. 
139 Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, op. cit., pp. 154-155. 
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language ("speculation"); on the other hand, they need to find a mirror/language for 
themselves ("speculafisation"). Finding a new language is an enterprise which is 
fundamentally political, as a change in the symbolic order is inextricably linked to a 
change in the social order. It is this political aspect of Ifigaray's work that has been 
pursued in Italy where the new feminine language devised is that of entrustment. 
Some exponents of il pensiero della differenza sessuale consider entrustment as 
having given women words with which a symbolic return to the mother is made 
possible. 1 40 
Examples of "speculation", that is of the work upon the existing language, 
can be found in Irigaray's notion of " arlerfemme " (speaking-as-a-woman) and in P 
her tactical use of mimesis. Very briefly, for a "parler femme", women must 
emphasise what has been marginalised in language in order to show up its 
unconscious. This involves playing on polysemy and disrupting syntax. 141 "Psych 
& Po " also proceeds to a polysemic work on language and on syntax. Contrary to 
the dialogical practice of entrustment, "Psych & Po " concentrates on writing as a 
way to "undermine the function of language as a tool for the naming and ordering 
of experience by masculinity". 142 More influential in Italy has been the strategy of 
mimesis. It is centred around the deliberate acting out of the representations of 
woman in discourse, but in a manner which is exaggerated so as to "convert a form 
of subordination into an affirmation and thus to begin to thwart it". 143 Mimesis 
turns passivity into activity in order to produce sexual difference in discourse. 144 
140 Adalgisa Giorgio, "Writing the Mother-Daughter Relationship: Psychoanalysis, Culture and 
Literary Criticism" in A. Giorgio (ed. ), Writing Mothers and Daughters: Renegotiating the Mother 
in Western European Narratives by Women (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002), p. 17. 
141 On the notion of "parler-femme", see "Power of Discourse and Subordination of the Feminine", 
"When Our Lips Speak Together", in This Sex Which Is Not One; "The Three Genders" in Sexes and 
Genealogies, and "Women's Discourse and Men's Discourse", in Je, Tu, Nous. The work on 
language has often attracted the accusation that Irigaray's project amounts to "a retreat into 
aesthetics" which involves "the trappings of old 'feminine' lyricism"' (see Christine Faur6 as quoted 
in Fuss, Essentially Speaking, op. cit., p. 56). I contest this interpretation to contend that there is a 
more actively political side to Irigaray, as the Italian emphasis on her theme of female genealogies 
show. 
142 Duchen, Feminism in France, op. cit., p. 35. One must note the close association of "Psych & 
Po " and H6]&ne Cixous' notion of "icriturefiminine " (feminine writing). 
143 For example, see Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, op. cit., p. 76. 
144 In the next chapter, we will see how, in Italy, the notion of mimesis can primarily associated with 
the work on feminine hysteria, carried out in the 70s, partly under the influence of "Psych & Po ". 
Chapter IV will show how a sort of mimetic definition of woman as "the living being who has 
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In addition to this necessary speculative work on the existing language, 
women must create a language of their own ("specularisation"). For Irigaray, this 
can only be done by establishing "female genealogies". As emphasised in Chapter 
1. Irigaray does not understanding "genealogy" in a Nietzschean or Foucauldian 
sense. For her, (. 4genealogy" refers to the "descent" or "lineage" from a point of 
origin (the mother). 145 The female genealogies that are to be created would need to 
be centred along vertical and horizontal axes. These two axes also structure the 
relationship of entrustment. 
The horizontal axis offemale genealogies. 
The horizontal dimension, which Irigaray calls a place "among women", 
"among sisters", or a "social entity of women" 146 could be conceived in terms of 
consciousness-raising. On the one hand, it is aimed at making each woman 
conscious of the false neutrality of reality and of her experience as a condition 
shared by all women. 147 On the other, it is destined to establish a feminine 
counterbalance in the form of "new values that correspond to their creative 
capacity". 148 The horizontal dimension of female genealogies is nonetheless 
different from Anglo-Saxon consciousness-raising since the latter takes language to 
be a means of communication, of expressing rather than constituting subjectivity 
and women's oppression. I think this divergence also explains why French 
language in the form of self-alienation" filtered through to the seminal text of the theory of sexual 
difference in Italy (Adriana Cavarero, "Towards a Theory of Sexual Difference", in Paola Bono and 
Sandra Kemp (eds. ), The Lonely Mirror: Italian Perspectives on Feminist Theory [London and New 
York: Routledge, 1993], p. 199). Chapter VI will finally compare Irigaray's strategic use of mimesis 
to Cavarero's notion of "conceptual theft". 
145 In Chapter 1, we have seen how Foucault described the genealogical method as being opposed to 
the search for origin. In Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, Irigaray interprets Nietzsche's 
denigration of origin as a fundamental ressentiment for maternal creativity (Luce Irigaray, Marine 
Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, transl. Gillian C. Gill [New York: Columbia University Press, 199 1 
p. 34). 
146 Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, op. cit., pp. 67,108. 
147 This reference to women's experience also conjures the problems of universalisation mentioned 
in Chapter 1. Entrustment theorists also refer to women's common experience of symbolic 
exploitation (This Sex Which Is Not One, op. cit., pp. 66-67) which forms the basis of all other types 
of exploitation. We shall come back to this objection of overlooking other differences such as race 
and class when dealing with the critical examination of entrustment 
in Chapter V. 
118 Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, op. cit., p. 67. 
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materialist feminists have often denounced Irigaray for ignoring the social 
construction of the "feminine" and for advocating a kind of pan-sexualism which 
strongly verges on naturalism. ' 49 
The horizontal axis of female genealogies thus supports strategic separatism 
aimed at developing a social system that recognises sexual difference. This 
preliminary and temporary essentialism is indeed practised with a view of re- 
entering a society where the two sexes could occupy the position of subjects. The 
productive communication between two subjects of different sexes is, in Irigarayan 
lexicon, called "love". 150 Contra Lacan, Irigaray asserts that sexual relationships do 
not exist but could if we rethought the symbolic order. Those relationships of love 
form the main thrust of the series of lectures compiled in Ethics of Sexual 
Difference, and inforni much of Irigaray's later work. 
"Psych & Po " and entrustment also stress the value of separatism as a 
temporary strategy. The latter indeed theorises a way of empowering women to 
participate in a mixed society. However, this concern for free mixed relationships 
as a goal of the practice of sexual difference is not always shared across ilpensiero. 
For example, Muraro declares: "I recognise and rejoice that the existence of female 
genealogies is conducive to freedom, even in the relations between the sexes, but I 
consider it an effect, not an end; I assign the dignity of being an end only to female 
freedom and whatever is indispensable to attain it. "151 Therefore, the ethical 
dimension of the relationship between the sexes, central to Irigaray's later work, is 
less evident in the theory of sexual difference in Italy. In that respect, entrustment 
and il pensiero are sometimes much more separatist. Although they posit 
separatism as a strategy and not as an aim in itself, I think that ultimately what 
some pensiero theorists work towards is a society which is better for women, 
"whatever is indispensable to attain it". This disagreement might also explain why 
the influence of Irigaray's thought (especially her more recent work) on Italian 
149 Monique Plaza, "Phallomorphic Power and the Psychology of Woman", op. cit., p. 9. 
Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, op. cit., p. 67. 
151 Luisa Muraro, "Female Genealogies", in Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor and Margaret Whitford 
(eds. ), Engaging With Irigaray: Feminist Philosophy and Modern European Thought (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 325. 
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feminism is today declining. We shall turn to these pressing issues in the last three 
chapters of the thesis. 
The vertical axis offemale genealogies. 
It is to Irigaray's conceptualisation of the vertical axis of female genealogies 
that I would like to return for the moment. While the horizontal axis is the axis of 
equality between women (that is, their equal belonging into the feminine gender), 
the vertical axis is that which allows them to express their disparity. 152 The vertical 
axis is linked to the efforts to reclaim pre-Oedipal attachment with the mother in 
order to s mbolise it. The matemal genealogy would challenge the patriarchal, Y 
phallocentric symbolic since it would put an end to women's specular confusion 
(women would no longer mirror one another or the mother). In other words, women 
need symbolic mediation in order for them to sublimate their drives and transcend 
the illusory realm of the imaginary. 
In some of Irigaray's writings, the need for symbolic mediation is linked to 
the theme of the divine, which seems to reappear in interesting ways within Italian 
feminism. ' 53 The vertical axis of female genealogies can be interpreted as an axis 
which gives women a God. The conception of God held by Irigaray is very 
different from the judgmental, punishing, Judeo-Christian God created in the image 
of man. 154 Irigaray rather thinks of God as a projection or principle linking 
perfection, falfilment and becoming. She writes: "To become means fulfilling the 
wholeness that we are capable of being. " God is thus a concept created by the 
152 One might want to note that, for Irigaray, "gender constitutes the irreducible differentiation that 
occurs on the inside of 'the human race"' (Sexes and Genealogies, op. cit., p. 170) before race, class, 
age and other varying features of an individual's identity. Again, Ingaray is strongly Lacanian in her 
conception of sexual difference at the basis of identity and subjectivity. 
153 See in particular "The Female Gender" and "Divine Women" in Sexes and Genealogies, and 
"The Envelope" in An Ethics of Sexual Difference for a discussion of the divine. The relationship 
with the transcendental is a theme which is recurrent within the community of Diotima. See, in 
particular, Luisa Muraro, La signora del gioco (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976), 
Guglielma e Mai/reda. 
Storia di una eresia femminista (Milan: La Tartaruga, 1987), Le amiche di Dio. Studi di mistica 
femminile (Naples: Liguori, 2001), Il dio delle donne (Milan: Mondadorl, 2003). 
154 Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies, op. cit., p. 64. 
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human mind and which has no end point. 155 1 find in these kinds of formulations 
not only an echo of Beauvoir's existentialist call for transcendence, but also a 
resonance with the social-symbolic practice of entrustment whose aim, as said, is 
"female freedom", that is the capacity to express feminine sexual difference 
socially. This also has implications for the type of feminine self envisaged by il 
pensiero theorists. In the following chapters, we will see how sexual difference 
does not refer to an essence but rather to a project or a process. It is therefore an 
identity which registers change and does not achieve closure. 
A contentious return to the mother. 
A study of Irigaray's use of the metaphor of the mirror has enabled the 
identification of the main themes that Italian feminists inherit from her work. In 
addition to a critique of the male imaginary which informs psychoanalysis, Italian 
feminists share Irigaray's assessment of the symbolic as an order where men only 
are able to occupy the position of subjects of desire. Because language is 
phallocentric, women are denied a relation to their origin. Thus, the symbolic 
foundations of our culture are built on the impossibility of a proper genealogy 
between women. But this situation needs not be so. Women could have a language 
of their own if genealogies between women were constructed. As we shall see in 
Chapter IV, the theorists of entrustment follow the guidelines set out by Irigaray in 
order to construct relationships between women which would translate their 
common belonging to the female sex, while respecting the differences separating 
them. 
I would like to conclude my discussion of Irigaray with some of the 
objections raised in relation to her project of symbolising the pre-Oedipal 
relationship with the mother, since the same reservations could be raised in relation 
to the strategies of "Psych & Po " and il pensiero. Lacanian feminists have 
implicitly accused Irigaray of misinterpreting Lacan's theories on at least four 
points. Firstly, Irigaray is often blamed for locking women outside language and 
155 ibid., p. 61- 
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history, and for arguing that women have another essence. 156 1 think this objection 
is entirely invalid. higaray contends that the problem lies in the fact that women are 
prevented from acceding language as subjects and remain prisoners in language 
(where they function as lack). 157 Irigaray would certainly not disagree with her 
critic Jacqueline Rose when the latter notes that "If woman is defined as other it is 
because the definition produces her as other, and not because she has another 
essence-)-). 158 In addition, Irigaray argues for women to search for an alternative by 
starting from this same phallic language ("speculation"), not from a fictitious 
"outside". As we shall see in Chapter IV, this is an exhortation that il pensiero 
theorists follow. 
The second Lacanian objection usually sees Irigaray as refusing the Lacanian 
split subject, whose desire is formed by this loss of origin. 159 As an answer, I would 
like to mention the way in which Irigaray envisages the reciprocal relationship 
between imaginary and symbolic orders. I believe that, here again, Irigaray is closer 
to Lacan that her critics realise. Irigaray's understanding of the imaginary- symbolic 
relationship appears to follow a shift in Lacan's writings. As Rose points out in 
relation to Lacan's earlier texts, unity is assigned to the Imaginary, whereas in his 
later texts, "There is no longer imaginary 'unity' and then symbolic difference or 
exchange, but rather an indictment of the symbolic for the imaginary unity which 
its most persistent myths continue to promote". 160 For Irigaray as for Lacan, the 
imaginary informs the symbolic and the latter is responsible for strengthening the 
unconscious hold of the former. The imaginary and the symbolic are hence not 
temporal stages in the teleological psycho-sexual development of the individual. 
They are co-existing elements which are never irremediably overcome. Thus, when 
Ifigaray suggests that we should return to the mother-daughter relationship, she 
does not suggest that we return to a pre-social psychic organisation but argues for a 
156 Rose in Feminine Sexuality, op. cit., p. 56. As pointed out in the previous chapter, Lynne Segal 
calls Irigaray a "psychic essentialist". See Segal, Is The Future Female? Troubled Thoughts on 
Contemporary Feminism (London: Virago, 1987), p. 132. 
157 As mentioned before, Fuss argues that it is Lacan who re-essentialises woman as "not-all". See 
her Essentially Speaking, op. cit., p. 12. 
158 Rose in Feminine Sexuality, op. cit., p. 56. 
159 ibid., p. 55. 
160 ibid., p. 47. 
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remodelling of the symbolic where the phallus is not the sole signifier of desire. It 
is in the symbolic that the intervention of female genealogies will be crucial in 
letting an alternative imaginary appear. Thus, Irigaray does not necessarily 
abandons the Lacanian idea of the decentered subject, but rather argues for a 
subject which is not solely signified in relation to the phallus. I will contend later 
that entrustment and il pensiero theorists also follow Irigaray on that point. 
The third objection regards this concept of desire which, contra Lacan, can be 
signified. It is true that, for Lacan, signifying female jouissance would indeed be 
very dangerous due to the close association of desire to the Real, the (m)Other and 
death. Irigaray does not insist on the domination of the Real and of the death-drive. 
Rather, she argues for a different allocation of the life and death instincts in culture, 
one where women would not inherit death. For that, women must become subjects 
of desire. Margaret Whitford expresses this idea very clearly: "Women's 'nature' 
has been constructed by a particular symbolic organisation, in which they are 'used' 
for the representation and sublimation of men's death drives, but are unable to 
sublimate or represent their own". 161 This change is brought about by a conscious 
and thus political work on the symbolic. 
One could be suspicious of any attempt to make the unconscious conscious 
and to insist, as the members of "Psych & Po " do, on the necessity of individual 
analyses for women to be freed from the unconscious hold that "phallocracy" have 
on their behaviour. As said, Irigaray distrusts this strategy and one can easily see 
why. Psychoanalytic relationships aimed at "freeing" women from the grips of 
phallocracy raises questions of power within the relationships between women. 
Who is to decide when one is "freed" - the analysand or the analyst (Antoinette 
Fouque, in "Psych & Po ... s case)? Irigaray openly criticises Fouque's excessive 
and dubious fidelity to the Lacanian psychanalytic practice. 
' 62 Indeed, as the 
analyst of many women in the group, Fouque's ability to read their unconscious 
desires and phantasies is accepted and undisputed. Her personal grip on "Psych & 
Po ", her intolerance of dissidents and her quasi-Messianic status call forth the 
161 Whitford, Luce Mgaray, op. cit., p. 97. 
162 Braidotti, Patterns ofDissonance, op. cit., pp. 228-229. 
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comparison with Lacan (Fouque's own analyst). In Chapter V, we will ask whether 
the social-symbolic practice is not too close to Lacanian psychoanalytic practice for 
the potential abuse of power from the affidataria to be contained. 
The final objection usually raised against Irigaray, which I believe is the most 
persistent, concerns the fact that the mother to whom women return is already 
constituted as a subject. 163 She thus bears the rules of the existing symbolic and has 
had to comply with them in order to take her place in the symbolic system of 
exchange. Irigaray is well aware of this problem since she herself explains the bad 
relationships between women on the fact that they all compete for the symbolic 
place reserved to the mother in patriarchy. Irigaray has always stressed the 
difficulty in bringing forth the feminine in a system which is based on its erasure 
(hence the strategy of "speculating" with the existing language). As for "Psych & 
Po" theorists, they would again likely stress the useftilness of psychoanalytic 
therapies within the group as a supplement to this work on language. We will return 
to the question of the "phallic" mother (and to the "phallic" inspirational woman) 
who bears the norms and prejudices of the society she lives in Chapter V. I shall 
contend that entrustment theorists are equally wary of a dangerous return to a 
phallic mother. Nevertheless, because they exc lusively focus on sexual difference 
as an ontological difference, they ignore the fact that, even if the affidataria's 
discourse is not phallic, it might still bear the dominant racist, homophobic or class 
norms of contemporary society. Thus, the question of oppressive power contained 
within these relationships between women is overshadowed. 
Concluding remarks: 
The above discussions of Beauvoir, Lacan, Irigaray and "Psych & Po " has 
shed light on the theory of sexual difference as elaborated in France, as favourably 
received within some Anglo-American feminist circles and as vehemently rejected 
by Christine Delphy. Firstly, I have used Simone de Beauvoir's Second Sex to re- 
163 Mitchell in Feminine Sexuality, op. cit., p. 23. 
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open the debate between equality and difference. I have examined the ways in 
which materialist feminists such as Delphy have used the egalitarian and anti- 
essentialist aspects of Beauvoir's influential classic as a weapon against difference 
feminists in the 1970s. The Second Sex has also been read here in a way which 
accounts for the specificity of woman's oppression and which indirectly reconnects 
it with Irigaray's theory of sexual difference. 
Secondly, I have tried to show the psychoanalytic origin of Irigaray's 
c(poststructuralist rewriting" by examining Lacan's influence on the French 
feminism of difference that Delphy labels as anti-feminist. In Section 11 of this 
chapter, I have spelled out the Lacanian understanding of the subject, of the other 
and of the structural role of language. I have also shown the limits and potential that 
Lacanian thought presents for feminism. 
The third part of the chapter has concentrated on the French feminists 
specifically targeted by Delphy's article, namely "Psych & Po " and Irigaray. We 
have advanced the former's controversial role within the history of the MLF as a 
major reason behind Delphy's rejection. We have also analysed its complex 
relationship with Irigaray. Irigaray's critique of the homosexual imaginary and 
symbolic together with her invitation to construct a language in which women 
would be reflected as subjects have been extensively discussed. 
It is now time to see how French and Anglo-American feminist theory has 
influenced the development of Italian feminism. The next chapter will familiarise 
us with the Italian background to the specific development taken by the theory of 
sexual difference in Italy and will take us up to the point when the social-symbolic 
practice of entrustment is elaborated in 1983. Irigaray, "Psych & Po" as well as 
some important features of Anglo-American feminism will reappear in the 
discussion. However, I will endeavour to retrace the specific course that the Italian 
theory of sexual difference takes from its first formulations in the late 1960s to the 
invention of the social-symbolic practice of entrustment in 1983. Let us hence turn 
to this fascinating period in the history of Italian feminism. 
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Chapter III 
Equality and Difference: the Italian Context 
Introduction: the "waves" of Italian feminism? 
The history of Italian feminism shares some general characteristics with the 
development of feminism in the Anglo-American and the French contexts. 
Equality and difference are still two central concepts, and one can identify a 
displacement from an egalitarian to a difference perspective, where many of the 
shifting definitions of both equality and difference already encountered in the 
previous chapters resurface. However, Italian feminism could also provide a 
strong case study to contest any reconstruction of feminist history in terms of a 
transparent debate between defenders of equality and subsequent supporters of 
difference. The Italian feminist historian Luisa Passerini has argued that the two 
processes of equality and difference "are always interconnected but perhaps not 
so synchronised as they have been in the Italian case [ ... where] the 
dialectical 
relationship between equality and difference with regard to gender is particularly 
evident not only on the theoretical level but also historically. "' Similarly, Italian 
feminism could also serve as a good example to question a sharp and repeatedly 
stressed dualism opposing an Anglo-American approach to a continental 
tradition. As it will become clear from the historical reconstruction here, Italian 
feminism heavily borrows and adapts theories put forward by both Anglophone 
and French feminists. 
The task of this chapter is thus to reconstruct a history of feminism in Italy. 
In Chapter 1,1 have argued that accounting for the history of feminism in terms 
of successive waves presents the risk, amongst others, of giving the crude 
impression of a smooth and linear development of feminist theory and practice. 
This is particularly true if one wants to account for the specificity of the Italian 
context. In the last 140 years, Italian history has been anything 
but "smooth and 
linear". Italy has moved from a nation of small ducalities and principalities to a 
unified democracy (1870). It has known a period of 
fascist rule (1922-1944); a 
105 
bitter post-war ideological battle between the far left and the remainder of the far 
right; one of the quickest and most important economic boom in Europe (mid- 
1950s to mid-1960s); a long-lasting social movement of protests (1968-1973), 
home-grown terrorism (1973-1980) and finally, a traumatic anti-corruption 
political purge at the beginning of the 1990S. 2 Relating the history of the Italian 
feminism in ten-ns of "waves" would obscure the influence that these historical 
events, specific to the Italian case, have had upon women and upon feminism 
itself. This would fail to account for the consecutive and sometimes simultaneous 
opportunities and difficulties that Italian feminism has had to contend with. 
Some feminist commentators have thus attempted to analyse the socio- 
cultural specificity of Italian feminism by identifying distinct historical periods. 
For example, Gisela Kaplan has identified four distinct epochs in the history of 
Italian feminism - the first stretching from the Unification to the rise of 
Mussolini (1870-1920); the second covering the fascist dictatorship and the end 
of the war (1922-1946); the third including post-war Italy (1946-1968), and the 
final relating to the student protests and the advent of "new wave" feminism. 3 
However such an approach is limiting for the more theoretical purpose of tracing 
the origins of the theory of sexual difference that I wish to pursue in this third 
chapter of my thesis. 
In this chapter then, I will trace the vicissitudes of the move which has led 
to the formulation of the social-symbolic practice of entrustment and to il 
pensiero della differenza sessuale. From 1968 onwards, heterogeneity 
characterises Italian feminism. The feminist movement is splintered into different 
groups which often have conflicting ideological positions. Debates within Italian 
feminism are thus fierce but encouraged and they contribute to the richness and 
vivacity of feminist theory. Whilst Chapter IV will exclusively focus on 
entrustment and on i1pensiero, this chapter traces the theoretical debates which 
progressively lead some feminist groups to choose entrustment as the social and 
symbolic practice constructing the matemal symbolic. For this particular task, I 
1 Luisa Passerini, "Gender Relations" in David Forgacs and Robert Lumley (eds. ), Italian 
Cultural Studies (Oxford: OUP, 1996), p. 145. 
2 For a historical account of these events which does not solely concentrate on feminism, see 
Christopher Duggan, A Concise History offtaly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
3 Gisela Kaplan, Contemporary Western European Feminism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1992), 
pp. 232-258. For another breakdown of Italian feminism into historical periods, see Susan 
106 
will not consider solely the history of Italian feminism in terms of either the 
equality vs. difference debate or successive historical stages. I will also relate the 
theoretical move which eventually leads to entrustment and to il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale in terms of a theoretical and practical shift from an analysis 
of sexual relationships between the sexes to a study of the relationships between/ 
amongst women. 
The first section of this chapter thus concentrates on Italian feminism's 
analysis of the relationships between men and women. It records the existence, in 
Italy, of an egalitarian tradition. We have already come across some of its 
theoretical features in Chapter I and we will seek here to identify some specific 
cultural and historical characteristics which have marked the Italian fight for 
gender equality. The second section of this chapter deals in more detail with the 
development of the difference perspective by the group DEMA U 
("Demystification of Authority"), by Rivolta Femminile and by the radical 
feminist Carla Lonzi. From our point of view, the period described in this second 
section is one of transition. Not only do we find, in post-1968 Italy, the 
emergence of a gynocentric perspective which seeks to re-value feminine sexual 
difference positively and above the masculine gender. Italian feminism also 
gradually evolves from a focus on the relationships between the sexes to an 
analysis of the relationships amongst women thanks to the emerging practice of 
it autocoscienza " and to the growing demands for separatism. The third section of 
this chapter records the shift provoked by the "Practice of the Unconscious". It is 
here that the meeting of a few Italian feminists with the French group "Psych & 
Po " completes the definite theoretical move from the analysis of sexual relations 
to an analysis of the relationships between/amongst women. It is also here that 
the language and perspective of Lacanian psychoanalysis makes its entrance on 
the Italian feminist scene. It is this concluding section which will allow an 
evaluation of the legacy left by Italian feminism in the 1970s for the future 
theorists of entrustment. 
Bassnett, Feminist Experiences: The Women's Movement in Four Cultures (London: Allen and 
Unwinn, 1986), p. 93. 
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Section 1. Thp reintionships between the sexes and the emerp-ence of Italian 
feminism. 
Gisela Kaplan claims that Italy's democratic tradition "emanating from the 
Renaissance cities of the north, revived by the freedom fighters of the 
Risorgimento [ ... ] and evidenced in the participatory principles of the workers' 
movements of the late I 9th and 20'b centuries" has often been undermined by an 
opposite but simultaneous current of machismo "steeped in violence, spanning 
the rural Mafias and fascism, surfacing regularly as a reactionary force 
throughout the post-war". 4 As the following discussion shows, this has meant 
that, in terms of the analysis of the relationships between the sexes, equality and 
difference have often co-existed either to advance the cause of women or to 
hamper it. 
I will here consider the emergence of Italian feminism from the birth of the 
Italian State (1870) to the commencement of the women's movement (1968). 1 
believe that, in order to convey the specificity of the Italian context, one has to 
consider the "forces" which have shaped the "Woman Question" and have 
influenced the development of feminism since Italy's unification. We will 
therefore examine, in turn, the impact that republicanism, the Church, fascism 
and socialism (the PCI and syndicalism) have had on the budding of Italian 
feminism. We will also consider the characteristics which have endured and 
which can still be found, in one way or another, in the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment and in i1pensiero della differenza sessuale. 
1. Republicanism and unification: women as "mothers of the nation". 
Like elsewhere, the egalitarian movement in Italy can be dated back to the 
end of the nineteenth century. Italian egalitarianism is rooted in the moral and 
secular republicanism of Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-72), a central figure in Italy's 
patriotic fight for unification (Risorgimento). In that respect, Mazzini's defence 
of women's civic equality is closer to Wollestonecraft's than it is to John Stuart 
ibid., p. 230- 
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Mill's. Mazzini initiates the fight for gender equality by arguing that the process 
of the Risorgimento, if it is to be complete, must include women. Like the 
English Liberals have done before him, Mazzini stresses that women are part of 
humanity, and he appeals to utility in order to contend that the building of a 
nation requires educated and virtuous citizens. Equality is here again a civic 
notion to be translated practically by a rise in education and a fight against 
illiteracy amongst women. 
Typically, the republican understanding of equality involves rights but also, 
and maybe principally in the case of women, duties towards the nation. 5 Mazzini 
defines women as "the mothers of the nation". a status which, like in Rousseau, 
requires them to be confined to the private sphere, that realm of morality 
untarnished by the corrupting influence of public life. Therefore, Mazzini's 
conception of the nation modelled on the family fails to challenge the sexual 
division of labour and difference becomes interpreted not as straightforward 
inferiority but as complementarity. 6 The shortcomings of Mazzinian 
republicanism are reflected in the Civil Code of the newly unified Italy - women 
are still economically, politically and legally dependent on their father or 
husband. 
The urgency of unification is also felt by Mazzini's contemporary women 
republicans (such as Sara Nathan, Carlotta Benettini, Anita Garibaldi) who 
prioritise it as their chief concern. 7 Nonetheless, one of these women, Cristina del 
Belgiojoso, attempts to combine the question of feminism within what is 
perceived as the more pressing and worthy cause of the Risorgimento. In 1866, 
Cristina del Belgiojoso publishes her Scritto sulla condizione della donna 
(Writing on the Condition of Woman), attempting to analyse the specificity of 
womeWs situation. 8 
5 Some feminist historians have described the feminism of this period as a "feminism of duties" 
('fiemminismo dei doveri"). See, for example, Roberta Fossati's review of Franca Pieroni 
Bortolotti's Alle origini del movimento femminile in Italia (1848-1892) in Aida Ribeiro and 
Ferdinanda Vigliani (eds. ), Cento titoli: guida ragionata al femminismo degli anni Settanta 
(Ferrara: Luciana Tufani Editrice, 1998), p. 32. 
6 Strong echoes of this pro-family and nationalist discourse can be found in France. See Karen 
Offen's article, mentioned in Chapter 11 ("Defining Feminism: a Comparative Historical 
Approach" in Signs 14.1 (1988): 144). 
7 For a more extensive study of the relationship between women and republican patriotism, see 
Judith Jeffrey Howard, "Patriot Mothers in the Post-Risorgimento", in C. R. Berkin and C. M. 
Lovett (eds. ), Women War and Revolution (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980). 
8 Kaplan, Contemporary Western European Feminism, op. cit., p. 23 1. 
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urch and fascism. 
The second "force" to have an effect on the emergence and on the 
development of Italian feminism is represented by the Vatican. Stressing the 
importance of the Church as a central feature in Italian political and cultural life 
has almost become cliche. However, when it comes to issues relating to gender 
and directly affecting women, this commonplace certainly holds some truth. 9 
Though seriously undermined by the Risorgimento, the Church manages to 
maintain its influence and authority over Italian political affairs, through an 
involvement in everyday life, local initiatives and associations. 10 Hence, the 
position of the Church on the nature and on the role of women still retains its 
social and political significance. Little variation marks the pre-1968 position of 
the Church on the nature and role of women. Here again, sexual difference is 
conceptualised in terms of complementarity. Women are portrayed in essentialist 
terms as quasi-Saintly or as sinful temptresses. 11 The tension between these two 
feminine stereotypes produces an ambiguity in the Papal pronouncements about 
women's naturally determined role as mothers. On the one hand, motherhood is 
praised as embodying women's perfect traits. On the other, good mothering is 
presented as being under constant threat from women's sinful disposition. Thus, 
motherhood either represents woman's rightful destiny as well as her means of 
falfilment, or a responsibility to be taught and dutifully accepted. 12 The 
pronouncements on motherhood, the affirmation of the sanctity and irrevocability 
of marriage, as well as the condemnation of non-procreative sex form a long- 
lasting obstacle during the fight, in the 1960s and 1970s, for the legalisation of 
contraception, abortion and divorce (three laws which, as we shall see shortly, 
mark the advent of a women's movement in Italy). 
The Church's influence on Italian feminism and on gender is intensified by 
the fact that there has existed, since unification, a catholic feminist movement. In 
9 Lesley Caldwell, Italian Famil Matters: Women, Politics and Legal Reforms (London: y 
Macmillan, 1991), p. 7. 
10 ibid., p. 8. Italian unification had meant the loss of the vast majority of the Papal territories and 
the confiscation of Rome as capital. Arguably, the decline of the Church's power 
had been made 
worse by the Pope's refusal to recognise the new 
Italian State, and by the threats of 
excommunication he 
directed to all citizens willing to participate in political life. 
11 The dogma of the "Immaculate Conception" is pronounced by Pius IX in 1864. See Caldwell, 
Italian Family Matters, op. cit., p. 10. 
12 ibid., p. 21. 
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a first instance, it aims at a greater involvement in the life of the Church on the 
Part of women, and campaigns for women to join the workplace. 13 To what it 
calls a "feminism of vindication" (that is, the liberal feminism of claiming rights) 
it opposes the aforementioned "feminism of services" (based on women's so- 
called natural "social vocation" to care for others and to contribute to the life of 
the community). The defence of this "feminism of service" is inherently 
essentialist and utilitarian. A series of associations are created by a variety of 
catholic women to rethink the interaction between women and the public sphere. 
These remain under the suspicious surveillance of the Vatican. 14 The presence of 
this religious form of feminism in Italy in the first half of the 20'hcentury, and in 
a revived form after VrWII 5 
15 not only allows the communication between 
catholic and secular feminists but also probably triggers an interest for religious 
themes amongst some sections of Italian feminism. To this day, some important 
exponents of il pensiero remain very interested in the relationship between 
women, ecclesiastical institutions and the divine. 16 
From the First World War, a reinforced understanding of difference as 
complementarity and destiny marks a quieter period for Italian feminism. ' 7 In the 
1920s, the fascist regime strengthens the women's vital roles as wives and 
mothers. 18 A series of conservative pieces of legislation such as maternity rights 
and restrictions on working mothers are voted. However, the faltering economy of 
Italy prevents the total confinement of women in their roles as wives and mothers, 
13 Paola Gaiotti De Biase, Le origini del movimento cattolico femminile (Brescia: Morcelliana, 
1963), pp. 96-97. 
14 One could mention, for example, the constitution of the Fascio Femminile Democratico- 
Cristiano (1901), the Federazione Femminile (1905), the Unionefrale Donne Cattoliche (1909). 
Amongst the prominent activists, one finds Adelaide Coari, Antonietta Giacomelli, Adele 
Colombo, Angiolina Dotti and Pierina Corbetta. See De Biase, Le origini del movimento cattolico 
femminile, op. cit., p-170. 
15 For example, soon after WWII, the Centro Italiano Femminile is 
founded by conservative 
catholic women previously active in the Resistance. It stresses women's place and role within 
family life and it manages to attract a large membership. See Kaplan, Contemporary 
Western 
European Feminism, op. cit., p. 240. 
16 For works on the transcendental by Luisa Muraro, see my Chapter 
11, n. 15 3. 
17 One should point out a difference between the Anglophone and the 
Continental contexts here. 
As it is the case in France, Italian feminism enters a more subdued period at the onset of 
WWI 
without having won the vote 
for women (they are denied enfranchisement in 1912). 
18 In 1929, Mussolini and the Vatican sign the Lateran Concordat. It restores the pre-unification 
prominence of the Church 
in political affairs and confirms the indissolubility of the family as 
well as the rule of the 
husband over his wife and children. See Kaplan, Contemporary Western 
European Feminism, op. cit. , p. 
234. On the complex relationships between women and fascism, 
with which Italian 
feminism has had difficulties to come to terms, see Victoria de Grazia, How 
Fascism Ruled Women. Italy: 1922-1945 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992). 
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and it cannot afford to lose the large (unskilled and cheap) female workforce. In 
addition, the participation of a high number of women in the Resistance 
movement during the fascist period keeps feminists' emancipationist hopes alive 
and places women in a good position to demand (as well as obtain) 
enfranchisement after the Second World War. 
3. The Italian Left and the "Woman Question". 
The third influence that Italian feminism has always felt is that of the Left. 
As Bianca Beccalli writes, "Despite some disagreement and tensions, feminism 
and socialism have never been in conflict in Italy, as they were in other 
industrialised countries at the end of the C19th. "19 It is true that, within the post- 
unification Italian Left, one also finds the familiar effort to associate the 
"Woman Question" with that of class and to encourage women to assimilate to 
the worker's fight against capitalism. As we have seen in Chapter 1, the question 
of gender equality is subsumed by class equality and Marxist analysis fails to 
tackle the specific oppression suffered by women within capitalism and within 
the proletarian family. The Italian Socialist Party of Turati thus refuses to fight 
for women's enfranchisement. 
Howeverý while some women within the party (such as Anna Kuliscioff) 
press for equality in the terms Marx had envisaged, others, like Anna Maria 
Mozzoni, already argue for considering the question of emancipation 
independently from that of class, and point to the necessary step of extending 
rights to women. Mozzoni, who notably pushes for the right to divorce and 
for 
the right to vote, founds La lega promotrice degli interessi femminili 
("The 
league for the promotion of women's interests") and is considered by some 
commentators as the forerunner of the fight for liberation. 
20 In an attempt to 
study the specific condition of women and 
in order to promote their specific 
interests, other grass-root organisations or journals are created at this time .21 
As 
19 Bianca Beccalli, "The Modern Woman's Movement in Italy" in Monica 
Threlfall (ed. ), 
Mapping the Women's Movement (London, New York: Verso, 1996), p. 
153. 
20 Kaplan, Contemporary Western European Feminism, op. cit. , p. 
232. See also Franca Pieroni 
Bortolotti (ed. ), Anna Maria Mozzoni. La liberazione 
della donna (Milan: Mazzotta, 1975). 
21 For example, Gualberta Adelaide Beccari 
founds the journal La Donna, still distributed today. 
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the rest of this chapter and the remainder of this thesis will show, Italian 
feminism could, in general, still be defined as a network of women's groups and 
periodicals. 
Another feature already apparent in the years following Italian unification 
is the enduring link between feminism and syndicalism. This has been explained 
in terms of Italy's late industrialisation, of the importance of agriculture and of 
the weakness of the industrial working class. All these factors have produced a 
type of socialism with a much more heterogeneous class composition than 
elsewhere in Europe. 22 The workforce is indeed composed at that time of a small 
number of high-skilled workers and a mass of young unskilled workers. Trade 
Unions tend to fight for mass of unskilled workers, which include most women. 
Another special characteristic of the Italian unions lies in the recruitment of 
intellectuals from outside, some of whom are female schoolteachers ("maestrine 
socialiste"). The unions thus offer a contact between socialism and feminism and 
an opportunity for women to access positions of relative influence within the 
unions' hierarchy. Hence, the Italian unions are, at this time, unknowingly 
feminist. In addition, the encounter between women and the unions probably 
gives Italian feminism one of its enduring strategies of mass (often violent) 
demonstrations, its high political awareness at grass-root level, and its openness 
towards foreign feminist theorists (notably those of Rosa Luxembourg, Clara 
Zetkin and Aleksandra Kollontaj). 23 
Working women also form their own organisations to demand improvement of working 
conditions and wage increases. For example, textile women workers create the Societti delle 
Sorelle del Lavoro ("Union of Sisters of Work") in Emilia in 1889. On a more national level, the 
Unione delle Donne Italiane ("National Women's Union" [Ronie]), the Associazione Nazionale 
delle Donne ("National Women's Association" [Milan]), the Consiglio Nazionale delle Donne 
Italiane ("National Council of Italian Women") and the Commitato Nazionale per il Voto alle 
Donne ("National Committee for Women's Suffrage") are established around the same time. See 
Kaplan, Contemporary Western European Feminism, op. cit., p. 232. 
22 Beccalli, "The Modem Woman's Movement in Italy", op. cit., p. 153. This distinguishes the 
Italian from the British context. In the latter, the class system is more pervasive. In the British 
context, feminism develops first and foremost from a middle-class perspective and, 
for a long 
time, a certain hostility characterises the relations between middle and working-class feminists. 
As the fights for divorce and abortion show, Italian women from different class backgrounds 
often unite in mass demonstration in order to fight for what is seen as essential rights. 
Class could 
also be considered as an index of variation between British and American 
feminisms, which this 
thesis associates under the label of "Anglophone" or "Anglo-American feminism". In the United- 
States, the class system is less pre-determined, more flexible and therefore less easy to define. On 
the issue of class and the different influence this category has had on American, British and 
Italian feminism, see Bassnett, Feminist Experiences, op. cit. 
23 Bassnett identifies violence as one of the characteristics of Italian feminism. For her, violence 
escalates as Italian feminism 
develops. Violence culminates in the phenomenon of female 
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The end of the Second World War provides an opportunity to re-launch 
women5s fight for equality as women expect to be rewarded politically for the 
active part they have played in the Resistance. 24 The right to vote is secured 
nationally in 1948. It is also at that time that gender equality is written into the 
Constitution and that the Unione delle Donne Italiane (Union of Italian Women 
or UDI) is formed. It is sometimes argued that the UDI is established and 
financed by the PCI because of a fear that newly enfranchised women would 
vote for more conservative parties . 
251-lowever, its members are originally from 
all parties and the UDI retains the freedom to set its own agenda. The UDI's 
outlook still espouses an egalitarian perspective, pushes for legal reform (the 
UDI is indeed instrumental in the fight for the legalisation of divorce and 
abortion), and focuses on providing practical aid and support for women in the 
shape of services ("assistenziali") such as day-care centres and communal 
laundries. 26 
Yet again, women find themselves caught, so to say, between the devil and 
the deep blue sea - the devil being the Christian Democrats whose power 
depends too much on the Church to be of a real help for the advancement of legal 
equality, and the deep blue sea being the strong Left which is at best ambivalent 
about emancipatory politics. The PCI still insists on the emancipatory 
opportunity that joining the workforce offers to women, despite its leader's 
opinion that the "Woman Question" is not a single-class or a single-party issue 
but is closely linked to the process of democratisation as a whole. Palmiro 
Togliatti, who headed the PCI from 1944 to 1964, is indeed instrumental in 
granting women an influential position within the PCI. Nevertheless, the role of 
women within the family and the specific nature of female oppression still 
terrorism of the "anni di piombo" ("lead years"), See Basnett, Feminist Experiences, op. cit., 
pp. 92 and 97. On this point of political consciousness, see Kaplan, Contemporary Western 
European Feminism, op. cit., p. 233, and on the influence of foreign feminist theorists at this 
point, see Lucia Chiavola Birnbaum, La Liberazione della Donna. Feminism in Italy 
(Middletown/ Connecticut: Weyslan University Press, 1986), pp. 26-27. 
24 Again, a number of organisations such as the Gruppi di Difesa della Donna ("Groups for the 
Defence of Women") are created. On the role of women within the Resistance, see E. Scroppo, 
Donna, privato e politico (Milan: Mazzotta, 1979). 
25 See Kaplan, Contemporary Western European Feminism, op. cit., p. 239. 
26 Kaplan, Contemporary Western European Feminism, op. cit., p. 240. For a history of the UDI, 
see M. Michetti, M. Repetto and L. Viviani (eds. ), Udi, laboratorio delle donne (Rome, 1984). 
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remain largely unanalysed. 27 In addition, the priority of the post-war years is 
believed to lie in reconstruction, not in the advancement of women's cause. 
Therefore, the majority of the misogynist laws current under fascism are left 
untouched until the 1960s. The advances of these years are again made thanks to 
the privileged relationship women maintain with trade unions. Such progress 
regards maternity leave, childcare provision, equal pay (written in the 
Constitution in 1956 but still to be applied), and equal working conditions. Once 
these issues are formally addressed, the Left considers the "Woman Question" to 
be resolved. 
Conclusion. 
As in the Anglophone context then, first wave feminism in Italy still 
understands equality in legal and economical terms. When difference is 
theorised, it stands to mean complementarity or inferiority. This is the case for 
two of the three forces which influence the emergence of an egalitarian 
perspective within Italian feminism (namely, republicanism and the Church). As 
for the Left, it seems to deny difference altogether and theorises the achievement 
of equality in terms of assimilation (to the proletariat). 
A study of these formative years is instructive because it shows that, 
despite a lack of co-ordination and of a coherent political agenda, and despite a 
strong definition of women as mothers or workers, there exists in Italy "a long 
standing political culture in which women [are] active. , 28 The post-unification 
treatment of the "questione femminile" ("Woman Question") also brings a 
number of idiosyncrasies that will follow Italian feminism through to the creation 
of entrustment and to the elaboration of il pensiero della differenza sessuale. 
Firstly, we have seen how equality and difference have always been connected. 
Secondly, republicanism, the Church, fascism, and the Left establish, in those 
years,, their long-lasting influence. Thirdly, women organise themselves in 
multiple organisations and create their own journals. Through their political 
27 Lesley Caldwell, "Italian Feminism: Some Considerations" in Z. G. BarAnsk, and S. W. Vinall 
(eds. ), Women and Italy: Essays on Gender, Culture and History (London: MacMillan, 1991), 
P. 99. 
115 
involvement at a grass-root level alongside men, women acquire a precious 
practical and theoretical knowledge of politics. Fourthly, from very early on, 
Italian feminism is receptive to foreign feminist theory. We shall see how these 
characteristics reappear once the women's movement is formed at the end of the 
1960s. 
Section 11. The birth of the women's movement and the revaluation of 
sexual difference. 
It is not until the mid-1960s that we can talk about an autonomous feminist 
movement in Italy. Although feminism exists before this date, it is still ignored 
by women and by the political process at large. Even the small women's groups 
mentioned above are either controlled by a political party or striving to get 
included in the established political institutions. The end of the 1960s and the 
long subsequent years of social unrest shaking Italian society articulate a critique 
of authority and of accepted forms of political life with which women engage. 
The women's movement thus emerges from a broader movement of protests. Its 
activists are women who have grown up during the so-called "economic-miracle" 
(c. 1955-1965). They are part of the first generation of emancipated women - they 
can vote and they are the first to have benefited massively from secondary and/or 
higher education, later but more quickly than in other capitalist countries. 
The years between 1968 and 1983 demonstrate another characteristic of 
feminism particular to the Italian context - this period is a period of the so-called 
"double-militancy". 29 Feminists simultaneously fight from within political 
institutions or parties (for an advance in legislation) and from within autonomous 
and extra-parliamentary women's groups (for the development of a specific 
consciousness). In that way, equality and difference still form two simultaneous 
facets of Italian feminism. Indeed it is thanks to their topical engagement with 
institutional politics that women inscribe equality within the law. Three specific 
28 Kaplan, Contemporary Western European Feminism, op. cit. , p. 
4 1. 
29 On the issue of "double militancy", see Laura Lilli and Chiara Valentini, Care compagne. 
femminismo nel PCI e nelle organizzazioni di massa (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1979). 
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laws - that on divorce (1970), on the lifting of the ban on advertising 
contraception (1971) and the law on abortion (1978) - are particularly important 
in the history of the Italian women's movement. These have acted as a rallying 
cry for women in all sections of Italian society. They are the result of many years 
of mass demonstrations and lobbying on the part of women . 
30 Finally, they 
coincide with a critique of the family which is elaborated by other sections of 
society in these years of social unrest. 
The social movement of protests at the end of the 1960s also change the 
nature of Italian politics. It is often said that, because of the strength of regional 
identities and of the late unification (a unification which has often been 
experienced as imposed), Italians have always been suspicious of the capacity of 
the state to provide for its citizens. Indeed, some historical commentators even 
explain the rise of the Mafia in the South, or the original appeal of Mussolini by 
the fact that they offered services and responded to needs when and where the 
state had failed to do so. 31 Without falling into stereotypes, I think it is fair to 
maintain that the long years of protests initiated in 1968 probably exacerbate this 
tendency, provoking, in their wake, a shift in the balance of power. At this point, 
the importance of grass-root political activism becomes re-enforced and this 
opens new avenues for women, not only outside the political institutions of the 
state, but also outside the traditional parties of the Left. Frustrated by a process of 
discrimination prevailing in a party like the PCI - openly sympathetic to 
women's cause but tacitly preventing the access to influential positions within its 
own hierarchy - many feminists are initially attracted by the New Left. However, 
like their counterparts in Anglophone countries or on the Continent, a vast 
number of these same feminists are soon disillusioned by the overt sexism 
widespread amongst students and workers' groups. 
32 The "new feminism" of the 
late 1960s hence becomes autonomous and concentrates on constructing its own 
feminist tradition (both by building on its past and by drawing on Anglophone 
and French theories). The feminist movement also splits up in hundreds of 
30 Massive street demonstrations are also a feature of American and French feminism in the 
1970s. In the UX however, the women's movement grows steadily in the 1970s but without 
those massive street rallies. 
31 For example, see Kaplan, Contemporary Western European Feminism, op. cit. , p. 244. 
32 For a personal account of the form which sexism took within those student groups, See Paola 
Bono, "Looking Back, Looking Forward: Looking at Italian Feminism/s", in Anna Bull, Hanna 
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collectives, tailoring their analysis to specific issues. This group diversity is still 
a characteristic of feminism in Italy today. It has produced a rich and diverse 
framework for debate. The rest of this chapter will trace a particular genealogy of 
the theory of sexual difference in Italy and deals with the theoretical production 
of a few very influential collectives. 
1. The emergence of an Italian theory of Sexual difference. 
The origin of a theory of sexual difference in Italy finds its antecedents in 
the formation of a particular women's group in 1966. The "Demystification of 
Authority" group (immediately known under the acronym DEMAU) is the first 
feminist collective to gain complete independence from any political party or 
organisation. The creation of DEMAU marks a turning point in the history of 
Italian feminism hitherto narrated. With the Manifesto 33 that the group publishes 
in 1966, Italian feminism progressively turns its back on egalitarian politics to 
look towards a politics of difference. Four years after the creation of DEMAU, 
the influential Carla Lonzi fon-ns Rivolta Femminile ("Feminine Revolt") which 
further elaborates many of the themes that the DEMA U Manifesto has formulated 
succinctly. 34 Let us now turn to the critique of society that DEMAU, Rivolta 
Femminile and Carla Lonzi engage in. 
In a first instance, DEMA U, Rivolta Femminile and Carla Lonzi contest the 
masculinist construction of the myth of woman. This involves rejecting 
essentialist descriptions advanced to legitimise women's unjust treatment and 
Diamond and Rosalind Marsh (eds. ), Feminisms and Women's Movements in Contemporary 
Europe (London: MacMillan, 2000), p. 168. 
33 The DEMA U Manifesto is reproduced in Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist 
Thought: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 34-35. For an account of the reflection carried 
out within the group, see Anna Rita Calabr6 and Laura Grasso, Dal movimento femminista al 
femminismo diffuso (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1983), and Lea Melandri, Una visceralitj indicibile: 
Ja pratica dell'inconscio nel movimento delle donne degli anni Settanta (Milan: Franco Angeli, 
2000), ch. 2. For my discussion of the DEMA U Manifesto, I will not indicate page numbers due 
to the brevity of this document. 
34 Rivolta Femminile will later become Lotta Femminile, the women's branch of the Red 
Brigades. For the debate around feminist involvement in terrorism, see Bono and Kemp (eds. ), 
Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., pp. 284-309. 
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Position within society, 35 and insisting on the social construction of sexual 
difference as inferiority. 36 In that respect, Hegel's assumption of an a priori 
passivity which naturally confines women to the family and denies them access 
to the realm of transcendence and knowledge is a principal target of Carla 
Lonzi's Sputiamo su Hegel [Let's Spit on Hegel] (1974). In addition, refuting 
masculinist constructions of woman also requires contesting the equation 
between difference and complementarity. In a similar way as that used by radical 
feminists in the Anglophone context, sexuality forms one of the central tools of 
this assault on complementarity as a "myth" used by man to justify his own 
power and to deny woman autonomy. 37 In La donna clitoridea e donna la 
vaginale [Clitoral Woman and Vaginal Woman] (1974), Lonzi argues that sexual 
intercourse is modelled on the penis as the organ used both for the attainment of 
sexual pleasure and for reproduction. 38 This image imposes a paradigmatic 
sexuality where procreation and pleasure coincide and where the vagina acquires 
its primacy over the clitoris . 
39As a result, women's pleasure is not only more 
difficult to attain. More importantly, the idea that women depend on men for the 
attaim, nent of their pleasure and on their laws (contraception, abortion and 
40 sterilisation) for the regulation of their reproductive powers is enforced . 
The second innovation that DEMAU, Rivolta Femminile and Carla Lonzi 
make to the feminist discourse of these years lies in the uncompromising 
rejection of the ideology of emancipation. Equality is here equated negatively 
with a pact made between men in order to assimilate women to the existing 
system of masculine values while pretending that they participate in society on a 
35 Manifesto di Rivolta Femminile, p. 22, reproduced and translated in Bono and Kemp (eds. ), 
Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., (40). All the numbers In parenthesis refer to Bono and Kemp's 
translation. 
36 Carla Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel [Let's Spit on Hegel] in Carla Lonz], Sputiamo su Hegel. La 
donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale (Milan: Grammalibri, 1982), p. 30. Sputiamo su Hegel has 
been reproduced in parts in Bono and Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit. The page 
numbers in parenthesis refer to this translation. One can also find a full translation of Sputiamo su 
Hegel in Patricia Jangentowicz Mills, Feminist Interpretations of G. WF. Hegel (University Park, 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1996). 
37 Manifesto di Rivolta Femminile, op. cit., p. 15 (37). 
38 Like Irigaray, Lonzi observes that, for Freud, "the relationship between male and female is not 
a relationship between two sexes but a relationship between one sex and its absence. " See Let's 
Spit on Hegel, p. 52. 
39 Lonzi, La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale, op. cit., p. 77. 
40 ibid., p. 78. The debate over vaginal orgasm 
is also a feature of American feminism in these 
years. See Bassnett, Feminist 
Experiences, op. cit., p. 28. 
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par with them .41 However the concept of equality is not altogether abandoned in 
those years. The type of "juridical equality" (equality of rights) is contrasted to 
equality as a "philosophical principle', 42 which recognises and respects the 
difference between the sexes. For contemporary Italian feminism in general (and 
this includes i1pensiero), equality is no longer conceived as the goal of feminism 
but as its effect. 
In those years, the rejection of equality as assimilation principally involves 
an attempt to dissociate the category of sex from that of class. Because of the 
historical association of feminism and the Italian Left, this attempt is of greater 
significance for the evolution of feminism in Italy than it is in the Anglophone or 
the French context. In the 1973, Lonzi declares: "I decided to write Let'S Spit on 
Hegel after having been shocked to realise that nearly all Italian feminists were 
giving more legitimacy to class struggle than to their own oppression. , 43 Like 
some feminists active in the Anglophone context, DEMAU, Rivolta Femminile 
and Lonzi here attack the dominant Marxist analysis of the "Woman Question" 
as economically reductionist, as confounding capitalism with patriarchy and as 
having a narrow conception of production, one which excludes women's specific 
participation. 44 In this way, these first Italian gynocentric feminists demarcate the 
family, sex-roles and the sexual division of labour as new areas of enquiry. 
45 
2. Reassessing all values: "autocoscienzy", separatism and 
"deculturalizzazione". 
The rejection of the existing definitions of sexual difference and the 
understanding of equality as assimilation will leave a long lasting 
legacy for the 
theonsts of entrustment and of il pensiero. Like some of their Anglophone 
counterparts, Italian gynocentric feminists, at that time, press 
for a re-assessment 
of society's values and of feminine sexual difference. 
The refusal to define 
41 DEMA U Manifesto, OP. cit., Manifesto di Rivolta Femminile, op. cit., p. 24, Sputiamo su 
Hegel, 
op. cit., p. 26. 
42 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, op. cit., p. 26. 
43 Carla Lonzi, quoted in Anna Ribeiro and Ferdinanda Vigliani (eds. ), Cento Tholi, op. cit. , p. 
65 
[my translation]. 
44 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, op. cit., p. 29 (43). 
45 DEMA U Manifesto, op. cit,. and Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, op. cit., p. 
36 (47). 
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women in relation to men incites separatism. In the earlier DEMA U Manifesto, 
separatism simply takes the forin of a search for a new ideological autonomy, 
one where women would be both objects and subjects of the "Woman 
Question". 46 For Rivolta Femminile and Lonzi, separatism involves a more 
radical critique and a practice called "deculturalizzazione" ("deculturalisation "). 
"Deculturalisation" is a process of "unlearning" patriarchal values in order to 
create new ones. 
47 
The practice of consciousness-rai sing, that Carla Lonzi imports from the 
United-States and introduces to Italian feminism as "autocoscienza". has a 
central role to play in this process of "deculturalisation". Like its American 
equivalent, the practice of "autocoscienza " refers to the discussion of women's 
shared experiences (which in Italy is called "the political practice of starting from 
oneself' ["la pratica del partire da se"l). It is also aimed at bringing to 
consciousness the unconscious aspects of oppression. However, unlike the 
English phrase "consciousness-rai sing", the ten-n "autocoscienza" also suggests 
"something of an auto-induced, self-determined, or self-directed process of 
, 48 achieving consciousness. Indeed, we shall see how another aspect of 
"autocoscienza" lies in expressing women"s own individual and collective 
(. 4sense of existence", independently of previous masculinist pronouncements. 49 
From our point of view, "autocoscienza" is the key political practice which 
starts to suggest that women"s liberation depends on the analysis and on the 
practice of relationships between women (later called "la pratica delle relazioni 
tra donne") within women-only groups. I will return to this when dealing with 
the encounter between "Psych & Po " and some Italian feminists. 
Alongside "autocoscienza" practised within women-only groups, Lonzi 
gives other examples of "deculturalisation ". Like Adrienne Rich in the 
Anglophone context, Lonzi argues that maternity has been used by patriarchy as 
a foundation stone of women's oppression but she simultaneously points out that 
"it has been for us an important source of thoughts and feelings, the circumstance 
46 DEMAU Manifesto, op. cit.. 
47 Manifesto di Rivolta Femminile, op. cit., p. 22 (40). 
48 Teresa de Lauretis, "The Essence of the Triangle, or Taking the Risk of Essentialism Seriously: 
Feminist Theory in Italy, the U. S., and Britain" in Differences I (Summer 1989): 19. 
49 Manifesto di Rivolta Femminile, op. cit. , p. 15 
(37). 
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of a special initiation". 50 For Lonzi, this experience of maternity, to use Rich's 
own expression, as that which provokes specific emotions independently of 
patriarchal norms, indicates the bond between women and youngsters (and, 
controversially, between mothers and sons). Wh 
- 
at women need to reject is not 
maternity per se but the myth of maternal love that men have used to control and 
channel those "feelings of joy, pleasure and playfulness" that a "woman, at the 
fullest time of her life, experiences quite genuinely, in a natural exchange with 
,, 51 the young. In accordance with the contemporary hippie movement, Carla 
Lonzi thus wishes to free love from the confines of the family so that the greater 
alliance between women and the young in their common battle against 
patriarchal authority can find full expression. 52 
Another example of "deculturalisation" is that linked to the distinction 
between the vaginal and the clitoral woman. The former is a woman "who is 
captive and measures her pleasure with that of the patriarch' S. ý, 53 The latter "is 
the woman, who hasn't given in to the emotional temptation of an integration 
with the other and has expressed herself in a non-coital sexuality. , 54 Lonzi does 
accept that there is no "purely" vaginal or "purely" clitoral woman, but these 
figures serve to measure the extent to which patriarchal ideology has reached into 
womeWs consciousness. She also acknowledges that some "emancipated" 
women do experience clitoral pleasure in sexual relationships with men. 
However, these women do not realise that their own sexual pleasure and self- 
affirmation are independent of men. 55 In La donna clitoridea e la donna 
vaginale, Lonzi also supports the call for a sexual education which would 
encourage auto-eroticism and homosexual contact as a way to free women from 
the imposed norm of heterosexual, reproductive sexuality. As we shall shortly 
see, the search for difference in lesbian sexuality will be a hypothesis considered 
by the Italian groups engaged in the "Practice of the Unconscious". 
Before addressing the positive re-evaluation of sexual difference that is 
made during those years of Italian feminism, I would like to mention a few 
difficulties already apparent at this point. Firstly, the whole project of refusing all 
50 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, op. cit., p. 42 (50). 
51 ibid., p. 42 (50). 
52 ibid., p. 42 (50). 
53 Lonzi, La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale, op. cit. , p. 80 [my translation]. 
54 ibid., p. 80 [my translation]. 
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existing values is highly problematic. Unlike the later groups engaged in the 
"Practice of the Unconscious", DEMAU, Rivolta Femminile and Carla Lonzi 
seem to underestimate the hold which the existing culture exercises on our 
psyche, something which complicates the possibility of change even if it doesn't 
rule it out. These feminists appear overly confident of the efficacy and 
sufficiency of consciousness-rai sing as a means of "deculturalisation". This Is 
similar to the reserve Monique Plaza expressed in relation to Irigaray's projected 
change in the symbolic, a critique which will also be made, in Italy, to the 
56 theorists of entrustment . It could be argued that the absence of an analysis of 
the complex relationships between women and their culture is the price Carla 
Lonzi pays for "deculturali sing" herself from theorists like Freud. 57 Had she truly 
engaged and used the tools offered by psychoanalysis, like Irigaray and the 
theorists of entrustment will do, her analysis might have gained in insight. 
The difficulty of the process of stepping outside one's culture in order to 
criticise it is apparent in Lonzi's own attempt at theoretical "deculturalisation 
58 from Marx, Freud and Hegel . For example, she seeks to reject Hegelian 
dialectic because it excludes women and because it does not apply to the 
relationships between the sexes. As Patricia Jagentowicz Mills notices, "beyond 
[Lonzi's] vehement dismissal of Hegel, she finds in his work a fon-nula for the 
destruction of patriarchal society: the revolutionary alliance of women and young 
males" against the community of patriarchs . 
59This ambivalent use of Hegel's 
philosophy can be explained by the theoretical agenda informing Let'S Spit on 
Hegel. As mentioned earlier, it is Marx's theory of revolution which Lonzi 
rejects here. For her, the problem inherent in Marx comes from his appropriation 
of the Hegelian dialectic. Therefore, while Lonzi denounces Hegel's sexist bias, 
55 ibid., p. 82. 
56 See Mana-Luisa Boccla and Franca Chlaromonte, "DIscutendo 'Sottosopra"' and Rossana 
Rossanda, "11 tempo di esistere", Orsaminore, 10 March 1983, pp. 3-9. 
57 Melandri, Una visceralitei indicibile, op. cit., p. 33. 
58 1 only illustrate this difficulty by focussing on Lonzi's discussion of Hegel. However, the same 
could be said of her analysis of Marx and Freud. She rejects the Marxist base- superstructure 
model as leaving women out but she still understands the myth of femininity as a form of "false- 
consciousness" which is imposed by the ruling sex and which ignores the concrete experience of 
women. Equally one could say that Lonzi does not reject but mirrors Freud's theories by 
privileging the clitoris as the one true sexual organ which alone can rival the penis. On this point, 
Lea Melandri has accused Lonzi, of penis envy (Lea Melandri, Una visceralitti indicibile, op. cit., 
p. 34). 
59 Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel, op. cit., p. 19. Hegel, 
Phenomenology ofSpirit, § 475. 
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she still retains his alliance of mothers to their sons. This is problematic since the 
alliance between mother and son seems to re-propose the familiar glorification of 
the mother-to-son relationship, a relationship which is already very potent in 
Italy, and which has overshadowed the link between mothers and daughters that 
entrustment will seek to revive. The revolutionary potential that Lonzi finds in 
the son appears questionable - "It is not the son that has made us into slaves but 
the father"), 60 she asserts. How can Lonzi ignore the fact that the son is also 
brought up in a patriarchal culture which promises him domination? 
In addition to its near impossibility, Carla Lonzi's gesture of 
"deculturalisation " further ignores the emotional complexity which link women 
to their culture. Firstly, it overlooks women's complicity in shaping the very 
culture that has marginalised them. Furthermore, the practice of "autocoscienza" 
subjects women to a certain degree of universalisation. Women have experienced 
their oppression in many different ways and degrees (depending on factors such 
as social class, age, race, and ability). The responses to this oppression have thus 
been similarly diverse. The homogenisation of women as an oppressed group is 
one of the problems that the theorists of entrustment will seek to address. They 
will be looking for a way out of what they will call a "subaltern symbolic", 61 a 
symbolic which defines women only as housewives, raped women or women who 
have experienced abortion. 
One must emphasise, as a partial response to these first points of criticisms, 
that this oversimplifying account of women's relations to society is also due to 
the nature of DEMA U, Rivolta Femminile and Lonzi's writings. These are meant 
to be polemical and provocative pieces of feminist propaganda, written at a time 
that many envisage as the dawn of a revolution. Carla Lonzi's autobiographical 
works are more attentive to the complexity of the relationship linking women to 
society. 62 That said, questions related to Lonzi's essentialist pronouncements 
remain and it is to these that I now wish to turn. 
60 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, op. cit. , p. 42 
(50). 
61 The Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic 
practice (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 102. 
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3. ýxual difference. 
The texts published by DEMAU, Rivolta Femminile and by Carla Lonzi 
mark a turning point in Italian feminism because they all re-evaluate sexual 
difference positively. We will now conclude our discussion of gynocentric 
feminism in Italy by trying to establish the content of this new definition. 
Undeniably, there exists in DEMAU, Rivolta Femminile and Carla Lonzi's 
wntings, strong tendencies towards an essentialist definition of sexual difference. 
For Lonzi, sexual difference is "the basic difference of humankind. )563 The 
DEMAU Manifesto appeals for a re-evaluation of sexual difference and for "a 
conscious evaluation of [women's] own essential values, " and one acquires the 
impression that these authentic feminine values are to be searched for under the 
layers of patriarchy. This is a line of enquiry that Lonzi herself pursues with the 
practice of "autocoscienza ". The purpose of "autocoscienza " is to return to an 
authentic part of the feminine subject, hidden under but uncontaminated by 
centuries of patriarchal rule. Bono and Kemp stress that "autocoscienza " is "a 
process of the discovery and (re)construction of the self. , 64 At times, Lonzi 
seems to hold a conception of "autocoscienza " which is more one-dimensional. 
She declares that "What must be changed is not the way [woman] is but the way 
she sees herself ). 65 "Autocoscienza " is indeed about the discovery of the self but 
not always about its reconstruction, since the essential self is hidden beneath that 
coat of "feminine myth" which requires demystification. In Chapter IV and V, 
we shall see how entrustment theorists and exponents of il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale, argue that feminine sexual difference has to be both 
discovered (in the gaps of the existing symbolic order) and created. I will argue 
that this conception of sexual difference is more dynamic and registers the 
possibility of change. 
Secondly, in their critique of patriarchy as a society based on the seizure of 
power, the feminists discussed here do not challenge but merely reverse the 
dichotomy which associates man with power and which presents women as 
62 See Carla Lonzi, Taci, anzi parla. Diario di una femminista (Milan: Scritti di Rivolta 
Femminile, 1978). Carla Lonzi, Vaipure. Dialogo con Pietro Consagra (Milan: Scritti di Rivolta 
Femminile, 1980). 
63 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, op. cit. , p. 
26. 
64 Bono and Kemp, Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., p. 9 [my translation]. 
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victims. This forms the premise of Lonzi's rejection of Hegel's master-slave 
dialectic and of Marx's historical materialism. Lonzi argues that the value of the 
master-slave dialectic extends only to the dynamics of the differences between 
men since it treats sexual difference as natural and eternal, 66 and "does not 
foresee the liberation of woman, the great oppressed of patriarchal civilisation. -)ý67 
The dialectic cannot explain sexual difference because "On the level of woman- 
man relationship, there is no solution which eliminates the other, thus the goal of 
seizing power is emptied of meaning. iý68 Therefore, Lonzi concludes, the 
dialectic loses its validity in a non-patriarchal society where transcendence is not 
measured according to the seizure of power. Hence, "The Phenomenology of 
Spirit is a phenomenology of the patriarchal spirit"69 where everything is 
assessed in relation to power. For Lonzi, power is explicitly linked to the 
masculine self. 70 
Lonzi offers a restricted definition of power. In her eyes, power is solely 
negative. It is in the sole possession of men (only a few emancipated women 
participate in power by joining political institutions and assimilating to male 
norms). It is an instrument which men use to keep women subjected, and it is 
also ideologically pervasive. 71 Indeed, it secures women's tacit consent to 
patriarchy and masks their real interests. The type of power that Lonzi criticises 
even has the perverse effect of luring women into believing that the present 
political system actively works towards their emancipation by conceding them 
more and more rights. 72 In Lonzi's scheme, "existing as a woman does not imply 
65 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, op. cit., p. 50 (57). 
66 Ibid., p. 28. Patricia Jagentowicz Mills and Mary O'Brien formulate a similar critique of 
Hegel's dialectic. See Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, Woman, Nature and Psyche (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987), p. 14; and Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction (Boston: 
Routledge and Keegan Paul, 198 1), p. 70. 
67 Manifesto di Rivolta Femminile, op. cit., p. 20 [my translation]. 
68 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, op. cit., p. 23 (44). 
69 ibid., p. 23 [my translation]. 
70 It is along the same terms that Lonzi rejects historical materialism as missing the "emotional 
key" with which to explain the passage to private property. Historical materialism ignores the fact 
that, in all times, man has considered woman as a sexual object to be dominated and as a 
springboard for higher deeds [Sputiamo, p. 36 (47)]. 
71 Lonzi thus theorises power in the same three dimensions as Stephen Lukes. It is linked to 
institutional politics (the first two dimensions of decision-making and agenda-setting), and to 
ideology (the third-dimension of interests shaping). See Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View 
(London: MacMillan, 1978). 1 will come back to Lukes's discussion of power. I will also 
complement it by using Michel Foucault's conceptualisation of power as productive, relational 
and ubiquitous in Chapter V when I will assess the theory of power on which entrustment and il 
pensiero rest. 
72 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, op. cit., p. 26 (4 1). 
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participation in male power, but calls into question the very concept of power'9.73 
Thus, women are presented as the natural antithesis to male power, as its victims 
who are subjected to it in equal measure and in identical ways. 
As we shall see in Chapter IV, entrustment theorists will identify serious 
problems in this pejorative conceptualisation of power, as well as in this 
universalisation of women as victims and sisters in oppression. Indeed, showing 
women as powerless and therefore virtuous is problematic. It implies that it is 
difficult for women to get out of their powerless situation without the help of 
somebody who not only has power (thus, in Lonzi's system, a man), but who has 
more power than the oppressors. 74 This jeopardises both the possibility of 
woman's liberation and the viability of separatism. Admittedly, Lonzi would not 
find this problematic because she aims at refusing the accession to a society 
whose standard is the possession of power. 75 Nonetheless, one has to ask whether 
she really does envisage two distinct forms of society, which would not 
communicate at all. She does not seem to when she asserts that "the feminist 
movement is itself the means and the end of any basic transformation of 
humankind". 76 How then, would the powerless convince the powerful to give up 
, 77 their power, "to start again with women as subject" especially when Rivolta 
Femminile vows not to communicate with men? Chapter IV will explain how 
entrustment theorists will develop a positive notion of authority. This particular 
notion of authority will be used to contest the type of power that Lonzi is herself 
criticising and, at the same time, to represent feminine sexual difference as free 
(that is, not defined in relation to a male frame of reference). Chapter V will 
criticise the dichotomy that entrustment and il pensiero theorists establish 
between a negative form of power (regulating relationships between the sexes) 
and a positive type of authority (prevailing in significant relationships between 
women). We will thus see, in the coming chapters, that the problems linked to 
73 ibid., p. 26 (41). 
74 Anna Yeatmann, "Feminism and Power" in M. L. Shanley and U. Narayan (eds. ), 
Reconstructing Political Theory: Feminist Perspectives (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). This is 
also a problem which entrustment theorists will address by emphasising relationships between 
women as a source of empowerment and liberty. We will come back to this point in Chapter IV 
when dealing with the concept of female freedom. 
75DEMA U equally reject the "fight for the supremacy over the male (an inverted dictatorship -a 
new matriarchy)", see DEMAU Manifesto, op. cit.. 
76 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, op. cit., p. 52 (59) [my emphasis]. 
77 ibid., p. 52 (59). 
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the conceptualisation of power will not easily (if at all) disappear from Italian 
feminism. They resurface, in a more refined form, in the social-symbolic practice 
of entrustment and in the writings of many of the exponents of ilpensiero. 
Thirdly, the problem of essentialism also reappears, in a more explicit 
fon-n, when Lonzi establishes a correspondence between a specific form of 
sexuality and a specific form of subjectivity. Clitoral sexuality becomes an 
affirmation of one's sex, a return to some authentic mode of being, before man 
imposes his form of sexual intercourse. In terms which would be closer to the 
Anglophone context, the clitoral woman is, for Lonzi, "woman-identified" and 
the vaginal is "male-identified". In this sense, Lonzi seems to confirm that 
anatomy is destiny (the vaginal woman is, by definition, an alienated woman). 
The insights that presented reproductive and heterosexual sexuality as imposed 
and constrictive (something which later theorists such as Butler in the U. S. and 
Bianca Pomeranzi in Italy will confirm), are lost by this implied essentialism 
which falls back into well-known dichotomies (clitoral woman/vaginal woman, 
activity/passivity, liberation/oppression, difference/identity, etc. ). It also confines 
women, once again, to a specific sexual expression, replacing one constructive 
non--n by another. The correspondence between an alternative form of sexuality 
and the search for a specific form of feminine subjectivity is a theme which can 
be also found in Irigaray's discussion of the two lips. As I have argued in 
Chapter 11, Irigaray however uses the two lips as an image or metaphor for 
plausible alternatives to a male model of subjectivity. In addition, her suggestion 
that women is "neither one, nor two" goes against substituting one norm of 
sexual behaviour for another, since woman's sexuality is multiple and 
polymorphous and thus difficult to define. 
Despite these objections that a commentator upon gynocentric feminism 
must surely acknowledge, the essentialism present in the theories exposed above 
is not as straightforward as this critique may suggest. In DEMAU, Rivolta 
Femminile and Lonzi's writings, there is a tension between an essentialist and a 
historicist account of sexual difference. Like DEM, 4U, Lonzi indeed defines 
feminine sexual difference in terms of woman's historical position, that is "her 
millenial absence from history". 
78 1 have already mentioned the problems of 
78 Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, p. 27 (41). 
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presenting women as innocent victims of a patriarchal culture which was 
established or reinforced without their contribution and which was thus imposed 
on them. However, it is nonetheless interesting to find Lonzi conceptualising 
gender in terms of women's present position since it suggests that this definition 
is related to a specific context and hence subject to change. Indeed, in the 
preceding passage, Lonzi asserts that "Difference is an existential principle 
which concerns the modes of being human, the peculiarity of one's own 
experiences, goals, possibilities, and one's sense of existence in a given situation 
one wants to create for oneself. ""79 The word "existential" is certainly not 
innocent. As in Beauvoir, it suggests transcendence from the mere biological and 
positive anatomical distinctions between the sexes, self-definition according to a 
life-plan, the possibility for change and for allowing differences (in "experience, 
goals and possibilities") between women to be expressed. 
This productive tension between conceiving sexual difference as the "basic 
difference" of humankind, while insisting that it is also historically constructed 
(by men) but must become a self-defined, evolving and individual project is still 
part of the way il pensiero della differenza sessuale defines sexual difference 
today. 11 pensiero and entrustment theorists still "stress process rather than 
essence, namely a difference which is constructed and subject to change. , 
80 
However, whilst Carla Lonzi tends to place the origin of this basic difference in a 
form of biological essentialism (that of the clitoral woman), or in a specific 
psychology (women's psyche as not pervaded by power, violence and death), 
entrustment and il pensiero theorists locate the source of this difference in the 
particular relationship that women have with the mother. Chapter IV will explain 
this point in more detail. In Chapter V, we will assess whether this important 
difference between Lonzi and later exponents of il pensiero, erase all the 
difficulties that the former's theses imply. 
79 ibid., p. 27 
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Conchip-jan- tha legacy of gynocentric feminism in Italy. 
Despite many problematic aspects of her work (some of which will be long 
lasting for Italian feminism), Carla Lonzi remains a central figure in the history 
of Italian feminism. Together with DEMA U and Rivolta Femminile, she is the 
first theorist to rescue feminine sexual difference from definitions of inferiority 
and complementarity. She also fonnulates long-lasting themes which will 
become leitmotivs of Italian feminist theory - maternity, political and ideological 
autonomy, equality as assimilation and the search for a subjectivity for women 
via a redefinition of their difference. 
Crucially for us, the impact of "autocoscienza ", as the first specifically 
feminist political practice, is stronger and more significant for Italian feminism 
than it is in the Anglo-American or French context. 81 This practice announces a 
shift away from an analysis of the relationships between the sexes to a study of 
the relationships between women. The practice and analysis of the relationships 
between women is indeed central to the later practice of entrustment and it is this 
theme that pensiero della differenza sessuale also recuperates for the elaboration 
of a matemal symbolic. We will now focus on the passage from gynocentric 
feminism to entrustment and i1pensiero that another feminist political practice of 
the 1970s - namely, "Practice of the Unconscious"- initiates. 
Section 111. The "Practice of the Unconscious" and the relationships between 
women. 
A significant part of the feminists active during the years of 
"autocoscienza" and "deculturalizzazione " are aware of some of the limits of 
such political practices. In particular, they highlight the psychological hold that 
the very culture criticised has upon them, their ambiguous relationship to men 
(both as objects and accomplices of oppression), and the practical inefficiency of 
80 Adalgisa Giorgio, "Mothers and Daughters in Italian Feminism: An Overview" in Anna Bull, 
Hanna Diamond and Rosalind Marsh (eds. ), Feminisms and Women's Movements in 
Contemporary Europe, op. cit., p. 182. 
81 Teresa de Lauretis, "The Essence of the triangle", op. cit., p. 19. 
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"autocoscienza ". 82 In 1972, a few of these feminists, notably those based in 
83 Milan, meet members of "Psych & Po ", by then known as MLF dýpose. This 
contact proves to be crucial in the development of the feminism of sexual 
difference in Italy, and marks a turning point for the theorists who will elaborate 
the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. From then on, one can say that the 
source of influence for Italian feminism shifts from America to France. The 
meeting wit "Psych & Po " inspires not only the creation of the Milan Women's 
Bookstore Collective (from which the social-symbolic practice of entrustment 
will originate). It also re-introduces the conceptual tools (Marxism and, above 
all, psychoanalysis) that Carla Lonzi had previously rejected. Let us close this 
chapter with an analysis of the effects the meeting with French feminists has on 
the genesis of the theory of sexual difference in Italy. 
1. The use of psychoanalysis 
The heterogeneity of the "new feminism" which develops in Italy at the 
end of the 1960s is a sign of its richness. 84 Bitter debates within and amongst the 
groups bom out of the advent of the Italian women's movement are a common 
and welcomed practice. This seemingly contradictory character of Italian 
feminism reflects the complexity of women's relationship to their society, a 
theme which is openly explored after the meeting with "Psych & Po ". From 
1972, Italian feminist theory becomes more refined and reflects on the 
contradiction central to feminism itself. "The fact that what unites women is also 
82 On the discrepancy between the attainment of self-consciousness within the small group and 
the women's movement's attempt to enforce change outside the small groups, see Sottosopra 2 
(1973). 
83 For a personal account of the meetings with "Psych & Po ", see Antonella Nappi, "La Nudiff', 
and "L"incontro di Vieux-Villez. Registrazione di una discussione collettiva, domenica 12 
Novembre", Sottosopra. Esperienza dei gruppi femministi in Italia I (1973). Both these texts 
have been reprinted in Lea Melandri, Una visceraliti indicibile, op. cit., pp. 141-164. 
84 As we will see in the following chapters, it is not until 1983 and the invention of entrustment 
that debates within Italian feminism will acquire a more polarised aspect. On the one hand, we 
will find those groups explicitly or implicitly sympathetic to entrustment (like Diotima, the 
Centro Culturale Virginia Wool(B for instance), and on the other, those feminists who strongly 
oppose it (like Adriana Cavarero, the Centro Documentazione Donna di Firenze, Silvia Vegetti 
Finzi, Nadia Fusini and Lea Melandri). 
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,, 85 what women seek to overcome - namely their marginalisation. It is a paradox 
which will accompany Luce Irigaray, the exponents of entrustment, and the 
theorists of i1pensiero della differenza sessuale in Italy, in their attempt to create 
a female subjectivity using a language, a knowledge which is precisely built 
upon its erasure. It is also the paradox which, from the 1970s onwards, the new 
"Practice of the Unconscious" seeks to address. 
The meeting with -psych & Po " generates the tools for the feminism of 
sexual difference to re-assess the efficiency of theoretical separatism, as it is 
practised at the time by the likes of Carla Lonzi, Rivolta Femminile and DEMA U. 
Instead of a rejection of the very culture to which they belong, the Italian 
feminism of difference now concentrates on a "laborious transfort-nation of 
culture", 86 bending the epistemological tools at hand. This allows the groups 
which openly engage in the so-called "Practice of the Unconscious" (groups 
named La Practica dell'Inconscio [1975] and Gruppo Analisi [1974]) to 
recuperate the insights of psychoanalysis. Documenting the "Practice of the 
Unconscious" in Italy is a complex task. "Pratica dell'inconscio e movimento 
delle donne" ["The Practice of the Unconscious and the Women's Movement"] 
(1974) is the only text dealing with the principles of such a novel approach to 
sexual difference. 87 The only other literature available is made up of notes 
compiled during the meetings of these groups. These remain largely unpublished 
to this date and are rarely available. 88 
The "Practice of the Unconscious" engages with psychoanalysis in a 
critical way. Members of the two groups mentioned above are aware that many 
feminists are reluctant to use psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is considered to be 
a prescriptive and potentially patriarchal theory. It is seen to exclude the 
feminine body and to deny woman access to language and subjectivity. 89This 
attack on a version of psychoanalysis, which seems close to the Lacanian 
8 -' Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros: Irigaray's Re-Writing of the Philosophers (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1995), p. 30. 
86 "A proposito di una tendenza", Sottosopra 1 (1973): 86. 
87 Alcune Femministe Milanesi, "Pratica dell'inconscio e movimento delle donne". L'erba voglio 
18/19 (October 1974- January 1975). 1 shall be quoting from the version which has been 
reproduced in Lea Melandri, Una visceralitti indicibile, op. cit., pp. 186-197. Parts of this article 
have also been translated in Bono and Kemp, op. cit., pp. 83-93. 
88 Lea Melandri, Una visceralihi indicibile, op. cit., p. 71. This announces the oral character of 
later practices such as entrustment. 
81 "Pratica dell'inconscio e movimento delle donne", op. cit., p. 190. 
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perspective encountered in the last chapter, Is coupled with a critique of 
transference. Transference is a reductive structure which leaves out social 
relationships. The relationships between women are believed to be the real site of 
change. 90 Psychoanalysis is rejected because it is a fonn of knowledge which 
ultimately reflects the ideology of the bourgeois family and of capitalism in 
general. 
The prescriptive side of psychoanalytic therapy is also viewed with 
suspicion. The authors of "Pratica dell'inconscio e movimento delle donne" point 
out that the removal of a precise kind of suffering that a patient seeks when 
entering treatment requires the adaptation to a type of society which has 
engendered this suffering in the first place. According to such a reading, one 
could say that the aim of psychoanalytic treatment is not to find a cure but to 
force individuals to adapt to the established order. For example: "a woman who 
undergoes analysis because she is frigid might find that this problem is resolved, 
but at the cost of being chained more forcibly and forever to the institutions of 
marriage-family-children. "91 Psychoanalytic therapy thus prevents an analysis of 
oppression and maintains the status quo. 
However, the Milanese feminists who engage in the "Practice of the 
Unconscious" welcome Freud's discovery of the unconscious as "signpost[ing] 
the liberation and the subversion of sexist society". 92 Like Mitchell and 
Chodorow in the Anglo-Saxon context, they believe feminists must take into 
account Freudian theory in order to shed light on the way in which patriarchy 
enjoys an unconscious hold. The potential of psychoanalysis is also valued for its 
attention upon the body and language, two existing components of 
"autocoscienza ". All psychoanalysis needs is a political adaptation which would 
render it useful to the feminist movement. The primary aim of the "Practice of 
the Unconscious" is therefore to apply psychoanalysis to feminist groups, and to 
look at the unconscious production which arises from collective discussions. The 
feminists involved in the "Practice of the Unconscious" thus make the leap that 
Mitchell, in Woman's Estate, had refused - to conceive the consciousness-raising 
group as a platform for a type of group therapy (aimed at liberating oneself from 
90 
ibid., p. 190. 
91 ibid., p. 187, translated in Bono and Kemp, Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., p. 83. 
92 ibid., p. 189. 
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patriarchal ideology). Attention is focused upon the discrepancy between what a 
woman says in the group and her feelings which are betrayed by, for example, 
dreams, slips of the tongue, hesitations and body language. 
Such a political adaptation to feminism's needs would also correct another 
fault of psychoanalysis. The authors of "Pratica dell'inconscio e movimento delle 
donne" criticise the analytic institution whereby the analyst occupies a position 
of power and prestige - on the one hand, he poses as the expert, and on the other, 
he appropriates what the patient reveals. Since the article responds to the double 
agenda both of refuting capitalism and a version of psychoanalysis which works 
within the bourgeois ideology, this process is referred to as "the capitalisation" or 
"privatisation" of knowledge. 93 The extraction of the analytic practice from the 
bourgeois institution of psychoanalysis and its adoption within the women's 
movement is judged to remedy this problem of power. The authors assert 
(perhaps naively) that if the analytic technique is adopted within a group where 
positions between analysed and analysand constantly shift, a circulation of 
knowledge ensues. This would curb the potential of one individual to accumulate 
power. In the process of a collective analysis, both the change in the person 
analysed and in those who analyse this person are rendered visible because the 
unconscious analysed is a collective one. 94 
Several difficulties that the "Practice of the Unconscious" will encounter 
are already laid out in this article and identified by the authors themselves. 95 The 
project of "incorporating the analytical relationship into the movement" remains 
vague. Entrustment will inherit the "Practice of the Unconscious" and will 
attempt to further define and structure it. There are also problems raised at this 
point but left unresolved. For example, the authors admit that a woman may not 
want her analysis to enrich a person with whom she tends not to agree. There are 
also the questions of finding the meaning of somebody's wish to listen and of 
determining whether it is at all connected with a desire to occupy a position of 
93 
ibid., p. 187. 
94 ibid., p. 186. The "collective unconscious" suggests another connection between Italian 
feminism and Junglan analytical psychology. There are indeed feminists in Italy whose 
theoretical premises are Jungian. See for example Silvia Montefoschi, "Matemal Role and 
Personal Identity: On the Women's Movement and Psychoanalysis", translated in Paola Bono 
and Sandra Kemp (eds. ), The Lonely Mirror: Italian Perspectives on Feminist Theory (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 99-114. 
95 See the section entitled "Some doubts". 
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power. As we will see in Chapter V, the latter two questions will also pose 
problems to the theorists of entrustment. 
I would like to add several further points of reservation to the "Practice of 
the Unconscious" as it is elaborated in this early article. Firstly, could a practice 
which promotes the pen-nutation of the positions occupied by analyst/ analysand 
work? Might the insights gleaned by psychoanalytic therapy precisely be 
produced by the non-reciprocity between the analyst and the analysand, that is, 
by a power differential? One is bound to wonder whether the "Practice of the 
Unconscious" is still psychoanalytic in nature. As we shall see in the subsequent 
chapters, some of these questions will reappear in relation to entrustment. 
Secondly, the authors of this early article appear to ignore the fact that the 
analysis will use the same male language which constructs women's alienation. 
Although there seems to be some traces of Lacanian theory in the 
conceptualisation of women as alienated in the symbolic, the authors do not 
confront this paradox thus risking to reinforce rather than challenge women's 
alienated position in relation to language. Thirdly, one might question this 
possibility of collapsing the history of the individual into the history of the group. 
How far does the concept of a collective unconscious apply to women? Might the 
concept of the collective unconscious present a risk of universalisation or even 
essentialism? Fourthly, and as we have already seen with DEMAU and with 
Carla Lonzi, the problem of power is dangerously simplified. The power inherent 
in the psychoanalytic relationship is said to be erased once this relationship is 
introduced within a feminist group. Might there not be other forms of power (for 
instance, charismatic or authoritarian power) which reappear within collective 
analysis and influence its outcome? The example of Antoinette Fouque's hold on 
"Psych & Po " might provide a good case-study of such power. 96 
Finally, Lea Melandri, who participated in the debate regarding the way to 
transform and to adapt the psychoanalytic practice to the women's movement, 
recalls the existence of very different positions. 97 Some feminists, mainly those 
of the group named "Practice of the Unconscious", insisted on the fact that the 
96 For Fouque's role and powerful position within "Psych & Po ", see the article by Kaufmann- 
McCall that I have already used in Chapter 11. Dorothy Kaufmann-McCall, "Polltl*cs Of 
Difference: The Women's Movement in France from May 1968 to Mitterand" in Signs 9.2 
(1983): 282-293. 
97 Lea Melandri, Una visceralith indicibile, op. cit, p. 71. 
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analysis should be collective. 98 Others, like Lia Cigarim and those of the Gruppo 
Analisi, worked on the introduction of the individual analyses, involving two 
women at a time (one can already foresee, from a psychoanalytic point of view, 
how this would prove difficult when women within the group know one another 
very well). Apart from the fact that those differences within the "Practice of the 
Unconscious" will exacerbate the imprecision of the whole project and will 
eventually lead to its demise, those divergences are interesting to note at this 
stage because they foretell the creation of entrustment. Indeed, it is the women of 
the Gruppo Analisi who will form the Group Number 4 of The Milan Woman's 
Bookstore, that is, the group responsible for the elaboration of the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment, a practice premised on a form of analytic 
relationship between two women. To a certain extent, the notion of entrustment 
can indeed be simplistically conceived as the introduction of individual analyses 
into the feminist movement. 
The relationships between women and the relationship with the mother. 
Despite these difficulties, the "Practice of the Unconscious" nonetheless 
represents a leap forward in the development of an Italian theory of sexual 
difference. The earlier practice of "autocoscienza" had the advantage of 
disconnecting the "Woman Question" from class politics. It also created a 
common identity around which women could be mobilised. This kind of strategic 
essentialism is today still conceived as a vital primary step. However, the "search 
for identity" has often been confused with the "search for the identical". 99 By 
focusing on oppression, woman is still defined in terms of her conflicting 
relationship with man and, in the process, the contradictions arising from the 
relationships between women within the consciousness-raising groups is being 
overlooked in the name of political identity. Apart from promoting the use of 
psychoanalysis as a political practice, the other contribution "Psych & Po " 
makes to Italian feminism is the definite shift of analysis from the relationships 
between the sexes to those amongst women. Deciphering the psychological 
98 "L'incontro di Vieux-Villez", op. cit., p. 149. 
99 "Pratica dell'inconscio e movimento delle donne", op. cit. , p. 192. 
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content of the relationships between women is seen to be crucial task if one 
wants to understand the relationships which exist between men and women. The 
question no longer considers as a primary goal the explanations behind the 
oppression of women, but rather the reasons as to why women do not rebel. 
Thanks to the import of the psychoanalytic technique of listening to 
somebody's speech, certain behaviours (such as aggression and its violent 
repression or silence) become subjects of analysis. The disavowed part of 
womenýs lives (such as the fear of solitude, rejection, the dependency on men, 
the search for approval, and related fantasies) enrich the analysis of women's 
position in society. The dominant phantasy which comes to the fore is that of 
acceptance/rejection, already identified during the meeting with the French 
feminists of "Psych & Po". The "Practice of the Unconscious" links this 
phantasy to infantilism: "At the level of phantasy, this acceptation is that of the 
child who, accepted by the mother, can say: I am good, I like myself, I am alive. 
We have all discovered that, from an affective and also a creative point of view 
we have an infantile 'F. "100 
The discovery of infantilism, which permeates the collective unconscious, 
thus ties the relationships between women to that with the mother. "Practising" 
the unconscious reveals how the relationships between women re-enact this 
relationship with the mother. One of the questions asked by the groups who 
practice the unconscious is "how much of the mother is inscribed in the male 
order? ". 101 The phallic mother is not only advanced as a psychological 
explanation as to why so many women refuse to embrace feminism. The phallic 
mother also becomes an object of analysis in her own right. This is the case, for 
example, in an article entitled "Madre mortifera" ("Deadly motherI)102 and 
published by those members of DEMAU who had participated in the meetings 
with "Psych & Po ". The authors of "Madre mortifera" contend that "the mother 
is seen, in our culture, as deadly, because she is the negativity of the father; she is 
ieux-Villez", op. cit. , p. 149 [my translation]. It 
is interesting to note that, i 100 "L' incontro di V, I in 
France, Fouque has also accused the MLF of infantilism. On this point see Rosi Braidotti, 
Patterns ofDissonance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 227. 
101 "Pratica dell'inconscio e movimento delle donne", op. cit. , p. 191. 
102 Lilith (Gruppo DEMAO, "Madre Mortifera" in LErba Voglio 15 (February-March 1974). 
This particular article is reprinted in Lea Melandri, Una visceralitii indicibile, op. cit., pp. 167- 
171.1 shall quote from the latter. 
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the negative which supports his law. "' 03 As we have seen with Lacan, the mother 
is confined to the Real and associated with the death-drive - she threatens the 
autonomy and the identity of the male subject. The article talks about a "Phallic 
monotony" or "sexual monism" to refer to what Irigaray calls the 
"hom(m)osexual economy". 104 Both culture and scientific discourse are 
incapable of conceiving woman independently from the phallus. Woman is either 
the phallic mother (who has the power to devour), or the masculine little girl 
(who experiences her sexuality in active terms). Therefore, male phantasies 
attribute power to the mother in so far as she is phallic, whilst men keep women 
oppressed in so far as they see them as castrated. For these feminists, this 
interpretation illustrates some strong characteristics of Italian culture, such as 
"omnipotent and exalted mothers, women who are particularly mute and 
subservient, virile parading, and endemic fascism". 105 
However, asking how much of the symbolic mother is inscribed in the 
patriarchal law also suggests that there is a part of the relationship with the 
mother, linked to the pre-oedipal phase and buried deeply in women's 
unconscious, which can be recuperated to women's advantage. As seen in 
103 ibid., p. 168. [my translation]. 
104 ibid., p. 169 [my translation]. In Italian, "monotonia" can both mean "single tone" or 
"monotonous". 
105 Ibid., p. 169 [my translation]. "Madre mortifera" is written in response to an earlier article 
published in the same journal by the Italian psychoanalyst Elvio Fachinelli. The polemic between 
Fachinelli and the DEMAU members revolves around two correlated phantasies - the decrepit 
virility and the devouring, insatiable mother. Fachinelli attributes the resurfacing of the phantasy 
of the devouring mother to the rise of consumerism as a law which regulates late capitalist 
society. According to him, this rise of consumerism is psychologically translated into the 
phantasy of the devouring mother who does not allow for space in which virile development can 
occur [p. 167]. Fachinelli sustains his argument by citing some sociological examples 
representative of late capitalist societies: the disappearance of the paternal figure, the correlated 
phenomenon and the growing importance of the relationship with the mother. Also common to 
Irigaray and the analysis made by the feminists of DEMA U is the lack of differentiation between 
woman and mother. The authors complain that, in Fachinelli's article, women are not heard. 
Nothing is said of their relationships, of their actual experience of motherhood, of the relationship 
the mother has with her children which "cannot be reduced to the Lacaman axiom: what the 
mother desires is the phallus" [p. 169], of the possibility women have of not becoming mothers. 
Therefore, women are used for theoretical elaboration but their actual experience is not 
considered. "Madre mortifera" thus shows that psychoanalytic concepts are not foreign to the 
emerging Italian feminism of difference, and this before the translation of Speculum and the 
explicit adoption of Irigaray's more extensive critical analysis of psychoanalytical theory. It also 
demonstrates that, from early on, Lacaman tools are privileged. Fachineill's interpretation of the 
phantasies of the devouring mother and of the decline of male virility is indeed closer to Kleiman 
theory where the mother is experienced as both a good and a bad object, a phantasy which a 
particular type of external culture can re-evoke - "I have indeed asked myself [ ... ] what it is in 
an advanced and industrialised society that makes this image of the mother resurface" [p. 169, my 
translation]. From early on then, I would argue that the direction taken by Italian feminism has 
favoured an immediately positive reception of Irigaray's work. 
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Chapter 11, the women of "Psych & Po " express this in the form of a primary 
homosexual relationship with the mother which is repeated in lesbianism. In 
Italy, the response to this proposal of defining sexual difference starting from 
sexual practice has been ambiguous and never openly welcomed. One could 
indeed see the problems that such a position might engender. Indeed, we have 
already encountered some of them in Carla Lonzi's conceptualisation of a free 
female sexuality as clitoral. For example, positing sexual difference in terms of 
sexual practice seems to suggest that women are repressed homosexuals and that 
the key of women's liberation lies in having a sexual relationship with another 
woman. This normative tendency is recognised by Lea Melandri, who herself 
took part in the meetings with the French women. She claims that homosexuality 
pre-existed the creation of the "Psych & Po ", and that it was therefore imposed, 
not retrieved. 106 
Nevertheless, lesbianism does not have to mean actual homosexuality. It 
could refer to as mbolic form linked to relationships between women. Another y 
of the Italian feminists who participated in the meeting with "Psych & Po " at 
Vieux-Villez (France), tries to distinguish between actual lesbianism (which she 
defines as a refusal to break with the mother, hence as a refusal of relationships 
with men) and symbolic lesbianism (which occurs when the primary relationship 
with the mother is broken by a relationship with man, that is itself subsequently 
renounced in a bid to return to the original bond with the mother). 107 This 
differentiation, as it is described here, is even more controversial. On the one 
hand, it seems to equate actual feminine homosexuality with infantilism, while 
presenting, on the other, symbolic lesbianism as mature subjectivity. It could be 
argued that this amounts to an uncritical acceptance of the Freudian heterosexual 
matrix, where mature development can only allow lesbianism in a symbolic 
form. Fortunately, these precise definitions of "actual" and "symbolic" 
lesbianism have never been pursued or developed in Italy. Nevertheless, it seems 
that the lesbianism which has been inherited by the theorists of entrustment and 
by il pensiero della differenza sessuale remains symbolic. ' 08 As Chapter V will 
106 Lea Melandri, Una visceralitti indicibile, op. cit., p. 59. 
107 'Vincontro di Vieux-Villez", op. cit., p. 152. 
108 The theorists of entrustment will indeed face some harsh criticism from the Italian Lesbian 
Union (Comitato Lesbico Italiano) for contributing to the invisibility and the marginalisation of 
lesbians within the feminist movement, and for refusing to define sexual difference erotically. 
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make clear, thIs has antagonised many lesbIan f eminists from entrustment and 
from ilpensiero. 
At this particular stage in the development of a theory of sexual difference 
in Italy, there is no mention of a Symbolic Mother or of a Symbolic Order of the 
Mother. Women's freedom is thought to result, almost automatically, from the 
relationships between women. Thus, engaging in these relationships and 
adopting psychoanalysis as a tool of investigation are conceived of as a political 
act. Italian feminists will evaluate the contribution of "Psych & Po " in the 
following terms - "The relationship of one woman to another is unthinkable in 
human culture. The female instrument which transforms the world is the 
relationships amongst women: this is the invention of the women of Psy&Po. "109 
Once again linking relationships amongst women with liberation appears 
reductive. It bypasses questions of power within the group. Some Italian 
feminists who have participated in the meetings with "Ps ch & Po " have Y 
expressed their unease at the acknowledged position of leader that Antoinette 
Fouque seemed to occupy within the French group. 110 But, instead of being 
aware and addressing the fact that some women will fulfil a leading role within a 
women's group, they declare that the "Practice of the Unconscious" refuses any 
leaders. Power between women is left unanalysed. The problems that are 
encountered in relationships between women are deemed to matter less than what 
can be gained. 
Conclusion: the mixed lepacy of the 1970s. 
The 1970s open a number of "doors" for Italian feminism. Firstly, the 
political gains are the most obvious. Political activism during the 1970s is at the 
origins of a number of legislative advances. The laws on divorce, on 
contraception, on abortion, for which feminists first unite into a movement, are 
the result of a desire, on the part of women, to take their lives into their own 
hands. The common goal is to free women from the servitude of their anatomical 
For example, see "More silences than lies" reproduced and translated in Bono and Kemp, Italian 
Feminist Thought, op. cit. , pp. 173-177. 
109 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference, op. cit., p. 48. 
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destiny and from the "chains of the flesh"-"' Demonstrations for legislative 
changes also provoke the implosion of the women's movement into small 
independent groups (a feature which still contributes to the rich feminist 
landscape today in Italy). 
Simultaneously, it is in the 1970s that the conceptualisation. of equality as 
assimi ation and the rethinking of female sexual difference in positive terms 
occur. Both "autocoscienza " and the "Practice of the Unconscious", view sexual 
difference as containing the seeds of women's liberation. The theorists of 
entrustment will inherit these definitions of equality and difference. A third 
element of the legacy left by Italian feminism in the 1970s is its will to 
experiment with the invention of new practices linked to relationships 
between/amongst women (be it in the form of "autocoscienza" or of the 
"Practice of the Unconscious"' 12 ). As we will see, entrustment can be considered 
as a later form taken by this politics of relationships amongst/between women. 
It is in tenns of its contact with "Psych & Po " that I will assess the legacy 
left by the 1970s. From 1972 (the date of the meeting with "Psych & Po ") Italian 
feminism becomes increasingly engaged with Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
directs its research for liberation towards the pre-Oedipal relationship with the 
mother. The "Practice of the Unconscious" also addresses the psychological hold 
that patriarchy has on women, and inaugurates an analysis which works at the 
margin of (male) language (slips of the tongue, body language, dreams). All 
these elements prepare for the good reception of Irigaray's work and are crucial 
to the successive practice of entrustment. 
Nonetheless, those years of Italian feminism have also been described by 
entrustment feminists as the period of "static separatism" or "ideological 
feminism". 1 13 Firstly, feminist discourse in the 1970s increasingly loses its ties 
with reality. Sexual difference functions as a ready-made discourse which does 
not really affect reality. Separatism reproduces the split between public and 
110 "L'incontro di Vieux-Villez", op. cit., p. 156. 
11 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference, op. cit., p. 127. 
112 1 have lacked the space to treat in detail another practice called the "Practice of Doing". It 
indicates that Italian feminism, in those years is not solely concerned with an increase in 
consciousness or an access to language. It also seeks to "create and transform - create female 
social spaces in order to transform the given social reality" (Milan Women's Bookstore 
Collective, Sexual Difference, op. cit., p. 84). One such space is the Milan Women's Bookstore 
Collective. 
113 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference, op. cit., p-84. 
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private that earlier feminists have criticised - women feel a sense of belonging 
within the enclosed space of the consciousness-raising groups, but when back in 
the public world, they feel alienated once again. They have to cope with a sort of 
schizophrenia -a desire to participate in society (called in Italy "a wish to win" 
[ "voglia di vincere "]) and a feeling of estrangement ( "estraneibi ") when they 
try to do so. Secondly, feminism in the 1970s presupposes a perfect identity 
between women. Here, sexual difference is promoted as a universal identity, and 
means not only equality but also uniformity between women. Elements of 
universalisation and essentialism are present both in the practices of 
94 autocoscienza " and of the Unconscious. Finally, the question of power 
between women remains bypassed. 
Teresa de Lauretis summarises the issues at stake: 
the experience of a harsh and protracted separateness, of social- 
symbolic defeat - in the impossibility for women to achieve 
what Lonzi called "philosophical equality" and to gain self- 
representation in the established symbolic order - may be just 
what enabled the subjects of that experience to reach the 
present-day critical understanding of their own different 
subjecthood (the theory of sexual difference) and to attempt to 
define the modes of its possible existence, the ways of living it 
out in the practice of every day life (the practice of sexual 
difference). 1 14 
In the following chapter, we will see how both those positive and negative 
elements, already present in the 1970s, re-emerge in the subsequent elaboration 
of the theory of sexual difference in Italy that the creation of entrustment partly 
but significantly represents. 
114 T. de Lauretis, "The Essence of the triangle", op. cit., p. 21. 
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Chapter IV 
The Italian Theory of Sexual Difference and the Social-Symbolie 
Practice of Entrustment: Evaluating the Specificity of 
Contemporary Italian Feminism. 
Introduction 
Through a discussion of diverse practices, the preceding chapter has related 
how post-1968 Italian feminism progressively concentrated on the relationships 
amongst women, the feminist use of psychoanalysis and the figure of the mother. 
These themes are given an important place in the present chapter, which deals 
with contemporary Italian feminism. In this fourth chapter, I will defend the 
central contention of this thesis - namely, that contemporary Italian feminism 
owes its originality to two factors. The social-symbolic practice of entrustment 
("affidamento") is the first source of distinctiveness. Entrustment, as a unique 
practice of sexual difference, has given the theory of sexual difference its 
"Italian" characteristic. Entrustment has also directly contributed to the 
subsequent hegemony achieved by the theory of sexual difference amongst a 
majority of feminist groups. Such a hegemony forms the second source of 
originality of contemporary Italian feminism. As we will now see, a vast majority 
of feminist groups have responded to il pensiero's critique of the monosexual 
social-symbolic order and its call to sexualise social relationships by creating a 
female symbolic centred on the figure of the mother. This chapter will, all in all, 
take up the claim, made in Chapter 1, that the polarising debates that followed the 
invention of entrustment in 1983, and the subsequent influence achieved by il 
pensiero confer to Italian feminism not only its "Italian", but also its 
"contemporary" character. 
However, I would like to reiterate an important point made in the 
Introduction: entrustment was not and is not embraced by Italian feminism as a 
whole. This chapter deals with some of its principal exponents - mainly, the 
feminists of the Milan Women's Bookstore Collective (La Libreria delle Donne 
di Milano), some of the members of the philosophical community of Diotima 
143 
(Verona), and of the Cultural Centre Virginia Woolf B (Rome) and certain 
political activists of the fon-ner Communist Party (PCI). Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that entrustment characterises Italian feminism because it has prompted 
the development of il pensiero della differenza sessuale, and because it has 
helped polarise the debate in Italy. Whether argued for, or disputed, the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment has never been ignored and has been at the 
centre of theoretical and political arguments. ' 
In treating the social-symbolic practice of entrustment, I will have to 
confront three interconnected questions. Firstly, how and why was the theory of 
sexual difference in Italy initially developed through entrustment? Secondly, 
what are the features of this social-symbolic practice? Thirdly, in what ways can 
entrustment and the symbolic order it generates be understood to give the Italian 
version of the theory of sexual difference its specific characteristic? These are 
interrogations which will accompany my argument throughout this chapter. 
The first part of this chapter will concentrate on the elaboration of 
entrustment which arose out of a political practice (that of the relationships 
between women developed during the 70s). Whilst recording the influence of 
Irigaray, I will use the exposition of the critique of the male symbolic order to 
concentrate on the pivotal link between theory and practice. This link is an 
idiosyncratic feature of entrustment, and of Italian feminism in general. The 
second part of the chapter will explain the mechanisms and aims behind a 
relationship of entrustment in order to argue that this social-symbolic practice 
has given the theory of sexual difference in Italy its specific and hegemonic 
character. The third part will concentrate on the figure of the mother, central to 
entrustment and to other exponents of il pensiero. This will set the scene for the 
next chapter which exclusively concentrates on a critical assessment of 
entrustment and ilpensiero della differenza sessuale. 
1 Teresa de Lauretis also considers the publication of "More Women Than Men" (the text which 
exposed for the first time the social-symbolic practice of entrustment) to be a turning point for all 
those involved in Italian feminism. See Teresa de Lauretis, "The Practice of Sexual Difference 
and Feminist Thought in Italy: An Introductory Essay", preface to the Milan Women's Bookstore 
Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 8. 
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Section 1. Linkino theory to practice: the practice of the relationships 
between wompn ynd the critique of the symbolic order. 
It is difficult to name the feminists responsible for the elaboration of 
entrustment. This social-symbolic practice was first outlined in the famous Green 
edition of the periodical Sottosopra, entitled "More Women Than Men" ("Piu, 
2 donne che uomini ") and published in January 1983 . The pamphlet was signed 
by the so-called Group n. 4 of the Milan Women's Bookstore Collective. Since its 
creation in 1975, the Liberia delle Donne di Milano has operated a policy of 
anonymity (which is no longer strictly respected). However, later personal 
accounts of these fervent formative years within the Milanese feminist circles 
inform us that some of the members of the Group nA had already been part of 
the Gruppo Analisi encountered in the previous chapter. 3 We will recall that 
Gruppo Analisi not only favoured the introduction of psychoanalysis into the 
women9s movement but also argued for practising individual analyses (involving 
two women at a time), something which arguably prefigures entrustment. Group 
n. 4 of the Libreria delle Donne di Milano was formed out of these encounters 
between different feminist collectives in Milan. The names of two of its most 
prominent members emerge - the lawyer Lia Cigarini and the philosopher Luisa 
Muraro. 
Luisa Muraro is particularly important to this chapter because she 
provides the link between the Libreria delle donne di Milano and the 
philosophical community of Diotima (formed in the early 1980s in Verona), the 
main groups at the centre of ilpensiero. It would be wrong to assume that all the 
members of Diotima also belong to the Libreria and that all automatically 
embrace the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. Nevertheless, many of the 
theses advanced in the pamphlet "More Women Than Men" are pursued, in 
more philosophical terms, both in the collective books published by Diotima, 
2 Sottosopra literally means "upside down" or "topsy turvy". The Green Sottosopra "Plfj donne 
che uomim" is now available from the Libreria 
delle Donne di Milano's website: 
www. libreriadelledonne. it/pubblicazioni. htm. It has 
been partly reproduced and translated in 
Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought: A Reader (Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 199 1), pp. 110- 123. Unless otherwise stated, I shall be quoting from this translation. 
3 For a personal testimony of feminist activity in Milan during those years, see Lea Melandri, 
Una visceralita indicibile: la pratica dell'inconscio nel movimento 




and in Luisa Muraro's personal work. 4 Therefore, if entrustment, as the 
constructive part of i1pensiero, is not unanimously considered as the solution to 
women5s alienation, the critique of the existing male symbolic, on which this 
first part concentrates, is broadly shared by Italian feminists. It is widely 
indebted to Luce Irigaray's work. As Mima Cicion, argues "what made it 
possible for ["More women that men"] to have a great impact on Italian 
feminism, was first of all the fact that it formulated, in direct and accessible 
language, some insights influenced by the philosophical elaboration of Luce 
,, 5 Irigaray. 
Undoubtedly, there is some truth in Cicioni's assertion and I stress that the 
elaboration of entrustment has been vital both to the subsequent development 
and hegemony achieved by il pensiero della differenza sessuale in Italy. 
Nevertheless, my aim, in this first section of the chapter, is to demonstrate that 
the Italian theory of sexual difference owes its first point of originality to the 
connection between theory and practice. Entrustment emerged as a response to 
specific problems identified during the earlier practice of the relationships 
between women. Thus, this first section of the chapter will show how Irigarayan 
themes reappear in the critique of the symbolic order put forward by il pensiero 
della dififerenza sessuale as a whole. Yet, it will also endeavour to demonstrate 
that these common themes and concepts have often been elaborated 
independently of Irigaray at the end of the 1970s (that is, before the formulation 
of entrustment). The fact that entrustment and il pensiero della differenza 
sessuale have always been linked to political practicesalso explain why, when 
recuperated, Irigaray's insights have been highly politicised. 
6 
4 For example, Adriana Cavarero, the co-founder of Diotima, has always 
been critical of 
entrustment, even before she distanced herself 
from Diotima in the early 1990s. We shall come 
back to Cavarero's critique of entrustment in the last chapter of this thesis. 
5 Mima Cicioni, "'Love and Respect, Together': The Theory and Practice of Affidamento in 
Italian Feminism" in Australian Feminist Studies 10 (1989): 76. 
6 Adalgisa Giorgio also notes this point of originality and the two-way exchange between Irigaray 
and il pensiero della difterenza sessuale. 
See A. Giorgio, "Mothers and Daughters in Italian 
Feminism: An Overview" in Anna Bull, Hanna Diamond and Rosalind Marsh (eds. ), Feminisms 
and Women's Movements in 
Contemporary Europe (London: MacMillan Press, 2000), p. 182. 
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1. The "wish to win", '4estranp_ement" and the critique of the existin 
symbolic. 
"More Women Than Men" opens by stating a concrete problem made 
evident by the practice of the relationships between women: women lack a 
positive experience of self-affirmation in social life. The practice of relationships 
between women point to a disparity, within women, between two contradictory 
feelings - namely, the "wish to win" ("voglia di vincere') and "estrangement" 
("estraneitti"). The "wish to win" refers to the desire women have to participate 
in society, or in the authors' own words, to "the wish to be victorious over 
everything which makes us insecure, unstable, dependent, imitative. ), 7 However, 
this wish is tempered, or sometimes even blocked, by a feeling of estrangement, 
which "resists an entry into social games, doesn't want to be there, is not there". 8 
The question of estrangement had already arisen as early as 1976 in the 
discussions of the Libreria's Group n. 4.9 With the publication of "More Women 
Than Men", Italian feminists formally shift their analysis away from the notion 
of discrimination, understood as only useful for identifying the external obstacles 
limiting women's social participation. They now concentrate on the concept of 
estrangement, itself better suited to interrogate the additional psychological 
reasons for women's marginalisation. 10 
Estrangement is produced when a woman feels that, whilst she can 
participate in society, something of the desire that she wishes to translate socially 
is refused social representation. This "residue" of desire is female sexual 
difference. It is this central claim which brings "More Women Than Men" and 
Irigaray's work closer. The "wish to win" and the sense of estrangement are 
considered here as consequences not as causes of women's weak desire. There is 
no existing social language with which women can represent and translate their 
desire in reality without assimilating to the male model. This is what causes the 
contradiction between the "wish to win" and "estrangement". Let us see why. 
7 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, "More Women Than Men", op. cit., p. 1 12. 
8 ibid., p. 113. 
9 "More Women Than Men" contains an appendix entitled "You see that you want to win" (" Vedi 
che vuoi vincere") which comprises extracts of the notes resulting 
from the 1976 discussions. The 
appendix is not reproduced 
in Bono and Kemp's Reader. 
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The male symbolic and the "indecent sexual difference". " 
Following its early formulation in "More Women Than Men", such a 
critique of the existing symbolic as an "asexual model [which is] interposed 
between body and language", 12 forcing women to live their gendered subjectivity 
as a split identity, is echoed throughout Italy. One can follow the acknowledged 
similarity between this critique and Luce Irigaray's along two axes: the attack on 
the false-neutrality of Western thought and language, and the impossibility of 
establishing female genealogies. These two axes of Irigaray's thought have 
already been analysed in Chapter 11. Therefore, we will now concentrate on their 
formulation within the Italian context. 
At the forefront of i1pensiero's challenge to "discover" 13 sexual difference 
by unmasking the false neutrality of language, thought and the subject at their 
base is the work produced by the philosophical community Diotima. Their 
analysis of the existing symbolic order is carried out in a more philosophical 
language than that used in "More Women Than Men". Hence, Irigaray's imprint 
is more directly noticeable in Diotima's texts. For example, Adriana Cavarero's 
contribution to Diotima's first collective work strongly echoes Irigaray's "Power 
of Discourse, Subordination of the Feminine" (This Sex Which Is Not One). In 
"Towards A Theory of Sexual Difference", Cavarero recuperates the Irigarayan 
account of the "sexualisation of discourse". She describes the "monstrosity" 14 of a 
masculine subject who defines himself and the other according to the criteria he 
has himself established. Woman, as that "other". is both necessary to the 
construction of the masculine subject and forsaken at the margins of language and 
knowledge. The masculine subject thus acquires a signifying value which is 
10 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, "More Women Than Men", op. cit., p. 1 12. 
" This is the title of an early article by Alessandra Bocchetti. See A. Bocchetti, "L'indecente 
differenza" in A. Bocchetti, Che vuole una donna? (Milan: La Tartaruga Edizioni, 1991), pp. 23- 
39. This article has been translated in Bono and Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., 
pp. 148-159. 
12 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, "More Women Than Men", op. cit., p. 1 15. 
13 This expression is borrowed from the title of the first collective essay published by Diotima. 
See "La differenza sessuale: da scoprire e da produffe" in Diotima, Rpensiero della differenza 
sessuale (Milan: La Tartaruga, 1987). 
14 This is Cavarero's own expression. 
148 
assumed to be neutral and in effect becomes universal in its designation of the 
other sex. 15 
Cavarero and the other exponents of il pensiero identify the same implied 
problems in the "monstrous" subject of language and knowledge. We have 
already discussed them in Chapter 11, in relation to Luce Irigaray's critique of the 
monosexual symbolic. Let us briefly return to these difficulties caused by such 
monstrosity, using Cavarero's inaugural essay, written for Diotima. Firstly, the 
neutral-universal harbours the masculine sex. Men and Woman are not 
interchangeable. Secondly, feminine sexual difference is included, assimilated, 
and not viewed as an ontological category in its own right. 16 Thirdly, the 
discourses of knowledge are incapable of thinking sexual difference in its 
ontological duality. Finally, woman is denied subjectivity, the position of 
enunciation or self-definition because she is alienated from language and in 
language. 17 Woman is alienated from language because Man takes possession of 
the position of enunciation by forcing Woman outside language. Woman is a 
constitutive outside necessary for Man to position himself as subject. Therefore, 
,, 18 woman is, "after all, 'inside' the subject as its own founding repudiation. 
Hence, her alienation in language. The unsymbolised feminine difference thus 
becomes a source of estrangement ("More Women Than Men"), an "indecency" 
19 (since it exceeds the accepted terms of discourse), or a "passion"20 (as it 
designates a psychological which has a corporeal cause). 
Female genealogies: the relationships between women and the 
relationship with the mother. 
The second axis that entrustment theorists, il pensiero thinkers and Luce 
Irigaray share is that linked to female genealogies. The fact that the male 
15 Adriana Cavarero, "Per una teoria della differenza sessuale" in Diotima. 11 pensiero della 
differenza sessuale, op. cit., translated as "Towards a Theory of Sexual Difference- in P. Bono 
and S. Kemp (eds. ), The Lonely Mirror: Italian Perspectives on Feminist Theory (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 189-22 1.1 shall be quoting from this translation. 
" Cavarero, "Towards a Theory of Sexual Difference", op. cit., p. 193. 
17 Diotima, "La differenza sessuale: da scopnre e da produrre" in Diotima, 11 pensiero della 
differenza sessuale, op. cit, pp. 9-42. 
18 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 3. We have already quoted 
this passage in Chapter I. 
19 See Bocchetti, op. cit. 
20 Diotima, "La differenza sessuale: da scoprire e da produrre", op. cit., p. 9. 
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symbolic also invades and codifies relationships between women, thus preventing 
these relationships from being free, is an additional explanation for women's 
estranged position. Like Irigaray, entrustment and il pensiero theorists also read 
equality as the equalisation of women in relation to an external phallic golden 
standard. As we have seen in chapter 11, it is because women are all defined in 
relation to men that they are considered to be the same, functioning as objects not 
subjects of exchange. This theme runs through "More Women Than Men" and 
Sexual Difference, a subsequent work published by the Libreria delle Donne di 
Milano. 21 According to this view, the differences between/amongst women lose 
their positive potential and women only experience them as threatening. 
We shall see shortly how entrustment is aimed at recuperating the potential 
of differential relationships amongst women. 22 Disparity is indeed the main 
pivotal and contentious point of entrustment. My present concern is to stress that, 
here again, it is possible to identify, in the discussions which led to the 
elaboration of entrustment, a contemporary conceptualisation and tension 
between equality as equalisation and an equation of difference with crushing 
inequality. In that respect, it is worth mentioning the collective pamphlet which 
preceded the pivotal "More Women Than Men" - namely, the so-called "Yellow 
Catalogue" of the Sottosopra periodical, entitled "Le madri di tutte noi", ("The 
mothers of us all"). Published in 1982 by the Milan Women's Bookstore 
Collective in conjunction with the Libreria delle Donne di Parma, it provoked the 
discussions which led the future theorists of entrustment to privilege disparity 
over equality. The Yellow Catalogue dealt with individual interpretations of 
literary works written by women. The rationale that motivated the discussions 
summarised in the "The mother of us all" was to read women writers, not as 
forgotten contributors to human culture, but as indicators of a female language in 
tune with women's experience. With hindsight, the Yellow Sottosopra can also be 
considered as an early search for a "genealogy of women". The political practice 
21 Libreria delle Donne di Milano, Non credere di avere dei diritti: la generazione della liberti 
femminile nell'idea e le vicende di un gruppo di donne (Turin: Rosenberg and Sellier, 1987), 
translated by Teresa de Lauretis as Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 112.1 shall be quoting from 
this translation. In this same work, the feminists of the Milan Women's Bookstore even go 
further and contend that women's politics has always been a struggle against man's interference 
in women's relationships between themselves and 
between themselves and the world (Sexual 
Difference, p. 148) 
22 
ibid., p. 12 1. 
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experimented in 1982 required women to name their favourite women writers 
(which they called "the mothe 
, 
rs of us all"). Not all women chose the same 
authors as their favourite. This result was expected. However, the realisation that 
the same author chosen as one woman's favourite occasioned such dislike in 
another woman came as a real surprise. This prompted endless arguments about 
individual choices. In addition, the women who were more certain about their 
preference were viewed as "authoritarian mothers" trying to impose their point of 
view on others. The way out of the practical cul-de-sac was indicated when one 
woman in the group declared, in a moment of frustration: "We say that the writers 
are our mothers, but the real mothers are here among us, because we are not all 
equal here. , 23 Sexual Difference describes how this statement (which occurred in 
the course of 1981) came both as a shock and as a relief - "by mentioning the 
disparity present in our relationship [ ... ] having released our minds from 
subjection to a neutral symbolic, we had released the symbolic power of the 
maternal figure. , 24 Reflecting back on this pivotal moment, Luisa Muraro notes 
that the next step was to create (and not simply to search for) female genealogies, 
"linking up with a theme that Luce Irigaray was already elaborating". 25 
The archetypal relationship where women are both equal and different, and 
where differences between women could be productive, is the pre-Oedipal 
relationship with the mother. In conjunction with Irigaray, "Psych & Po" and the 
"Practice of the Unconscious",, Italian theorists of sexual difference consider the 
mother-daughter relationship to be a particular area of symbolic devastation. 
26 
Again, masculine norms prevail to break the autonomy of the relationship 
between mother and daughter, thus using it to the advantage of the existing 
order. 27 
23 For an account of the discussions surrounding the Yellow Catalogue of Sottosopra, see Sexual 
Difference, op. cit., pp. 108-113. 
24 ibid., p. I 11 
25 Luisa Muraro, "L'amore come pratica politica: 1'esempio dell'amore per ]a madre" in Paola 
Bono (ed. ), Questioni di teoriafemminista (Milan: Tartaruga, 1993), trans. as "Love as a Political 
Practice: the Example of the Love for the Mother" in Bull, Diamond and Marsh (eds. ), 
Feminisms and Women's Movements in Contemporary Europe, op. cit., p. 82. I am using this 
translation. Luisa Muraro has been a major force behind both the Yellow and the Green 
sottosopra and has translated all of Irigaray's works published in Italian. 
26 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, "More Women Than Men", op. cit., p. 121. 
27 it would of course be absurd for Italian feminists to ignore the fact that Italian culture virtually 
puts the mother on a pedestal. But culture glorifies a mother who 
is constructed by men, the one 
who raises sons, not daughters. Again she is a commodity in the exchanges 
between men. That is 
why Alessandra Bocchetti, 
for instance, distinguishes between the matemal (the symbolic 
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In "More Women Than Men". the authors attribute the refusal to accept 
disparities amongst women and the consequential symbolic insignificance of the 
mother-daughter relationship to "the obliteration of the mother in our society. ). )28 
This resonates with Irigaray's theme of symbolic matricide. Whilst the theme of 
female genealogies was already at the centre of the Yellow Catalogue, the 
concept of symbolic matricide only features as a passing comment in "More 
Women Than Men". It has been developed more amply, in the years following 
the elaboration of entrustment, by the two leading figures of the philosophical 
community of Diotima - namely, Luisa Muraro and Adriana Cavarero. 29 
I will have the occasion of dealing with Cavarero's work more specifically 
in Chapter VI. I will also be returning to Muraro's own conceptualisation of 
matricide and of the Symbolic Order of the Mother in Section III of this chapter. 
For the moment, I will just indicate that, although their critique is conducted in 
different ways, both Cavarero and Muraro view Western philosophy as the 
theoretical tool that Man uses to usurp the matemal potential to give life. 
Cavarero, whose thought bears the acknowledged influence of Hannah Arendt's 
philosophy, argues that Man finds refuge in the philosophy of death so as to 
evade the fact that his life depends upon the birth given by a woman's body. By 
emphasising death, Western philosophy occludes female genealogy in general 
and the work of the mother in particular. Muraro, for her part, criticises the 
propensity of a certain dominating branch of philosophy and of psychoanalysis 
for positioning the mother in between the subject and his/her symbolic 
independence . 
30 The mother is thus reduced to nature, to the reality above which 
representation of what it is to be a mother), and maternity (the corporeal experience of bearing, 
giving birth and raising children). She points out that the maternal is valued at the expense of 
maternity (A. Bocchetti, "L'ambiguo matemo" in Che vuole una donna?, op. cit., pp. 12-21). This 
distinction echoes Adrienne Rich who, in Of Woman Born, differentiates between motherhood as 
institution and motherhood as experience. 
28 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, "More Women Than Men", op. cit., p. 12 1. 
29 For the forgetting of the mother in pedagogy, see Anna Maria Plussi, "Significativ]tA/visibilitA 
del femminile: logos della pedagogia" and Elvia Franco, "L'affidamento nel rapporto 
pedagogico", in Diotima, Il pensiero della differenza sessuale, op. cit. For the theme of the 
"obliteration of the mother" treated in relation to ethics, see Diana Sartori, "Tu devi: un ordine 
materno" in Diotima, 01tre Vuguaglianza. Le radid femminili dell'autoritti (Naples: Liguori 
Editore, 1995). 
30 Luisa Muraro, Lordine simbolico della madre (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1992), p. 8. A similar 
critique of the Freudian and Lacanian notion of symbolic independence from the mother appears 
in "Differenza sessuale. Da scopnre e da produrre" in Diotima, II pensiero della differenza 
sessuale, op. cit., and in A. Bocchetti, "Vincere cosa. Vincere cosa. La nostra questione con il 
potere" in A. Bocchetti, Che vuole una donna?, op. cit., pp. 86-119. See also the different essays 
contained in Diotima, Il ciello stellato dentro di noi (Milan: La Tartaruga Edizioni, 1992). 
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it is necessary to rise if symbolic independence is to be achieved. For both 
Cavarero, and Muraro, Man is able to conceal the work of the mother and give 
symbolic birth to himself, independently of the mother, by taking control of 
philosophy and of language. We will later see how Muraro contends that the 
mother gives the infant language as well as life, and that she is the true source of 
symbolic independence. We will also explain the important role that the mother 
plays in Cavarero's philosophy by examining her Arendtian conceptualisation of 
natality. 
2. The practice of sexual differeuce 
The critique put forward by Diotima, although subsequent and more 
philosophical than the one found in "More Women Than Men", is useful for 
highlighting the affinity it bears with Irigaray's work. Diotima's texts also show 
that the critique of the existing symbolic is unanimously embraced by the 
exponents of il pensiero della dififerenza sessuale, even if entrustment is not 
supported by all Italian feminists. Nevertheless, relying on Diotima's 
philosophical elaborations rather than on that of "More Women Than Men" (a 
pamphlet which is the result of discussions starting as early as 1976) risks 
occluding the distinctive development followed by the theory of sexual difference 
in Italy. Its origins are not merely philosophical or theoretical but primarily 
political. They lie in the practice of the relationships between/amongst women, 
which started in the 1970s with autocoscienza and the "Practice of the 
Unconscious". and gave rise to entrustment in the 1980s. In the history of Italian 
feminism, especially after the 1970s, insisting on the relationships between 
women has not been a matter of simple organisation, a way of bringing women 
together. Rather, it has been "the site, the 'setting', where women's subjectivity 
can come into being [ ... ]a form of politics where the means and the ends, the 
subject and the object of change are not separate but coincide. , 
31 
31 Ida Dominijanni, "Language, Communication and Betrayal" in European Journal of Women's 
Studies 1 (1994): 68 n. 2. 
153 
11 pensiero della differenza sessuale, historical context and the concept of the 
socia I-symbolic. 
When studying feminism in general and Italian feminism in particular, it is 
hence useful to bear in mind the strong link between theoretical contentions and 
the historical context in which they were elaborated. The theorists of entrustment 
constantly remind their readers of the historical and cultural specificity which has 
determined the outcome of their work: "We see the necessity of entrustment 
because it appeared to us, but we cannot demonstrate it fully because our view is 
necessarily partial. To admit this does not weaken our arguments. It means that 
our arguments have been dictated in part [by] events that are not under our 
control but somehow favourable to US.,, 32 
A certain conception of history underlies this remark. First of all, history 
does not appears to be totally outside our control since it is possible to alter its 
course through the conscious choice of appropriate practices ("autocoscienza" 
and the "Practice of the Unconscious" in the 1970s, entrustment in the last two 
decades). Secondly, political activism, that is human intervention in the course of 
history, is about the dialectical relationship between theory and practice. What 
entrustment theorists and sexual difference thinkers elaborate is indeed apraxis, a 
theory bound up by a practice. This is the feature which gives il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale its first specific character, and which has allowed the 
feminists discussed here to move beyond Irigaray's insights and methods to 
develop their own. For example, Ida Dominijanni remarks that it is in political 
practices adopted through the years by the women's movement that one can 
33 identify the theoretical moves. Lia Cigarini, for her part, conceives of theory as 
a practice put into words, as a way of narrating experience. 34 When dealing with 
the Symbolic Order of the Mother, we shall see that Luisa Muraro also thinks of 
theory as "the words which make us see what is", 35 that is . as what makes 
experience "sayable". It is because of its adherence to context that Muraro has 
likened the language born out of the relationship between women to that of the 
32 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference, op. cit., p. 150. 
33 Ida Dominijanni, 'T desiderio di politica" in L. Cigarini, La Politica del desiderio (Parma: 
Pratiche Editrice, 1995), p. 11. 
34 Lia Cigarim, La politica del desiderio, op. cit., p. 152. 
35 Luisa Muraro, Lordine simbolico della madre, op. cit., p. 45 [my translation]. 
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mother (whose relationship with the child, "creates" the world, that is makes it 
possible to be "spoken"). In addition, we may point out that it is thanks to a 
practice (the symbolic debt), that the Symbolic Order of the Mother is created. 
The connection between theory and practice can also explain the epithet of 
'(social-symbolic" used to describe the practice of entrustment. The use of the 
Lacanian concept of the "symbolic", that the exponents of entrustment and of il 
pensiero inherit from Ingaray, "Psych & Po" and the "Practice of the 
Unconscious", shifts slightly. However, it is still a question of tackling women's 
alienation in language, but transforming the symbolic also requires the right 
material conditions - those established by another practice of relationships 
between women, that of entrustment. The symbolic thus becomes the 
level of culture related to the interpretation of human experience 
and [ ... ] to codified mediations. It is impossible to perceive or 
modify without a coming to consciousness, a decoding of 
written texts and of social behaviours which seem, but are not, 
spontaneous or natural. Its perception and modification also 
require a political practice. 36 
The symbolic and the social thus becomes indistinguishable and give birth to the 
notion of the "social-symbolic", which also appears, at a later date, in Irigaray's 
writings. 37 The "social-symbolic" designates the circular relationship and 
interaction between symbolic and social factors in attributing meaning to 
phenomenological reality, thus determining the form of sexual identities, the 
shape of social norms, as well as the way in which these are lived 
psychologically. 
36 Luisa Muraro, "L'orientamento della riconoscenza" in Diotima, 11 cielo stellato dentro di noi, 
op. cit., p. 17 [my translation]. 
37 See for example, Luce Irigaray, Le temps de la diffiýrence: pour une r6volution paciflique 
(Pans: Le Livre de Poche, 1989). This particular text was originally published in Italian as Il 
tempo della differenza. Per una rivoluzionepacifica (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1989). It is the result 
of a series of conferences given by Irigaray at the invitation of the PCI and of the Women's 
Research Centre in Sicily between 1986 and 1989. The concept of the social-symbolic is also 
widely used by the Milan Women's Bookstore Collective in Sexual Difference, op. cit. It is 
difficult and of little interest to establish whether the concept of the social-symbolic originates 
with Ingaray or with the Libreria delle Donne di Milano. What the common use of this concept 
indicates is the fact that the communication of ideas 
between Irigaray and ilpensiero feminists 
has been a two-way exchange. 
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What does the notion of the social-symbolic mean for feminist political 
activism? To a certain extent, it aims to tackle the dilemma f. aced by the theory of 
sexual difference, that of constructing a female symbolic order when the only 
language available is that which is based on the erasure of sexual difference. The 
notion of the social-symbolic takes feminist political activity beyond a work on 
language and points to social relationships between women as a way of 
modifying the order of signification. As we shall see, entrustment relationships 
set the material (social) conditions for an intervention in the symbolic. 
Relationships of entrustment have, in themselves, a capacity to challenge the 
social-symbolic hegemony and to re-structure the order of representation so that 
the latter can include feminine sexual difference and thus permit women access to 
subjectivity. We will now turn to consider the features which distinguish 
entrustment from earlier forms of relationships between women, and which give 
it this restructuring capacity. 
Section 11. Constructinp, a female symbolic: the structure of entrustment. 
Like Irigaray, the authors of "More Women Than Men" believe that we 
have to "sexualise social relationships") 38 and establish a "common world of 
women ". 39 Group nA warns that this involves a simultaneous work of reflection 
and one involving a political practice. 40 We have just seen here how the work of 
reflection, carried out within separatist groups such as the Libreria but also within 
the philosophical community of Diotima, involves discovering sexual difference 
beyond the pretence of neutrality defended by the existing social-syrnbolic. 
This part of the chapter will engage with the more constructive side of il 
pensiero della difference sessuale taking entrustment as the example of a practice 
meant to sexualise social relationships and create female genealogies. I will 
explain the mechanism of such a social-symbolic practice of entrustment while 
identifying its original elements. In the previous section, the connection between 
38 Milan women's Bookstore Collective, "More Women Than Men", op. cit., p. 1 16. 
39 ibid., p. 1 19. "A common world of women" is also an essay by Adrienne Rich. It appears as an 
appendix to "More Women Than Men". The necessity 
for such a creation implies that, in the 
existing society, a common world of women 
does not exist at present. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, the exponents of entrustment 
have been criticised by lesbian feminists on this point. 
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theory and practice was treated as the first distinctive characteristic of the Italian 
theory of sexual difference. I will here concentrate on additional points of 
originality displayed by entrustment: the attempt to go beyond 
deconstruction/critique; the centrality of disparity; the particular conception of 
desire, necessity, realism and freedom that entrustment and i1pensiero hold. I will 
leave a last original feature of entrustment, that is, the conception of authority that 
it expresses and sustains, for the concluding part of the chapter which deals with 
the Symbolic Order of the Mother that both entrustment and il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale seek to create. 
1. The "wish to win" and "estrangement": the startinp, defmition of sexual 
difference. 
As "More Women Than Men" details, the practice of sexual difference 
starts within separatist groups, via an analysis of the concrete effects that the 
erasure or hiding of sexual difference has on women. 41 It is this "diagnosis" 
which is to be transformed into a critique of the present society, and which must 
generate social change. Practically speaking, beginning with estrangement (and 
its contradiction with the "wish to win") means that it is not the emancipated 
women who pave the way to liberation but those women who actively agonise 
within the existing social-symbolic - the estranged, silent women, those suffering 
from hysteria and other forms of neurosis. 42 
Nevertheless, the aim is not to stress irrationality and emotionality as 
essential components of some eternal woman's nature. 
43 The strategy adopted by 
the exponents of ilpensiero in general is to start from the present social-symbolic 
situation of women and transform the passive and oppressive experience of 
40 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, "More Women Than Men", op. cit., p. 1 16. 
41 ibid., p. 1 18. 
42 The work on hysteria has been central to Italian feminism from the 1970 onwards. Some 
feminists have reclaimed the term "hysteric" from its psychoanalytic use in order to describe a 
particular positioning in relation to the mother. See Luisa Muraro and Zulma 
Paggi, "Come, 
quando, perch6 Anna 0. si ý trasformata in Bertha Pappenheim" 
in Lucy Freeman, La storia di 
Anna 0. (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1979), and Luisa Muraro, L'ordine simbolico della madre, op. cit., 
especially. ch. 4. For a critique of such a use of hysteria, see Angela 
Putino, Amiche mie isteriche 
(Naples: Cronopio, 1998). Putino's critique will feature in my Chapter V. 
43 This intention is denied as early as 1976, in "D tempo, 1 mezzi, i luoghi", Sottosopra, Milan, 
1976. 
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44 estrangement into an active weapon to be used in the social-symbolic struggle. 
Il pensiero attempts to take the theory of sexual difference beyond the residues 
left in the symbolic because this strategy tends to portray woman as though she 
were in between two languages -a language in which she feels alienated, and a 
45 missing language. Estrangement is that which must be transformed to arrive at 
an autonomous definition of sexual difference. Muraro describes this constant and 
relentless search for self-definition as "the strength of the wish, the strength of 
,, 46 desire, that is to say an absolute and unconditioned 'positive' . We will come 
back to the specific understanding of desire that Italian feminists adopt. For the 
moment, let us see how this desire for affirmation and self-definition manifests 
itself in the texts published by the exponents of ilpensiero. 
As Diotima's texts and "More Women Than Men" show, the search for the 
possibility of woman's self-definition and self-representation does not lead to an 
underlying, fixed and eternal feminine essence. This self-definition is rather a 
process which starts from the re-signification of the present social, symbolic and 
historical position occupied by women in patriarchal society (the position of 
"alienation" and "separateness" for Cavarero, or that of "estrangement" for the 
Milan Women's Bookstore Collective). 47 Precisely, the first collective essay 
published by Diotima points out that their project involves the discovery of 
sexual difference (in the gaps left open by the existing social-symbolic) and its 
production. Woman's self-definition cannot but be multiple, forever challenged 
and "re-constructed', . 
48 Some Italian feminists have remarked that such a 
44 For another example of this strategy, see Wanda Tommasi. In "La tentazione del neutro" in 
Diotima, Rpensiero della differenza sessuale, op. cit. Tommasi works on the potential offered by 
the category of the neutral. She points out that the meaning of the word neutral has considerably 
shifted from its original Greek sense of "neither this, nor that" (ný-uter), where equal worth is 
given to the two propositions. If taken in its original sense and then confronted to the biased 
symbolic, the neutral simultaneously hides and refers to something which has been erased, that is, 
in Tommasi's interpretation, the asymmetry between the sexes. Being "tempted by the neutral" is 
thus a preliminary move. It means acknowledging that the neutral becomes the trace of what has 
been cancelled. "It brings women to the threshold: they listen out for the traces of the cancellation 
of their self in language, in writing, so as to speak with a new language, one which is not neutral, 
but aware of these silences. This language thus speaks starting from sexual difference. " (p. 96, my 
translation). One could also venture on a political reading of Tommasi's words: I do not think it 
must be read as an acceptance of the fight for liberal "neutral" rights as a first preliminary step 
which needs to be overcome. Rather, I believe that it could be a call to supplement the fight for 
rights by an analysis of their biased foundation. 
45 This difficulty is acknowledged by Wanda Tommasi, ibid. 
46 Luisa Muraro, "Love as a Political Practice", op. cit., p. 80. 
47 ibid., p. 203. 
48 On this point, see "La differenza sessuale. Da scoprire e da produrre" in Djotima, Il pensiero 
delia differenza sessuale, op. cit., p. 37 
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deconstructive approach which stresses multipliticity and change has been 
favoured by philosophical critiques of the humanist subject. On this Point, 
Alessandra Bocchetti maintains that women have long been subjects of the 20th 
century because they have always experienced subjectivity as fragmentation. 49 
She exhorts women to use this knowledge of fragmentation to their advantage. In 
Chapter V, we will come back to these questions and to the accusation of 
essentialism which has hindered the diffusion of contemporary Italian feminism 
in the Anglophone context. 50 At present, let us turn to the social-symbolic 
practice of entrustment as a specific and original way to go beyond 
deconstruction and to restructure the order of representation so that feminine 
sexual difference can be expressed and included. 
2. Entrustment and disparity. 
Disparity is the main element of entrustment which makes it both an 
original and a contentious social-symbolic practice. A relationship of entrustment 
is modelled on the mother-daughter relationship. It is established when a woman 
experiences a desire to act in a society without paying the price of assimilation to 
a male model that denies her the expression of her feminine sexual difference. 
She thus finds another woman (who is sometimes called in Italian the affidante 
51) ' "). She chooses the or affidataria with "something more" ("un di piU 
affidataria as an authoritative figure and entrusts her desire to her. The 
"something more" that the affidataria displays socially can take many forms: for 
49 Alessandra Bocchetti, "The Indecent Difference", in Bono and Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist 
Thought, op. cit., p. 148. 
50 Chapter I describes how in the 1980s - that is, at the time when the first texts about 
contemporary Italian feminism were being published in English - the discrediting accusation of 
"essentialism" was widely used against a variety of different feminist strands. I suggest that, as 
has been the case for the initial reception of Irigaray's texts, this Anglo-Saxon climate of 
suspicion of any theory stressing sexual difference has prevented a fair examination of ilpensi . ero 
della difterenza sessuale. The first texts in English to allude to entrustment were: Lucia Chiavola 
Birnbaum, Liberazione della Donna: Feminism in Italy (Middletown: Weysleyan University 
Press, 1986) and Judith Adler Heilman, Journeys Among Women: Feminism in Five Italian Cities 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1987). The articles by Teresa de Lauretis in Differences and Mirna Cicioni 
in Australian Feminist Studies were both published in 1989, and the translation, by de Lauretis, 
of Non credere di avere dei diritti appeared in 1990. 
51 See, respectively, Adalgisa Giorgio, "Mothers and Daughters in Italian Feminism", op. cit., 
p. 185, and Lia Cigarini, La politica 
del desiderio, op. cit., p. 159.1 shall be using the latter terin of 
-affidataria " throughout my discussion. 
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example, she can have more talent, more power, more prestige, more charm. 
However, the constant characteristic is that the woman whom one chooses as 
affidataria has found ways of signifying, in a masculine society, the fact that she 
is a woman. 
For entrustment theorists, "signifying the fact that one is woman" means 
expressing a particular desire in society without imitating men or depending on 
them for approval. It is a vague definition (and one which is bound to cause 
problems, as we shall see in Chapter V). Nevertheless, I believe that the area of 
obscurity is intended to avoid setting normative criteria for women's actions. The 
"something more" could also be read in the light of one of the definitions of 
woman that Adriana Cavarero offers in the influential essay mentioned above. 
Woman is defined as man plus an irreducible sexual difference that, because it 
cannot be represented in the existing symbolic, is experienced as a "minus" (the 
52 neutral-universal man minus the masculine gender). This is certainly a position 
which is shared by the Libreria delle Donne di Milano. 53 
The affidataria's role is to recognise the entrustee's needs and desire as 
well as to aid this desire's application. Because the woman chosen is not just a 
mirror, the attention given to the entrustee must aim at the latter's symbolic 
independence. It is thus a relationship based not on symmetry (an identity 
entrustee-affidataria) but one structured on imbalance. A relationship of 
entrustment does not try to erase the disparity between the two women it 
involves; instead, it aims to Preserve and exploit it. Cultivating disparity amongst 
women allows value to circulate. This is a new idea which contrasts with the 
politics of emancipation (where women want to access society in the hope of 
sharing men's value). In Italian feminism, value is hence sexualised. Entrustment 
theorists contend that women are the only ones who are able to give value to 
women, and this is, as we shall later see, what constitutes the basis of a new 
feminine symbolic. 14 Entrustment is controversially hierarchical, but hierarchy is 
here given the positive connotation of a real difference which is productive and 
52 Cavarero, "Towards a Theory of Sexual Difference", op. cit., p. 193. 
53 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference, op. cit., p. 124. 
54 Alessandra Bocchetti, "Le donne con le donne possono" in Che vuole una donna?, op. cit.. We 
will here recognise the influence of the concept of the "woman-identified woman", partly 
developed by Adrienne Rich. 
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55 empowering because it is acknowledged . Disparity, in a relationship of 
entrustment, is also linked to a specific context. One chooses to entrust oneself to 
a woman in a given social situation where a particular capacity of the affi'dataria 
will help the entrustee develop and express a specific desire. The same 
affidataria can in turn become an entrustee in another situation so that the 
positions of authority are said to constantly shift. The same woman can 
simultaneously be, in two different relationships, an affidataria and an entrustee. 
We will see that this provision seeks to avoid the mutation of authority into 
domination. 
When compared to earlier practices of relationships between women 
(('autocoscienza", "Practice of the Unconscious"), entrustment draws part of its 
originality from the fact that it is applied socially. Although it designates a 
relationship between two women, the context in which this desire is meaningful 
is one where both women and men act. This also affects the nature of the 
disparity between women. The affidataria's greater capacity must be shown in 
public (and not in a private relationship) in order to counter the risk of 
domination. Entrustment yields "a material link [ ... ] which can allow the 
communication of things which have been forced into silence or distorted in 
individual confrontation with male society. , 56 That is the reason why entrustment 
is not only a symbolic but a social-symbolic practice. It is a new form of feminist 
political activism based on individual, rather than collective action. Ida 
Dominijanni reports the reasons for such a conception of political activism: "A 
collective mediation presupposes common needs. Our political practice of 
affidamento, instead, has always reflected each individual woman's reality and 
needs. , 57 Unlike 1970s separatist practices, entrustment thus fights against 
universalisation and aims at providing for a social-symbolic representation of 
individual differences amongst women. 58 
55 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, "More Women Than Men", op. cit., p. 121. 
56 ibid., p. 121. 
57 Ida Dommijanni quoted in Mima Cicioni, "'Love and Respect, Together"', op. cit., p. 77. 
51 It is to emphasise this fact that that Lia Cigarini distinguishes between separatism 
("separatismo") and separation ("separazione"). "Separatism" (the type that was deemed "static" 
at the end of the 70s) designates an autonomous, and self-sufficient community of women. 
"Separation" refers to a social situation where women entrust themselves to other women in the 
view of acting out their desires in a mixed society. Similarly, Cigarinj distinguishes between 
"partition" ('ýpartizione'), linked to separatism, and "partiality" ("parzialitti"), that is, the fact 
that women do not claim to have a universal point of view, one which applies to men as well). On 
these linguistic distinctions, see Lia Cigarini, La politica del desiderio, op. cit., pp. 146,147,179. 
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3. ind realism. 
Apart from the centrality of disparity, the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment can also be considered original and specific to Italian feminism for 
its understanding of the concept of desire. As we have explored, entrustment 
attempts to seal the gap between the "wish to win" and the feeling of 
estrangement. 59 A relationship of entrustment could be described as a gendered 
relationship which mediates an inner disparity (between "wish to win" and 
"estrangement") and an external disparity (between the entrustee and the 
world) . 
60 Entrustment goes a step further than the practice of "autocoscienza "- 
in addition to a revaluation of feminine sexual difference within separatist 
groups, entrustment addresses the problem women still have in translating the 
experience, value, and knowledge of being women in society. Indeed, the task of 
the affidataria, in a relationship of entrustment, is to open up a creative 
relationship between her entrustee and social reality. She helps the latter to 
formulate or clarify her desires, to come to terms with her contradictory feelings 
(for example, her own insecurities on the one hand, and her aspirations on the 
other). The growth of the entrustee is possible only where she can translate her 
desires socially, and when she feels that the social-symbolic order recognises the 
existence of feminine sexual difference. 
In other words, entrustment pays more attention to the fort'n (which we will 
refer to as a "structure" when dealing with the Symbolic Mother) rather than the 
content of desire: it teaches women how to desire, not what to desire. It is said to 
position women in the economy of the "for oneself', also called "the politics of 
putting oneself at the centre" ("la politica del mettersi al centro ,) .61 Although 
It is also worth mentioning here that the rejection of univiti-salisation 
lies at the basis of another 
linguistic distinction between "rappresentanza " and "rappresentazione ". In English, a single 
word, that of "representation", covers up the distinction. "Rappresentanza" refers to political 
representation, while "rappresentazione " gives the idea of theatncal representation, performance. 
Towards the middle of the 1980s, the debate on political representation raged across Italian 
feminism. We shall come back to this debate in Chapter V with a discussion of the Communist 
Women's Charter ("La carta delle donne") a (failed) attempt to introduce feminine sexual 
difference into institutional politics. 
59 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference, op. cit., p. 116. 
60 In chapter V, we shall see that this dialectical understanding of entrustment can 
be problematic 
for any theory of subjectivity. 
61 The politics of "putting one self at the centre" ("la politica del mettersi al centro 
") is often 
discussed by Alessandra Bocchetti. For example, see A Bocchetti, "Per se, per me" in Che vuole 
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seeking to convey socially the specificity of women's experience, entrustment 
theorists stand against any traditional representations of women as primary 
carers, or any utilitarian arguments in favour of women's emancipation. Leaming 
how to want is learning how to put one's own desires first (that is, to find a 
social-symbolic place for oneself in the world). Hence the individualist basis of 
the relationship of entrustment mentioned above. Even if the affidataria fails to 
give enough attention to the entrustee, the fact that the latter recognises the value 
of the former occasions the contract between the self and the self, whereby a 
woman learns to understand and express what she wants. Female desire, whose 
weakness was identified as being a major problem in woman's alienation, is thus 
enhanced and brought to bear upon reality. 
Thus, the concepts of desire, necessity and realism are, in the opinion of 
entrustment and il pensiero theorists, inextricably linked. 62 The contradiction 
between the "wish to win" and estrangement creates a situation which is referred 
to as one of necesSity. 63 Here, necessity describes the fact that there is only one 
way out of this contradiction, namely finding a female mediation which will help 
the entrustee to understand and express her desires socially. Entering a 
relationship of entrustment is a choice (one chooses a particular woman to whom 
one entrusts) and a contingency (some women may well wish to stay well out of 
any relationship of entrustment). However, it becomes a necessity if one wants 
her desires to be expressed socially without conforming to male models. Hence, 
the paradoxical formula of "choosing necessity", a leitmotiv used by many sexual 
difference theorists in Italy. In Luisa Muraro's words, "choosing necessity" 
means 64assum[ing] at the social-symbolic level, the fact of being born a woman 
and [this is where entrustment becomes paramount] the responsibility of making 
sense of such a fact. , 64 Using such a philosophically charged tenn as "necessity" 
in unusual ways indicates that the dominant social-symbolic order requires one to 
forget one's feminine sexual difference in order to assimilate to the existing 
una donna?, op. cit., and "Politica per le donne, politica 
delle donne" in Paola Bono (ed. ), 
Questioni di teoriafemminista, op. cit. 
62 The link between desire, necessity and realism is the object of Diotima, Mettere al mondo il 
mondo: oggetto e oggettivitti alla luce della differenza sessuale 
(Milan: La Tartaruga, 1990). In 
particular, see the essays on Rahel Vernhagen 
(by Adriana Cavarero), on Theresa of Avila (by 
Diana Sarton), and on Simone Weil (by Wanda Tommasi). 
63 Lia Cigarini, Lapolitica del desiderio, op. cit., p. 152. 
64 Luisa Muraro and Alessandra Bocchetti, "La nostra questione con il potere" in A. Bocchetti, 
Che vuole una donna?, op. cit., p. 106. [my translation and my addition]. 
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society. In this context, choosing not to ignore the phenomenological fact that we 
are born women means "choosing necessity". 
Expressing one's desires socially requires a certain awareness of the 
contextual demands of a social situation and, at the same time, a capacity to 
somehow transcend these demands. Within the vocabulary used by il pensiero 
della difference sessuale, this dual capacity is referred to as "feminine realism". 
The interaction between two women in the relationship of entrustment thus aims 
at achieving a level of "feminine realism". Lia Cigarini explains: "In relation to 
the initial project, the measure is given by the limits, the constant adjustments 
and displacements that the given reality imposes . "65 This attention to the 
exigencies of reality is problematic for feminist theory. In Chapter V, we will see 
how the Italian version of "realism" risks being interpreted as a conservative 
adaptation to the given reality, or as a way to re-propose a correspondence 
between the subject and the view the subject has of reality. For the moment, I 
would like to point out that this understanding of realism is linked to several 
preoccupations - the constant concern to tie theory to a political practice, the 
effort to carve a place for women from within the existing social-symbolic (and 
not from some utopian outside), and the attempt to go beyond the usual 
dichotomous choice between exclusion and assimilation. We shall come back to 
"feminine realism" with Muraro's notion of the "Realistic-symbolic order" in 
Section III of this chapter, and with Cavarero's In Spite ofPlato in Chapter VI. 
Such perceptions of necessity and realism require a brief return to the 
notion of desire upheld by entrustment theorists. The aim is re-working on the 
symbolic structure of desire so that desire is not, as it is in the Lacanian scheme 
already challenged by Irigaray, confined to an unsymbolisable and dangerous 
realm (the Real), associated with the death-drive and with being a woman. Here, 
entrustment is close to Irigaray's project in that it too challenges the use of 
woman for the sublimation and representation of the male death-drive, a use 
which leaves women's own desire outside symbolic translation. Entrustment 
theorists and exponents of il pensiero della differenza sessuale believe that a 
social intervention (that is the empowering relationships set up between two 
women) can have a restructuring effect on the order of representation and can 
65 Lia Ciganni, La politica del desiderio, op. cit., p. 14 1. 
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make sexual difference "appear" on the soeial-symbolie level. It is a question of 
"liberating [female] desire so that it can act on society". 66 Female desire or "wish 
to win", can be defined as a desire to signify sexual difference both symbolically 
and socially, not in relation to Man (as a lack) but starting from the experience of 
women. It is a desire to know and to express feminine specificity in action, 
starting from the circumstance of one woman's life. 67 As we have explained 
above, the impossibility to symbolise their relation to their origin (the mother) 
within the existing symbolic denies women the position of subject. Female desire 
arises out of this impossibility. Entrustment "liberates" desire because it re- 
enacts, on a social -symbolic plane, the birth scene and thus symbolises women's 
relationship to their origin. Just as the daughter physically entered the world with 
the help of her mother, the entrustee accesses society as a subject thanks to 
another woman's mediation. 68 We shall come back to this parallel in Section III 
of this chapter, since it is taken up and further developed by members of Diotima 
and by Luisa Muraro. For the moment, let us turn to the idiosyncratic notion of 
freedom developed by entrustment theorists. 
4. Entrustment and female freedom 
There are several ways in which the concept of freedom appears within the 
writings of entrustment theorists and of some exponents of il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale. Firstly, freedom refers to the practice of the free 
relationships between women as new forms of political association able to 
represent the mother-daughter relationship on a social level. Freedom is 
connected to the genealogy between women that the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment is purported to create. "Genealogy" is here conceived in Irigarayan 
terms and structured along the same horizontal and vertical axes described in 
Chapter 11. The horizontal axis of the genealogy created through entrustment is 
66 bid, p. 141 [my translation and my alteration]. 
67 For example, this idea is expressed in Luisa Muraro, "Love as a Political Practice", op. cit., or 
in Angela Putino, "LibertA femminile e desiderio", in Bono (ed. ), Questioni di teoriafemminista, 
op. cit. See also, Cicioni, "'Love and Respect, Together"', op. cit., p. 73. 
68 Adalgisa Giorgio, "Writing the Mother-Daughter Relationship: Psychoanalysis, Culture, and 
Literary Criticism" in Giorgio (ed. ), Writing Mothers and Daughters: Renegotiating the Mother 
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manifest in the fact that women seek the help of other women in order to 
participate in many areas of public life. Therefore, the relationships of 
entrustment diffuse feminine presence in male society. When compared to 
previous practices of relationships between women, entrustment thus represents a 
step forward since it takes the expression of sexual difference outside the 
"autocoscienza " groups of the 1970s, and beyond Adrienne Rich's separatist 
vision of the "common world of women" . 
69 
Freedom is also related to the vertical axis of entrustment. The verticality 
of entrusting relationships produces freedom by making the qualities displayed 
by the various inspirational women chosen as affidatarie circulate in society. It is 
this verticality, this support sought in another woman with something more ("un 
di piu"'), which allows the social translation of the entrustee's desires, while 
remaining outside the masculine frame of reference. 70 The vertical axis of the 
genealogy puts women, not men or their laws, at the origin of their freedom. 71 
This has lead some Italian feminists to distinguish between "the politics for 
women" ("la politica per le donne') and "women's politics" ("la politica delle 
donne "). The former starts from what women lack, from the condition of 
injustice and inequality that demands reparation via the acquisition of rights. The 
criteria of judgement is Man and the goal is to achieve equality with men by 
asking them to concede more rights. It is grounded on a "subaltern symbolic", 
which requires the mass-identification with the suffering of some women (those 
who have experienced abortion, rape and physical abuse for example). 72 The 
latter form of politics - women's politics - starts from what women have (their 
"di pffil"), and rather than formal equality, aims at the free social inscription of 
the individual woman's desire. 73 
in Western European Narratives by Women (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002), 
p. 17. 
69 It is for that reason that entrustment theorists have described their social-symbolic practice as 
"difftise feminism" and contrasted it to the "static separatism" of the 1970s autocoscienza groups. 
70 This is the basic difference between "rappresentanza " and "rappresentazione " found in 
footnote 58. 
71 Milan women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference, op. cit., pp. 144,145. 
72 ibid., p. 103. 
73 On the distinction between "politica per le donne" and "politica delle donne", see Alessandra 
Bocchetti in Bono (ed. ), Questioni di teoria femminista, op. cit. This distinction implicitly 
informs one of Muraro's recent articles, published in the new online periodical issued by 
Diotima. See Luisa Muraro, "L'enjeu du f6minisme" in Per amore del mondo 1 (27 February 
2004), available at www. diotimafilsofe. it/riv --online. 
php. 
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Entrustment theorists have thus rejected the liberal notion of negative 
freedom - guaranteed by a set of individual rights which protects one from the 
interference of others. 74 However, entrustment theorists' conception of freedom 
remains grounded, to a certain extent, in liberal discourse. Indeed, entrustment is 
a practice based on the individual's desires that she chooses for herself It is a 
freedom which is both negative (freedom from interference of men, freedom 
from the crushing ideal of equality)75 and positive. It is a question of providing 
the individual with thefreedom to fulfil these desires, not by means of rights but 
by means of symbolic support. Moreover, entrustment is often described as a 
"social contract between women" (albeit voluntarily and explicitly chosen) 
involving an obligation (towards women only). 76 
Finally, the liberal notion of contract implies that the freedom attained 
through relationships of entrustment necessarily involve an obligation. It is 
because freedom is relational (the entrustee gains freedom thanks to the 
affidataria's symbolic and practical assistance) that it involves an obligation to 
pay a "symbolic debt", a notion which is shared within il pensiero. It could be 
defined as finding ways to "make the force and the valorisation taken from 
women circulate in society". 77 In entrustment, the payment of this debt must be 
more than a private, verbal expression of gratitude. It must be public and the 
content of a political project, in order for women's social achievements not to be 
considered exceptions, or the results of favours granted by men. 78 Paying the 
symbolic debt thus helps building the genealogy of women, and making women 
enter society as agents. A certain amount of obligation lies with the affidataria 
too. The notion of contract also stresses the formality of the relationship of 
entrustment: the desire to be carried out and what will happen in the relationship 
between the entrustee and her affidataria must be clearly explained. It is thanks 
74 Lia Cigarini, La politica del desiderio, op. cit., p. 159. On the distinction between negative and 
positive freedom, see Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 
1969). 
75 On this freedom from the ideological grip of patriarchy, I would like to mention the 
controversial claim, made in 1996 by the Libreria delle Donne di Milano, that patriarchy had 
44ended". This fall of patriarchy is intended as a decline of its symbolic power for women, its 
capacity to represent reality and women by taking Man as model. On this point see Sottosopra 
(January 1996) and the discussion of this claim in Letizia Paolozzi and Alberto Leiss, Un paese 
sottosopra: una voce delfemminismo italiano (Milan: Pratiche Editrice, 1999), pp. 131-152. 
76 On entrustment as a "social contract between women", a notion principally developed by the 
lawyer Lia Cigarini, see her Politica del desiderio, op. cit., pp. 140,146,158,167,181. 
77 ibid., p. 166. 
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to such an understanding of freedom that entrustment links private to common 
interest. 
In Sexes and Genealogies, Luce Irigaray laments the lack, in our culture, of 
female ceremonies. Entrustment could be seen as a sort of female ceremony. 79 
Through the formal relationship of entrustment, female sexual difference is 
produced and made visible in social reality. Entrustment is a social-symbolic 
practice which is original for its efforts to go beyond critique, towards 
reconstruction. It also marks a departure from the former separatist practices 
grounded in a discourse of equality and sisterhood since entrustment offers a 
positive interpretation of disparities between women. Finally, the connection 
between desire, necessity and realism as well as the specific definition of 
freedom all affirm the original character taken, via entrustment, by il pensiero 
della differenza sessuale. Entrustment puts new value on the mother-daughter 
relationship. It therefore has an even more important consequence - allowing 
women to return to the mother, and to create a symbolic order of their own. It is 
to the elaboration of the symbolic order of the Mother that this chapter will now 
turn. 
Section 111. Entrustment and the Symbolic Order of the Mother. 
Most of this chapter has described entrustment as the first political practice 
seeking the subversion of the existing symbolic order by constructing a network 
of empowering relationships between disparate women. Entrustment is thus an 
original application of the theory of sexual difference, one which has directly 
inspired the later fon-nulations of il pensiero della dififerenza sessuale. My 
objective, in this third section of the chapter, is to go beyond the original 
formulations of "More Women Than Men". In particular, I will here focus on the 
role and place that ilpensiero della dififerenza sessuale reserves for the mother in 
the new female symbolic order. It thus deals with the second assertion of this 
78 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference, op. cit., pp. 128-13 1. 
79 ibid., p. 148. 
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thesis - namely, that entrustment is the practice which has given contemporary 
Italian feminism its original characteristic because it has contributed to the 
development and theoretical hegemony of i1pensiero della differenza sessuale. 
This section will firstly return to the pre-oedipal relationship with the 
mother which stands at the basis of the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. 
Secondly, I will examine the figure of the mother to explain why she is 
instrumental in the creation of a symbolic order which can accommodate 
feminine sexual difference. Finally, I will analyse the notion of authority 
generated by this figure. 
1. "Putting the world into the world 9980: the relationship with the mother. 
One manifestation of the vertical axis structuring female genealogies is to 
be found in the practical work carried out by the Libreria delle Donne di Milano. 
The Libreria is a bookstore which gathers works of theory and fiction written by 
women of different times and places. It is aimed at creating what the pamphlet 
"More Women Than Men" calls a "strong precedent"81 -a historical and 
intellectual community and tradition of women. 82 Contained in the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment is another interpretation of the verticality of 
female genealogy, one which does not refer to a historical lineage, but rather to a 
s mbolic descent. Indeed at the basis of the genealogy created by entrustment Y 
stands the re-enactment and the re-potentialisation of the mother-daughter 
relationship, independent of the male symbolic. 83 
As said above, entrustment, as a practice of sexual difference, is concerned 
with ('sexualising all social relation down to their foundation [ ... ] at the time 
80 , putting the World Into the World" is also the title of another collective work by the 
philosophical community of Diotima. See Diotima, Mettere al mondo il mondo, op. cit. 
81 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, "More Women Than Men", op. cit., p. 121. 
82 This search for a "strong precedent" is what motivated the work behind the Yellow catalogue 
of Sottosopra, analysed earlier in this chapter. Identifying women as "mothers of us all" seems to 
be at odds with the refusal to call an affidataria a Symbolic Mother, and points to the difficulty in 
keeping the affidataria, the real mother and the Symbolic Mother confined to their respective 
roles. This point will be developed in the next chapter. 
83 in -More Women Than Men", it is expressed in the following way: "In order to struggle 
against patriarchal society we must give real strength within our relationships to that ancient 
relationship in which there could be, fused together, 
love and esteem for another woman" (p. 
122). 
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[when] sexual difference receives itsfirst interpretation", 84 that is, in the pre- 
oedipal period. Entrustment has inherited from its diverse sources of inspiration 
(Adrienne Rich, Luce Irigaray, "Psych & Po".. the "Practice of the 
Unconscious") the conviction that the relationship with the mother is the 
foundation of all relationships between women and that these relationships 
involve both equality and disparity. 
This original relationship with the mother has been the focus of Diotima 
and, more particularly, of Luisa Muraro. Muraro starts from the premise that 
language creates reality by attributing meaning to it. Speaking is literally, 
"putting the world into the world". In the preceding sections, we have seen how 
Italian feminists argue that, although sexual difference is a phenomenological 
truth, it is denied symbolic representation. By using the expression of "putting 
the world into the world". which itself evokes maternal scenes of birth, Muraro 
and Diotima suggest that it is a question of giving symbolic weight to thefact of 
being bom a woman ftom and with the help another woman. In entrustment, this 
is presented as entering the social world by means of a female mediation. 
Il pensiero della dififerenza sessuale thus looks to the pre-oedipal for the 
existence of another reality, another language contained at the margins of the 
existing symbolic. In L'Ordine simbolico della madre, Muraro deepens this thesis 
to propound the mother as the giver of both life and language. Unlike Julia 
Kristeva who also stresses the existence of a pre-symbolic language, Luisa 
Muraro does not say what form this particular language takes, whether it is a 
serniotic or semantic language. Nonetheless, Muraro argues that it is through 
language that women attribute symbolic meaning to reality according to an 
experience of reality that they share with their mother. 
The contention that the mother is both the giver of life and language has 
tremendous implications for the understanding of feminine subjectivity shared by 
entrustment theorists and il pensiero della dififerenza sessuale. Firstly, the 
Lacanian belief that subjectivity requires one to severe the pre-Oedipal link with 
the mother is challenged. Muraro historicises the Oedipus Complex as 
characteristic of a patriarchal society. 
85 Following Adrienne Rich, Muraro, 
believes that the Lacanian Paternal Metaphor is not so much a paternal metaphor 
84 ibid., pp. 144 and 145 [my emphasis]. 
85 Muraro, Lordine simbolico della madre, op. cit., p. 45. 
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as a patriarchal metaphor aimed at appropriating the mother's symbolic power. 86 
It is because women have to cut their link with the pre-oedipal that they lose the 
symbolic connection with the mother, hence forgetting the maternal genealogy. 
The patriarchal symbolic is a state of "syrnbolic disorder', 87 which nurtures 
difficult, or sometimes impossible, relationships between mothers and daughters. 
In fact, Muraro depicts the feminist project as the reinterpretation of our 
relationship with the mother. 88 
Secondly, putting the mother at the origin of our life and language suggests 
that subjectivity is given, independently of the father, by the relationship one has 
with the mother. Female subjectivity is then taken away by the subsequent 
imposition of the patriarchal symbolic. Retrieving the matemal origins of 
subjectivity is the aim of such practices of relationships between women as 
entrustment. 
Thirdly, the type of female subjectivity envisaged by entrustment theorists, 
Diotima philosophers and Luisa Muraro is relational. Muraro writes that the 
"creation of the world" is by attribution of symbolic meaning to the lived 
experience of a subject in relation with the one whom has given her life. The 
subject is therefore distinct from the mother but not from the relationship she has 
with her. 89 Muraro seems to conceive of the child in the mother-child 
relationship as an already constituted "subject". This assertion stands in sharp 
contrast to the Lacanian schema, analysed in Chapter 11, in which the subject is 
only formed through becoming a signifier in language. For Lacanians, there is no 
subject prior to signification. 
We shall come back to this point in Chapters V and VI with Cavarero's 
own account of the relational self. For the moment, I wish to remark that 
positioning the mother as the origin of life and language has a fourth implication 
which is epistemological in nature. Along with most exponents of il pensiero 
della differenza sessuale, Luisa Muraro argues that our first and most important 
knowledge comes from the contact with our mother. As noted above, learning 
how to speak is to attribute symbolic meaning to the world around us. The 
86 ibid., p. 46. 
87 MUraro in Bull, Diamond and Marsh, Feminisms and Women's Movements in Contemporary 
Europe, op. cit., p. 82. 
88 ibid., p. 83. 
89Muraro, Lordine simbolico della madre, op. cit., p. 57. 
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criteria of truth lies in the experience and perception of reality which the mother- 
child couplet shares and which thus creates a common language. Therefore, for 
Muraro, this truth is not to be found in objective, abstract, universal and eternal 
metaphysical forms or laws. Nor is this truth totally subjective: instead, it 
depends on the experience one has of reality, but this is a mutual experience thus 
an interpretation of reality that one shares with the mother. 90 Thinking of the 
mother as both the giver of life and language requires, for Muraro, this 
"epistemological move". 91 It explores a notion of truth which transcends the 
dichotomous opposition between self and other, objectivity and subjectivity, and 
it gives rise to a notion of a "realistic symbolic". 92 Muraro refers to this as the 
"interpretation of experience with the help of a mediation imposed by experience 
, 93 itself 
. 
2. A symbol, not a metaphor: entrustment, il pensiero delly differenza 
sessuale and the status of the mother. 
Il pensiero theorists thus contend that if we put a woman at the origin of 
our social relationships, the force of this discarded feminine symbolic might be 
retrieved. For this to happen, we must abandon the illusion of a solipstic self 
which gives birth to itself by severing the link with the mother. 94 On the contrary, 
we must actively seek relationships with other women in order to give these 
relationships symbolic, and hence political significance. This is to be done, of 
course, through the practice of entrustment. 95 As I will also argue in the next two 
90 On the discussion of the three types of truth, see Alain Naze, "A propos de L'Ordre symbolique 
de la tnýre de Luisa Muraro" in Per amore del mondo 1 (27 February 2004), periodical of the 
philosophical community of Diotima, available only at www. diotimafilsofe. it/riv online. php. 
91 Luisa Muraro, Lordine simbolico della madre, op. cit., p. 65. It seems to me that, although 
Adriana Cavarero has been very critical of entrustment as we shall see in chapter VI, the same 
epistemological move is at stake in her work on natality. As we shall see, entrustment and 
Cavarero's work bear more similarities than Cavarero would be comfortable to acknowledge. 
92 Luisa Murato, Lordine simbolico della madre, op. cit., p. 19. Although she never uses the 
actual notion of "realistic symbolic", the connection between real and symbolic is also proposed 
by Annamaria Piussi, "Era IA dall"inizio" in Diotima. Il cielo stellato dentro di noi, op. cit., p. 24. 
93 Luisa Muraro, Lordine simbolico della madre, op. cit., p. 94. 
94 This call to renounce to a "symbolic independence" has been further elaborated by other 
members of Diotima. It re-appears as the "impersonal perspective" in Chiara Zamboni's "Simone 
Weil: dare corpo a] pensiero", and as "mystical ecstasy" in Diana Sartori's "Perch& Teresa". See 
Diotima. Mettere al mondo il mondo, op. cit, pp. 48,32. 
95 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual difference, op. cit., p. 148. 
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chapters, entrustment is best considered as part of a common but plural Italian 
strategy of "practising" significant relationships between women. We have 
already referred to the practical work carried out in places such as the Libreria 
delle donne di Milano. Luisa Muraro also talks of the need to learn how to "love" 
our real mother because the ambivalence or even hatred often marring such 
relationships is the result of an existing symbolic which discards the role of the 
mother and which only values the mother-son relation. In order to love her, 
women need to "narrate the mother" ["raccontare la madre"], that is, "transforin 
the relationship with the mother, whatever affects and emotions which constitute 
it, into a matter for reflection. [Women have to] translate this relationship into 
knowledge and life, having as a direction the principle of gratitude. , 96 It seems 
that the old practice of consciousness-raising in women's groups is still useful in 
this respect, but it is no longer a question of simply becoming conscious of the 
psychological hold that patriarchy detains, or of being aware of the identical 
suffering of women. 97 
To understand how the feminine symbolic can be re-activated, one has to 
grasp the nature of this "restoration" or "re-enactment" of the pre-oedipal 
mother-daughter relationship. It is not a question of "regressing" to the pre- 
Oedipal. Neither is it a matter of substituting the mother with another woman. 
Both entrustment theorists and Luisa Muraro insist that they are talking of the 
mother symbolically, not metaphorically. Indeed, one cannot speak of the mother 
metaphorically because no flesh-and-blood woman can replace the real mother. 
A metaphorical use of the mother still robs the real mother of the recognition she 
deserves, and an alternative symbolic remains impossible. 
98 
Throughout my explanation of the mechanisms of entrustment, I have 
purposely referred to the woman to whom one decides to entrusts her desires as 
affidataria, since the affidataria is not a "Symbolic Mother". Lia Cigarini 
repeatedly points out that "there aren't, amongst us, Symbolic Mothers in flesh 
and blood, because the Symbolic Mother is a figure of a symbolic order, not a 
96 Muraro in Diotima, Il cielo stellato dentro di noi, op. cit, pp. 16 and 18 [my translation]. 
97 Ida Dominijanni, for one, stresses the usefulness of considering the practices of autocoscienza 
and of entrustment as connected and complementary. 
See Ida Dominijanni in Lia Cigarini, La 
politica del desiderio, op. cit., p. 
20. 
98 See Luisa Muraro, Lordine simbolico della madre, op. cit.; Lia Cigarini, La politica del 
desiderio, op. cit.; Anna Maria Plussi, "Era M dall'iniziO" and Veronica Mariaux, "Tenere 
presente la madre" in Diotima, 
Il cielo stellato dentro di noi, op. cit 
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factual reality. "99 Having the real mother as the model of all relationships of 
entrustment is said to prevent the risk of putting too much psychological power 
in the hands of either the affidataria or her entrustee. In Chapter V, we will come 
back to consider this point critically. 
Entrustment and il pensiero theorists often point out that the Symbolic 
Mother is a figure of symbolic exchange between two women who want to 
translate their feminine sexual difference socially. The Symbolic Mother is thus a 
structure of subjectivity expressed through a language that women speak 
together, and through which they confer meaning to reality according to their 
common experience of it. Entrustment relationships also "re-present" the 
relationship with the mother in the more literal sense of "presenting anew", of 
"re-thinking and re-symboli sing" the mother-daughter relationship as a source of 
social-symbolic strength. 100 The Symbolic Order of the Mother can thus be 
conceived as the order of significant relationships between women which 
restructure representation so that feminine sexual difference can be included. 
Therefore the Symbolic Mother is a relation, a language which acts as a 
bridge between the real mother and younger generations. " 01 The Symbolic 
Mother places women in a maternal continuum, 102 whereby the relationship of 
the daughter with her mother recreates the relationship between the latter and her 
own mother, and so on and so forth. This symbolic lineage places the meaning of 
sexual difference genealogically. It stresses that all women are daughters, and 
that all are born of a woman's body. The daughter "is at the same time the centre 
and the end of the matemal continuum (except if she want to reopen this 
continuum by becoming a mother herself), while [the son] stands outside it, [ ... ] 
from the moment that the mother comes to know his sex. "103 Therefore, the 
maternal continuum does not confer an identity to women in biologically 
deterministic terms (the capacity to be mothers), but by necessity (through the 
99 Lia Cigarini, op. cit., p. 141 [my translation]. 
100 ibid., p. 17 1. 
101 A. M. Piussi, "Era M dall'inizio", op. cit., p. 28. 
102 On the "maternal continuum", see Luisa Muraro, Lordine simbolico della madre, p. 54. The 
influence of Adrienne Rich on Muraro is here evident. When referring to a "common world of 
women", Rich does not speak of a "maternal continuum", 
but of a "lesbian continuum". See her 
-Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" In Signs 5.4 (Summer 1980): 631-60. 
Adrienne Rich, "The Common World of Women" in On Lies, Secrets and Silence: Selected 
prose 1966-1978 (London: Virago, 1980). 
103 Muraro, Lordine simbolico della madre, p. 54 [my translation]. 
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phenomenological fact that one is born a woman from a woman's body). In 
addition, the matemal continuum also expresses differences between women. 
Understanding women as daughters is less normative because mothers and 
daughters are no longer identified. Their relationship becomes one of sameness 
and difference, but not one of rivalry. In Chapter VI, we shall see that the 
maternal continuum also plays a central role in Adriana Cavarero's political 
philosophy. 
The following chapter will partly concentrate on the complex distinction 
between the Symbolic and the real mother as the source of some of the criticisms 
addressed to entrustment and to il pensiero. We will identify, at the heart of il 
pensiero, an oscillation between theorising a Symbolic Mother which transcends 
the real mother (Lia Cigarini) and conceptualising a Symbolic Order of the 
Mother based on the gratitude that one has for the real mother (Luisa Muraro). 1 04 
We will also return to this discussion of the matemal continuum in the following 
chapter. Finally, we will ask whether entrustment theorists ignore the possible 
degeneration of an empowering disparity into an abusive power. In this respect, a 
preliminary discussion of the notion of female authority is required. 
3. The Symbolic Mother and female authoritv. 
Chapter III examined the move towards a positive revaluation of sexual 
difference, which occurs in Italy at the end of the 1960s. We have seen how this 
move is initiated by a negative interpretation of the concept of authority, then 
called authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is that negative form of power, which, 
for Italian feminists of the time, is buried deep in men's psyche and which is 
used to oppress all women in the same pervasive way. There are two factors 
which prompt entrustment theorists to reopen the subject of power and authority. 
Firstly, rescuing feminist theory and practice from the common identification of 
women as victims of male power is perceived as an urgent need. This notion of 
sisterhood in oppression has the disadvantage of purposely ignoring the potential 
qualities and strengths of women, thus limiting the prospects for their liberation. 
104 Ida Dommijanni also makes this point in Cigarini, La politica del desiderio, op. cit., p. 40 n. 17. 
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It also puts women in a position where their sole recourse is to ask the oppressor 
to be generous enough to concede them rights. 105 Secondly, from the meeting 
with "Psych & Po" and from the publication of the Yellow Sottosopra, the 
question of power becomes a tacit issue within women's groups. With the 
positing of disparity at the centre of entrustment, differences between women are 
redefined in a positive way. It is thus at the end of the 1980s that the question of 
authority takes centre stage for entrustment theorists and for exponents of il 
pensiero della differenza sessuale. 106 
It is against this background that authority becomes, for il pensiero della 
dififerenza sessuale as a whole, a positive form of power. 107 The originality of 
this new analysis comes from presenting authority as linked to the symbolic 
dimension of language. For Muraro and the members of Diotima, the mother and 
child speak together with authority on the basis of a shared experience of 
reality. 1 08 In entrustment, authority is given to the language that two women 
speak together in a view of acting in society so as to make it correspond to their 
interpretation of reality (the symbolic). 109 Therefore, the authority activated is 
relational - it is not given by one flesh-and-blood woman in particular, it is not a 
zero-sum; it is rather dialogical and refers to a significant relationship between 
women. As such, authority is said to belong to the Symbolic Mother, that is to 
the figure which represents these significant relationships between disparate 
women. The authority of the Symbolic Mother is visible in a relationship of 
entrustment when a hannony, a dialectical relationship, is set up between the 
105 Anna Yeatmann has reflected on the same problem within an Anglophone context. See her 
"Feminism and Power" in M. L. Shanley and U. Narayan (eds. ), Reconstructing Political Theory: 
Feminist Perspectives (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). 
106 Apart from Luisa Muraro's L'ordine simbolico della madre, there have been many works 
regarding the specific conception of authority in Italian feminism. For example see the 
aforementioned Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference; Diotima, 01tre 
l'uguaglianza; Centro Virginia Woolf-B, "L'autoritA femminile. Incontro con Lia Cigarini" in 
Lia Cigarini, La politica del desiderio, op. cit.; or Alessandra Bocchetti, "Vincere cosa, vincere 
cosa", op. cit See also Ipazia, Autorit6 scientiflica. Autorihi femminile (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 
1992). 
107 This is certainly what comes through Giannina Longobardi's early analysis which argues that 
power can be used positively within relationships of entrustment. Giannina Longobardi, "Donne 
e potere'% in Diotima. 11pensiero della difterenza sessuale, op. cit. 
108 Luisa Muraro, Lordine simbolico della madre, especially chapter IV. 
109 On this point, see Chiara Zamboni, "Ordine simbolico, ordine sociale" in Diotima, 01tre 
lluguaglianza, op. cit. 
176 
entrustee's desires and reality. This authority helps identify desires and finds a 
way of translating them socially. " 0 
For il pensiero, authority is thus linked to becoming a subject - being an 
actor and occupying a position of enunciation (author-ity). Indeed, the feminine 
subject is given birth by a network of these significant relationships between 
women. III It is this network which creates authority-' 12 Authority thus refers to a 
capacity (to speak and to act in society) independently of the male frame of 
reference. When considered as a relationship which links a woman to her mentor, 
entrustment theorists employ authority in its Latin sense of au-gere (to make 
something/someone grow). ' 13 
For ilpensiero della dififerenza sessuale, authority is also solely legitimate. 
In entrustment, it is consented to (by the women who has less) rather than taken 
(by the women who display the "something extra" central to entrustment), and 
refers to the capacity to direct circumstances and human relationships towards a 
positive outcome. 1 14 This legitimisation is made explicit - we will recall how 
entrustment is conceived of as a social contract which includes a visible gesture 
of gratitude, a "symbolic debt", to be paid publicly. Some entrustment theorists 
have distinguished "authority" [autoritti] (which refers to a linguistic relationship 
called the Symbolic Mother) from "autorevolezza" (the type of authority 
bestowed on the affidataria by the entrustee). 1 15The particular quality for which 
the affidataria is chosen, together with her experience of social interaction, gives 
her words a certain weight, and it is this weight that is indicated by the word 
"autorevolezza". 
Rpensiero theorists often refer to Hannah Arendt and to her claim that the 
modernity has lost a sense of "authority". ' 16 Some commentators have identified 
some strong Arendtian tones in the articulation of a consensual and responsible 
political space developed by il pensiero. 117 It is arguably this sense of the 
110 Cigarim, La politica del desiderio, op. cit. , p. 169. 1 Wanda Tommasi, "I] lavoro del servo" in D'otIma, 01tre l'ugualglianza, op. cit. 
112 Cigarini, La politica del desiderio, op. cit., p. 148. 
113 Tommasi, "11 lavoro del servo", op. cit. 
114 Anna Rosa Buttarelli, "Fare autoritA, disfare potere" in Diotima, 01tre luguaglianza, op. cit. 
115 Letizia Comba, "L'obbedienza" in Diotima, 01tre l'uguaglianza, op. cit., p. 49. 
116 Hannah Arendt, "What is Authority? " in Between Past and Present (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1977). This essay is repeatedly referred to in Diotima, 01tre l'uguaglianza, op. cit. 
117 On this point, I would like to mention an article by Linda M. G. Zerilli. Zerilli tries to glean an 
Arendtian conceptual i sation of the political (as the shared interractive scene where individuals 
express their singularity) from the Milan Women's Bookstore 
Collective's Sexual Difference. 
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Political which needs to be retrieved for contemporary institutional politics. I 
would thus argue that, although entrustment theorists have re-valued authority as 
a capacity form of power, they have still retained from the 1970s critique of 
authoritarianism, a conflictual conception of power. The novelty of i1pensiero's 
theory of power is thus contained in the separation of authority (viewed 
positively) from power (viewed negatively), and in the attribution of the latter to 
the existing social-symbolic. Thus, power is still theorised as conflictual, 118 
imposed from the outside, aimed at keeping the status quo, 119 and employed by 
an agent (Man) in order to govern. 120 Although never analysed in Lukesian 
terms, it is possible to view its three dimensions (of decision-making, agenda 
setting and interest shaping) at work in what il pensiero targets as male 
Politics. 12 1 The political is here criticised as the fight to acquire that instrumental 
and oppressive power. 122 
This somewhat limited conception of power and artificial separation of 
power from authority will be one of the main reservations that I will address to 
the social-practice of entrustment and develop in the following chapter. Although 
il pensiero elaborates the theme of authority in relational terms, its presentation 
of entrusting relationships seems to leave out the kinds of insights that we can 
glean from a Foucauldian analysis of power (as self-discipline and normalisation, 
power acting at the microphysical level and as the recuperation and 
resignification of norms). 123 
Her aim is to use this in the service of a reconfiguration of rights and equality which does not 
relinquish claims to difference. See Linda M. Zerilli, "Refiguring Rights Through the Political 
Practice of Sexual Difference" in Differences 15.2 (2004): 54-90. Although I found in this article 
a very interesting reading of Sexual Difference and although Arendt is often mentioned by il 
pensiero theorists, I do not think it is possible to push the comparison between Arendt's 
conceptual i sati on of politics and ilpensiero's too far. Indeed, the latter still works on the premise 
that women meet between women (that is, on the basis of "what" they are, not "who" they are). In 
Chapter VI, I will argue that Cavarero develops a "politics of uniqueness" which is much closer 
to Arendt than the politics of sexual difference favoured by the rest of ilpensiero. 
118 See, for example, Diana Sartori, "Tu devi, un'ordine materno", in Diotima. Oltre 
l'uguaglianza, op. cit. 
'19 See, for example, Zamboni, "Ordine simbolico, ordine sociale", op. cit. 
120 Anna Rosa Buttarelli, "Dare autoritA, disfare potere", in Diotima. Oltre l'uguaglianza, op. cit. 
121 Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: MacMillan, 1978). 
122 Luisa Muraro's preface to Diotima, Oltre luguaglianza, op. cit. 
123 On Michel Foucault and power, see The History of Sexuality: An Introduction 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), esp. ch. 2; "Truth and Power" in Colin Gordon (ed. ), Powerl 
Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings (Brighton; Harvester, 1980); "The Subject 
and Power" in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982). 
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Indeed, Luisa Muraro, in an interview with Alessandra Bocchetti, explicitly 
rejects Foucault's theories, not because she deems them unhelpful, but because 
they belong to a discourse built on man's experience and conventions and thus 
do not correspond to women. Luisa Muraro argues for an independent 
(separatist? ) analysis of power. For this to happen, she contends, we have to 
analyse the symbolic tools created by the women's movement, namely the 
practice of disparity amongst women. 124 The impossibility of such theoretical 
separatism left aside, 125 1 think that this approach is bound to lead to an 
impoverished analysis, one which crudely creates a dualism between a negative 
form of power and a positive type of authority. This gives the sense that, whilst 
the negative form of power is assigned to men and institutional politics, 
productive authority characterises women's politics. In Chapter V, I will argue 
that this is a politically motivated strategy to avoid accounting for power 
relationships within the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. The analysis of 
authority at work in the relationships between women is normative rather than 
descriptive. In the following chapter, I will also argue that, although Foucault's 
theories are gender-blind, 126 they can usefully offer a more complete analysis of 
the notion of power/authority currently missing from entrustment and i1penslero. 
We will see, in Chapter VI, that Adriana Cavarero adopts a different attitude 
towards Western male philosophical tradition, instead seeking to recover a 
feminist politics from her hermeneutic dialogue with major political thinkers 
(from Plato to Jacques Derrida). However, Cavarero retains this normative 
description of positive relationships between women. 
Conclusion 
This chapter on the social-symbolic practice of entrustment opened with 
three questions. My starting point was to ask how and why the theory of sexual 
difference developed, in Italy, through entrustment. From an analysis of "More 
124 Alessandra Bocchetti, "Vincere cosa, vincere cosa", op. cit., p. 90. 
12' This impossibility has been pointed out In relation to Christine Delphy (in Chapter 11) and to 
Carla Lonzi (in chapter III). 
126 On this point see Caroline Ramazoglu (ed. ), Up Against Foucault: Explorations of Some 
Tensions Between Foucault and Feminism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993). 
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Women Than Men". the 1983 pamphlet which first detailed the social-symbolic 
practice of entrustment, I was able to conclude that the choice to adopt the theory 
of sexual difference In Italy was made because it corresponded to problems 
(those of "the wish to win" and "estrangement") which had been identified in the 
previous practices of the relationships between women. From this, we have been 
able to highlight the strong practical nature of the theory of sexual difference - 
not only did it arise out of a political practice but it purported to have developed 
through another practice, that of entrustment. The first point of originality of the 
Italian version of sexual difference thus arose: entrustment sustains the link 
between theory and practice which has been characteristic of Italian feminism 
since its re-emergence in the late 1960s. 
My second and third questions regarded those elements which justified my 
contention that entrustment is an original application of sexual difference. In the 
second part of the chapter, we found the reasons for its originality in the 
solutions entrustment presented to a "state of emergency". Throughout this 
chapter, we have seen how i1pensiero della differenza sessuale answered the call 
of entrusment theory to go beyond separatism and victimization, to develop the 
original insights of "More women then men". In addition, entrustment is original 
for its atypical understanding of disparity, desire, necessity, realism and freedom, 
subsequently adopted and refined by il pensiero della differenza sessuale. The 
third section of the chapter added the figure of the Mother and her symbolic 
order, which implied a specific understanding of female subjectivity and of 
authority. 
However, this description of the originality of entrustment also raises many 
critical points, which will fon-n the back-bone of the following chapter. Chapter 
V will therefore give a more complete overview of contemporary Italian 
feminism. it will not only come back to the internal tensions within il pensiero 
della differenza sessuale. It will also be concerned with those feminists who have 
opposed the social-symbolic practice of entrustment and who have devised 
slightly different ways of arriving at the representation of feminine sexual 
difference on a social-symbolic plane. Finally, Chapter VI will deal with the 
most significant of these dissenting voices by offering an exegesis of Adriana 
Cavarero's thought as both central to the development of il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale and as a fierce critic of entrustment. 
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Chapter V 
Power and the Feminine Subject: A Critical Evaluation of 
Entrustment and of the Maternal Symbolic Order. 
Introduction: 
Chapter IV has described several specific characteristics which bestow on 
the social-symbolic practice of entrustment its originality. Firstly, entrustment 
arose out of the political strategy of practising relationships between women. 
This not only places entrustment at the centre of the Italian feminist tradition. It 
also shows that the conclusions reached by entrustment theorists were attained, to 
some extent, independently of Irigaray's influence. Secondly, Chapter IV has 
exposed entrustment as an attempt to go beyond the critique of the existing 
social-symbolic order, towards a positive search and reconstruction of feminine 
sexual difference. Thirdly, we have seen how the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment is structured on a disparity between women and on a specific 
conception of desire, necessity, realism and freedom. Finally, Chapter IV has 
examined the maternal symbolic order that entrustment and il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale seek to create. 
This fifth chapter returns to a point repeatedly emphasised during my study 
of contemporary Italian feminism. I have indeed stressed that entrustment 
characterises the feminism of sexual difference in Italy not because it is a social- 
symbolic practice which is embraced unanimously, but because it has polarised 
feminist debates between its defenders and its detractors. My presentation of 
entrustment has thus raised a number of contentious issues for further discussion. 
Here, I will concentrate on the controversial aspects of entrustment and take my 
analysis outside the sole feminist collectives at the forefront of il pensiero. In 
particular, I will assess how some Italian feminists have developed a more 
critical engagement with entrustment and i1pensiero, while keeping the common 
goal of creating feminine sexual difference by focussing on the figure of the 
mother. Through a discussion of debates internal to contemporary Italian 
181 
feminism, I will develop a critical assessment of entrustment, and of the maternal 
symbolic that it seeks to create. 
In particular, I will focus on two themes that have been at the forefront of 
many objections directed at entrustment and il pensiero theorists. The first 
section of this fifth chapter will return to the question of disparity between 
women, a questionable notion which structures entrustment and which is still at 
the centre of the matemal symbolic order envisaged by the likes of Diotima. I 
will assess the claim that the social-symbolic practice of entrustment creates 
situations where abusive power relations may thrive. Is entrustment an 
empowering practice or is it a practice of repressive power? I will also evaluate 
the way in which entrustment and i1pensiero exponents theorise the relationship 
between disparity, authority and power. What theory of power lies at the basis of 
entrustment and il Pensiero? The second section of this chapter will reconsider 
the new conceptualisation of the feminine subject that arises from entrustment, 
and from the conception of the maternal symbolic order, taking up its theoretical 
significance and implications for sexual difference. It is also in this second 
section that we will expose this feminine subject to the contested charges of 
essentialism. In the process, we will return to the discussion of essentialism 
initiated in Chapter I and to some of the feminist theorists discussed there. 
Section 1. Authority and power in entrustment and il pensiero delly 
differenza sessuale: 
In our earlier discussion, the central notion of disparity, which structures 
entrusting relationships, has been introduced as the major source of both 
originality and controversy. Rather than being crushing, disparity is presented as 
empowering and productive, allowing the entrustee to express a particular desire 
in social reality. Entrustment's initially positive use of the difference between 
women, first exposed in "More Women Than Men", is taken up by il pensiero 
theorists later and developed into the notion of authority. 
In section I of the chapter, I will focus on the relationship between 
authority and power in entrustment and i1pensiero. I will begin by assessing, in a 
first part, the relation between disparity, authority and power in entrustment via 
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an analysis of the psychoanalytic concept of transference. I will also return to the 
distinction between the affidataria, the real mother and the Symbolic Mother. 
We shall see how entrustment and i1pensiero theorists rely on this distinction in 
order to counter the accusation that entrustment is a practice of repressive power. 
In the second part of Section 1,1 will elaborate my own critique of entrustment 
by using the psychoanalytic concepts of counter-transference and the imaginary, 
which entrustment and il pensiero theorists do not explore sufficiently. I will 
conclude Section I by evaluating the conceptualisation of power and authority 
offered by entrustment and il pensiero theorists in order to see whether it can 
respond to its critics. 
1. Disparity, authority and power. 
Entrustment theorists are very cautious not to qualify the nature of the 
"something extra" that the affidataria displays socially and for which she is 
chosen by her entrustee. They are similarly careful not to specify the content of 
the desire that the entrustee seeks to express socially. Indeed, entrustment is not 
about defining what "Woman" is or should be, or what she should or should not 
desire. It is rather designed as a relationship allowing women to offer symbolic 
and practical support to one another on the basis that they all suffer from the 
existing monosexual symbolic order. Thanks to the disparity which constructs it, 
the practice of entrustment is believed to express and use the individual 
disparities which exist between women in a positive manner. 
Entrustment theorists nonetheless provide some guidelines for the 
affidataria to follow. This provision is made so that the relationship is one of 
entrustment and not of repressive power, and so that differences amongst women 
are respected. We have encountered these rules when describing the mechanism 
of entrustment. Let us briefly record the main ones. First of all, the role of the 
affidataria is to respect and cultivate the asymmetry that separates her from her 
entrustee. She should be the one to adapt herself to the desires of the entrustee 
(and not the other way around). Secondly, the affidataria must realise that the 
added value for which she is chosen is not absolute but linked to a specific social 
context. The permutation of the roles of affidataria and entrustee in relationships 
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between women is also said to prevent one single woman enjoying a privileged 
and powerful status. As seen in Chapter IV, the authority activated by entrusting 
relationships is presented as relational and not as the instrument of a particular 
agent. Il pensiero as a whole links authority to significant relationships between 
disparate women which themselves create the Symbolic order of the Mother. 
Finally, the affidataria's specific advice and qualities expressed in a relationship 
of entrustment are said to matter less than the entrustee's decision to enter into 
such a relationship. What is paramount is the action of contracting with a person 
of the same sex who has also been faced with the desire to enter social life from 
within a female frame of reference. It is the coming to consciousness of one's 
need to take another woman as a mediation for the social expression of one's 
desire which is decisive. 
One can see how such guidelines, if respected, allow the two women to 
gain from a relationship of entrustment. On the one hand, the affidataria gets her 
specific quality recognised and valued by another woman, outside the male frame 
of reference. On the other hand, the entrustee can use the af fidataria's specific 
quality in order to bring her desire to bear on social reality. However, one could 
wonder whether the mere existence of these numerous guidelines, increased over 
the years, do not betray a disavowed fear that abusive power could always be 
lurking in relationships of entrustment? Let us now turn to examine this question 
in more detail. 
Entrustment, psychoanalysis and transference. 
One could argue that entrustment relationships will always be threatened 
by an invasion of repressive power because they are structured on a 
psychoanalytic model. The closeness of entrustment and psychoanalysis has 
indeed been one reason why several Italian feminists have always remained 
suspicious towards entrustment. 
' I have retraced the genealogy of the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment in Chapters 11 and III and have constantly 
emphasised the critical link between entrustment theorists and Lacanian 
1 See, for example Grazia Zuffa, "Tra libertA e necessitA. A proposito di Non credere di avere dei 
dirittil' in Reh: pratiche e saperi di donne, 1 (1987): 51-53. The closeness of entrustment to 
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psychoanalysis: firstly, via the French group "Psych & Po"; secondly, via the 
1970s "Practice of the Unconscious"; and thirdly, via Luce Irigaray's influence. 
With the emphasis on entrustment first and foremost as apractice, it is difficult 
not to liken an entrusting relationship to the one which links analyst to analysand 
in a therapeutic situation. 
In psychoanalytic therapy, the analyst undeniably occupies a position of 
power. He is the one who possesses knowledge and who pronounces diagnostics 
or rather judgements. According to both the Freudian and the Lacanian 
therapeutic models, the analyst does not commit himself emotionally (something 
which I will later contest). He is not even judged by the patient on the 
truthfulness of his interventions since he is not supposed to utter truths, but 
should rather lead the patient to betray his own unconscious thoughts through the 
mechanism of transference. In Madness and Civilisation, Michel Foucault has 
highlighted all these elements: 
[Freud] exploited the structure that enveloped the medical 
personage: he amplified its thaumaturgical virtues, preparing for 
its omnipotence a quasi-divine status. He focused upon this 
single presence - concealed behind the patient and above him, in 
an absence that is also a total presence - all the powers that had 
been distributed in the collective existence of the asylum; he 
transformed this into an absolute Observation, a pure and 
circumspect Silence, a Judge who punishes and rewards in a 
judgement that does not even condescend to language; he made 
it the Mirror in which madness, in an almost motionless 
movement, clings to and casts off itself. 2 
Unlike a therapeutic relationship, a relationship of entrustment does not 
have to conform to a set of guidelines which determine its spatio-temporal 
setting. Entrustment theorists have never raised questions of place, form and 
duration, central to the differentiation between various schools of 
psychoanalysis also explains why Cavarero 
has never embraced entrustment explicitly, although 
she has been a central figure in the 
development of i1pensiero della differenza sessuale. 
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psychoanalysis. 3 In addition, the position of affidataria is bound to a particular 
context where her specific qualities can prove to be an advantage in the 
relationship which ties her to the entrustee. Like the "Practice of the 
Unconscious", described in Chapter 111, the permutation and instability of roles is 
believed to curb the "capitalisation of knowledge" (that which puts the analyst in 
4 a position of power), so as to make it circulate within women's groups. 
In Chapter 111,1 criticised the "Practice of the Unconscious" for brushing 
aside the notion of the power inherent in psychoanalytic relationships by 
proposing this interchanging of positions. I wish to reiterate the same critique in 
relation to the permutation and contextuality of entrusting relationships between 
women. Although temporary and contextual, a relationship of entrustment can 
induce a certain level of dependency in the entrustee so that such a relationship 
becomes, in a certain way, "addictive". The aim of a relationship of entrustment 
is the entrustee's eventual symbolic independence. But without precise criteria, 
how is one to know when she has achieved a sufficient degree of symbolic 
independence? Who judges that independence has been attained? The affidataria 
or the entrustee? 
Entrustment theorists are generally caught up in a dilemma. On the one 
hand, they refuse to give a precise definition of what is meant by several of the 
recurrent expressions which appear in their writings for fear of being too 
normative. They do not qualify idioms such as "something extra", "signifying the 
fact that one is a woman". "recognising the authenticity of the entrustee's desire 
to count in the world", the social translation of a desire while "not imitating 
men". On the other, such a lack of precision presents the risk of leaving the 
establishment of these definitions to the sole affi'dataria, thus offering her an 
enormous amount of power. 
Despite the differences in "setting" mentioned above, the parallels which 
can be drawn between a relationship of entrustment and a psychoanalytical one 
2 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation: a History of Insanity in the Age of Reason 
(London: Routledge, 1997), p. 278. 
3 For example, one of the reasons why Lacan was expulsed from the International Psychoanalytic 
Society lies in his proposal to do away with the 50 minute time-frame for therapeutic sessions. 
See Jacques Lacan, "Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis" in Alan 
Sheridan (ed. ), Ecrits: A Selection (London: Tavistock, 1977) and Elizabeth Roudinesco, Jacques 
Lacan (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). 
4 See "Pratica dell'inconscio e movimento delle donne" in Lea Melandri, Una visceralit'i 
indicibile (Milan: Franco Angeli Edizioni, 2000), pp. 186-197. 
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thus remain evident. The aim of a relationship of entrustment is to identify and 
define the precise desire which the entrustee aims at expressing socially. In 
addition, the point behind the social-symbolic practice of entrustment is also to 
create a symbolic order by socially re-enacting the pre-oedipal relationship with 
the mother, in order to give it an actual force. This brings us to a discussion of 
transference, central to psychoanalytic therapy. In transference, the desires and 
affects linked to a particular relationship belonging to the past of the patient are 
5 revived and transferred onto the analyst . This is the point of psychoanalytic 
therapy - to re-invoke past relationships in order to identify the desires and 
affects buried behind them. The process of transference is precisely encouraged 
by the analyst's silence, apparent passivity which Foucault describes in the above 
quotation. Could we argue that transference is the aim behind the relationship of 
entrustment? In that case, is the relationship re-enacted in entrustment that which 
links a daughter to her real mother and shows the desires behind it? What is the 
connection between transference, entrustment and Luisa Muraro's invitation, 
discussed in Chapter IV, to transform all the affects and emotions linked to the 
relationship with our real mother in a matter for reflection and knowledge? 
Entrustment theorists never address these questions explicitly. However, it 
seems that the transference which could occur in a relationship of entrustment is 
only temporary, a sort of preliminary stage which is meant to be transcended. 
One evident objection to the proposal of entrustment is given by the fact that 
many women have difficult contacts with their mother and would strongly reject 
the proposition to re-live, even if symbolically, such a relationship. 6 This 
7 
objection is acknowledged by entrustment theorists. However, they contend that 
the mother we hate is the oedipal mother. She is the mother who serves the 
existing symbolic order and whom we judge by adopting phallic parameters. She 
is the one whom the daughter blames for not having given her a penis, or, in 
5 Sigmund Freud, "Fragments of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria" (London: Freud Penguin 
Library, Vol. 8,1977), pp. 157-158. 
6 As we shall see shortly, there exists in Italy, a feminist vision of the mother-daughter 
relationship as one of irreconcilable conflict. See in particular Silvia Vegetti Finzi, Il 
bambino 
della notte. Divenire donna, divenire madre (Milan: Mondadori, 1990). Lea Melandn also 
questions the undisputed benefits of reviving the mother-daughter relationship 
by fostering 
relationships between women. See Lea Melandri, Una visceralitii indiscibile, op. cit., p. 
125. We 
will come back to Vegetti Finzi and Melandri's critiques shortly. 
7 For example, see Luisa Muraro, "L'orientamento della riconoscenza" in Diot1ma, Il cielo 
stellato dentro di noi, or L 
'ordine simbolico della madre (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1992), ch. 1. 
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more Lacanian terms, the one whom we reproach for giving us biological but not 
symbolic life. 8 A relationship of entrustment thus allows all of these affects to be 
put into words. Presumably, thanks to the mechanism of transference, the 
relationship with the affidataria would remind the entrustee of her link to her 
own mother. The affidataria's role would thus be to encourage the process of 
transference in order to identify, in the entrustee's speech, the affects that are 
linked to her ancient relationship with the mother. It is in that sense that we must 
perhaps understand Muraro's request to "narrate the mother" ["raccontare la 
madre"] in order to "love her". 9 
Therefore, the disparity between entrustee and affidataria should be used 
positively to trigger the mechanism of transference. The transference from the 
real mother to the affi'dataria could thus be seen as a way of re-presenting, 
rethinking, re-symbolising the relationship with the mother, away from the 
masculine frame of reference. The entrustee would then become conscious that 
her difficulties with her real mother are due to a patriarchal symbolic which 
opposes the figure of the mother to the subject's symbolic independence. Once 
this coming to consciousness occurs, the aim of the relationship would be to 
consider the work of the pre-oedipal mother and to try and re-instate the 
symbolic link between mother and daughter via a system of dialogical 
relationships between disparate women. 
Affidataria, real mother and Symbolic Mother. 
There is however a difficulty in considering the relationship of entrustment 
as one of transference. If transference is the aim of entrustment, then the 
affidataria temporarily takes on the place of the real mother. She would hence be 
in a position of extreme power in relation to the entrustee: like the real mother of 
our life, she could demand from her daughter obedience to her dictates. Some 
commentators have expressed their doubts about the possibility of dissociating 
the pre-oedipal from the phallic mother. They have thus seen in entrustment a 
problematic return to the mother who has fitted in the existing symbolic, the 
8 on this point, see Alessandra Bocchettl's dialogue witb Luisa Muraro in "Vincere cosa, vincere 
cosa: la nostra questione con il potere", in A. Bocchetti, 
Che vuole una donna? (Milan: La 
Tartaruga, 1991), esp. pp. 105-107. 
188 
glorified mamma, whom the strong Catholic imaginary has nourished over the 
years, and who sustains patriarchal society as bearer and transmitter of 
patriarchal norms. 10 Conversely, Angela Putino, an active member of the Centre 
Virginia Wooýf B and of Diotima, has recently expressed her fears that il 
pensiero's emphasis on the matemal order, on the mother's adequate response to 
the daughter's exigencies, on dependency and on disparity might renew the 
social view of women as primary carers. 11 Similarly, Teresa de Lauretis views 
the emphasis on the figure of the mother (even when symbolic) as a dangerous 
return to the association between feminine sexuality and maternity on the one 
hand, and between feminine identity and motherhood on the other., 2 We shall 
return to the feminine subject that entrustment and il pensiero call forth in 
Section 11 of this chapter. 
For the moment, I will contend that, in view of these risks, we have to 
think of transference not only as one important aspect of the relationship of 
entrustment, but also as a stage to be transcended. I suggest that this is the central 
reason why entrustment theorists have repeatedly tried to distinguish between the 
real mother, the affidataria and the Symbolic Mother. This mistaken confusion 
has often led to the theoretical dismissal of the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment. For example, in the context of her more general discussion of 
Irigaray's interpretation of Antigone, Christine Battersby refers to entrustment as 
a "harmful practice". 13 She argues that entrustment "has led to political practices 
structured around the need to choose (and obey) a symbolic mother who is not 
one5s natural mother". 14 As we have seen in Chapter IV, entrustment does not 
aim at substituting the real mother with another woman. As Muraro expresses it, 
the use of the mother is here symbolic and not metaphorical. Contrary to 
Battersby's reading, the Symbolic Mother is not and cannot be the affidataria 
either, since the Symbolic Mother does not refer to a flesh-and-blood woman, but 
9 Luisa Muraro, "L'orientamento della riconoscenza", op. cit., p. 16. 
10 See Grazia Zuffa, "Tra libertA e necessitA. A proposIto d' Non credere di avere dei diritti", op. 
cit. and Luisa Accati, "Explicit Meanings: Catholicism, Matriarchy and the Distinctive Problems 
of Italian Feminism" in Gender and History, 7 (1995): 241-259. 
11 Angela Putino, Amiche Mie Isteriche (Naples: Cronopio, 1998), p. 67. 
12 Teresa de Lauretis, The Practice ofLove. - Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 198. 
13 Christine Battersby, The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of 
Identity, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 1 19. 
14 ibid., p-1 19. 
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to a dialogical and significant relationship between two women who, together, 
represent reality in accordance with their shared experience of it. The Symbolic 
Mother is thus a figure of linguistic exchange between women, aimed at 
signifying feminine sexual difference socially. 
However, I believe that Battersby's erroneous interpretation is indicative of 
an implicit oscillation at the heart of il pensiero, della difference sessuale. This 
oscillation itself relates to the difficulty in keeping the affidataria, real mother 
and Symbolic Mother confined to their respective functions. While all 
entrustment and il pensiero theorists reject the incarnation of the Symbolic 
Mother in any specific woman, there seems to be two distinct conceptualisations 
of the relationships between affidataria, real and Symbolic Mother. On the one 
hand are those entrustment theorists who, like Lia Cigarini and Ida Dominijanni, 
envisage the Symbolic Mother as transcending the real mother. On the other 
hand are those who, following Luisa Muraro, and Diotima, insist on the symbolic 
importance given to the gratitude for one's real mother. As seen above, Muraro 
insists on the necessity to transforni our relationship with our real mother into a 
source of knowledge, thus expressing our love and gratitude to the woman who 
has given us both life and language. What both positions express in a slightly 
different way, is a concern for the potential incarnation of the Symbolic Mother 
into the a dataria thus enabling an abuse of power on the part of the latter. I 
would thus argue that, in effect, entrustment and il pensiero theorists share 
Christine Battersby's concerns. The first group prevents such an incarnation by 
stressing that the symbolic debt must be paid publicly to a particular woman who 
is not one's mother but who has helped the entrustee carry out a specific desire 
attached to a given context. 15 The second position seeks to prevent the confusion 
between affidataria and Symbolic Mother by interposing the real mother 
between the Symbolic Mother and the affidataria, and by stressing that the debt 
must be paid primarily to the real mother. ' 6 
This slight fluctuation explains why entrustment and il pensiero theorists 
have been attacked, by different critics, from opposite directions. As seen above, 
some have rejected entrustment on the basis that it puts too much emphasis on 
" Ida Dommijanni, "D desiderio di politica" in Lia Cigarim, La politica del desiderio (Parma: 
Pratiche Editrice, 1995), pp. 15-16. 
16 Anna Maria Piussi, "Era ]A dall'inizio" in Diotima, Il cielo stellato dentro di noi, op. cit., p. 30. 
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the real mother and on her role within the existing social order. Others have 
expressed their dislike for entrustment on the basis that it ignores the mother. We 
will now approach this second critical position by concentrating on the 
mechanism of counter-transference. 
2. Entrustment, counter-transference and the imaginary. 
If transference could be implied in a relationship of entrustment as a 
preliminary step towards the establishment of a female symbolic (by reflecting 
on our relationship with the real mother), a consideration of counter-transference 
seems to be lacking. In psychoanalysis, counter-transference refers to the desires 
and affects aroused, this time, in the psychoanalyst, by the relationship he has 
with his patient. Laplanche and Pontalis' definition is more precise; counter- 
transference is "Tbe whole of the analyst's unconscious reactions to the 
individual analysand - especially to the analysand's own transference.,, 17 'what 
of counter-transference in the relationship of entrustment? What are the effects 
that entrustment has on the affidataria herselP Entrustment theorists seem to 
ignore these questions. Let us examine the reasons for and the consequences of 
such a blind spot. 
If, thanks to transference, some of the fantasies that the entrustee has 
towards her real mother have space to resurface within entrustment, the fantasies 
brought by the affidataria when entering a relationship with another woman 
remain dangerously unexamined. What motivates a woman to pose as an 
affidataria? Is it always a feminist desire to participate in the construction of a 
maternal symbolic? Is mere goodwill a factor? Or is it pride, flattery, and worse, 
a taste for the exercise of power? Or is it an unconscious desire to conform to her 
patriarchal role as primary carer? One could also ask how, in an entrusting 
17 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: 
Hogarth, 1973), p. 92. In Freudian psychoanalysis, counter-transference is viewed as threatening 
the good functioning of an analytic therapy since it jeopardises the analyst's objective 
interpretation of the patient's transference. For a discussion of counter-transference as analysed 
by the different schools of psychoanalysis, see Stephen Frosh, The Politics of Psychoanalysis 
(London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 300-303. For Lacan's own analysis of transference and counter- 
transference in the reference to the case of Dora, see his "Intervention on Transference", in Juliet 
Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (eds. ), Feminine sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the Ecole 
Freudienne (London: MacMillan, 1982). 
191 
relationship through which she gains recognition, is the affidataria changed? All 
these questions are related to counter-transference. To my knowledge, the 
accusation of ignoring counter-transference has never been made to entrustment 
theorists either from theorists working within or without the contextual frame of 
"Italian feminism". 
However, a similar kind of concern has been voiced by Teresa de Lauretis 
and other feminists working within the geographical frame of Italian feminism. 
They have accused entrustment theorists of paying too much attention to the 
symbolic at the expense of the imaginary. 18 In Chapter 11, we have noted how, 
for Irigaray, the symbolic and the imaginary are reciprocally determined. 
Therefore, one could ask, with Teresa de Lauretis "which phantasies or phantoms 
does the symbolic order of the mother generate? And, conversely, what 
imaginary gives rise to the notion of a symbolic or feminist mother? ". 19 
A few Italian feminists working within the Centro Documentazione Donna 
di Firenze [Florence Women's Research Centre] have tried to address the 
importance of the imaginary and its role in determining the syrnbolic order. 
While still stressing feminine sexual difference, the link between practice and 
theory, the political viability of practising relationships between women, and the 
important figure of the mother, these feminists have retained the Lacanian 
distinction between the three registers of the Real, the Imaginary and the 
Symbolic to account for women's acquisition of subjectivity and sexuality. They 
have tried to redirect their research towards an analysis of the body, sexuality, 
the actual mother-daughter relationship. 20 Hence the Centro Documentazione 
Donna di Firenze have criticised entrustment theorists for failing to analyse the 
images and phantasies which inform the real mother-daughter relationship and 
for ignoring the corporeal experience of motherhood and of the maternal body. 
For example, Silvia Vegetti-Finzi, an influential psychanalyst involved in 
the activities of the Firenze Centre, has retrieved the notion of "the child of the 
18 Teresa de Lauretis, "The Essence of the Triangle or, Taking the Risk of Essentialism Seriously: 
Feminist Theory in Italy, the U. S., and Britain" in Differences I (Summer 1989): 3 1. 
19 Teresa de Lauretis, The Practice ofLove, op. cit., p. 18 1. 
20 For example, see 11 Centro Documentazione Donna d' Firenze, Verso il luogo delle origini 
(Milan: La Tartaruga, 1992). Silvia Vegetti Finzi and Lea Melandri are members of the Florence 
Women's Research Centre. Although they have criticised entrustment and il pensiero theorists, 
the members of the Centro Documentazione Donna di Firenze have acknowledged the influence 
that the Libreria delle Donne di Milano or the Centro Virginia Woolf B have had on their 
research project. See Verso il luogo delle origini, op. cit. , p. 9. 
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night" ("il bambino della notte") from the clinical observation of little girls. The 
("child of the night" designates an image of a parthenogenic child, firmly 
anchored in the little girl's unconscious. She subverts the Freudian account of the 
penis envy: the little girl primarily perceives her body as a place of fullness and 
satisfaction, not as lack. Vegetti-Finzi considers the existence of that 
parthenogenic image as an evidence of a repressed maternal pulsion which would 
precede sexual desire, and which would not involve the existence of a sexual 
partner or of a reproductive act .21 The maternal pulsion thus ignores social 
interraction. However, the phantasies linked to this matemal pulsion are not 
allowed social expression. It is a forbidden desire that the little girl should 
renounce to fit in the norms of a society organised around masculine desire and 
body. The matemal phantasies are thus repressed and manifest themselves only 
through dreams, games, day-dreaming and pathological symptoms. This has 
devastating consequences for the little girl's access to subjectivity. First of all, 
the little girl is forced to turn to the masculine body to find an acceppted form of 
fullness. It is only then that the little girl experiences her own body as lacking. 22 
Secondly, woman's relationship to her own body is changed in such a way that 
her creative capacities (biological reproduction and intellectual production) are 
downgraded. Finally, woman's relationship to her reproductive and productive 
capacities is now mediated by a masculine imaginary so that woman is defined in 
relation to man. 
23 
Like entrustment and il pensiero theorists, Vegetti Finzi and the other 
members of the Firenze group, seek to retrieve feminine specificity from an 
invasion of the masculine norms. However, for the Centro Documentazione 
Donna, this is solely possible by trying to analyse the repressed feminine 
imaginary which links feminine sexual desire to the maternal body and which 
escapes representation. Thus, the members of the Firenze Centre concentrate on a 
series figures (mythical characters such as Medusa or psychoanalytic figures 
such as hysteric or the little girl). Alongside psychoanalysis, women's literature 
is a great resource for such a research. Lea Melandri, who conducts courses at the 
Libera Universitti delle Donne (Free University of Women) in Milan, is at the 
21 1111 Silvia Vegetti-Finzi, "Archeologia dell'immaginano femminile" in Centro Documentazione 
Donna di Firenze, Verso il luogo delle origini (Milan: la Tartaruga, 1992), p. 20. 
22 ibid., p. 22. 
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forefront of this attempt to express women's corporeal experiences through 
autobiography as well as creative and critical writing. 24 
Vegetti Finzi's efforts to locate the origin of sexual difference in 
motherhood is not shared by entrustment or ilpensiero theorists. On the contrary, 
the concept of "matemal continuum" stresses the identity of women as 
daughters. However, the work on the imaginary carried out by Vegetti Finzi and 
the other members of the Firenze Centre can be used to support my own 
reservation towards some aspects of the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. 
Since the imaginary and the mechanism of counter-transference are not analysed 
sufficiently, the healthy functioning of a relationship of entrustment is predicated 
on a transparency between affidataria and entrustee. In many cases, such 
transparency might be difficult to achieve or uphold. The members of the 
Libreria delle Donne di Milano and those of Diotima, some of whom have 
presumably been chosen as affidatarie, have themselves often been accused of 
authoritarianism, elitism and prevarication. 25 They have also been seen as 
imposing a "necessary and thus obligatory" practice of female symbolic 
mediation. 26 As Lois McNay has argued in relation to Habermasian discourse 
ethics and the account of intersubjectivity supporting it, such a level of 
transparency is attained firstly by ignoring psychic blockages (in our case, that of 
the affidataria in entrustment). This, explains McNay, leads to "anodyne notions 
of subjectivity" and a "sanitized view of gender subjectivity and agency [ ... ] 
based on respect and equality which suppress the irrational and often negative 
contents of identity. , 27 It is also in the name of transparency that such theories 
further ignore the influence that other structural elements will have on 
23 ibid., p. 29. 
24 Giorgio, "Mothers and Daughters in Italian Feminism: An Overview" in Anna Bull, Hanna 
Diamond and Rosalind Marsh (eds. ), Feminisms and Women's Movements in Contemporary 
Europe (London: MacMillan, 2000), p. 189. 
2' For example, see the pamphlet by Laura Lepetit, et al., Una libreria e suoi doni. Lettera aperta 
alla Libreria delle Donne di Milano (Milan: 1987): 3-6. The internal conflicts of authority are 
also analysed in Lucia Re, "Feminist Thought in Italy: Sexual Difference and the Question of 
Authority", Michigan Romance Studies 16 (1996): 61-86. 
26 See the aforementioned article by Grazia Zuffa who nostalgically looks back at the "'free' 
feminist politics" of the autocoscienza age and rejects the "necessary and thus obligatory" 
practice of female symbolic mediation (p. 52). It is also the compulsory politics of mediation 
structured around the symbolic order of the mother that Angela Putino contests in Amiche mie 
isteriche, op. cit., p. 8. In my interview (Warwick, 18.05.2004), Adriana Cavarero has equally 
mentioned the lack of open-mindedness as a reason for leaving the Diotima community. 
27 Lois McNay, Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 12. 
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relationships such as entrustment. Let us now turn to examine the precise 
objections made to entrustment theorists in relation to these structural elements. 28 
Entrustment and "La carta delle donne ". 
Entrustment theorists have faced the accusation that the "something extra" 
that the affidataria demonstrates socially can take the habit of class, age, social 
position, level of education, professional status, income or even magnetic or 
charismatic personality. If left untheorised, the "something extra" displayed by 
the affidataria could become a mere reflection of power relations and 
entrustment could become a conservative and adaptive social-symbolic practice. 
In Italy, this type of criticism has emanated from two sources: Marxist and 
Lesbian feminists. It could have equally come from ethnic minorities had Italy 
been sufficiently multicultural at the time of the elaboration of entrustment. 29 
Marxist feminists have typically accused entrustment theorists of elitism and a 
bourgeois class bias. 30 However, a group of communist women active in the 
P. C. 1 became extremely interested in the potential of the practice of entrustment 
and tried to apply it to their political party. In 1986, Livia Turco, Rossana 
Rossanda, and Maria Luisa Boccia issued a document called the "Women's 
Charter" ("La carta delle donne") .31 At the time of 
its publication, the "Women's 
Charter" seemed to ally feminists, communist women, the female electorate, and 
even some communist men (including the future secretary of the Party, Achille 
Occhetto). The "Women's Charter" urged women to be communist and feminist 
at the same time, and requested both equality for women within the party and the 
28 ibid, p. 12. 
29 Race is surely an issue that entrustment and ilpensiero, theorists will have to face in the coming 
years, now that Italy is no longer a land of emigration but one of immigration. Asylum seekers 
and illegal workers, mainly from North Africa and Eastern Europe, are rapidly increasing in 
number, and such a change of circumstances will certainly influence the development of 
feminism in Italy. The question of the relationships between Western and third-world women is 
slowly starting to be addressed. In October 1993, the Milanese Associazione per una Libera 
Universitii delle Donne [Association for a Free Women's University] organised a two-day event 
on this subject. The conference papers were subsequently published in Luciana Percovich, Franca 
Petromo and Cesarina Damiam (eds. ), Donne del Nord, donne del Sud: Verso una politica della 
relazione tra diversitii, solidarietti e conflitto (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1994). 
30 See for example Chiara Ravajoli, "Contro la mitizzazione della 'diversitA"' in Quaderni 
Piacentini 13 (1984): 63-80. 
31 Partito Comunista. Italiano, "Dalle donne la forza delle donne" (Rome, 1986). Extracts from La 
carta delle donne have been translated and published in Bono and Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist 
Thought: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 340-349. 
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recognition of demands specific to women. The road to such a double 
recognition was thought to be possible only by choosing women candidates who 
were receptive to the question of sexual difference, sensitive to women's desire 
to participate in society, and willing to build a network of communication and 
strong relationships. These women candidates were considered to best represent 
the interests of women. The P. C. Us "Women's Charter" did achieve greater 
political representation for women in the subsequent elections, and even 
occasioned Luce Irigaray's praise. 32 
However, both the Charter and Irigaray's apparent support of it were 
heavily criticised and eventually dismissed by entrustment theorists themselves. 33 
Entrustment theorists considered the "Women's Charter" as a simplified and 
misleading application of entrustment to the political arena. 34 The project was 
rejected for favouring political parity and women candidates at the expense of 
finding social-symbolic significations of being a woman in society. Parity is 
indeed diametrically opposed to entrustment which holds that women are not a 
class or not even a compact interest group and cannot therefore be represented in 
a traditional sense of the word. 35 In addition, the Charter still upheld liberal rights 
as the answer to women's disadvantaged position in society, and put loyalty to 
the party before being a woman in society. Finally, the Charter was written by 
women who often conceived the political as the realm of political parties, 
institutional procedures, economics, and mass mobilisation, rather than as a 
sphere of significant relationships between women. 36 
32 95 women (65 of whom were communist candidates) were elected as members of parliament 
(the total numbers of members of parliament is, in Italy, 945). For a historical account of the 
vicissitudes and of the political destiny of the "Women's Charter", see Chiara Valentini, Le 
donnefanno paura: la veritti sulla vita delle italiane (Milan: 11 Saggiatore, 1997), pp. 49-50. For 
her praise, see the opening paragraph of Irigaray's foreword to the French edition of Le temps de 
la diffiýrence (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 1989), p. 7. 
33 For a critique of Irigaray's endorsement of the "Women's Charter", see Alessandra Bocchetti, 
"Lettera per Luce Irigaray" in Che vuole una donna?, op. cit. 
34 On the criticism of La Carta, see Lia Cigarini, La politica del desiderio, op. cit., pp. 100- 107, 
155-156; A. Bocchetti, "Dove va il PCIT' in Che vuole una donna?, op. cit.. On the critique of 
political representation, see A. Cavarero, "L'ordine dell'uno non 6 l'ordme del due" in Maria 
Luisa Boccia and Isabella Perretti (ed. ), Il genere della rappresentanza (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 
1987). 
35 This is the point made by Adriana Cavarero in "L'ordine dell'uno non ý l'ordine del due", op. 
cit. 
36 A good example of such a conception is to be found in a major communist figure of Italian 
political life, namely Rossana Rossanda. For example, see her "Politica: significati e progetti. Le 
diverse strade delle Carta e dell'affidamento" in Reti: Pratiche e saperi di donne 1 (1987): 39-44. 
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"common world of women " and lesbofemminismo. 
Lesbian theorists have also objected to entrustment on the account that the 
affidataria and entrustee might carry the heterosexual bias of the existing 
society. 37 The lesbian critique of "More Women Than Men" has been strong 
enough for some entrustment theorists to predict the imminent advent of a 
"double movement". 38 In Italy, lesbian feminism ('Vesbofemminismo ") arose as a 
distinctive trend of the women's movement, at the beginning of the 1980s, thanks 
to the efforts of some feminists who felt that their lesbian difference was being 
ignored within women's groups. 39 
The creation of the Italian Lesbian Union (Comitato Lesbico Italiano) thus 
marks the formation of a lesbian line in the debate on sexual difference. It is this 
line which opposes the social-symbolic practice of entrustment for upholding the 
ambiguity of heterosexual society. Firstly, entrustment theorists are criticised for 
using Adrienne Rich's work without mentioning the fact that she is a lesbian 
40 
theorist . More importantly, entrustment theorists are accused of turning a blind 
eye to the homosexual implications of creating a "common world of women". 
Thirdly, entrustment is said to ignore important questions such as the specificity 
of lesbian identity in relation to woman's identity as well as the relationship 
between a collective lesbian identity and a heterosexual feminist one. 41 
Lesbofemministe contend that entrustment theorists' silence regarding an erotic 
definition of sexual difference amounts to an implicit homophobia. 42 For 
37 Some commentators have objected to the social-symbolic practice of entrustment on the 
grounds that it refuses mixed social relations and therefore amounts to "homosexual 
fundamentalism". On this point, see Grazia Zuffa, "Tra l1bertA e necessitA. A proposito di Non 
credere di avere dei diritti", op. cit. 
38 Ida Dominijanni, "Doppio movimento" in Donna WomanFemme, 4, (1986): 25. 
39 Although the Italian Lesbian Union (Comitato Lesbico Italiano) was only created in 1982, 
lesbian women have always been active within Italian feminism, especially within il pensiero 
della differenza sessuale. For a history of lesbian activism and its relation to the women's 
movement up to the 1980s, see, Bianca Pomeranzi, "Differenza lesbica e lesbofemminismo" in 
Memoria 13 (1985): 72-78. This essay has been translated in English as "A Survey: Lesbian 
Difference and Lesbian Feminism" in Bono and Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., 
pp. 162-169. See also Rossana Fiocchetto, L'amante celeste: la distruzione scientiflica della 
lesbica (Rome: Estro, 1987). 
40 "Our Common World" (Felina Editrice, 1983), mentioned by Bianca Pomeranzi, in Bono and 
Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., p. 168. 
41 Raffaella, "More Silences than Lies", and Sandra, "Suggestion from Irigaray" in Bono and 
Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought: A Reader, op. cit., p. 172 and pp. 178-180. 
42 On the call for an erotic definition of sexual difference, and on the homophobic practice within 
the Libreria, see Rossanna Fiochetto, "Quattro luoghi comum" in Squaderno, I (June 1989): 5-9. 
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separatist lesbians, a compulsory heterosexuality is thus at the basis of the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment. The problem of betero sexuality, as imposed by 
men's desire and values, is never challenged or even approached. As a result, 
entrustment imposes a new type of universality on women, one which has 
resulted, for lesbians in "the non belonging to oneself as well as others", and in 
"the loss of identity and of community"43 . 
There is certainly no attention to the lesbian imaginary that relationships of 
entrustment might foster, and this, lesbofemministe contend, results in an 
impoverished analysis. Some lesbian theorists, such as Simonetta Spinelli, have 
argued for this lacunae to be filled by "coming out" in order to show the potential 
of lesbianism as a critique of patriarchal society and as a position from which to 
theorise a specifically lesbian feminist identity. 44 
3. The power/authority dichotomy: 
Why, then, do entrustment theorists, concentrate solely upon an analysis of 
the position occupied by the entrustee? Why are the unconscious motives and the 
changes in the affidataria left aside? Entrustment theorists would probably 
answer this question by stressing that it is the entrustee, and not the affidataria, 
who chooses to enter a relationship of entrustment; that it is she who is motivated 
by a desire for which she can find no social expression; and that it is she who 
needs assistance. The affidataria, we are told, has already found ways of socially 
signifying the fact that she is a woman, and this is the precise reason for which 
she is chosen. However, I propose an additional explanation as to why 
entrustment theorists seem to have bracketed the problems of counter- 
transference and of the imaginary content of relationships of entrustment. I 
contend that avoiding counter-transference might be a way for entrustment 
theorists to elude the pressing question of power within entrustment and within 
relationships between women in general. 
Some commentators sympathetic to the Libreria admit this silence: see Ida Dominijanni, "Doppio 
Movimento", op. cit., p. 25. 
43 Simonetta Spinelli, "Il silenzio & perdita" in Donna WomanFemme 4 (1986): 52. 
44ibid, p. 52. 
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In order to proceed from our discussion of transference and counter- 
transference in a relationship of entrustment, I will begin with a psychoanalytic 
definition of power. As Stephen Frosh points out, in the context of the 
psychoanalytic relationship, "power refers to the forces by which structures of an 
individual's subjectivity are produced. " Power is conceived both in positive 
terms (as an enabling process which produces and organises experience), and in 
negative ones (as something repressive which contains actions and desires). 45 In 
political theory, power is an essentially contested concept which has also been 
theorised in pejorative and in positive terms. In the context of the "Community- 
Power debate" for example, Stephen Lukes has analysed the three-dimensions 
that the conception of power as conflict can take: the dimensions of decision- 
making, of non-decision-making and of interest- shaping. 46 Other theorists such 
as Hannah Arendt have linked power with the more positive capacity to come 
together in order to reach a consensus, and to act in concert. 47 Michel Foucault, 
for his part, has theorised power in both repressive and productive terms. In 
Foucault, power is fluid, beyond the individual, the group and social structures. It 
"is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are 
endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation 
in a particular society. "48 Let us briefly return to examine the relationship 
between entrustment, i1pensiero and these different conceptions of power. 
As seen in Chapter IV, the re-examination of power and authority by il 
pensiero theorists occurs towards the end of the 1980s. The critique of power 
taken by i1pensiero from Carla Lonzi, is viewed as problematic since it portrays 
women as the helpless victims of male domination, therefore limiting their 
prospect for liberation. Entrustment and il pensiero theorists face the task of 
retrieving a positive conception of power so as to stress that where there is 
power, there is also potential for resistance. In Foucauldian terms: "power is 
exercised only over free subjects, and only in so far as they are free. , 
49 
45 Stephen Frosh, The Politics ofPsychoanalysis (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 271. 
46 Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1978). For a formulation of each 
dimension, see pp. 15,16,27. 
47 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969), p. 44. See also 
"What Is Authority? " in Between Past and Present (New York: Penguin Books, 1977). 
48 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1978), 
p. 93. 
49 Foucault, "The Subject and Power", op cit., p. 22 1. 
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This is how entrustment theorists develop a positive sense of authority that 
we have analysed in Chapter IV. To sum it up briefly, authority is linked to the 
symbolic dimension of language. It is not the possession of an individual but 
only exists in a dialogical relationships between women. It arises every time two 
women enter in a signifying relationship and interpret the world in accordance to 
their shared experience of it. Authority is linked to becoming a subject, an actor 
in a position of enunciation. It refers to the capacity to act and speak in the world 
independently of the male frame of reference and is thus conducive to what 
entrustment theorists call "female freedom". Authority is solely legitimate since 
women choose to enter entrusting relationships, and actively select a particular 
affidataria. 
This vision of authority thus corresponds to the "enabling process which 
produces and organises experience" mentioned above, in the psychoanalytic 
definition of power. In addition, the representation of authority as a capacity to 
act and speak in concert with another woman has Arendtian resonance. 50 One can 
equally find echoes of Foucault in i1pensiero's conceptualisation of authority as 
relational, fluid (that is, constantly arising and disappearing), and observable at a 
microphysical level. As we shall later see, entrustment is also about the 
(conscious) re-appropriation and re- signification of (masculine) norms. 
We will recall from Chapter IV that this type of authority is then contrasted 
to power. Entrustment theorists theorise power as conflictual, imposed from 
outside and aimed at keeping the status quo. It is related to the male political 
sphere, and features the Lukesian three-dimensionality mentioned above. 
Institutional politics is seen as the battlefield for the acquisition of instrumental 
and oppressive power. The negative, repressive side of power, that which 
delimits actions and desires, or at least governs their production and expression, 
is visible only outside relationships between women. However, I have argued 
that this forrn of power may be displayed through the mechanism of counter- 
50 Several articles from the collection on authority published by Diotima deal with Hannah 
Arendt. See Diana Sartori, "Dare authoritA, fare ordine" in Diotima, Il cielo stellato dentro di noi, 
op. cit, pp. 123-162. See also Diana Sartori, " 'Tu devi': un ordine materno", in Diotima, Oltre 
l'uguaglianza. Le radicifemminili dell'autorhi (Naples: Liguon Editori, 1995), pp. 5-29, Chiara 
Zambom, "Ordine Simbollco, ordine sociale" in Diotima, Oltre l'uguaglianza., op. cit., pp. 42-43, 
and Luisa Muraro, "AutoritA senza monumenti" in Per amore del mondo 1 (27 February 2004), 
periodical of the philosophical community of Diotima, available online at 
www. Diotimafilosofe. it/riv - 
online. php. As we shall see in the last chapter of this thesis, Hannah 
Arendt has also had a great influence on Adnana Cavarero. 
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transference, where the affidataria can bear the patriarchal, sexist or classist 
non-ns of society. 
The splitting of the concept of power into a positive and a negative forin is 
not, in itself, theoretically restrictive. As we have seen above, power is multi- 
dimensional. What is harmful for the credibility of the social-symbolic practice 
of entrustment, is the construction of a sharp distinction between the positive 
aspects of power (the pole of "authority" and entrustment) and the negative ones 
(the pole of power proper to patriarchy). The analysis of power thus becomes 
somewhat limited. As a result, the study of relationships between women (which 
are governed by authority) and that of patriarchy (where power thrives) look 
inherently biased. Firstly, the good functioning of such relationships seems to 
rely on an over-optimistic view of women. 51 Secondly, patriarchy becomes a 
"closed system". 52 where power related to race, class, history, sexuality and 
upbringing is contained and does not affect relationships between women. 
Relationships between women are presented as a haven of transparency and 
goodwill. This tendency, if reinforced by Irigaray's influence on Italian 
ferninism, has got its own domestic history. In chapter 111, we have indeed 
developed a similar critique in relation to Lonzi's attitude to power. 
In addition, the simplistic antithesis set up between authority and power 
triggers other dichotomous oppositions. For example, there is the "common 
world of women" vs. patriarchy. In the previous chapter we have also revealed 
the difference, in Italian feminism, between "rappresentanza" (the political 
representation of the traditional political system) and "rappresentazione" (the 
social "acting out" of sexual difference) which refers to the schism between 
women's politics ("politica delle donne") and traditional politics. 53 There would 
thus be the order of sexual difference on the one hand, and the political order on 
51 Christine Battersby links this tendency to Ingaray's own sentimental i sing of relationships 
between women, even when unequal power relations exist between them. See Battersby, The 
Phenomenal Woman, op. cit., p. 119. 
52 ibid., p. 119. 
53 This schism often appears under different terms: those of "immediate politics" ('Politica 
immediata ") and "instrumental politics" ('ýpolitica strumentale "). The term "Immediate politics" 
refers to the will of entrustment theorists to tie theory to practice and to act on present reality. It is 
contrasted to "instrumental politics", which refers to the strategy of acquiring rights for the 
future 
improvement of woman's socio-political condition. On the two types of politics, see Ida 
Domminijanni, "D desiderio di politica", op. cit., pp. 25-33 in particular; Luisa Muraro and Lia 
Cigarini, "Politica strumentale, politica diretta" in Lia Cigarim, Lapolitica del desiderio, op. cit., 
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the other. This series of dichotomies could be criticised on a number of counts. 
Firstly, such dualisms may create inadvertently a new form of separatism, when 
it was precisely the critique of "static separatism" which gave rise to entrustment 
and to il pensiero (as seen in Chapters III and IV). Secondly, they could be used 
(as it indeed has been within Italian feminism) to contend that i1pensiero simply 
re-introduces and re-affinns the dichotomies upheld by the existing symbolic 
which it seeks to criticise. 
54 
Entrustment theorists have contested these charges of renewed separatism. 
Rather than emphasising a parallel world of feminine values, they have stressed 
that feminist political practice must go beyond institutional politics since the 
latter is built on a masculine norm which does not recognise feminine sexual 
difference. Ida Dominijanni explains that the order of sexual difference and the 
political order are not antithetical but are rather asymmetrical: the order of sexual 
55 difference contaminates and reshapes the order of the political. We will come 
back to this point in the second section of this chapter. For the moment, I wish to 
stress that this re-shaping also calls for an analysis of the way in which the order 
of masculine politics and of repressive power might contaminate the order of 
women's relationship and of symbolic authority. 
If disparity constitutes the originality of entrustment, it also remains the 
most dangerous of its aspects. It may certainly be partly justified by its capacity 
to trigger the temporary and necessary mechanism of transference, and partly by 
the transitive nature of the "something extra". However, if insufficient attention 
is paid to counter-transference and to the workings of the imaginary in entrusting 
relationships, power may be permitted to creep back in. In the relationship which 
links her to the entrustee, it is conceivable that the affi'dataria may reproduce 
power relations already at work in the existing symbolic order. 
Such an analysis of authority allows entrustment theorists to conceptualise 
relationships between women as outside the masculine frame of reference, 
transparent and protected from an invasion of external social norms. In this way, 
entrustment and il pensiero theorists avoid accounting for power relationships 
within the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. In Chapter VI, we will see 
pp. 223-228, Glona Buffa, "La storia non si ripete" in II Manifesto (2/6/1995), and Letizia 
Paolozzi, "Tagliare i ponti fra due politiche? " in II Manifesto (27/6/1995). 
54 See for example, Lea Melandri, Una visceralitii indiscibile, op. cit., p. 125. 
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how Cavarero retains some aspects of this normative description of the positive 
relationships between women. But for the moment, we will turn to analyse a 
second source of criticism: the notion of subjectivity which sustains the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment and i1pensiero della differenza sessuale. 
Section 11. Entrustment and the feminine subject: 
In Chapter 1,1 reconstructed a history of Anglophone feminism by 
focussing on the equality vs. difference debate. This reconstruction was not 
aimed at producing a rigid and all-encompassing account of the history of 
feminism in the Anglo-Saxon context. On the contrary, my objective was to 
select the key aspects and thinkers who would subsequently aid me to confirm as 
well as undermine the distance separating Anglo-Saxon from continental 
feminism, and to establish the originality of the Italian position. I chose the 
equality vs. difference debate as the best starting point since this debate barbours 
. other 
important concepts at the centre of my analysis of contemporary Italian 
feminism. I will now return to one of these concepts - that of essentialism. 
In Chapter IV, I have argued that the diffusion of entrustment and of il 
pensiero outside the Italian context has been hindered by early suspicions of 
essentialism. Indeed, in the climate of the late 1980sl when both entrustment and 
il pensiero della differenza sessuale were starting to receive international 
attention, any theory stressing sexual difference, feminine subjectivity or 
feminist political agency tended to be considered with suspicion. Essentialism 
functioned as a gauge which determined the theoretical fate of many works on 
feminism. I believe that Italian feminism was one of the many victims of the 
crusade against essentialism. 56 The fact that entrustment theorists and exponents 
of il pensiero have still not openly confronted these charges of essentialism has 
done nothing to improve the exchange of ideas between Italian and Anglophone 
55 Ida Domminijanii, "D desiderio di politica", op. cit., pp. 29,34. 
56 We have seen that the diffusion of Irigaray's work in the Anglophone context was equally 
hampered by suspicion of essentialism. 
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feminiSMS. 57 Re-opening the question of essentialism is important in order to 
avoid misunderstanding contemporary feminism's attempt to build a maternal 
symbolic. It will allow to draw parallels between Italian feminists and 
Anglophone theorists such as Diana Fuss, Judith Butler and Christine Battersby, 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
Once again, the term "essentialist" requires some qualification. In Chapter 
11,1 defined essentialism loosely, as the belief in an underlying substance, a set of 
fixed and unchanging characteristics defining the "whatness" of things. In the 
case of feminism, it refers to a given set of attributes without which a woman 
would not be a woman. "Essentialism" usually contains several variants or 
"cognates" (biologism, naturalism and universalism). In this second section of 
the chapter, I endeavour to follow Naomi Schor's invitation to "deessentialize 
essentialiSM,, 58 by further distinguishing between three critiques that have - or 
could be - formulated against the feminine subject resulting ftom the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment and from il pensiero. Firstly, I will weigh the 
validity of an egalitarian critique of essentialism by assessing whether the Italian 
theory of sexual difference imprisons the feminine subject in a pre-given 
biological or naturalist essence which serves the perpetuation of patriarchy. 
Secondly, I will address the Lacanian critique of essentialism by considering 
whether il pensiero confines women in a pre-symbolic realm, refuting the 
concept of desire and the decentering of the subject in language. Lastly, I will 
come to what Schor calls the "philosophical critique" and establish whether the 
kind of subjectivity envisaged by entrustment and il pensiero is still enclosed in 
existing dichotomies and "remains prisoner of the metaphysical with its illusions 
of presence, Being, stable meanings and identities. " 59 
57 As we will see in the next chapter, Adnana Cavarero is an exception here. In particular, her 
Relating Narratives (originally published in 1997 and translated in 1999) establishes a dialogue 
with Anglo-American feminism and attempts to confront the charges of essentialism. 
58 Naomi Schor, "This Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips With Ingaray" in 
Differences I (Summer 1989): 40. 
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1. ? nsiero and the egalitarian critique of essentialism. 
Chapters I and 11 have shown how the egalitarian critique of essentialism 
has its feminist origins in Beauvoir's distinction between sex and gender. Anti- 
essentialists, in this context, consider any stress on differences between the sexes 
as a return to a kind of biologism (the stress on women's biological capacities) 
and to naturalism (the emphasis on a fixed nature which does not necessarily 
manifest itself in biological terms). Indeed, essentialism and its cognates have 
always been invoked to justify women's subordinate position in society. Could 
entrustment and il pensiero's stress on sexual difference be translated as a return 
to sex roles? 
The last chapters have made this type of accusation invalid. Following 
Lacan and Irigaray, entrustment and il pensiero theorists understand women's 
alienation and exclusion to be the result of their position (or non-position) within 
the symbolic order, rather than of some biological characteristic or pre- 
determined nature. The seminal essay by Cavarero, which I have referred to at 
length in Chapter IV, provides an initial definition of woman as "the living being 
who has the language of the other", as "the living being who has language in the 
form of self-alienation" or "separateness", as "the Other who thinks herself as the 
other, and in this thinking herself she experiences that separateness of the other 
from the Other. , 60 Cavarero's stress on alienation/separateness, together with 
entrustment theorists' focus on estrangement, are meant to be starting points, not 
indications that there is an authentic core to Woman's nature, one to be found "in 
some improbable era whose sun has set. , 61 
Teresa de Lauretis has defended Italian feminism against this charge of 
essentialism by stressing that Italian feminists historicise women's position. She 
has pointed out that the only type of essentialism that entrustment theorists might 
be guilty of is a form of Lockean nominalism which describes "specific 
properties (e. g. a female sexed body), qualities (a disposition to nurturance, a 
certain relation to the body, etc. ), or necessary attributes (e. g., the experience of 
59 ibid., p. 42. 
60 Adriana Cavarero, "Towards a Theory of Sexual Difference" in P. Bono and S. Kemp (eds. ), 
The Lonely Mirror: Italian Perspectives on Feminist Theory (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 199, 
201,206. 
61 ibid., p. 203. 
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femaleness, of living in the world as a female) that woman have developed or 
have been bound to historically, in their differently patriarchal sociocultural 
contexts, which make them women, and not men. , 62 As seen in Chapter 1, 
Christine Battersby uses a similar strategy in her search for a feminist 
metaphysics. Her starting point is the common positioning of women (what she 
calls the "five features") vis-a-vis the founding metaphysical categories of 
"identity", "self', "substance", "personhood". 63 
It remains nevertheless true that ilpensiero constantly "risks essentialism", 
to borrow de Lauretis' own expression. A parallel could thus be drawn here with 
Diana Fuss' notion of "strategic essentialism". For entrustment and il pensiero, 
the ontological subject Woman or the political subject women are still deemed 
fictitious (since it is the existing symbolic which equalises women in their 
gender, as the "other" of Man). However, it is the common positioning of women 
at the margins of signification which brings women together to devise a social- 
symbolic practice which would signify sexual difference. 64 
In the later texts of entrustment and of i1pensiero, the definition of sexual 
difference manages to challenge the sharp distinction between nature and culture, 
thus between essentialism and constructionism. The point of departure is the 
phenomenological fact that we are born women. This fact clashes with the order 
of representation which denies the signification of the female body (and hence, 
women's historical experience of estrangement). The purpose is to take on the 
task of "signifying [the body], instead of negating its significance merely 
because, thus far, it has been interpreted to [women's] disadvantage. , 65 It could 
be argued that this move is more existentialist than essentialist. We will recall, 
from Chapter IV, the emphasis entrustment theorists place upon action as "the 
social translation of the human value of being a woman". 66 and their definition of 
62 Teresa de Lauretis, "The Essence of the Triangle", op. cit., p. 5 [my emphasis]. 
63 Christine Battersby, The Phenomenal Woman, op. cit., pp. 8-1 1. We will recall that the five 
features are: the conceptual link between the paradigm of woman and a body that births, the 
socialisation of women as primary carers, the impregnation of the self with otherness, the 
connection woman has with a flesh-and-blood body, and the experience of the female as 
anomalous/monstrous. 
64 On this point, see Dominijanni, "I] desiderio di politica", op. cit., p. 24. 
65 Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp, "Introduction: Coming from the South" in Bono and Kemp 
(eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., p. 16. 
66 Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: a Social-Symbolic Practice, op. cit., 
p. 146. 
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freedom as the capacity to express sexual difference in words and actions. 67 
Adalgisa Giorgio similarly points out that i1pensiero stresses process, rather than 
essence, 4(-namely a difference which is constructed and subject to change. , 68 
With the notion of the matemal continuum, having a woman's body is 
supplemented by the fact that we are born women out of a woman's body. This is 
a source of value which women must constantly re-activate (by seeking 
signifying relationships with other women). 
Therefore, the positing of sexual difference as an irreducible difference, 69 
and as a starting point for any notion of female subjectivity is what makes the 
social-symbolic practice of entrustment a feminist practice. In this context, 
"risking essentialism" thus means privileging this irreducible difference as part 
9. )70 of "an ongoing (re)definition of [the] specific difference [of feminism] . In 
Chapter VI, we will see how feminism is no longer the starting point of 
Cavarero's later "politics of uniqueness" but becomes its necessary result. For 
the moment let us turn to a second type of accusation related to essentialism. 
2. Entrustment, il pensiero and the contentious return to the mother. 
As explained in Chapter IV, entrustment's objective is to make feminine 
difference appear in the existing social-symbolic order by re-enacting/re- 
actualising the pre-Oedipal relationship with the mother. For Lacanians, this goal 
is essentialist on at least two counts. Firstly, returning to the pre-Oedipal mother 
contains the risk of locking women outside language and history. Secondly, 
returning to the mother is essentialist because it denies the concept of desire and 
the decentering of the subject in language. We have already encountered these 
67 On this point, see the article by Ida Dominijanni, interestingly entitled "Women, We Are Born. 
Different, We Become". See 1. Dominijanni, "Donna si nasce. Differenti si diventa", 11 
Bimestriale 1, supplement to 11 Manifesto 25: 74-78. 
68 Adalgisa Giorgio, "Mothers and Daughters in Italian Feminism", op. cit., p. 183. 
69 On this point, Cavarero writes: "being engendered in difference is something not negotiable; 
for each one who is born female, it is always already so and not otherwise, rooted in her being, 
not as something superfluous or something more, but as that which she necessarily is: female". 
See Adriana Cavarero, "L'elaborazione filosofica della differenza sessuale" in Maria Cristina 
Marcuzzo and Anna Rossi Doria, La ricerca delle donne: studi femministi in Italia (Turin: 
Rosenberg and Sellier, 1987), pp. 180-18 1. 
70 Teresa de Lauretis, "The Essence of the Triangle", op. cit., p. 13. 
207 
two objections in Chapter 11, when discussing Irigaray's thought. Let us turn to 
examine their validity in the light of entrustment and i1pensiero. 
According to the Lacanian scheme discussed in Chapter 11, symbolising the 
mother-daughter relationship is a theoretical aberration. In particular, the return 
to the pre-oedipal (and thus pre-symbolic) relation between mother and daughter 
as constitutive of an alternative feminine symbolic could indeed trigger 
accusations of restricting women to an archaic form of expression which remains 
erratic and unintelligible. This would more or less confirm the prejudiced view of 
women as hysterics, irrational, closer to dangerous and unruly passions. In the 
light of this accusation, it is not surprising to find, for example, Luisa Muraro 
reclaiming hysteria as a feminist position which opens the way to subjectivity via 
an attachment to the mother .71 Does Muraro and the rest of il pensiero 
della 
differenza sessuale really envisage hysteria as a model for a new feminine 
subjectivity? 
Understanding the nature of this "return" or this "attachment" holds the key 
to counter this first Lacanian accusation of essentialism. It is not a question of 
locating feminine subjectivity in a pre-discursive realm or re-valuing the pre- 
oedipal realm of hysteria as "more authentic". In fact, il pensiero criticises the 
existing symbolic on the grounds that it essentialises women as outside 
language. 72 11 pensiero theorists use the political practice of relationships 
between women to restructure the existing order of representation so that it can 
accommodate sexual difference. This is not an easy task since the only symbolic 
available is that which forecloses the thinking/expression of sexual difference. 
With this in mind, contemporary Italian feminists devise several strategies to 
push the boundaries of the existing symbolic order. These include Diotima's 
feminine realism, Muraro's mimetic re-appropriation of hysteria, her "narration 
of the mother" (all discussed in Chapter IV), or Cavarero's conceptual theft 
(examined in the following chapter). Entrustment was the first of these strategies 
to be elaborated: since the existing symbolic order denies female genealogies and 
differences between women, entrustment theorists practice relationships between 
71 Luisa Muraro, L'ordine simbolico della madre, op. cit., p. 59 [my translation]. For a 
discussion 
of this feminist reclaiming of 
hysteria, see Angela Putino, Amiche mie isteriche, op. cit., ch. 1. 
72This point is also made by Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: 
Feminism, Nature and Difference 
(London: Routledge, 1989), p. 12, and by Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: 
Philosophy in the 
Feminine (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 14. 
208 
women so as to see the destructuring effects these would have on the order of 
representation. It is not so much a question of reproducing, in the present 
relationships between women, a more authentic a priori language buried (one 
might say "forgotten") under the patriarchal one. It is the actual relationships of 
entrustment which create a new language, whose relational forin recalls the 
language spoken with the mother. 
This thesis has repeatedly stressed that there are two levels which 
contemporary Italian feminism wants to preserve and link together: language and 
political practice, or text and context . 
73 Entrustment is a social-symbolic practice. 
It creates a language aimed at being visible socially and at altering political 
reality. Entrustment is in no way a parallel language to be spoken within 
women's separatist groups; it is one which is spoken between women so that 
women can enter a mixed society as subjects. It is this new language which 
makes the "retum" to the mother possible. 74 
Nevertheless, some critics have questioned the possibility of adapting the 
past to the present. For example, Angela Putino claims that "there might be 
parallels [between past and present] but that their possibility should not 
overshadow the evidence of a rupture. , 75 In her view, interpreting past events 
through the lens of the present understanding of what sexual difference is, also 
risks establishing "a new chain of being, where the present is the complete and 
perfect fon-n of an evolution". 76 This critique could be answered by pointing out 
that, firstly, Italian theorists do recognise a cut or break, namely that imposed by 
the access to the existing symbolic (see discussion below). Secondly, entrustment 
and i1pensiero do not conceive of the pre-Oedipal and the symbolic as temporal 
stages in an individual's development, but as co-existing elements that detennine 
one another. There is therefore no question of a "past" or a "present" or of a 
teleological progression since past and present coexist in the existing symbolic. 
Finally, entrustment theorists, or Diotima for that matter, do not aim at providing 
73 Ida Dominijanni, "Language, Communication and Betrayal" in European Journal of Women's 
Studies 1 (1994): 65. 
74 Adalgisa Giorgio also makes this point in "Writing the Mother-Daughter Relationship: 
Psychoanalysis, Culture and Literary Criticism" in A. Giorgio, Writing Mothers and Daughters: 
Renegotiating the Mother in Western European Narratives by Women (New York and Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2002), p. 28. 
75 Angela Putino, Amice mie isteriche, op. cit., p. 15 [my translation]. 




psychoanalytic account of the child's psycho-sexual 
Entrustment and desire. 
The second Lacanian critique linked to the return to pre-Oedipal mother, is 
even more fundamental - since it focuses upon the concept of desire and the 
decentering of the subject in language. The recuperation of the "original" 
relationship with the mother is here interpreted as a refusal of the "split" which 
inaugurates both subjectivity and desire. 78 
Entrustment theorists start from this notion of desire, at the core of 
womenýs problematic rapport with society. We will recall how the two central 
affects of "More Women Than Men" are called "the wish to win" (desire) and 
44 estrangement" (the failure of desire). The aim of a relationship of entrustment is 
to enable a woman to express her desire and make it count socially, while staying 
faithful to her feminine sexual difference (this is called the "sense of ease"). 
Contra Lacan, for whom the full-expression and satisfaction of desire is not only 
impossible but also threatening to subjectivity, entrustment theorists seem to 
stress that some social translation of desire is not only possible, but also central 
to female subjectivity. 
What must be made clear, from the outset, is that the notion of desire 
evoked by entrustment and that employed by Lacanians differ considerably. In 
the wake of Irigaray, entrustment theorists contest the current allocation of life 
and death-instincts in culture, one where women inherit death. In other words, 
they argue for a representational system where desire is not solely signified in 
relation to the phallus. Entrustment relationships aim at re-working the symbolic 
structure of desire through conscious social interventions. Entrusting 
relationships are thought to have this restructurig capacity. Desire thus becomes 
the desire to signify sexual difference starting from the particular circumstances 
of one's life. 
77 Giorgio, "Writing the Mother-Daughter Relationship", op. cit., p. 18. For an alternative account 
of the child's psycho-sexual development, one has to turn to Silvia Vegetti-Finzi's notion of "the 
child of the night", discussed above. 
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There are many ways of signifying sexual difference. This explains the 
formalism of the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. Chapter IV explained 
that the role of the affidataria was to teach the entrustee how to desire (the fon-n 
of desire) and not what to desire (the content of desire). The affidataria's role is 
to help the entrustee to understand and express what she wants. A relationship of 
entrustment is built on an individualist basis. It is sought when a woman wants to 
express a particular desire in a specific situation. Therefore, relationships of 
entrustment are designed to cater for a vast arrays of individual desires and 
hence, for differences between women. Relationships of entrustment thus express 
the many faces of sexual difference in society. The feminist politics which arises 
from entrusting relationships is not based on one collective subject Woman to be 
represented in the political arena. Rather, entrusting relationships act out the 
many aspects that feminine sexual difference can take on a political and social 
level. 
Entrustment relationships and "coalition politics " 
In Sexual Difference, the Milan Women's Bookstore Collective describes a 
relationship of entrustment as linking two "moments of humanity", represented 
by the "woman who wants" and who seeks help of the "woman who knows". 79 
The typical description of a relationship of entrustment is indeed one where the 
disparity, which differentiates but at the same time connects the entrustee to the 
affidataria, is represented by a difference in experience. While the affidataria 
has "the experience which comes with defeat", the entrustee has her "claims 
intact". 80 "More Women Than Men" describes the "sense of ease" (that feeling 
acquired when one's desires affect reality) as "the third terni between a savage 
wish to win and submission, between fantasies of omnipotence and failure. , 81 
Other questions hence emerge: in order to be applied, must this "wish to win" be 
necessarily weakened and adapted to the existing reality.? Is the "sense of ease" a 
conservative adaptation to social reality? Does the dialectic established between 
78 We have also seen that it is on this basis that Irigaray had been read as a "psychic essentialist". 
See Lynn Segal, Is the future Female? Troubled Thought on Contemporary Feminism (London: 
Virago, 1987), p. 132. 
79 The Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference, op. cit., p. 123. 
so ibid., p. 122. 
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desire and its social expression suggest a feminine subjectivity devoid of 
ambiguities? 
In order to answer the first of these questions, let us return to the notion of 
"feminine realism". developed in the writings of Diotima. In Chapter IV, we 
have described this specific understanding of realism as an awareness of the 
contextual demands of a social situation and as the simultaneous capacity to 
subvert these demands. I believe that it is here possible to draw a limited 
comparison between the type of realism produced by an entrusting relationship 
and Butler's notion of "coalitional politics", discussed in Chapter 1. Like Butler, 
entrustment theorists do not appeal to a coherent subject Woman to be 
represented politically. Instead, two particular women can form an entrusting 
relationship (a "coalition", in more Butlerian terms) on the basis of their common 
positioning within the existing symbolic in a view of expressing a specific desire 
socially. Certainly, Butler is not to be considered a sexual difference theorist, and 
the notion of genealogy she appeals to is of Foucauldian rather than Irigaryan 
inspiration. Nevertheless, both coalition and entrusting relationships involve re- 
assuming and re-signifying existing social norms in order to represent gender (in 
82 a theatrical more than a political sense) . 
As for the second remaining question, I will only provide here a partial 
answer, to be completed in the following section. If the sense of "ease" is the 
third term, the synthesis between the "savage wish to win" and "submission", 
does that suggest a subjectivity which is devoid of ambiguities? In Freudian 
terms, this notion of "ease" could be the name given to the dialectical 
relationship between the pleasure and reality principles. Nothing says that female 
desire is always fully translated or indeed translatable. There might be an excess 
of desire which resists social translation into "ease". Far from being conflict-free 
and unified, the feminine subject arising out of relationships of entrustment is 
one who negotiates the demands of desire and that of reality. In the preceding 
section to this chapter, it has been argued that because entrustment theory fails to 
give proper attention to the mechanism of counter-transference and to the 
imaginary, the entrustee might, in some cases, have to negotiate the 
demands of 
the affidataria as well. 
81 "More Women Than Men" in Bono and Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., p. 122. 
82 See the aforementioned difference between "rappresentanza" and "rappresentazione". 
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In this way, the feminine subject arising from entrusting relationships, and 
from the theoretical elaboration of il pensiero, is not coherent and void of 
ambiguities. As the chapters of this thesis have made clear, il pensiero theorists 
do not contest the Lacanian positing of the subject as constituted by language. 
However, they do contest the status of the phallus as primary signifier. For them, 
its law is not an "eternal law'583 and it is in this respect that Lacanian 
commentators might dismiss il pensiero as essentialist. Entrustment and il 
pensiero theorists search for a symbolic order not solely centred on the phallus, 
one which would therefore allow an alternative representation of sexual 
difference. We have seen how this alternative is explored by setting up 
significant relationships between women and making possible a symbolic return 
to the mother. 
We will now assess whether this return to the mother, the giver of life and 
language, to paraphrase Muraro, implies a feminine subject which mirrors the 
"monstrous subject of philosophy,. 84 This is indeed Teresa de Lauretis' main 
objection to the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. For her, the excessive 
emphasis on the symbolic content of relationships between women and the 
simultaneous lack of attention to the imaginary content evoke a feminine subject 
with universalist pretensions. In the critique of psychoanalytic feminism that she 
develops in The Practice of Love (1994), Lauretis condemns the social-symbolic 
practice of entrustment for failing to account for the erotic content of the mother- 
daughter relationship, turning the mother into a metaphor for women's individual 
and collective empowerment. 85 According to de Lauretis, this leads to a false 
universalist picture of the feminine subject, one which fails to considers lesbian 
specificity. 86 Section I of this chapter has contended that the mechanism of 
counter-transference and the position of the affidataria were dangerously left 
aside. I have shown that this resulted in a lack of analysis of the norms that the 
affidataria might herself embody. We shall now take this accusation of 
83 The expression is Naomi Schor's. See Schor, "This Essentialism Which Is Not One", op. cit., 
p. 42. 
84 Teresa de Lauretis, "The Essence of the Triangle", op. cit., p. 3 1. 
85 Teresa de Lauretis, The Practice ofLove, op. cit., pp. 165-166. 
86 Naomi Schor refers to this type of accusation as the "feminist critique of essentialism": 
"essentialism, according to this critique, is a form of 'false universalism' that threatens the 
vitality of the newly born women of feminism. " See Schor, "This Essentialism Which Is Not 
One", op. cit, p. 42. 
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44 monstrosity" a step further and relate it, finally, to what Noami Schor calls the 
(. 4 philosophical critique of essentialism". 87 
3. Within or beyond existiniz dichotomies? 
The last critique of essentialism to be considered is more philosophical in 
nature. Naomi Schor links it to the feminists who have relied on Derrida's 
critique of Western metaphysics as a metaphysics of presence by which he 
understands a belief that language (the logos) can make the world present to the 
speaker. 88 In the logocentric system, meaning (presence) is constructed by 
imposing order, coherence and closure on heterogeneity and mobility. The logos 
precisely imposes order and coherence by discarding all that is unrepresentable 
(because heterogenous and mobile) as non-existent. The logocentric system is 
thus founded on binary oppositions where one tenn is taken as norm, in 
opposition to a denigrated one. It is these dichotomies that create an illusion of 
stability Therefore language constructs reality/meaning/stable identities by 
denying genuine difference. In this deconstructive context, an essentialist is 
somebody who believes in a subject anterior to language and a metaphysics 
which prioritises transparency, identity and self-consciousness. It also involves 
denying the play of difference in language, subscribing to the binary opposition 
woman/man, and to stable identities or meanings. 
In the light of this new definition, the charge of essentialism could be 
expressed in relation to two components of entrustment and il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale. Firstly, entrustment has sometimes been viewed as offering 
women a subjectivity which simply mirrors that of men. According to this point 
of view, entrustment still upholds a dichotomous frame of representation 
modelled on the binary opposition between man and woman. For example, Lea 
Melandri sees in the establishment of female genealogies a direct analogy of 
men's historical community. 
89 The existing symbolic is criticised for obeying the 
(41aw-of-men-between-themselves", and finds its counter-weigbt in the 44common 
87 ibid., p. 42. 
88 in Chapter VI, I will come back to Derrida's metaphysics of presence when discussing 
Cavarero's For More Than One voice. See Chapter VI, fn. I 11. 
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world of women"90 established by entrusting relationships. Secondly, some 
sympathetic commentators have also warned against i1pensiero's "unquestioning 
acceptance of the classic, unified subject of philosophy". 91 11 pensiero is here 
seen as establishing a dialectic between the experience that women have of 
reality and its symbolic representation. Indeed, in L'ordine simbolico della 
madre, Muraro argues that there is no temporal or psychic separation between 
experience and the possibility of signifying this experience (between "being" and 
the "sense of being"92) . Hence the assertion that, together, the mother-child 
couple "creates" the world according to the shared experience they have of it. 
Entrustment would thus provide the practical framework in which subject and its 
social meaning can be made to correspond. Critics such as Rosi Braidotti argue 
that the crisis of the classical subject of Western metaphysics was precisely 
brought about by the contention that reality and our symbolic representation of it, 
or that the subject and thinking consciousness do not concur. 93 Entrustment 
theorists seem to contend that, once feminine sexual difference is introduced, 
reality and representation will once again be harmonised. Similarly, the 
correspondence between the subject and the consciousness the subject has of 
herself will be restored anew. 
To a certain extent, our discussion of desire in the context of 
psychoanalysis has already contested a reading of entrustment and of i1pensiero 
as presenting a new, fixed and stable model for women's subjectivity. I will 
therefore simply complement this discussion here. It is possible to conceive the 
form of subjectivity arising from entrustment and from il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale as transcending sexual dichotomies by envisaging a dynamic 
subject always in process. In some texts of entrustment, sexual difference is 
theorised as that which exceeds the norms of the existing symbolic. With the 
social-symbolic practice of entrustment, the norms of the symbolic are constantly 
redefined, re-figured and signified anew. Ida Domminijanni writes: 
89 Lea Melandri, Una visceralitti indiscibile, op. cit., p. 125. 
90 "More Women Than Men",. in Bono and Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., 
P. 119. 
91 Teresa de Lauretis, "The Essence of the Triangle", op. cit., p. 33. Rosi Braidotti, "Commento 
alla relazione di Adriana Cavarero", in Maria Cristina Marcuzzo e Anna Rossi Dona, La ricerca 
delle. donne, op. cit., p. 196. 
92 In Muraro's text, this appears as "essere" and "senso dell'essere". See Lordine simbolico 
della madre, p. 26 and again on p. 58. 
93 Braidotti, "Commento alla relazione di Adriana Cavarero", op. cit., p. 196. 
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sexual difference is always at stake because the symbolic 
collocation of men and women in relation to the symbolic order 
is always at stake [ ... ] one can change it, modify it, displace it 
[ ... ] It is not a question of fixing sexual difference in a 
definition of gender (masculine or feminine) but of interpreting 
how being a man or a woman is precisely played, combined, and 
shifted in actual situations. 94 
Three points need to be made here. Firstly, this viewpoint underscores that 
feminine sexual difference is now considered, in the words of Lia Cigarini 
herself, as a "universal mediation". 95 Since feminine sexual difference has placed 
the monstrosity of the subject in crisis, men can now investigate masculine sexual 
difference beyond the pretence of universality. 96 This has prompted a re- 
examination of masculinity, of which entrustment theorists have been very 
supportive. 97 It is in this sense that one must understand Italian feminists' 
contention that feminine sexual difference does not seek the inclusion of a 
feminine subject into the existing symbolic. Rather, the project set out by il 
pensiero is one of "asymmetry and dislocation of the forms of subjectivity and of 
sociality considered as universal. It implies a change not only in women, but also 
in the world, a change of both social and symbolic orders, or reality and 
representation". 98 
Secondly, sexual difference is no longer simply understood as feminine 
sexual difference. In more recent years, sexual difference is interpreted as that 
which does not find signification in the existing symbolic. In other words, that 
which exceeds the existing symbolic is attributed to Woman. 
Thirdly, sexual difference is always at stake and is subject to a perpetual 
movement of re-signification. This suggests that entrustment might 
be one 
possible strategy which might prove effective in a particular situation, and 
for the 
94 Ida Dominijanni, "11 desiderio di politica", OP- cit., pp. 33-34 [my translation]. 
95 Lia Ciganni, Lapolitica del desiderio, op. cit., p. 245. 
96 
ibid., p. 246. 
97 Many articles on masculine sexual difference have been published in the 
Milan Women's 
Bookstore Collective's own periodical Via Dogana. For example, see the articles 
by Aldo 
Tortorella and Dino Leon in Via Dogana 8 (1993) and those by Alberto 
Leiss and Victor J. 
Seidler, in Via Dogana 21-22 (1995). 
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social expression of a specific desire. Entrustment is thus best understood as a 
part of a plural but shared strategy of "practising relationships between women" 
in order to restructure the order of representation so that sexual difference can be 
included. Cavarero's description of ilpensiero seems to confirm this point. She 
writes: 
Crucially, it is not a question of a theory of the subject, male or 
female, but a theory of a structure understood as a relation. In 
other words, the question of the subject and of its construction is 
here replaced by the question of a relation as a practice able to 
simultaneously de-structure the patriarchal symbolic order and 
to restructure a female symbolic order in which the signification 
of the individual woman is generated in her relationship with 
another woman. 99 
A final point concerns the supposed correspondence between reality and 
the feminine sub ect's perception of it, since this relation is at the origin of the 
accusation that entrustment and il pensiero still rely on some characteristics of 
the Cartesian subject, a solipsistic and sef-reflective subject guarantor of 
knowledge. The Cartesian self acquires certainty of his own existence by 
discarding the realm of the corporeal in order to focus on his rational activity. 
Once the material realm is transcended, this rational self is able to know the 
world with certainty. He can attain universal truths. Cartesianism is thus 
predicated on another series of dualisms (mind/body, subject/object, self/other, 
etc. ) which inevitably involves a hierarchical mastery of the first term over the 
other. Feminists have often pointed out that, in patriarchal societies, the 
dominated terms of the different dichotomies are generally associated to women. 
Psychoanalytic and poststructuralist critiques refutes this Cartesian self as an 
illusion on the basis that the unconscious or the play of difference in language 
always erases the possibility of self-mastery or self-transparency. 
98 Ida Dominijanni, "Il desiderio di politica", op. cit., p. 36 [my translation]. 
99 Adriana Cavarero, "11 pensiero femminista. Un approcclo teorico", in A. Cavarero and F. 
Restaino, Lefilosofiefemministe (Turin: Paravia Scnptorum, 1999), p. 141 [my translation]. 
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Unlike the masculine subject they criticise, the feminine subject theorised 
through entrustment and il pensiero della differenza sessuale is not solipsistic 
and fixed. Rather, it is dialogical, relational and "in process", as our discussion of 
desire has shown. One can counter this last objection by using Luisa Muraro's 
"epistemological move" (discussed in Chapter IV). We will recall that, for Luisa 
Muraro, our first and most important knowledge comes from the contact with our 
mother. From the mother, we "create the world" by attributing symbolic meaning 
to the reality around us. For Muraro, the criteria of truth lies in the experience 
and perception of reality shared by two women. As pointed out in Chapter IV, 
this truth is thus dissociated from objective, abstract, universal and eternal 
metaphysical forms or laws. This truth is not entirely subjective either: instead, it 
depends on the experience one has of reality, but this is a mutual experience thus 
an interpretation of reality that one shares with the other. By theorising 
relationships between women, Muraro explores a notion of truth which 
transcends the dichotomous opposition between self and other, objectivity and 
subjectivity, and gives rise to a notion of a "realistic symbolic". Reality becomes 
a particular interpretation of the world that two women share. This interpretation 
is constantly re-worked, adjusted to new contexts and new dialogical 
relationships which link two women. 
Conclusion: 
In this chapter, the social-symbolic practice of entrustment has had to face 
two major sources of criticism. In the first section, I have enquired whether 
entrustment is an empowering practice or a practice of power. I concluded that, 
although entrustment is not meant to be an outright practice of power, it is 
predicated on a level of transparency (between entrustee and afji'dataria), which 
could be difficult to attain or indeed to maintain. Entrustment theorists do not 
consider the risks of such a social-symbolic practice due to two theoretical 
blindfolds. Firstly, they do not analyse the pole of the relationship that the 
affidataria occupies. The phenomenon of counter-transference is untheorised and 
the imaginary which might inform the relationship is insufficiently analysed. In 
addition, the social-symbolic practice of entrustment is weakened by the artificial 
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dichotomy set up between authority and power. The risk of an abuse of power 
within entrustment cannot hence be properly tackled. Far from a genuine 
oversight, this limited conceptualisation Of Power is aimed at presenting 
relationships between women as founded on legitimate authority only. 
The second section of the chapter has re-examined the contentious issue of 
essentialism from an egalitarian, Lacanian and philosophical point of view. 
Accusations of a biological form of essentialism have been rejected. The 
Lacanian accusation that entrustment imprisons women in a pre-linguistic essence 
have equally been deemed unfounded. I have also argued for conceiving of sexual 
difference in entrustment, and more generally in il pensiero, as a process to be 
constantly re-signified anew. Finally, the theme of essentialism has allowed 
parallels to be drawn between contemporary Italian feminism and Diana Fuss, 
Judith Butler and Christine Battersby, whose contribution to feminist thought was 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
To conclude, the main weakness of entrustment lies, I would argue, in its 
voluntarist character. It is surprising that such a social-symbolic practice, which 
was created using the contribution made to feminism by psychoanalysis, ignores 
precisely those elements (e. g., counter-transference, imaginary, and erotic desire) 
structurally linked to the unconscious. Nevertheless, it is important to conceive of 
entrustment as an open project, as a practice which is meant to be complemented. 
Then, space exists to develop these connections. 
The last chapter of this thesis examines the work an Italian feminist 
philosopher who has offered an alternative to the politics of sexual difference 
embraced by entrustment theorists and by il pensiero della differenza sessuale. 
Although an important figure at the origin of the elaboration of il pensiero, 
Adriana Cavarero, has professed her dislike of entrustment. In the 1990s, she has 
also distanced herself explicitly from those collectives still close to entrustment as 
well as from Diotima. Cavarero's work thus provides an important concluding 
perspective on contemporary Italian feminism. Chapter VI will thus examine a 
passage from a politics of difference to one of uniqueness in her work. It will also 
determine whether her thought goes beyond the problems posed by the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment. 
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Chapter VI. 
Adriana Cavarero: From a Politics of Sexual Difference to a 
Politics of Uniqueness. 
Introduction: Adriana Cavarero and Italian feminism. 
Of all the Italian feminists encountered along the chapters of this thesis, 
Adriana Cavarero, is the best known in the Anglo-American context. ' In Italy, 
Adriana Cavarero has been instrumental to the development of i1pensiero della 
differenza sessuale and my account of contemporary Italian feminism would be 
incomplete, it may be argued, without a chapter dedicated to an exegesis of her 
work. 
Despite her important role in Italy, Cavarero's journey into feminist theory 
has not followed the evolution of feminism that I have retraced in Chapter 111. 
Cavarero has never been a member of Milan Women's Bookstore Collective and 
has never embraced the social-symbolic practice of entrustment, which she has, 
at times, openly criticised. 2 Rather than political activism in the ranks of the 
Milan Women's Bookstore or of other feminist collectives operating during the 
1970s, Cavarero first approached feminism via her academic interest in 
' Cavarero's articles published in English include "Equality and Sexual Difference: Amnesia in 
Political Thought" in G. Bock and S. James (eds. ), Beyond Equality and Difference (London: 
Routledge, 1991), "Doppelganger Tentations" in Cosimo Marco Mazzoni (ed), Ethics and Law 
in Biological Research (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), "The Envied Muse: Plato Versus 
Homer" in Efrossmi Spentzou and Don Fowler (eds. ), Cultivating the Muse (Oxford: OUP, 
2002), "Thinking Difference" in Symposium XLIX/2 (1995): 120-129, "Regarding the Cave" in 
Qui Parle 10/1: 1-21, "Birth, Love and Politics" in Radical Philosophy 86 (1997): 19-23, 
"Politicizing Theory" in Political Theory 30 (2002): 506-532, "The Need for a Sexed Thought" 
in Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought: A Reader (Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 199 1), pp. 181-185. The following books have been translated into English: In Spite 
of Plato (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood 
(Routledge: London, 2000), Stately Bodies (Chicago: Michigan University Press, 2002), and For 
More Than One Voice: Philosophy of Vocal Expression (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005). Cavarero has also recently been the subject of a conference at the University of Warwick 
(19.05.04), and she is a regular visiting Professor at the University of New York, and at the 
University of California, Berkeley. 
2 When I interviewed Cavarero at the University of Warwick (19.05.04), she vehemently rejected 
entrustment as a practice which established a 
dangerous psychological dependency between 
women. 
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philosophy and her personal experience as a female scholar. 3 With other women 
academics from the University of Verona, she co-founded the philosophical 
community Diotima. She remained deeply involved in the group's activities until 
the beginning of the 1990s, when she chose to take her distance. Despite both her 
dislike for entrustment and her more recent separation from Diotima, Cavarero's 
positioning as a proponent of sexual difference leads her work to share many of 
the theses held by entrustment theorists. 
I will thus conclude my study of contemporary Italian feminism with an 
account of the complexity of the relationship between Adriana Cavarero's 
thought and il pensiero della differenza sessuale. In particular, this chapter will 
compare and contrast Cavarero's thought to the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment. It will trace its evolution. Indeed, in the course of my argument, the 
shift of influence from an Irigarayian to an Arendtian frame of reference will 
become evident. 4 My aim is to show how, like entrustment theorists, Cavarero 
inherits from Irigaray the critique of the existing "hom(m)osexual" symbolic and 
answers the call to "invent" feminine sexual difference. 5 This is what situates 
Cavarero, Diotima and entrustment theorists under the banner of i1pensiero della 
differenza sessuale. However, this chapter also endeavours to demonstrate that 
the solutions that she proposes to "invent" feminine sexual difference 
distinguishes Cavarero from entrustment theorists, and from the other members 
of Diotima. It is in the last fifteen years, a period which more or less corresponds 
to her criticism of entrustment as well as to her estrangement from Diotima, that 
Cavarero's frame of reference has shifted resolutely from Irigaray to Arendt. The 
31 owe this information to the interview mentioned above. It seems to be confirmed in writing in 
one of Cavarero's early papers. See A. Cavarero, "L'elaborazione filosofica della differenza 
sessuale" in Maria Cristina Marcuzzo and Anna Rossi Doria (eds. ), La ricerca delle donne: studi 
femministi in Italia (Turin: Rosenberg & Sellier, 1987), translated in P. Bono and S. Kemp (eds. ), 
Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., p. 182. 
41 am referring to an evolution and not a break in Cavarero's thought. Indeed and as this chapter 
will show, Arendt has long been a source of reference for Cavarero. Arendt's influence is explicit 
right from one of the first essays Cavarero published under the banner of il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale (see "Dire la nascita" in Diotima, Mettere al mondo il mondo: oggetto e 
oggettivith alla luce della differenza sessuale [Milan: La Tartaruga, 1990]). Equally, Cavarero 
has not altogether turned away from Irigaray. Although Irigaray is not given centre stage in 
Cavarero's latest works such as For More Than One Voice, her concept of symbolic matricide 
still features as a support to Cavarero's attack on the centrality of the category of death in 
Western philosophy. 
5 In chapter IV, we have seen that "inventing" sexual difference is the project which informs the 
work of Diotima. "Inventing" sexual difference is understood as this symbolic search and 
translation of feminine sexual difference. See Diotima, "Differenza sessuale: da scoprire e da 
produrre" in Ilpensiero della differenza sessuale (Milan: La Tartaruga, 1987). 
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originality of Cavarero's thought, in relation to other exponents of i1pensiero, is 
marked by two components of her work - firstly, the feminist adaptation of the 
Arendtian. categories of natality, uniqueness and action, and secondly, the 
prevalence of these themes over the Irigarayian concept of female mediation 
(central to entrustment and to the philosophical elaborations of Diotima). 
My rendition of Cavarero's work and of her relationship with il pensiero 
and the social-symbolic practice of entrustment will thus be informed by three 
questions. Firstly, how does Cavarero manage to integrate Arendt into a feminist 
theory of sexual difference? Secondly, what can this shift from Irigaray to Arendt 
offer contemporary Italian feminism? In other words, how does Cavarero's 
thought resolve some of the limitations of entrustment that we have identified in 
Chapter V? Thirdly, what are the difficulties already encountered in relation to 
entrustment which persist in Cavarero's version of the theory of sexual 
difference? My argument will be divided into two parts. The first section will 
treat Adriana Cavarero as an integral and pivotal exponent of il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale. The second section of the chapter will concentrate on 
Cavarero's recent work, which is markedly more Arendtian. It is here that I will 
weigh the contribution that Adriana Cavarero's writings can bring to an 
assessment of the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. 
Section 1. For a theory of sexual difference: Cavarero as an exponent of il 
pensiero della differenza sessuale. 
In an essay discussing feminist philosophy in a comparative context, 
Cavarero declares that Italian feminism, while internally marked by many 
diverging and sometimes conflicting positions, owes its originality to the 
hegemony achieved by the theory of sexual difference. 6 In this opening section, I 
will thus look for this mutual approach. It is because contemporary Italian 
feminists all denounce the existing symbolic order for not representing sexual 
difference that they all come under the label i1pensiero della differenza sessuale. 
In Chapter IV of this thesis, the hegemonic critique of the existing symbolic 
6 Adriana Cavarero, "I] pensiero femminista. Un approccio teorico" in Franco Restalno and 
Adriana Cavarero, Lefilosofiefemministe (Tunn: Paravia Scriptorum, 1999), p. 140. 
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order has been divided into two areas: the monosexual norin which 
inconspicuously rules over the existing symbolic order and the denial of female 
genealogies. I have shown that these two themes are inspired, in part, from 
Irigaray and adapted to the Italian context via the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment. These are also two leitmotivs that we find in Adriana Cavarero's 
work, especially in her early writings for il pensiero della differenza sessuale. 7 
Let us briefly return to these two themes in order to detennine their role in the 
development of Cavarero's work, and to assess the originality and theoretical 
potential that references to the thought of Hannah Arendt confer upon Cavarero's 
approach. 
1. The monosexual symbolic order: 
Central to "More Women Than Men", the original document of 
entrustment which we have extensively analysed in Chapter IV, is the 
contradictory experience of women who are moved by a desire to actively take 
part in society (the "wish to win") and a feeling of estrangement when they do 
so. Echoing the insights of Irigaray, entrustment theorists contend that women 
"live out" a fractured subjectivity because of the monosexual symbolic order 
which, under the pretence of neutrality and universality, harbours the masculine 
sex as a noryn. 
It is on this political basis opened by "More Women Than Men" that 
Diotima and Cavarero elaborate their philosophical analyses of the social- 
symbolic system which hides its masculine mark. In fact, the historical genesis of 
the philosophical community of Diotima, as it is recorded in an appendix of 
Diotima. 11 pensiero defla differenza sessuale, 8 explicitly refers back to "More 
Women Than Men". It also places Cavarero at the centre of this philosophical 
translation of the political work that entrustment theorists carried out before the 
creation of Diotima. In this respect, Cavarero fin-nly grounds her work in the 
7 For example, see "L'elaborazione filosofica della differenza sessuale", op. cit. "Per una teoria 
della 
, 
differenza sessuale" in Diotima, Il pensiero della differenza sessuale, op. cit., "Dire la 
nascita" in Diotima, Mettere al mondo il mondo, op. cit., and, to a lesser extent, In Spite ofPlato, 
op. cit. 
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Italian tradition of feminist political activism, which seeks to keep theory not 
only connected but subsequent to political practice. 9 
In her early research as a member of Diotima, Cavarero refers to women's 
experience by employing the same terminology previously used in "More 
Women Than Men". 10 Women's experience is viewed as one of estrangement 
and desire. But Cavarero theorises estrangement in epistemological ten-ns, as a 
constitutive gap between being a woman and being the subject of language and 
of knowledge. As seen in Chapter IV, it is in "Towards a Theory of Sexual 
Difference", where Cavarero blames women's estrangement on what she calls 
the "monstrous subject" who defines himself and the other according to the 
criteria he has himself established, that the extent of Irigaray's influence really 
becomes evident. ' I As for desire, it is theorised by the early Cavarero as "a desire 
to think oneself, starting from oneself and not already thought by the other. " 12 
This is the desire to inscribe feminine sexual difference as an ontological 
principle. 
Arendtian Reality and the "atopicality " ofsexual difference. 
This other resource that Arendt's political philosophy provides for 
Cavarero, becomes perceptible from the publication, for Diotima, of an essay on 
"feminine realism". 13 It is a distinctive understanding of realism, a concept that 
we have previously encountered in entrustment theonsts and in other exponents 
8 See Chiara Zamboni and Luisa Muraro, "Cronaca dei fatti principali di Diotima" in Diotima, 11 
pensiero della dififerenza sessuale, op. cit., p. 175. 
9 On this important relationship between theory and practice, Cavarero writes in 1987: "Since 
Diotima has achieved a precise theoretical configuration, it would please me a great deal to 
identify the theory we have been developing as the consequent result, or, if you will, as the 
mature elaboration, of the theoretical speculations carried on in the past years by the feminist 
movement in Italy. In other words, I'd like to be able to put it in this way: feminist theorizing has 
developed over the years to the point where it demanded a philosophical 'systematization' of its 
concepts and categories. Diotima has then responded to this need by engaging in the production 
of a 'sexed thought' (pensiero sessuato)". Cavarero, "L'elaborazione filosofica della differenza 
sessuale", trans. in Bono and Kemp (eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought, op. cit., p. 181. 
10 ibid. 
11 See Cavarero, "Per una teoria della differenza sessuale" in Diotima. Ilpensiero della differenza 
sessuale, op. cit. and my discussion of this text in Chapter IV, pp. 148-149. 
12 Cavarero, "L'elaborazione filosofica della differenza sessuale", op. cit., p. 177. We shall see 
how in later works, such as Relating Narratives, Cavarero no longer conceives of desire as 
specific to women. Desire becomes an ontological component of a self who always desires to be 
narrated. 
13 Adriana Cavarero, "Dire la nascita", op. cit. 
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Of il pensiero, 14 which offers Cavarero a bridge between the theory of sexual 
difference as developed in Italy and a feminist adaptation of Hannah Arendt. 
For Arendt, reality, appearance and the political/public sphere are 
intrinsically linked and it is upon this connection that Adriana Cavarero 
extensively draws in order to think feminine sexual difference. In The Human 
Condition (1958), Arendt explains that "appearance - something that is being 
seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves - constitutes reality. " 15 In other 
words, for Arendt, reality is constructed through our "appearances" with others. 
If one thought of feminine sexual difference along these lines, one could say that 
being a woman is a fact of reality because women appear in their corporeality. 
The definition of sexual difference would be here phenomenological - others can 
see that I am of the feminine sex, therefore feminine sexual difference is real and 
exists. But in Arendt, it is not as straightforward. Although aware of the body (of 
its needs and desires which have to be catered for in the private realm for 
political life to be possible), Arendt sees corporeality as antithetical to and 
threatening of politics-' 6 Arendt further points out that "the human sense of 
reality demands that men actualize the sheer passive givenness of their being, not 
in order to change it but in order to make articulate and to call into existence 
what otherwise they would have to suffer passively anyhow. , 17 Consequently, 
for Arendt, reality is not a mere collection of facts but a shared sense of the 
world that one acquires through the witnessing or the perpetrating of an action on 
an interactive political scene. 
Arendt's notion of reality thus provides Cavarero with slightly different 
tools to theorise the estrangement felt by women within the dominating male 
symbolic, allowing her to argue that, for women, the world is separated into two. 
On the one hand stands the social order, whose reality comes from the fact that it 
14 See my part on "Desire, necessity and realism" in Chapter IV. 
15 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 50. 
16 ibid., p. 112. For a discussion of Arendt's treatment of the body and the role of coporeality in 
her thought, see John Tambornino, "Locating the Body: Corporeality and Politics in Hannah 
Arendt" in The Journal of Political Philosophy 7.2 (1999): 172-190. A feminist adaptation of 
Arendt will inevitably seek, as in Cavarero, to reconnect in some manner corporeality and 
politics. We shall come back to this point shortly. For the moment, I would like to mention two 
essays which discuss Arendt's treatment of the body from a feminist perspective: Bonnie Honig, 
"Toward an Agonistic Feminism: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Identity", and Linda G. M. 
Zerilli, "The Arendtian Body" in Bonnie Honig (ed. ), Feminist Interpretations ofHannah Arendt 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: Universtity of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), pp. 135-166,167-194. 
17 Arendt, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 208. 
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designates a shared symbolic order. 18 On the other hand stands the factuality of 
"that which is, without having a space within this social order". 19 The reality 
women feel estranged from is that of the social order. Although being a woman 
cannot be expressed in the given social order, the fact of feminine sexual 
difference is still "there", as an excess. Cavarero's feminist slant on Arendt here 
becomes the claim that it is the masculine sex who monopolises the scene of 
appearance (the political or, in the vocabulary used by il pensiero, the symbolic 
order), thus relegating feminine sexual difference to a mere fact without real 
political significance . 
20 In Cavarero's ternis, feminine sexual difference is 
"atopical", that is it is without location within the existing symbolic order. In 
Cavarero's early reading of Arendt, the symbolic order becomes that shared 
reality, the political scene where one appears to others by acting out one's sexual 
. 
21 
1 res difference In Section 11 of this chapter, we shall see how Cavarero reconf gu 
this understanding of the political. 
2. Equality and the relationships between women. 
For all feminists endorsing the project of il pensiero, the second area of 
attack regards female genealogies that the current symbolic order denies. As seen 
in Chapter IV, contemporary Italian feminists contend that the masculine norm 
also invades relationships between women. It codifies and prevents them from 
being free. This insight is then used politically in order to bring philosophical 
weight to the case against egalitarian politics, already put forward in the 1970s. 
18 1 will later analyse Cavarero's critique of Arendt's conceptual isation of the political sphere. 
Here, I temporarily refer the reader to Elizabeth Young-Bruehl's discussion of the different 
feminist reactions to Arendt's sharp distinction between public and private realm in "Hannah 
Arendt Among Feminists" in Larry May and Jerome Kohn (eds. ), Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years 
Later (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), esp. pp. 307-320. See also Hannah Finechel Pitkin, 
"Conformism, Housekeeping, and the Attack of the Blob: The Origins of Hannah Arendt's 
Concept of the Social" in B. Honig (ed. ), Feminst Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, op. cit., 
pp. 51-83. 
19 Cavarero, "Dire ]a nascita", op. cit., p. 99. 
20 ibid., p. 94. As a preliminary remark to a more lengthy discussion that I will conduct in the 
second part of the chapter, I would point out 
here that Cavarero understands the political in 
Arendtian terms as "a plural and interactive space of exhibition that is the only space which 
deserves the name of politics". See Relating Narratives, op. cit., p. 57. 
21 ibid., p. 93. 
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Cavarero's work has been instrumental in the denunciation of the 
egalitarian politics which constitutes, for her, one of the four axes of i1pensiero. 22 
She rejects it for the same reasons as the other exponents of i1pensiero - equality 
either means assimilation or equalisation, but never subjectivity. Cavarero sees an 
elementary repression of feminine sexual difference at work when women are 
simply excluded from political participation. Here, exclusion is coupled with 
equalisation - the differences between women are completely insignificant since 
they are all equalised as the "other of man" and confined to the private realm . 
23 It 
is when the repression of sexual difference is more complex, that one can talk of 
assimilation. In that case, feminine sexual difference is not altogether excluded 
but rather included in the neutral-universal definition of Man. 24 
Against assimilation and equalisation: Rahel and natality. 
Again, in relation to the common attack on equality as sameness and 
assimilation, Hannah Arendt proves to be a useful ally for Cavarero. Cavarero 
first focuses on Hannah Arendt's biography of Rahel Varnhagen, a well known 
nineteenth century Berlin Jewish woman. For Cavarero, Rahel Varnhagen 
narrates the story of a "cruel auto-negation because, by seeking to integrate to the 
social order which excludes her, [Rahel] participates and contributes to her own 
exclusion. 5,25 In addition, Arendt's text is used by Cavarero to confirm il 
pensiero'S rejection of separatism as a political strategy which needs to be 
complemented. Indeed, Rahel contemplates the possibility of extracting herself 
from the world. This, for Arendt (and Cavarero), would mean not to "exist" since 
22 Cavarero, "L'elaborazione filosofica della differenza sessuale", op. cit., p. 173. This is 
Cavarero's first paper as an exponent of Il pensiero. It is not, by any means, the first essay 
published by Cavarero. In 1977, she published "Politica e ideologia dei partit] in Inghilterra 
secondo Hume", in AA. VV., Per una storia del moderno concetto di politica (Padova: Cleup, 
1977), pp. 93-119. Dialettica e politica in Platone (Padova: CEDAM, 1974) is Cavarero's first 
book. It is not until 1987 and "L'elaborazione filosofica della differenza sessuale" that Cavarero 
began to write on feminism and on the theory of sexual difference. 
" Cavarero, "Beyond Equality and Difference", op. cit., p. 34. 
24 ibid, p. 37. Also see Adriana Cavarero's "L'ordine dell'uno e l'ordine del due", in Maria Luisa 
Boccia e Isabella Peretti (eds. ), Il genere della rappresentanza: materiali e atti di 'Democrazia e 
Diritto'(Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1988), pp. 67-80 and "L'emancipazione diffidente: considerazioni 
teoriche sulle pari opportunitit", Reti, 2 (1988): 42-52. The critique of political representation and 
equal opportunities is echoed throughout Italy. For example, see Anna Rossi Doria, "I] voto alle 
donne: una storia di contraddiziom" in Boccia and Peretti, Il genere della rappresentanza, op. 
cit., pp. 29-41. As for entrustment theorists, see my chapter IV, n. 72 and M. Campari and Lia 
Cigarini, "Fonte e principi di un nuovo diritto", Sottosopra (January 1989): 6- 7. 
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existence is necessarily public. It would also negate politics as that shared scene 
of appearance. 
However, the main aim behind Cavarero's use of Rahel Varhagen lies in 
her recuperation of a second Arendtian category, that of natality. In Arendt's 
system, natality is linked to the coming into being of what is new. Natality 
permeates what Arendt classifies as the three fundamental human activities: 
labour, work and action. 26 Labour and work are rooted in natality since they 
27 provide and preserve the world for the constant influx of newcomers" . But, 
most of all, natality is what impregnates action as both are linked to new 
beginnings, new possibilities, to the occurrence of the unpredictable and 
unexpected. If natality is concerned with the disclosure of uniqueness at the time 
of one's birth, this uniqueness is then acted out through one's life, through one's 
words and deeds. 
For Cavarero, Rahel's biography supports Arendt's general thesis that birth 
gives the individual a uniqueness, which if ignored, leads to the experience of 
estrangement. 28 However, a feminist reading of Arendt is at work here. For 
Cavarero, what is inescapable and does not find a place in the given order is not 
Jewishness per se, as it is in Rahel Varnhagen, but sexual difference itself 29 
Cavarero adds corporeality as a feature of natality. Birth is, in Cavarero, the birth 
of sexed bodies from a sexed body (that of the mother). She comes back to this 
point in Relating Narratives when she writes: "Despite Arendt's reticence on this 
point, one must affirm that, [by] being born, there always appears to the world a 
sexed who. The one who is born is always this girl or this boy, even if the 
absolute nudity that exposes it corresponds with the absolute absence of the what 
The one who is born does not yet have any qualities; and yet has a sex. "30 
The Arendtian category of natality is here used for rooting out a corporeal 
identity, one marked ontologically by sexual difference. We shall return to this 
point in Section 11 of this chapter. 
25 Cavarero, "Dire la nascita", op. cit., P. 101 [my translation]. 
26 Arendt, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. q. 
27 ibid., p. 9- 
28 Cavarero, "Dire la nascita", op. cit., p. 99. 
29 ibid., p. 102. 
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3. The ri-Intim,. hip with the mother and symbolic matricide. 
All the thinkers of il pensiero, from entrustment theorists to the 
philosophers of Diotima, attribute the poverty of female relationships primarily 
to the social refusal to accept disparities between women. Rpensiero theorists 
repeatedly mention that the relationship where both equality and difference 
prevail is one linking a mother to her daughter. For them, this relationship also 
serves, and is "colonised" by, the masculine symbolic . 
31 In the existing social- 
symbolic, the differences between mother and daughter are either deemed 
irrelevant or are theorised as a source of rivalry. In any case, the link with the 
mother must be broken in order to access subjectivity. The influence of Luce 
Irigaray and her conceptualisation of female genealogies are here evident. As 
Chapter IV has noted, in Italy, it is the need to develop and weave such 
genealogies between women that is addressed by entrustment theorists. In the 
writings of the Diotima philosophers, and in Muraro's work in particular, the 
expression "female genealogies" is often supplemented by the notion of a 
02 "matemal continuum" . 
The interruption of female genealogies and the maternal continuum are two 
central themes in Cavarero's interpretation of the myth of Demeter and Kore, 
discussed in In Spite of Plato. 33 Here, Cavarero also interprets female 
genealogies in terms of the "matemal continuum". The maternal continuum 
indicates the lineage linking the daughter both to the origin of her life and to her 
34 children (should she be able or decide to have any). It also defines sexual 
difference. Men and women are differentiated by the fact that the former are 
given birth by an individual of the opposite sex and thus stand outside the 
continuum, while the latter are always at its centre (should a particular woman 
have a daughter) or at its end (should she remain daughterless). Finally, we have 
30 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, op. cit., p. 3 8. Also in Nonostante Platone, op. cit., p. 57. 
31 1 once again refer the reader to "More Women Than Men", p. 12 1. 
32 In Chapter IV, we have discussed the notion of matemal continuum in relation to Muraro's 
L'ordine simbolico della madre (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1992), p. 54. 
33 The themes also inform Cavarero's interpretation of Sophocles' Antigone in Corpo in figure: 
filosofia e politica della corporeitii (Milan: Feltrinell i, 1995), Ch. 1, esp. p. 5 1. A similar reading 
of Demeter's myth is to be found in Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), pp. 79,132. 
34 Cavarero, Nonostante Platone, op. cit., p. 63. The notion of maternal continuum, mainly 
developed in Nonostante Platone, also features in "Dire la nascita" in Diotinia. Mettere al mondo 
il mondo, op. cit, p. 114. 
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mentioned how the maternal continuum is a useful concept which breaks the 
mother-daughter confusion. Thanks to the maternal continuuml the mother- 
daughter relationship is one of sameness and difference, rather than one of 
rivalry. 
The maternal continuum is a useful interpretative key to the myth of 
Demeter. It is used by Cavarero to place, at the centre of the myth, the theme of a 
35 
woman5s control over her maternal potential for generation. For Cavarero, this 
particular myth narrates the progressive submersion of this maternal potential by 
the patriarchal symbolic order. The myth opens with Demeter and Kore side by 
side, or in Cavarero's terms, "in the reciprocal gaze', 36 of legitimation. Demeter's 
power to give or not to give life is not regulated. When Hades abducts Kore, 
Demeter cannot, does not and, crucially for Cavarero, chooses not to generate 
life. In both these phases, Demeter makes free use of her power to give and not to 
give life. It is in the last phase of the myth, when Hades concedes to Kore's 
periodic release, that the maternal potential is usurped by patriarchy. Hades 
comes to decide on the time of generation, thus organising and normalising the 
maternal potential. 37 By breaking the continuum, patriarchy has transformed the 
mother from a subject who chooses, to an object that patriarchy may rule and 
regulate. Thus initially a potential, maternity becomes a role and, often, a 
"Prison'. ) . 
38 In the same chapter, a discussion on demography and abortion ensues 
to illustrate this usurpation of the maternal potential. 
Now, whilst Arendt anchors her thinking of the "vita activa" in the 
category of natality, the theme of maternal continuum is absent from her oeuvre. 
In Arendt, natality is not only a birth without bodies, but being bom is also a 
"coming from nowhere"39 and from "no one". This brings us to the last theme 
that Cavarero and il pensiero thinkers share - that of matricide. By ignoring the 
35 ibid., p. 61. In the English translation, the original "potenza materna" has been translated as 
"maternal power" (In Spite of Plato, op. cit., p. 61). However, I shall use "maternal potential" 
because I believe it better indicates Cavarero's idea that, as a mother, and as a woman, Demeter 
can also choose not to give life. 
36 ibid., p. 62; In Spite ofPlato, op. cit., p. 61. 
37 ibid., p. 73. On this point, Cavarero argues that Western tradition has relied on the 
last phase of 
the myth to explain the seasons, menstrual cycles, as well as the "mystery" of generation, and to 
convey the belief that it is in fact the sperm which contains the active element of 
life (while the 
maternal womb is just a passive container). The supposed passivity of the mother 
in generation is 
also dealt with in Corpo infigure, op. cit., pp. 94 - 97. 38 ibid., pp. 64,66. 
39 ibid., pp. 8,47. 
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mother, Arendt could well stand accused of symbolic matricide. Interestingly, 
this accusation of matricide is directed by Cavarero to many of the philosophers 
who make up the so-called "tradition" of Western thought, but not to Arendt. It is 
perhaps the immense resource that her philosophy of natality provides to counter 
death as the privileged concept in Western philosophy, which redeems Arendt in 
the eyes of Cavarero. Let us now turn to consider these themes in more detail. 
Matricide and the philosophy of death. 
As we have seen in Chapter IV, the matricidal character of the existing 
symbolic is an Irigarayian theme, one shared right across il pensiero, and 
particularly developed by Luisa Muraro. In Cavarero's writings, there seems to 
be two sides to the notion of symbolic matricide. The first one is already present 
in Muraro and indicates Man's symbolic usurpation of the mother's power to 
40 give birth . We have seen this at work in Cavarero's reading of the myth of 
Demeter discussed above. At a deeper level, however, Cavarero interprets this 
. )41 matricide in Arendtian tenns, as a violation of what she calls "the natal order' . 
What structures the myth of Demeter is the philosophical act of turning away 
from the place of Man's origins to favour death as a measure of existence. 
Cavarero contends that the myth betrays the supremacy of a philosophy of death, 
according to which men are mortals and the masculine sex signifies the whole of 
42 humankind . 
Cavarero, is thus able to combine Arendt's critique of death as the paradigm 
of Western philosophy with Irigaray's insights on sexual difference. She 
contends that there are at least four important consequences of this priority of 
death over natality. Matricide comes first and is explained by the kind of "womb 
envy', 43 to which Muraro also seems to point. Man finds refuge in the philosophy 
of death not because he does not give birth (since some women do not give birth 
either), but because a woman's body necessaily generates him. Secondly, looking 
40 see chapter IV of this thesis and Lulsa Muraro, Lordine simbolico della madre, op. cit., p. 9 
41 Cavarero, Nonostante Platone, op. cit., p. 63. This is a contention which informs other chapter 
of In Spite of Plato and other works by Cavarero. I have chosen to restrict my argument to 
Demeter because we have previously discussed Cavarero's interpretation of the myth when 
dealing with maternal potential and the maternal continuum. 
42 ibid., p. 70. 
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at death for a measure of one's existence creates a great deal of anxiety. It is in 
terms of this anxiety that Cavarero explains the male subject's obsession with 
eternity, where the same subject is thought of as universal and where death is 
seen as a detachment from the body. Thirdly, human essence is displaced into 
thought. Here again, Cavarero recuperates the challenge that Arendt addresses in 
The Life of the Mind (1978) to the philosophical dualism established between 
being and appearance. 44 Like Arendt, and Nietzsche before her, Cavarero 
questions the strong tendency of Western philosophy to picture two worlds - one 
real or "true" and one only apparent. What is real and true is the realm of thought 
and ideas, while phenomenal reality is relegated to mere semblance. This is 
understood by Cavarero as "an inversion" or "dematerialisation" of our sense of 
reality. 45 This primary opposition between Being and appearance triggers the 
other dualism between body and thought. 46 We shall see below how Cavarero 
uses this critique to oppose this masculine "autistic intellectUaliSM,, 47 to an 
"elementary realism". 48 For the moment, I just wish to remark that the fourth 
consequence of the conceptual primacy of death is to picture the body as a 
superfluous burden, especially when it is gendered ferninine. 49 Together with 
sexual difference and the body, the mother and the natal order are erased. The 
mother is no longer viewed as the origin of life, but as a "container, 50 necessary 
for the nourishment of bodies. Natality is also reduced to the provision of bodies 
in which thought can spend its earthly life. Restoring the full meaning to natality 
43 The expression comes from Adrienne Rich (See Of Woman Born [London: Virago, 1979], 
p. 11). It is explicitly used by Cavarero in Nonostante Platone, op. cit, p. 105. 
44 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 
pp. 19-65. For example, in the Introduction, Arendt writes: "What has come to an end is the basic 
distinction between the sensory and the suprasensory, together with the notion, at least as old as 
Parmenides, that whatever is not given to the senses - God or Being or the First Principles and 
Causes (archai) or the Ideas - is more real, more truthful, more meaningful that what appears, 
that it Is not just beyond sense perception but above the world of the senses. What is "dead" is not 
only the localization of such "eternal truths" but also the distinction itself'(p. 10). 
45 Cavarero, Nonostante Platone, op. cit., p. 37. 
46 ibid., p. 45. 
47 
ibid., p. 52. 
48 In the introduction to Nonostante Platone, Cavarero calls "elementary realism" the fact of 
insisting on one's corporeal singularity. See Nonostante Platone, op. cit., p. 7. We shall see how 
this insistence on a singularity which is embodied and corporeal is an addition made by Cavarero 
to the Arendtian notions she employs. More will also be said on the feminist strategy of 
"elementary realism" in the second section of this chapter. 
49 Cavarero, "Dire la nascita", op. cit., p-115, Nonostante Platone, op. cit., p. 71, and Corpo in 
Figure, op. cit., especially ch. 2. 
50 Cavarero, Nonostante Platone, op. cit., p. 74. This is also a term that Irigaray uses extensively. 
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thus involves, in Arendt and Cavarero alike, thinking of individuals as natals, 
unique singularitles, and in Cavarero's thought alone, as sexed beings. 
As a forceful and convincing exponent of il pensiero della differenza 
sessuale, Cavarero shares the two themes that Italian feminism inherited from 
Luce Irigaray. At this point, Arendt's notions of reality, atopicality and natality, 
that Cavarero liberally adapts to her feminist needs, impart added strength to the 
critique of the existing symbolic order as monosexual, patriarchal and matricidal. 
But this critique is merely one side of the project of i1pensiero. The other side is, 
in Cavarero's own words, "the restitution of the bisexuality of the world, which 
inevitably involves the re-signifi cation of sexual difference". 51 It is here that 
Cavarero distinguishes herself from Diotima philosophers and entrustment 
theorists. Instead of favouring a political strategy based on feminine mediation, 
Cavarero, chooses an alternative which progressively becomes more Arendtian in 
content. We turn now to consider Cavarero's radical feminist politics. 
Section 11: Cavarero's political practice: refutinp_ entrustment? 
Section 11 of this chapter will be dedicated to a discussion of Cavarero's 
political strategy. We will here again trace an evolution in Cavarero's political 
thought from an Irigarayian "politics of sexual difference" to an Arendtian 
"politics of uniqueness". The differences between the political practice suggested 
by Cavarero and that employed by entrustment theorists will become more acute, 
and will further allow me to determine whether Cavarero's re-conceptualisation 
of the political surpasses some of the difficulties encountered in entrustment. 
This is a key issue in my exegesis of Cavarero's later work. In addition, a new 
question will surface - how does this move from a politics of difference to one of 
uniqueness manage to be afeminist move? In other words, how does Cavarero's 
conception of politics remain afeminist conception? 
51 Cavarero, "Dire ]a nascita", op. cit. p. 108. 
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I. Cavarerols politics of sexual difference: 
The analysis of the existing symbolic order that il pensiero has inherited 
from Irigaray, and that we have re-visited above in the work of Cavarero, shows 
that the erasure of sexual difference is not and cannot be entirely successful. 
Although the existing symbolic order relegates feminine sexual difference to the 
margins of language and thought, the symbolic supremacy of the masculine sex 
relies, nonetheless, on the definition of the feminine as "other of the same". For 
the political strategy followed by Irigaray and il pensiero, this has two 
implications that Cavarero places at the centre of her re-conceptualisation of a 
feminist politics. Firstly, feminine sexual difference resurfaces, in the existing 
symbolic order, as an excess. Secondly, the language and thought which exclude 
and marginalise women are the only ones available to devise an alternative 
feminist politics. Against the backdrop of these consequences, Cavarero uses the 
same deconstructive method found in Irigaray and entrustment theorists. It 
involves looking for, and re-signifying, the traces that the erasure of feminine 
sexual difference has left behind. Emphasising estrangement as the experience 
that women share in virtue of their position in the existing symbolic thus 
becomes the first step of a more complex political strategy. 
Estrangement and conceptual theft. 
In Chapter IV, we have used Cavarero's "Towards a Theory of Sexual 
Difference" to elucidate the workings of such a strategy of re-signification of the 
experience of alienation in/from language. We have seen how Cavarero arrived 
at a multiple and temporary definition of "woman", starting from her place in the 
existing symbolic order. 52 We stressed that this preliminary step was in fact a 
political move aimed at taking women from a situation where they suffer 
estrangement passively, to one where they actively re-possess and re-signify it. 
53 
This preliminary re-signification is also a hermeneutical step which 
Cavarero calls "conceptual theft". It is the traces left by the erasure of sexual 
difference in the narrative figures of philosophy which direct Cavarero's 
52Cavarero, "Towards a Theory of Sexual Difference", op. cit., pp. 199,201. 
53 ibid., p-199. 
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hermeneutic perspective Cavarero then "abducts" these figures E . 
54 
rom their 
contexts and uses them to point towards a different female symbolic as an 
alternative place for PolitiCS. 55 Conceptual theft is akin to Irigaray's notion of 
mimesis. In Irigaray, mimesis designates a political attitude whereby a woman 
assumes the definition that the existing patriarchal order gives of her, exaggerates 
it and by doing so, manages to transcend the meaning originally attached to it. It 
is also in this spirit that some entrustment theorists stress the political resources 
held by the psychoanalytic concept of hysteria. 
Let us use the example of Cavarero's "abduction" of Penelope in In Spite 
of Plato. In the traditional interpretation of Ulysses, Penelope portrays the good 
and faithful wife who preserves, for her husband, both a space (her body and the 
kingdom) and a time (the eternal present that weaving and unweaving maintains). 
Cavarero challenges this version of Penelope by insisting that she does not 
recognise (or, chooses not to recognise) Ulysses at his return from the sea. 56 
Penelope here becomes the figure who has created a space of her own within the 
place assigned to her by patriarchy. The weaving room to which she has been 
confined becomes the place where she is nobody's wife. More than the tapestry, 
what Penelope unweaves is the role (of woman and wife) that the existing order 
has assigned to her. What she weaves in its place is an impenetrable time and 
space of her own, where she may define autonomously who and what she is. 57 
The space that Penelope carves for herself within the existing symbolic is 
"impolitical". Cavarero's notion of the "impolitico " is here to be understood in 
two interconnected ways. 58 Firstly, the "impolitical" is the anti-political. This 
does not mean that Cavarero is opposed to politics as such: it rather signifies that 
women should not seek to be included in the existing symbolic order's 
understanding of "the political". Secondly, the "impolitical" refers to a different 
type of politics wherein feminine sexual difference can feature. However, the 
notion of the "impolitico" must not be understood as the gynocentric evaluation 
of the private sphere over the public one, or as a call for political separatism. 
54 Cavarero, Nonostante Platone , op. cit., p. 6. 55 ibid., pp. 6,15. 
56 Cavarero, Nonostante Platone, op. cit., p. 15. 
57 ibid., p. 18. 
58 A third definition is given to the "impolitico" in Relating Narratives where the "'impolitico 
also means a "lack-of-politics" (cf Cavarero, Relating Narratives, p. 57). We will come back to 
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Rather, I would argue that it is to be read as an implicit feminist critique of 
Hannah Arendt's tripartite categories of private/social/public and 
labour/work/action. Penelope's activity escapes these tripartite distinctions. Her 
act of weaving and unweaving cannot be considered as action because it takes 
place in the domestic sphere. It is not work either because it does not produce an 
object which gives permanence to the world (Penelope undoes by night what she 
has just woven by day). Penelope does not "labour" either - although her 
weaving/unweaving is repetitive, confined to the private sphere and unseen by 
others, it is not vital to the continuation of life. Similarly, Penelope's time is not 
that of action as it does not involve new and unexpected beginnings; instead it is 
predictable and eternally set in the present. Yet, what Penelope does at home is 
similar to action because it has the political consequence of postponing a political 
marriage, thus preserving Ulysses' crown. It could also be considered as "a new 
beginning", that is, an alternative, novel, and unexpected way to approach the 
activity which has been assigned to her. Some commentators have seen in 
Cavarero's challenge to Arendt's cherished distinction between private and 
public a possible support of the feminist motto "the personal is political" . 
59 What 
is certain is that it remains an objection to the Arendtian time of action as the 
accumulation of the new which projects the protagonist towards the future and its 
possible experiences. 60 Therefore, even in Arendt, action is directed towards 
death, which implies the dissolution of the body and the ignorance of sexual 
difference. 61 
The "Impolifico ": feminine realism and the politics of the body. 
Cavarero's Penelope also displays a particular quality that both entrustment 
and Diotima theorists value highly. We have already encountered it in Chapter 
IV as a foun of "feminine realism". In relation to Penelope, it is described as a 
sort of intelligence which is aware of the contextual demands of a particular 
the "impolitical" as lack-of-politics when dealing with Cavarero's discussion of the role played 
by consciousness-rai sing practices within Italian feminism in the 1970s. 
59This possible interpretation of Penelope in In Spite of Plato was alluded to in a paper entitled 
"Elizabethan 'spinning' and Penelope's Weaving: The Political, the Common Law and Stately 
Bodies", given by Janice Richardson during the Warwick conference on Cavarero ("The State 
He's In: Political Philosophy and the Figural", 19.05.2004). 
60 Cavarero, Nonostante Platone, op. cit., p. 16. 
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situation, yet manages to transcend them. 62 We have alluded to a similar attitude 
when describing the mechanism of entrustment. In an early essay for i1pensiero, 
Cavarero argues that women will represent themselves by privileging 
relationships with such women. 63 It seems that Cavareros Penelope is one of 
them. By carving a place for herself within the existing symbolic, Penelope has 
devised the premise for a political strategy which displaces women's usual 
dichotomous choice between exclusion and assimilation. 
In Cavarero, this realism is attached to the body. Weaving and unweaving 
are corporeal activities. In addition, Penelope is a "'whole' that does not accept 
the separation of body (manual labour) and mind (thought). ý64 The intellectual 
part of manual labour is usually seen as minimal and inferior to the kind of 
intellect displayed by men in public. For Cavarero, Penelope does not contest the 
fact that she is "a whole" of body and mind, and instead reasserts the intellectual 
part of that whole that her physical gesture of weaving now supports. The 
"impolitico " that Penelope represents is thus a politics of the body, and it is one 
diametrically opposed to that of philosophy. Whilst, for Cavarero, philosophy 
stresses death as the final liberation of thought from its corporeal prison, and as 
the separation of body from thought (or mind), Penelope reconnects the two. This 
time, Penelope's weaving becomes even more important than her unweaving 
since she weaves back what philosophy unweaves (the connection between body 
and thought). 65 In this politics where the body features, sexual difference can 
feature as well. We will see how this politics of the body is taken a step further 
in For More Than One Voice (2003). 
2. The politics of uniqueness: 
Up to this point, we have considered Cavarero's political strategy in terms 
of a deconstructive method shared with other exponents of il pensiero, 
entrustment theonsts included. However, like all labels and categorisations, a 
61 
]bid., p. 22. 
62 
ibid., p. 20- 
63 Cavarero, 'Velaborazione filosofica della differenza sessuale", op. cit., p. 181. 
64 Cavarero, Nonostante Patone, op. cit., p. 20. 
65 ibid., p. 3 1. 
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name like il pensiero della differenza sessuale carries the risk of concealing 
important differences in the theoretical location that Cavarero, the philosophers 
of Diotima and entrustment theorists respectively occupy. It is rather telling that 
Cavarero, in an aforementioned essay on feminist theory, presents her own work 
in a section set apart from that reserved for contemporary Italian feminism and 
entitled "anomalous positions in the contemporary geo-philosophy of 
feminism". 66 The first section of this chapter has already stressed the early 
references to Arendtian categories which stamp the originality of Cavarero's 
critique of the monosexual symbolic. It is now time to assess what Cavarero's 
present position (as "Arendtian") entails for a feminist political practice as well 
as for a critical evaluation of the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. 
Disparity and uniqueness: the "what " and the "who ". 
Stressing and valuing disparity between women is the alternative to 
egalitarian politics and it is the strategy at the centre of the social-symbolic 
practice that entrustment theorists propose. Entrustment is structured by an 
empowering disparity between two women who, by virtue of their position in 
relation to the existing social-symbolic, share an identical historical condition 
which forces them to live their "being women" as estrangement. Whilst the 
theme of disparity between women also appears in Cavarero's early exposition of 
il pensiero della dififerenza, it is eclipsed by the concept of uniqueness in her 
later works. From the early texts analysed in Section 1, one can trace a different 
political agenda in Adriana Cavarero - if she emphasises differences between 
women, it is to later contend that every single existent is different because it is 
unique. 67 The uniqueness of the living existent is a theme which becomes central 
to Cavarero's recent work, and which she inherits from Hannah Arendt. 
66 Adriana Cavarero, "D pensiero femmimsta. Un approcio teorico", op. cit., p. 140 [my 
translation]. According to Cavarero's classification, another "anomalous" position is occupied by 
Christine Battersby (pp. 138,156). Indeed, Cavarero and Battersby's ideas overlap. In The 
Phenomenal Woman, Battersby's search for a feminist metaphysics which would take women as 
norm, by exploring "an ontology in which 'self and 'other' intertwine in ways that allow us to 
think identity alongside radical novelty, power-dependency and birth" strongly recalls many 
aspects of Cavarero's work. See Christine Battersby, The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist 
Metaphysics and the Pattern of1dentity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 2-3. 
67 "Single existent", "unique existent" are expressions which are reminiscent of Jean-Luc 
Nancy's work. In recent years, Nancy's philosophy has appeared repeatedly in Cavarero's texts. 
Cavarero has referred to his own critique of the subject as that which calls up a "what", an 
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Arendt's concept of uniqueness relies on the distinction between "who" 
and "what" somebody is. It is one's words and deeds that reveal to others "who" 
somebody is, that is his uniqueness and singularity. Revealing "Who" one is thus 
requires witness(es). It hence involves human plurality, the existence of a 
public/political space where all unique existents "appear" and "exhibit" who they 
are through speech and action. 68 In its attempt to define Man, philosophy is 
unable to express the "who", precisely because it denies plurality. When trying to 
arrive at a definition of Man, that is in its search for generalities, philosophy falls 
back into the description of "what" somebody is - "his qualities, gifts, talents, 
and shortcomings which he may display or hide"69 and which this person 
possibly shares with others. If philosophy is insufficient, literature provides 
better tools for expressing human singularity and plurality because "every 
individual life can eventually be told as a story with a beginning and an end. , 70 
Arendt asserts that "Who somebody is or was can be known only by knowing the 
story of which he is himself a hero - his biography, in other words .,, 
7 1 The 
consequences of one's words and deeds are almost always unpredicted and 
unpredictable, and somebody's life story is open to multiple significations. 72 
Therefore "who" somebody is always revealed by an other, ex post facto, and 
never achieves "closure". 
essence, but also promises and, at the same time conceals, the singular existent. See Jean-Luc 
Nancy, Eduardo Cavada and Peter Conner (eds. ), Who Comes After the Subject (New York: 
Routledge, 1991). When I asked Cavarero about the influence Nancy exercised on her present 
work, she answered that "Nancy is an interesting thinker [ ... ]. However, there are two things that 
I would like to say about Nancy. Firstly, he is inspired by Hannah Arendt but scarcely says so 
[which] seems to me to be slightly disrespectful. Secondly, Nancy has a postmodern sensibility 
which I do not share. The 'unique existent' of which Nancy speaks of is passive, void of action. 
Nancy belongs to these philosophers who valorise passivity. Again, his position for me is more 
aesthetic than political. I am very Arendtian and what is important for me is action [ ... ] Politics is 
about action, about taking up a position. This is the step that Nancy does not make. In addition, 
Nancy tends to link what is human to what is not. On the one hand, this is interesting because we 
should all be conscious of ecological issues. But the link between what is human and what is not 
cannot for the basis of a politics. It has more to do with aesthetics. " In "Politicizing Theory" 
(section 4), and A piý voci (pp. 211-214), Cavarero stresses the usefulness of Nancy's thought - 
his stress on singularity, on the "knot" as relation between unique existent, and his politics of 
44singular plural" - for a re-conceptualisation of the self However, she deems him less useful for 
rethinking the political since the singular, the knot, and the "singular plural" do not involve 
action, but are more "ways of being". Ultimately, Cavarero criticises Nancy for collapsing 
politics into ontology. It is beyond the scope of my thesis to evaluate such a criticism. For another 
instance of direct confrontation between these two thinkers, see Cavarero, "L'orecchio di 
Nancy", aut aut 316-317 (2003): 68-76. 
68 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 180. 
69 
ibid., p. 179. 
70 ibid., p. 184. 
71 ibid., p. 18 6. 
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In the past fifteen years, Cavarero has positioned the Arendtian concepts of 
uniqueness and relationality at the centre of her political theory. Cavarero's 
Relating Narratives displays this Arendtian legacy. In the introduction for 
example, Cavarero relies on an anecdote, told by Karen Blixen (Isak Dinesen) in 
Out of Africa, to introduce some of the Arendtian themes at the centre of this 
particular work. Here, in the stork, we have the allegory of a unique, unintended 
and unforseeable existence, traced in the snow; the fragile figure of a stork which 
is only glimpsed, after the nocturnal episode when looking from a detached point 
of view. Chapter One of Relating Narratives can also complete our search for a 
common ground between Cavarero and Arendt. Cavarero interprets Sophocles' 
King Oedipus as the tragic story of a man who privileges the "what" over the 
"who". "At a time when he has yet to learn who he is, Oedipus recognizes 
himself in the definition of Man. , 73 Oedipus, refusing to know his birth, is forced 
to deny his uniqueness, something which leads him to a tragic end. "Who" 
Oedipus is, is revealed to him by many others, especially through the 
retrospective gaze of the blind Teiresias. Thus, through his speech and actions, 
Oedipus, without wanting or being conscious of it, exhibits "who" he is to others, 
on an interactive and plural scene. 
The desirefor narration. 
For both Arendt and Cavarero, then, the self is unique and re-enacts or 
actualises the singularity given to him by birth on a shared political scene 
through words and deeds. As Mary Dietz writes of Arendt, this means favouring 
the "who-ness of acting" over the "what-ness of being", 74 a philosophy of 
existence over one of essence. It also implies, for both Arendt and Cavarero, that 
the meaning of a particular existence is best glimpsed, not in the universal 
discourse of philosophy, but in "polyphonic" 75 life-stories told, ex postfacto, to 
the existent by others who have witnessed the words and deeds of the actor. 
72 ibid., p. 187. 
73 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, op. cit., p. q. 
74 Mary G. Dietz, "Feminist Receptions of Hannah Arendt" in Bonnie Honig (ed. ), Feminist 
Interpretations ofHannah Arendt, op. cit., p. 32. 
75 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, op. cit., p. 12. 
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However, Cavarero brings additional elements to Arendt's conception of 
the unique existent, ones which are important to take into consideration for a 
feminist political strategy. What a life story reveals is both a unique and 
unrepeatable identity and a desire to hear that singular identity. 76 That is why, in 
Cavarero's text and in very different contexts, both Ulysses and the Milanese 
housewife Emilia (who will turn out to be a pivotal character in our discussion of 
Cavarero'sfeminist, politics) weep. At last, their fundamental desire to hear their 
story being told has been unexpectedly recognised and answered. It is an 
"immediate"77 desire. Emphasising her contention that, in Arendt, the time of 
action is oriented towards death, Cavarero argues that Ulysses does not partake 
in heroic actions because of a desire to be narrated and thus remembered 
posthumously. Action is not a challenge to death. Ulysses' tears rather show a 
desire to hear one's story in life. 
Desire is also constitutive of the self - the self knows itself (and others 
around him) to be narratable and thus desires this narration. Following Arendt, 
this means that, from its birth, the self is exhibited to others through speech and 
actions. Departing from Arendt, it also implies that, because it can be exposed, 
this same self "senses itself '[assaporarsi]78 to be narratable and comes to desire 
his narration from the mouth of another. The characteristics of exposure and 
narration are thus conditions of the self, but these characteristics do not re-confer 
upon it an essence. Cavarero insists that the self is narratable and not narrated. 
The content of the narration of one's life story does not matter and does not alter 
the fact that this story can be told . 
79Rejecting the thesis of the performative 
power of narration, Cavarero argues that the self is not an effect of the text 
either. 80 Rather, she coincides with this desire to have a text about her life story. 
But a question remains - why do we desire our story to be told, or, in 
Cavarero's own words, "what exactly is desired by this desire? ,. 8 1 To the 
Arendtian category of uniqueness, Cavarero adds that of unity. Despite her 
76 ibid ., p. 32. 77 
ibid ., p. 
33. 
78 ibid ., p. 
35. 
79 ibid ., p. 
35. 
80 
Ibid ., pp. 
35,37. 
81 
ibid ., p. 
37. 
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declared and clamorous dislike for psychoanalysiSý82 I would argue that 
Cavarero's account of desire contains strong psychoanalytic undertones which 
recall the ones at the basis of the social-symbolic practice of entrustment. 
Cavarero opposes the unity of the One (the universal Man) to that of the one (as 
singular, as unique existent). The unity of the unique existent involves not only 
natality as the occurrence of new and unforeseen beginnings, but birth - the baby 
who is born is always a unique singularity. The new-born - unique and 
immediately expressive in the fragile totality of her exposure - has her unity 
precisely in this totally nude self-exposure. "This unity", Cavarero writes, "is 
already a physical identity, visibly sexed, and even more perfect in so far as she 
is not yet qualificable. , 83 Nonetheless, this time of perfect correspondence 
between unity and identity is ephemeral. With the immediate unfolding of time, 
this conformity between identity and unity is turned into a distant memory (the 
sense that one's unity is narratable) and into desire. , 
The importance that birth takes in the narratable self s desire for its unity to 
be narrated allows Cavarero to stress the third characteristic of the self - the self 
is unique, narratable and relational. Autobiography is unreliable because 
personal memory fails to recall the details of one's birth, the details of that unity 
that quickly withers away and that we wish to recover. 84 The unity that one 
desires necessarily begins by the birth that only another (often one's mother, as 
we will later stress) can narrate. 
Cavarero also distinguishes unity from homogeneity. 85 The desire in 
question is "the desire for unity which asks the narration of another above all to 
be recognised as desire. , 86 It is not the text of the story but my desire which 
confers unity. We have already pointed out that, because the self is narratable 
82 When interviewing Cavarero at Warwick, I was struck by Cavarero's vehement rejection of 
psychoanalysis: "I am familiar with psychoanalytic theory because, for an academic working in 
the field of political theory, it is inevitable not to be... but I do not have any interest In it. I do not 
exclude it as unimportant for feminism because it has been very influential for feminists such as 
Irigaray, de Lauretis, Butler, but I personally try to avoid using psychoanalytical categories in my 
writings. [Like] Hannah Arendt, I can say that I loathe psychoanalysis. I get teased in Italy about 
the fact that I avoid using psychoanalytic theory - there is a kind of joke that Adriana does not 
have an unconscious! " Adriana Cavarero also cited the importance of psychoanalytic theory for 
the theory of entrustment as one of the reasons why she refused to support this social-symbolic 
practice. 83 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, op. cit., p. 3 8. 
84 ibid., p. 39. 
85 
ibid., p. 72. 86 ibid., p. 42. 
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and not narrated, her 11fe-story can be polyphonic. It can come from different 
sources and have diverse contents. When conversing with post-modem and 
poststructuralist feminist theory, mainly of Anglo-American provenance, 
Cavarero emphasises that stressing unity does not mean moving closer to a 
t. (. )5 87 unitary, substantial and self-referential subject . 
It is perhaps in this respect that Arendt is Cavarero's best ally. Indeed, 
Cavarero uses Arendt's philosophy to argue that, because uniqueness constantly 
and relentlessly shows itself in action, it can never be substantiated or frozen into 
a content. "The unity lies precisely in this insubstitutability that persists 
[permane] in time because it continues to present itself in time". 88 Even a 
posthumous life-story does not satisfy homogeneity, because the unity that the 
life-story confers ex post facto is, for Cavarero and contra Arendt, inscribed in 
the economy of desire. This desire, as said above, is immediate. One desires to 
hear one's own life-story whilst still alive and, ultimately, in Hegelian fashion, 
desires her desire to be recognised. 
The narratable selfand Italian feminism. 
Chapter III of this thesis showed how the practice of storytelling lay at the 
heart of the history of Italian feminism. Cavarero devotes a full chapter of 
Relating Narratives to a discussion of such a practice, thus situating her political 
strategy within that of contemporary Italian feminism. As it has become her 
habit, Cavarero begins her discussion with an anecdote, that of the friendship that 
Emilia and Amalia forged while attending "the 150-hour schools" ("le scuole 
87 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, p. 69. For a comparative discussion of Cavarero and Butler, see 
Paul A. Kottman's rich introduction to Relating Narratives, op. cit., pp. vii-xxxi. Cavarero 
explicitly discusses Butler in "Il pensiero femminista. Un approccio teorico" in A. Cavarero and 
F. Restaino, Lefilosofiefemministe, op. cit., pp. 154-156, and in "Politicizing theory", op. cit., 
p. 520. I would also like to point out that Cavarero often mentions the "theoretical isolationism" 
of the members of Diotima as a reason why she distanced herself from the group in the 1990s. 
During the interview in Warwick, Cavarero declared: "To a certain extent, my position is 
pluralist [ ... 
] in that I am very interested in debating my ideas with different perspectives [ ... 
]I 
find positions which are radical and different from mine (like those of Butler and Braidotti) very 
challenging, even when they are held by men like Nancy and Derrida. This openness to other 
opinions does not exist within Diotima. Diotima is a group structured around internal, not 
external debate. It is true that Diotima has contacts with other women's groups but these are 
groups which share the same ideas, and which look to Diotima as a guide [ ... 
] in Relating 
Narratives, there is a constant dialogue with American feminism and literary theory, with what 
they have to say on biography, on the subject. This type of dialogue is absent from the texts of 
Diotima. " 
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delle 150 ore") . 
89 Amalia has the gift of expression and communication and 
whenever she exchanges the stories she has written with Emilia, who does not 
possess such talent, the latter weeps and expresses her desire to be able to talk 
about her life. Amalia, who comes to know Emilia's story from the scattered 
details given orally, decides to write her friend's story. On the reception of such 
gift, Emilia is overcome by emotion and always carries her life-story close to her, 
in her handbag. 90 
Apart from strengthening Cavarero's previous contention on the self s 
desire for narration that the other recognises and satisfies, this anecdote offers 
Cavarero the opportunity to examine Arendt's distinction between private and 
public, and her allocation of action to the latter, in the light of women's 
experience. Cavarero points out that the difference between Ulysses and Emilia 
is that the fon-ner is a hero who has access to an interactive public space where he 
can exhibit himself, whilst the latter is a Milanese housewife whose only scene is 
the "impolitical" ("impolitico ") private house. Here the "impolitical" is not the 
44anti-political" and does not indicate a different type of politics, as it did earlier 
in our discussion of Penelope. The "impolitical" takes on the new signification of 
"without politics", where "politics" is understood in Arendtian terms as "a plural 
and interactive space of exhibition". 91 While Cavarero adopts Arendt's 
interpretation of Western history as a history of depoliticization, she argues that, 
because of "the dominant social codes". this lack-of-politics takes a dual form for 
women. On the one hand, women are traditionally denied a public space of 
exhibition and expression. On the other hand, and this is where Cavarero makes 
the link with her earlier work as an exponent of il pensiero della differenza 
sessuale, women remain at the margins of the patriarchal symbolic order. 
Therefore, "Whether on the level of expression or on the level of representation, 
women find themselves trapped between a double powerlessness that concerns 
both uniqueness and quality. ), 92 Hence the usual resource that friendship (and 
love) represent for a woman, like Emilia, who has the desire to exhibit her 
uniqueness. Cavarero extends action to the private sphere of relationships. 
88 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, op. cit., p. 72. 
ry YM 89 The Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theo of Social-S bolic 
Practice (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 102-107. 
90 ibid, pp. 105-106. 
" Cavarero, Relating Narratives, op. cit., p. 57. 
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Friendship is indeed "the scene where uniqueness constitutes itself 'in 
relation"', 93 as the story of Amalia and Emilia illustrates. The "political act" of 
exhibition is here one of self-narration (autobiography). Emilia provides Amalia 
with disjointed details of her life, which Amalia weaves together in the narration 
of her friend's life-story. 
This same mechanism, one that sees autobiography/biography coincide to 
reveal the life-story, 
94 
is at work in consciousness-rai sing groups, where "the 
95 feminine custom of self-narration finds a political scene" . The 
consci ousness-rai sing group is also the other prime example of a space where 
politics and narration intersect. This is particularly true of its Italian version 
which,, as seen in Chapters III and IV, stresses "practices" ("the relationships 
between women". "the practice of starting from oneself 1, etc. ) and their link with 
the historical and political context. Cavarero thus uses the consciousness-rai sing 
group to dissociate gender from the "what" of qualities, where Arendt assigns it 
because of her rejection of corporeality, and reintroduces it as an ontological 
component of uniqueness. She anticipates the objection which chastises 
consci ousness-rai sing groups for hypostatising the female gender by inviting 
women to identify with all other women. Cavarero acknowledges this risk, 
inherent in feminist politics, of mobilising an essentialised political agent in view 
of collective action. However, she still retains the phenomenon of autocoscienza 
since it shows that "the impulse for self-narration, at the moment in which it 
generates a political space, roots itself [ ... ] in a self that 
is constitutively 
sexed. 5996 Like the technique used by Penelope, consciousness-raising becomes a 
sign, an indication, of a possible and multiple political strategy. Consciousness- 
raising belongs to the "impolitico " because it is not longer "apolitical" (that is, 
without a public space of exhibition and appearance) but still "anti-political" 
(namely, against the traditional definition of politics) and is indicative of a 
different type of politics. Like entrustment theorists, Cavarero stresses that 
consciousness-rai sing, while indicative of one route to pursue, must be 
92 ibid., p. 58. 
93 
ibid., p. 58. 94 
ibid., p. 63. 95 
ibid., p. 59. 96 
ibid., p. 61- 
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97 complemented. Can entrustment, like the practice of autocoscienza be 
considered as "another piece in the mosaic of a potential female symbolic 
order"'? 
98 
The social-symbolic practice of entrustment: a practice ofstorytelling? 
It is interesting to note that, whilst Cavarero explicitly refers to some 
important Italian practices put into place in the 1970s and 1980s, she never 
alludes to the social-symbolic practice which has been the object of my thesis. 
Why, then, doesn't Cavarero consider entrustment? Is it a sign of her 
disapproval, or is it because, despite her professed antipathy for this social- 
symbolic practice, some elements suggest that entrustment could be considered 
as a practice of narration? 
A number of common elements can be drawn from a comparison between 
Cavarero's conception of storytelling and the social-symbolic practice of 
entrustment. On the surface, entrustment could indeed be considered as an 
exemplary practice where biography and autobiography, as well as narration and 
politics, intersect and where the desire for narration roots itself in a self which is 
constitutively sexed. Both storytelling and entrustment are also relationships of 
desire. A woman entrusts herself to another by virtue of a desire that she wants to 
translate socially, while not forgetting the fact that she is a woman. Similarly, the 
narratable self desires her story to be narrated by another in order to confer upon 
her both uniqueness and unity. 
In addition, both storytelling and entrustment are relational. In storytelling, 
each one of us entrusts his or her identity to another's tale; in entrustment, one 
entrusts to an affidataria her desire to make her sexual difference count socially. 
Because of the importance Cavarero gives to natality as actual birth, it is often 
the mother, as other, who is best able to describe the first chapter of the story 
97 Milan Women's 
i 
Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference, op. cit., p. 84. As said in Chapter III 
of this thesis, "static separatism" refers to those years at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of 
the 1980s when the laws on divorce, contraception and abortion had been secured. The future 
entrustment theorists felt that feminism, as theorised and practised in consciousness-raising 
groups (gruppi di autocoscienza) was functioning as a ready-made discourse without visible 
effects on political and social reality. "Static separatism" or "ideological feminism" was also 
rejected on the basis that it assigned a universal identity to women, where sexual difference was 
defined in terms of battered housewives, raped women or women who had suffered abortion. 
18 Cavarero, Nonostante Platone, op. cit., p. 125 n. 5. 
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stubbornly sought by the narratable self with all her desire. 99 The desire 
expressed here is to go back to "the miracle of the beginning"100 when unity and 
identity coincide. In a relationship of entrustment, it is also a question of 
recreating the language of that initial relationship when, following the 
description given by Muraro in L'ordine simbolico della madre, mother and 
daughter together create the world by naming it according to their shared 
experience of it. As we will shortly see when dealing with Cavarero's politics of 
the voice, mother and daughter together create a language. Arguing for a 
relational subject (in entrustment) and a relational self (in storytelling) is an 
evident challenge to the subject of the existing symbolic and modem 
philosophical discourse, that subject who defines himself by rejecting the other. 
Likewise, both entrustment and storytelling stress "the essentiality of the 
context and the inessentiality of the text". 101 Cavarero stresses her disregard for 
the content of the life-story narrated, or the identity of the narrator. The life- 
stories are always polyphonic, their content is never definite and always in 
process. A relationship of entrustment is also always tied to a specific situation 
and to a particular desire to be carried out in society, thanks to a particular 
affidataria. It is also said that the act of entering into a relationship of 
entrustment is more important than the actual advice or identity of the 
affidataria. As seen in the preceding chapters, some entrustment theorists do not 
foreclose the possibility that desire is not entirely translatable into the "sense of 
ease" expected. The subjectivity arrived at in entrustment is thus neither 
"whole", nor void of ambiguities and contradictions. In the course of one's life, 
one can enter into several relationships of entrustment (which can sometimes be 
simultaneous). Finally, the positions of narrator/narrated, affidatarialentrustee 
can permutate or be assumed simultaneously. Such a stress on contextuality and 
formalism in storytelling and entrustment is used by both Cavarero and 
entrustment theorists to avoid hypostasizing, respectively, the female subject and 
the self 
Despite these obvious similarities, differences subsist and obstruct a 
straightforward categorisation of entrustment as a politics of narration. First of 
99 ibid., p. 39- 
100 ibid., p. 38- 
101 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, op. cit., p. 75. 
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all, Cavarero has never employed such terms as the "Symbolic Mother". The 
relationship of storytelling also loses the liberal undertones of entrustment. It is 
not a "contract" which one chooses to enter into and which involves an 
"obligation" to pay a "symbolic debt". Since it is not a contract, the narrator does 
not have to conform to any preventive rules (that the affidataria must respect in 
order not to misuse the disparity which separates her from the entrustee). 
Secondly, desire is not quite conceptualised in the same way. In Cavarero, 
desire is constitutive of the narratable self, regardless of her gender. Both men 
and women feel the same desire to be narrated, and wish this desire to be 
recognised and answered. In entrustment, the desire to count in society while not 
forgetting one's sexual difference is a desire which, by virtue of the place 
occupied by women within the existing symbolic, is specifically feminine. 
Equally, unlike narrator and actor who do not necessarily share the same sex, it is 
a precondition of a relationship of entrustment that entrustee and affidataria do. 
Thirdly, and as a result, a relationship of entrustment is much more 
voluntarist in nature - both the relationship of entrustment and the affidataria are 
chosen. In Cavarero, storytelling is always desired (something which one could 
contest), but often unforeseen and not chosen. It is the case with Ulysses and 
Emilia who both weep at having their desire for narration unexpectedly answered 
and recognised. Narration, in Cavarero, thus acquires the characteristics of a gift. 
Without this voluntarist element, can storytelling still be counted as a political 
strategy? I shall come back to this important question in the concluding 
paragraphs of this chapter. 
The fourth major difference regards the concept of power. As seen, 
Cavarero values difference between women (and men) as uniqueness rather than 
disparity. Cavarero insists that if a disparity exists in the relationship between 
two singular existents, then it is purely accidental and not chosen. In Cavarero's 
storytelling, the narrator does not possess authority, even when the "authority" is 
taken in its literal sense as authorship. Following Arendt on this point, Cavarero 
insists that neither narrator nor actor are the authors of the life-stories. The 
former just relates the words and deeds of the former, who does not know in 
advance "who" he exhibits. 
In addition, Cavarero professes that entrustment carries the risk of too 
much psychological dependency between an entrustee and an affidataria who is, 
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first and foremost, a guide, a model or a mentor. ' 02 In Relating Narratives, 
Cavarero declares that a politics of uniqueness "does not support empathy, 
identification or confusions. "' 03 This is the reason why it follows an "altruistic 
ethics of relation" where the other is irreducibly other. Under such an ethics, "No 
matter how much the larger traits of our life-stories are similar, I still do not 
recognise myself in you and, even less, in the collective we. ", 04 Hence the 
aforementioned limits of the practice of consciousness-rai sing, and the questions 
it calls forth for feminist politics. 
Nevertheless, if one wants to transform Cavarero's philosophy of 
storytelling into a political practice, some of the problems already encountered in 
entrustment resurface. I would suggest that, if storytelling is to be considered a 
political practice, valuing uniqueness over disparity is not enough to evict the 
questions of power and psychological dependency. For instance, one could point 
out that, although she is not the author of the story, the narrator, like the 
psychoanalyst or the affidataria, still enjoys considerable power since she 
possesses greater knowledge, does not commit herself emotionally, and is not 
judged on the truthfulness of her intervention. Cavarero accepts the resemblance 
between her version of storytelling and psychoanalysis, 105 but avoids too many 
similarities to be drawn by her exhibitive account of the self Indeed, the self is 
completely expressive and "symptomatically external in so far as it is entrusted 
to the gaze, or the tale, of another. " 106 Unlike entrustment, the aim is not to locate 
something internal, deep and intimate, the content of a specific unconscious 
desire to be expressed in reality since this desire, which shows itself through 
exhibitive action, is known to be the desire for narration. Unlike entrustment, 
there is no question of (temporary) transference between narrator and narrated. 
One of the advantages of Cavarero's philosophy of storytelling is thus to resist 
the traps of essentialism - there is no hidden core to the self. 
However, Cavarero still overlooks a number of questions and problems. 
First, and as we have argued against entrustment, power does not disappear with 
the interchangeability of positions between narrator and the person whose story 
102 Adriana Cavarero herself pointed to those differences between narration and entrustment in 
the Warwick interview. 
103 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, op. cit., p. 9 1. 
104 
ibid., p. 92. 
105 
ibid., p. 64. 
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is narrated. Secondly, even if a relationship of narration is not structured by 
disparity, how is this relation affected when there is a difference in power 
between narrator and the person whose story is narrated? Thirdly, 
countertransference, already ignored by entrustment theorists, is also overlooked 
by Cavarero. The following questions remain unanswered - what are the affects 
and desires aroused in the narrator by his relationship to the person whose story 
she tells? What motivates a unique existent to pose as a narrator? What 
imaginary sustains the relationship between narrator and actor? Thirdly, is the 
content of the story really irrelevant? However much the text of our life stories is 
cast aside by the fact that we are narratable and not narrated, there a risk that 
one might feel more "attached" to that particular narrator who pictures a 
flattering image of one's identity. The image, the content, would indeed be 
composed of one's qualities - one's "what" - and this is not what Cavarero has 
in mind. But it is easy to be seduced by this "what", and to become dependent on 
the story told by an indulgent narrator. Equally, one can be ashamed of the 
content of one's life story and refute it. Thus, Liz Mitchell asks whether Emilia 
((carr[ied] her life story always with her because the story fulfilled her desire, or 
because she wanted to keep this very private document to her person? ". 107 Hence, 
this desire for exposure and narration of one's story could also be questioned, 
especially when it is left in the hands of an other. ' 08 
We will now conclude with a brief analysis of Cavarero's latest work in 
order to see whether the problems outlined above are resolved by her recent 
philosophy of vocal expression. An exegesis of For More Than One Voice will 
also serve to determine the extent to which Cavarero's political strategy 
compares with entrustment, il pensiero and feminism in general, and to what 
degree her move from a politics of sexual difference to one of uniqueness and 
relationality remains afeminist move. 
106 ibid., p. 41. See also p. 23. 
107 Liz Mitchell, "Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood" in Women's Philosophy Review 
27 (2001): 85. For another opponent to Cavarero's assertion that one desires one's story to be 
told, see Carolyn Steedman, "I Want to Tell You a Story", Radical Philosophy 105 (Jan. 2001): 
45-48. 
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The politics of the voice and the politics of locality. 
In her latest work, For More Than One Voice, Cavarero returns to the 
unique, relational and plural existent ignored by philosophy. In order to insist 
further on the corporeality of this uniqueness and relationality, Cavarero focuses 
on the voice, as the mark of all these ontological categories of the self. Through 
the voice, one can perceive both sex and age. The voice also shows the 
relationality of the human condition because it is destined to be heard. It is 
contextual and requires what Arendt would have referred to as the condition of 
plurality, but which Cavarero here conceives as a system of bodily 
C(. resonance 11 . 
109 With the voice, one arrives at a phenomenology, which for the 
Arendtian Cavarero, is simultaneously an ontology, of "uniqueness-in- 
resonance"). 110 
Since Western metaphysics is obsessed with eternal and universal truths, 
with the privileging of the mind over the body, it has come to exclude the theme 
of the voice from its consecutive speculations on ontology. ' 11 The voice, as it is 
manifested in speech, comes to be thought solely as that which signifies. 112 This 
has the three-fold consequence of privileging the semantic part of the speech 
over the vocal, of conceptualising speech as a vehicle for thought, and of 
108 Mitchell, "Relating Narratives", op. cit., p. 85. 
109 On the interpretation of the theme of resonance, see the chapter of For More Than One Voice 
dedicated to the myth of Echo. 
110 Cavarero, A piý voci [For More Than One Voice], op. cit., p. 217. 
111 1 would like to point out that Cavarero does acknowledge the attempts made by several 
disciplines to reckon with the theme of the voice. However, all these sources of interest for the 
voice fail to study the voice as carrying an embodied uniqueness and relationality. It is beyond 
the scope of my study to evaluate here Cavarero's criticism of thinkers such as Roland Barthes 
(p. 216-217), Emmanuel Levinas (pp. 35-43,192-193) and Franz Rosensweig (pp. 29-31,191- 
191). However, it is here important to say a little more about Cavarero's reading of Jacques 
Derrida, to whom Cavarero dedicates For More Than One Voice ( p. 233) and whose Speech and 
Phenomena is. discussed in the postscript (pp. 233-263). Cavarero sees the resources that the voice 
offers for a critique of Western philosophy's logocentrism. The voice is an element of speech. 
From Aristotle, the voice is the logos which signifies. Cavarero starts from the analysis and 
critique of the "metaphysics of presence" made by Derrida in Speech and Phenomena. Derrida 
links "presence" to a certain form of phonocentrism. The voice of phenomenological 
consciousness is the voice of thought - namely, the voice of the individual who hears himself 
speak, and the presence of the signified in the acoustic signifier. Cavarero argues that Derrida's 
contribution lies in opening the theme of the voice and of its relation to metaphysics. However, 
Cavarero adds that the voice targeted by Derrida privileges semantics over vocality. It is the 
voice which signifies. It is "related to the speech of a self-referential subject who basically speak 
to himself' (A Piý voci, OP- cit., p. 246, trans. p. 224). The voice is here the metaphorical voice of 
consciousness, devoid of vocality. If the voice is not thought as corporeal, relational and unique, 
then logocentrism and phonocentrism become interrelated. 
112 A piý voci., OP. cit., pp. 45-52. 
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rendering speech impersonal. The act of speaking is separated from the speaker 
and listener to find its origin in thought. In For More Than One Voiceý the voice 
is still conceived as an element of speech since it is still destined to the spoken 
word. However, Cavarero's task lies in stressing the vocal part of speech (the 
voice as an ontological indicator of the singularity, plurality of unique existents 
in relation). Cavarero, hence seeks to interrogate the "the vocal phenomenology 
of uniqueness" or "vocal ontology of uniqueness". ' 13 
What is interesting for our discussion here and what grounds For More 
Than One Voice in il pensiero della differenza sessuale is Cavarero's suspicion 
that the type of philosophy which refuses to thematise the voice is informed by 
the patriarchal symbolic order. We here find a familiar contention already 
developed in In Spite ofPlato and in Stately Bodies. In Cavarero's view, all that 
philosophy excludes or devalues (the voice, the particular, the body) is then 
associated to Woman, while all that is valued (thought, the universal, reason) is 
viewed as the sole property of Man. ' 14 Cavarero insists that, although voice is 
destined to speech, it is not reducible to speech. - The relationship between 
vocality and semantics is one of excess but the dominant tradition of Western 
philosophy has turned this excess into a lack. ' 15 This examination of the status of 
the voice is reminiscent of il pensiero, and of Cavarero's earlier analyses of the 
position of the feminine sexual difference in the existing symbolic order. 
Feminine sexual difference is seen to be lacking in relation to the male model, 
and women are therefore alienated in and from language. However, feminine 
sexual difference manages to pierce through the existing symbolic order as 
excess. If both the voice and feminine sexual difference are excluded from the 
order of signification (semantics), the hermeneutical choice of concentrating on 
the voice becomes a feminist move. 
As she had done in Relating Narratives, Cavarero identifies the prime 
place where uniqueness, relation and corporeality meet in "the phenomenology 
of the matemal scene". 116 CaVarero'S contention bears some affinity with the 
113 ibid., pp. 14,20. 
114 Thus, Cavarero employs the same technique of "conceptual theft" in order to re-appropriate 
and re-signify those vocal feminine figures such as Homer's Muse, the Sirens, the Opera Singer 
which have served the stereotypical association between woman and the voice on the one hand 
and man and thought on the other. 
'15Cavarero, A piý voci, op. cit., p- 19. 
116 ibid., p. 186. 
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thesis developed by Luisa Muraro in The Symbolic Order of the Mother. In the 
first months of life, and indeed even inside the womb, a mother teaches the child 
a "maternal tongue" (lingua materna). 1 17 The maternal scene is, first and 
foremost, a scene of resonance and repetition of sounds that are exchanged 
between mother and child, and which Cavarero designates as a "song", before the 
signification of that voice in language. ' 18 Cavarero stresses that, more than 
teaching us how to speak (Muraro), the mother teaches us how to communicate. 
She does not limit herself to responding with noises to the call of the child, but 
she also links voice to speech by telling stories, singing songs, and thus 
introducing the child to language. Contra Lacanian analysis, the mother does not 
stand in total opposition to a Father who severes the relationship to introduce his 
Paternal Law. Instead, she symbolises that link between voice and speech, "to 
which, as it were, metaphysics reacts in the name of the father"-' 19 Therefore, the 
mother does not speak with the child a language with which they signify reality 
in accordance with the common experience of it (Muraro). Instead, the mother 
reorients speech to its vocalic and musical nucleus of sounds, resonance and 
repetition. 
Nonetheless, a politics of the voice is not intended, by Cavarero, as a 
regression to the maternal scene. Like Muraro, Cavarero uses the maternal scene 
as a way to imagine a re-conceptualisation of the political. The question that 
Cavarero, implicitly addresses is thus the following - how would this politics of 
the voice, or rather of voices, be expressed? In other words, how can we rethink 
politics as a sort of musical ensemble of unique voices? Cavarero defines this 
politics in Arendtian terms. It is a space of appearances. The political is an "in- 
between" (inter-esse), a relational and public place of interaction where one can 
show her uniqueness to others who are equally unique. Cavarero defines it as 
117 ibid., p. 186 [translation P. Kottman, For More Than One Voice, p. 170]. 
118 Cavarero also draws on H616ne Cixous and Julia Kristeva's conceptual isation of the pre- 
symbolic language spoken with the mother. See in particular A piý voci, pp. 154-160 for a 
discussion of Cixous' concept of the "languelait", and of the "&ritureflminine " and pp. 146-155 
for Kriteva's notion of the maternal chora. These two concepts are developed, respectively in 
Cixous, "Sorties" in Catherine C16ment and H61&ne Cixous, La jeune nýe (Paris: UGE, 1975) 
[The Newly Born Woman (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986)], and in Kristeva, 
Revolution in Poetic Language (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). However, what 
Cavarero contests in Cixous and Kristeva's positioning of the maternal figure as the source of a 
vocal pre-symbolic language, is their over-reliance on a psychoanalytic model which thinks of 
the mother-child relation as one of fusion. Thus, the phenomenon of vocal uniqueness is once 
again ignored (A pitý voci, op. cit., p. 187). 
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"absolute locality" or a "locality without territories". 120 Its geography and 
temporality are therefore contingent, as "absolute locality" constantly arises and 
disappears anew. 121 It has the physicality of the gaze and the voice. Indeed, for 
Cavarero, concentrating on the voice has the philosophical advantage of thinking 
ontology in terms of uniqueness, relationality and corporeality. But it also has the 
political benefit of allowing the conceptualisation of politics in ten-ns of: 
a contextual relation, which is entrusted to speech and which 
does not appeal to a territory or to identity myths of conu-nunity. 
The protagonist of this politics is a speaker who, leaving aside 
his or her belonging to this or that group, this or that language, 
communicates him- or herself, first of all, as voice. ' 22 
Cavarero here returns to the notion of the "impolitical". The politics of the voice 
is "impolitical" because it is a different type of politics which stands against the 
traditional practice of politics. 
Two important questions nonetheless remain. Considering the irrelevance 
of the "what", and the deconstruction of any identity or "belonging" that the 
politics of "absolute locality" requires, is this new politics compatible with 
feminism? And if it is, is the politics of the voice reconcilable with entrustment 
or with the project of i1pensiero della differenza sessuale? When comparing the 
practice of storytelling to that of entrustment, I have already questioned the 
extent to which one could understand the former as afeminist strategy. Cavarero 
would probably answer that storytelling is not only a political strategy but a 
feminist strategy because it re-introduces what the existing symbolic order of 
representation (the order of the "what") has excluded, namely, uniqueness which 
is both corporeal and marked by sexual difference. One could build on this 
answer by observing that the uniqueness conferred upon us by birth is corporeal 
and marked by sexual difference where both corporeality and sexual difference 
"' Cavarero, A piý voci, op. cit., pp. 195-196 [trans. p. 180]. 
120 ibid., p. 222, "Politicising Theory", op. cit., p. 525. 
121 Cavarero, "Politicising Theory", op. cit., p. 525. 
122 Cavarero, A piii voci, op. cit. p. 227 [trans. p. 209]. 
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are not yet qualifiable, therefore not yet masculinized. 123 Cavarero's politics of 
uniqueness, although distinctive, is also reconcilable with il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale, since uniqueness shows up all the elements that are excluded 
in the existing symbolic order. 
Cavarero expresses this similarity explicitly in For More Than One Voice 
through a radical re-thinking of the relationship between speech and politics. By 
re-connecting speech to its vocal root, Cavarero thereby dismantles the binary 
oppositions set up between vocality and semantics, speech and thought, body and 
mind. She also challenges the allocation of the former terms to Woman and of 
the latter to Man. 124 It is not "Woman" who can be heard in the vocal part of 
speech but uniqueness, relationality, and corporeality - namely, all which is 
rejected by the existing symbolic order. The vocal part of speech thus contains an 
intrinsic anti-patriarchal value. 125 Consequently, to recognise and account for the 
vocal part of speech is not a feminist practice per se, but it necessarily leads to 
one. Feminism becomes the necessary result of Cavarero's politics. It is no 
longer the starting point. This has the incommensurable advantage of taking 
feminism beyond the equality versus difference debate, and carrying il pensiero 
out of the crippling accusation of essentialism. Cavarero's politics is ultimately a 
politics of the "who" which, albeit tacitly, serves the interests of feminism. 
Conclusion. 
Adriana Cavarero is a central political thinker of il pensiero della 
differenza sessuale. As this chapter has shown, she has been instrumental in 
developing the critique of the existing symbolic order first put forward by 
entrustment theorists in "More Women Than Men". Her early references to 
Arendt have conferred a certain originality to the critique that all pensiero 
123 The relationship between the body and the masculine norm is extensively analysed in one of 
Cavarero's work which has not featured extensively in this chapter. In Stately Bodies, Cavarero 
analyses the ambiguous treatment of the body in philosophy and literature. She shows that, on the 
one hand, the body is conceived of as dangerous and threatening to politics. The body which 
is 
cast away from the polis is usually a feminine body. On the other hand, the body reappears 
in the 
metaphor of the "body politic", but this time it is an adult, able and masculine body which 
is 
reintroduced, one which signifies rationality and order. 124 Cavarero, A piý voci, op. cit., pp. 224-225. 
125 ibid, p. 226. 
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thinkers embrace. However,, it is since Cavarero's split from Diotima that the full 
potential contained in her early writings has manifested itself In other words, it 
is in the last fifteen years that one is able to best grasp her contribution to theory 
of sexual difference in Italy. 
With the displacement from a politics of difference to one of uniqueness, 
Cavarero has managed to put forward a political strategy which is still feminist in 
its effects. This has required a few modifications to Arendt's political thought. 
Firstly, Cavarero has used the Arendtian categories of natality and plurality to 
stress corporeality and thus, indirectly, sexual difference. Secondly, besides 
thinking of natality as bringing on the new and unexpected, Cavarero has also re- 
conceptualised it as actual birth: it is the birth of a corporeal uniqueness, from a 
mother who is equally corporeal and unique. Thirdly, Cavarero has challenged 
the spatio-temporal limits of Arendt's category of action. 
Despite this feminist adaptation of Arendt, her stress on uniqueness rather 
than difference displaces feminism from being the cause to being the effect of 
her political strategy. Uniqueness indeed contains all that is "atopical" in the 
existing symbolic order. If one stresses uniqueness, one automatically stresses 
sexual difference which shows itself as one of the self s unique qualities. Sexual 
difference, visible and still unqualified at birth, can then be signified in multiple 
ways. This has the invaluable advantage to take Italian feminism away from the 
essentialist accusation and establishes its distance with the equality versus 
difference debate. 
Cavarero's political strategy also has had the benefit of contesting the strict 
and often artificial barriers that the equality v. difference debate has erected 
between Anglo-Saxon and Continental feminism. Cavarero has indeed restored 
the dialogue between Italian feminism and its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. As seen 
in the preceding chapters, this dialogue was fervent in the 1970s (at a time when 
both the practice of consciousness-raising and Adrienne Rich's writings erupted 
onto the Italian scene), but was virtually abandoned in the 1980s and 1990s 
(when members of il pensiero elaborated and consolidated their particular 
version of the theory of sexual difference). This does not mean that, in the 
process, Cavarero has lost the originality which has marked Italian feminism 
for 
more than three decades now. Indeed, she has not opted for a strategy of 
diversity, as many Anglo-American feminists have in recent years, but has rather 
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stressed the resources that the concepts of uniqueness, relationality and 
corporeality hold. 
For my particular concern, her thought also becomes useful in examining 
and re-assessing the value of entrustment for (Italian) feminism. As seen in this 
chapter, it is probably her antipathy to the Issue of power that lies at the heart of 
entrustment, which excludes such a practice from her consideration. For her, 
even without entrustment, Italian feminism retains its originality. It originates in 
the political practices of "the relationships between women" [la pratica delle 
relazioni tra donne] and of "starting from oneself' [la pratica del partire da sel, 
and the political stress on the figure of the mother, all of which date from the late 
1970s-beginning of the 1980s. 
However, I would argue, that rather than completely sidelining the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment, which has been central to the development of 
Italian feminism, it might be more useful to consider it as a part of what Cavarero 
describes, in In Spite of Plato, as that "mosaic" of feminist strategies. Although 
its weakness and dangers must be reckoned with, entrustment might help to put 
Cavarero's politics of uniqueness into effect. In other words, the politics of the 
"who" might sometimes need to use the strategy of the "what". If uniqueness is 
to be exhibited through acts and words, a work on the symbolic level might still 
be required to give women the possibility to speak. Entrustment could thus 
becomes that practical refusal of the monstrous subject of representation, and the 
setting up of an alternative where, thanks to a relationship, women (but not only 
women) would be able to speak and act in society thus expressing and exhibiting 
their uniqueness as corporeal beings. 
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Concluding Remarks: 
The Essential Difference of Italian feminism 
This thesis opened by referring to Teresa de Lauretis' efforts to familiarise 
Anglophone feminism with the Italian theory of sexual difference. By way of 
conclusion, I wish to return to one of her observations. In "The Essence of the 
Triangle", de Lauretis remarks: 
The essential difference of feminism lies in its historical 
specificity - the particular conditions of its emergence and 
development, which have shaped its object and field of analysis, 
its assumptions and forms of address; the constraints that have 
attended its conceptual and methodological struggles; the erotic 
component of its political self-awareness; the absolute novelty 
of its radical challenge to social life itself' 
This thesis has not so much described the essential difference of feminism. It has 
rather focussed on the essential difference of Italian feminism. It has confronted 
the "difficult negotiation [... ] between recognising the specificity of different 
women9s struggles and locating points of identity or synthesis that sustain a 
recognisably feminist process. ,2 The first three chapters have attempted to 
delineate the historical specificity of Italian feminism, by situating it in relation 
to the more familiar Anglo-American and French contexts. Together, these 
chapters have focussed on what Bono and Kemp have called the "interculturality 
and intertextuality"O of Italian feminism. Chapter I has partly concentrated on 
imports made from the Anglophone context - mainly, the practice of 
consciousness-rai sing and the thought of Adrienne Rich - whilst Chapter 11 has 
1 Teresa de Lauretis, "The Essence of the Triangle or, Taking the Risk of Essentialism Seriously: 
Feminist Theory in Italy, the U. S. and Britain" in Differences I (Summer 1989): 4. 
2 Diana Coole, "Threads and Plaits or an Unfinished Project: Femlmsm(s) Through the Twentieth 
Century" in Michael Freeden (ed. ), Reassessing Political Ideologies: the Durability ofDissent 
(London and New York: Routledge, 200 1), p. 15 8. 
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started to trace the enon-nous influence that the feminist group "Psych & Po" 
and, above all, Luce Irigaray have had on the development of Itallan femimsm 
towards a specific theory and practice of sexual difference. 
The "essential difference" of contemporary Italian feminism has formed 
the focus of the rest of this study. In order to locate and analyse the essential 
difference of contemporary Italian feminism, I have focused on the social- 
symbolic practice of entrustment. While Chapter III has analysed the Italian 
intellectual and historical foundations of entrustment, Chapter IV has 
specifically concentrated on the contemporary character of Italian feminism. The 
social-symbolic practice of entrustment, formulated in 1983, has been a unique 
way of practising sexual difference. It is by no means a practice which has been 
unanimously embraced, as Chapter V has made clear. However, it has helped 
polarise the feminist debate in Italy and has also directly contributed to the 
subsequent diffusion of the theory of sexual difference amongst a majority of 
feminist groups. These groups have responded to il pensiero's critique of the 
monosexual social-symbolic order, as well as to its call to sexualise social 
relationships by creating a female symbolic centred on the figure of the mother. 
Despite the cautions I have expressed in Chapter V, entrustment remains 
an exemplary way for a topical engagement of women with society. As the 
Libreria delle Donne di Milano point out, the search for a symbolic reference 
and the practice of relationships between women are very ancient practices. 
4 
These mediating relationships have often taken the form of friendships because 
"there are no other social forms in which a woman can satisfy her need for self- 
verification through a fellow-creature. ,5 The novelty brought by entrustment has 
been to transform these relationships between women into the content of a 
political project, that of signifying sexual difference within a monosexual social- 
symbolic order. This has provided a platfon-n for the public discussion of sexual 
difference outside the sole feminists groups as Chapter V has emphasised. It has 
also supplied contemporary Italian feminism with a practical frame in which to 
subsequently theorise the maternal symbolic order. 
3 Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp, "Introduction: Coming from the South" in Bono and Kemp 
(eds. ), Italian Feminist Thought: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 12. 
4 The Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: a Theory ofSocial-Symbolic 
Practice (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 27. 
5 ibid., p. 30. 
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In its attempt to study "contemporary Italian feminism", my thesis has run 
the risk of presenting Italian feminist theory and practice as a unified form with 
a single identity. I hope that Chapters III and V have partly countered this 
tendency by exhibiting a picture of Italian feminism as a context in which lively 
and diverse feminist debates are a common and welcomed practice. Chapter V 
has also endeavoured to glean an engaged critique of entrustment and of il 
pensiero della differenza sessuale from the internal debates current in Italian 
feminism. While I have supported the cautious attention that one must pay to 
disparity and its possible degeneration into abusive power, I sought to recover 
both entrustment and il pensiero from different accusations of essentialism 
which have obstructed the dialogue between Italian feminists and their 
Anglophone counterparts. Chapter VI concluded the thesis by examining 
Adriana Cavarero as a feminist thinker who has been, at the same time, a fierce 
critic of entrustment and a major exponent of il pensiero della differenza 
sessuale. I have argued that her Arendtian stress on uniqueness has reserved to 
Cavarero a unique place amongst contemporary Italian feminists. 
These last two chapters have aimed at conveying, one might say, the 
differences within the essential difference of Italian feminism. They have 
centred on more recent developments and debates in the theory of sexual 
difference,, while stressing the factors which remain distinctively Italian. I have 
hence argued that entrustment is best considered as a part of a plural but 
common strategy of practising relationships between women. Sexual difference 
now becomes the political practice of restructuring the order of representation so 
that feminine specificity can be included. 
Finally, this thesis has been an attempt to add the Italian perspective to the 
past and current debates about the essential difference of feminism. In this way, I 
have tried to counter the inherent imperialist tendencies of feminist theory, 
discussed in the Introduction. In an article regarding the failure of the traditional 
vocabulary of political theory (which is founded on the territorial sovereignty of 
nation-states) to account for "globalisation", Adriana Cavarero remarks that one 
of the ways in which the force of the "global" has been countered is through a 
stress of the "local". Thus, Cavarero writes that "the globalization of the market 
and technologies sees a resurrection of identity localism that in turn gives 
rise "to a narrative that is, essentially, anti-State, or rather, antimodem, 
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performing islands that aspire to assert themselves exclusively and thus to fight 
one another,. 6 Whilst conscious of the limitations of this image, I nonetheless 
wish to draw a comparison between this phenomenon and the presentation of 
feminist theory. A central objective of my thesis has been to counter feminism's 
imperialistic tendencies without asserting contemporary Italian feminism as a 
sort of island which resists and opposes the invasion of its Anglophone and 
French counterparts. Indeed, I think that a much more efficacious way of 
stressing the essential difference of feminism while allowing for multiple ways 
of expressing this difference is to theorise feminism as a shifting space of 
plurality and relationality - in the terms used by in Cavarero's article, this would 
mean to understand feminism as "a locality without territories"7 . One current of 
feminism (here, il pensiero della differenza sessuale) would hence define itself 
against, but also in relation to, other strands of feminism (here, the Anglophone 
and the French). In this regard, Cavarero's move to restore the dialogue between 
Italian and Anglo-Saxon feminist theories should be welcomed. To borrow 
Cavarero's imagery (drawn upon in Chapter VI), presenting the essential 
difference of feminism would be like constructing a "mosaic", where each piece 
of this overall image would be made by different shades of the same colour. 
6 Adriana Cavarero, "Politicizing Theory" in Political Theory, 30.4 
(2002): 525. 
7 ibid., p. 525. 
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